All what you say means is that we experience the beer when we drink it— enjoy it or dislike it or remain indifferent to it, and machines don't have any of these reactions as far as we can tell.

Despite what some Westerners like to believe, Buddhism is not a philosophy and is not intended to be discussed at philosophy forums, in the manner of Western secular academia. — baker

Says you, who just this minute has pasted an entire paragraph from the Pali texts into another thread.

I don’t see any ‘bad blood’. Hostile reactions are only to be expected when people’s instinctive sense of reality is called into question. I know mine is a minority position but that in itself gives me no concern.

Yes, that's what I mean. That's why it's not redundant. My experience of it is something extra. Something on top of just drinking it.

Hostile reactions are only to be expected when people’s instinctive sense of reality is called into question. — Wayfarer

I haven't seen any hostile reactions. I've seen some impatient and frustrated ones.

Yes, that's what I mean. That's why it's not redundant. My experience of it is something extra. Something on top of just drinking it. — Patterner

You can think of it like that, but really your experience of it is nothing over and above your drinking of it, except as an (unnecessary) idea.

You can think of it like that, but really your experience of it is nothing over and above your drinking of it, except as an (unnecessary) idea. — Janus

Necessary or not, it is a feeling about drinking it that the machine or very distracted person does not have. Isn't that the point? How can something I have that they do not be a redundant feature? It seems to me this is what consciousness is all about. Would you give it up?

Necessary or not, it is a feeling about drinking it that the machine or very distracted person does not have. Isn't that the point? How can something I have that they do not be a redundant feature? It seems to me this is what consciousness is all about. Would you give it up? — Patterner

Sure we enjoy drinking the beer or whatever, sometimes more sometimes less consciously. Drinking the beer may initiate feelings in the body that we can be more or less aware of. I don't see any reason to think machines have such experiences. The redundant feature is that these feelings are reified as a kind of entity we call qualia, which are over and above the drinking of the beer or whatever.

How do you justify a preference for parsimony? Does it allow you to summarily eliminate the entities you don't like? — Gnomon

Everyone has a preference for parsimony, until it's their turn to put something on the chopping block.

Perhaps the most parsimonious way to eliminate Qualia is suicide. — Gnomon

I'm starting to suspect you're not taking me entirely seriously.

I think 'qualia' in its subjective sense as opposed to its 'sense data' sense is a kind of reification, and maybe the latter is too. — Janus

I always thought that was the whole point, if qualia does not refer to something with its own ontology above and beyond the physical process of an experience there's really no use to the word at all.

I think 'qualia' in its subjective sense as opposed to its 'sense data' sense is a kind of reification, and maybe the latter is too.
— Janus

I always thought that was the whole point, if qualia does not refer to something with its own ontology above and beyond the physical process of an experience there's really no use to the word at all. — goremand

This is my point. It is something with its own ontology above and beyond the physical process of an experience. It is our experience of hearing an A major chord, whereas a machine only detects vibrations of 440, 553.365, and 659.255 Hz.


, I'm not sure I understand what you think is redundant. I don't mean that in a smartass way. I mean I'm not sure what you're saying.

I think 'qualia' in its subjective sense as opposed to its 'sense data' sense is a kind of reification, and maybe the latter is too.
— Janus

I always thought that was the whole point, if qualia does not refer to something with its own ontology above and beyond the physical process of an experience there's really no use to the word at all. — goremand

This is my point. It is something with its own ontology above and beyond the physical process of an experience. It is our experience of hearing an A major chord, whereas a machine only detects vibrations of 440, 553.365, and 659.255 Hz.

↪Janus
, I'm not sure I understand what you think is redundant. I don't mean that in a smartass way. I mean I'm not sure what you're saying. — Patterner

I guess what they are saying is that ideas are redundant in a material world. Only the senses of vision, hearing, touch & smell are important for Materialists. Even a blind mindless mole can find a worm without imagining it.

What you experience subjectively in the Cartesian Theatre is immaterial, hence not useful (i.e. redundant). What they are implying is that you are mistaking your abstract mental feeling for a concrete material object. But I'm sure that's not how you feel about it. What is a Philosophy Forum for, it not for sharing subjective Ideas & Feelings encapsulated in artificial words? Do they have a mechanism for sharing Sense Data over the internet?

Since they view Qualia as non-existent, or even superfluous, I assume they don't have any use for the redness or the sweetness of a rose, as long as they can see & smell it. Those qualitative words (and their associated ideas) in our common languages are redundant in a physics lab. All they need is the data. So, when you insist that the rose smells sweet, it's as-if you are reifying an idea. But, really all you are doing is experiencing the sensation.

The bottom line here is that you are speaking a different language (Empirical vs Experiential) from the Materialists. But apparently your attempts at translation have fallen on deaf ears. :wink:


"Yes, "qualia" is a philosophical idea that refers to the subjective, qualitative aspects of conscious experience"

"Reifying an idea is the act of treating an abstract concept as if it were a concrete thing".
___Google AI overview

Discussion of qualia and the nature and significance of subjectivity are subjects for the numerous threads on David Chalmers and the 'hard problem'.

, if is right about what you mean, would 'superfluous' be a good word? I'm thinking it's redundant to say I am fast, quick, and speedy. But you're saying there's a different thing going on, but it doesn't actually do anything, and nothing would be different if it didn't exist?

Discussion of qualia and the nature and significance of subjectivity are subjects for the numerous threads on David Chalmers and the 'hard problem'. — Wayfarer

Indeed. And I'm sure there will be numerous more threads about it.

↪Janus
, I'm not sure I understand what you think is redundant. I don't mean that in a smartass way. I mean I'm not sure what you're saying. — Patterner

After I wrote the post above, I read this statement in a National Geographic magazine article about Artificial Intelligence. Under the title : Do we have to accept that machines are fallible?, it says "That's a big issue facing AI right now --- these evolving algorithms can hallucinate, a term for what happens when a learning model produces a statement that sounds plausible but has been made up. This is because generative AI applications . . . work functionally as a prediction program".

Most definitions of AI "hallucinations" describe it as "false" data. But if you think of it as "anticipation", it could be useful information for entities that encounter rapid change, as in modern human cultures. The human brain seems to have adapted to deal with complex social networks, in which the ability to anticipate behaviors, or to read other minds would be beneficial.

I suspect that is critical of a crucial function of General Intelligence : that it goes beyond the facts, the raw data, to infer something that is not-yet-real ; maybe even ideal. An imaginary inference exists only as an immaterial idea. Even though it is embodied in a machine or brain, the idea (prediction ; conjecture) is not meaningful or useful except for another predictive intelligence. For a digital computer, not-yet-real data is erroneous information. For AI and human Intelligence, that data may be useful for anticipating future or possible situations. Yes, human brains are fallible, but they are also surprisingly adaptable to evolving realities. :smile:

I haven't spoken with ChatGPT in more than a year. But back then, it was making mistakes. I pointed out factual errors occasionally, and it apologized, saying I was correct. It never gave me an answer as to how it made such an obvious error. It has all the information instantly available, but gives the wrong answer?

This is my point. It is something with its own ontology above and beyond the physical process of an experience. — Patterner

I'm not sure I understand what you think is redundant. I don't mean that in a smartass way. I mean I'm not sure what you're saying. — Patterner

An ontology is something we posit. If something is real in the physical sense it has effects on and relations with other physical things. What effects do you think our (purported) experience of qualia has over and above the effects of the neuronal and bodily processes which seem almost unquestionably to give rise to it?

I'm not saying that our feelings and creative imagination have no value but that there seems no substantive reason to believe they are not real, physical, neuronal, endocrinal and bodily processes. That from a linguistically mediated "perspective" (which is really just another neuronal process) it doesn't seem that way would seem to be just a quirk of language.

I don't deny that for us the most important things are the emotions and the creative imagination. They enrich life. I see no reason to think of them in some unknowable sense as "non-physical" as if that would somehow impart greater value to them. I think it is only a concern with something transcendent which is imagined to come after this life that leads people to be concerned about a purported disvalue inherent in the thinking that takes things to be just material/ physical. If you don't have that need for the transcendent then what difference does it make if you think things are all physical or functions of the physical?

All that said, I don't think it really makes any difference if people want to have faith in something transcendent if that is what they need and as long as that thinking doesn't negatively impact significant issues in this life on account of them being thought to be of lesser importance.

Ultimately, it's a personal matter and I don't think it really has much place in useful philosophical discussion because it just comes down to personal preference. And yet it seems to be one of the issues that fire people up the most. Could be something to do with the religious conditioning of our thinking which I think we are all subject to even when our upbringings are secular. It still permeates the culture, and it would be interesting to see how things differ if and when religion completely loses its hold. I don't think that day is too far away, but I probably won't see it in my lifetime.

The bottom line for me is that the belief that the world is created by the mind is religiously motivated in a mostly unacknowledged way.

I haven't spoken with ChatGPT in more than a year. But back then, it was making mistakes. I pointed out factual errors occasionally, and it apologized, saying I was correc — Patterner

Ditto. It seems to confabulate.

What effects do you think our (purported) experience of qualia has over and above the effects of the neuronal and bodily processes which seem almost unquestionably to give rise to it? — Janus

I could say something to you right now which would raise your blood pressue and affect your adrenal glands. And in so doing, nothing physical would have passed between us.

I could say something to you right now which would raise your blood pressue and affect your adrenal glands. And in so doing, nothing physical would have passed between us. — Wayfarer

That's just not true. If you are talking about what you write on the computer, then I would be looking at shapes (letters, words and sentences) on a screen which means the light from the screen enters my eyes and stimulates rods and cones, causing nerve impulses which travel to the brain and cause neuronal activity which in turn may or may not raise my blood pressure and affect my adrenal glands.

But, as you well know, that would be described as an intentional activity, revolving entirely around interpretation of meaning, and how that would affect you. As I'm sure you are doing now, as you already said earlier in the thread that you experience 'frustration and impatience' in some of the discussions. They too are not physical states, although they have physical correlates. None of what you're describing can be reduced to, or explained in terms of, physics or physical mechanisms. It would require analysis in terms of linguistics, semiotics, and psychosomatic medicine. The letters and binary code may be physical, but their meaning is not, nor their effects.

I haven't spoken with ChatGPT in more than a year. — Patterner

Well, just for a lark, I asked ChatGPT about whether it is possible to detect the physical correlates of emotional states, such as anxiety, and whether it might be possible to devise an AI system which could derive such results all by itself, both of which questions it answered in the affirmative. (You can review the interaction here.)

(Bolds added. Moderator: I am cognizant of the prohibition against using ChatGPT to generate posts, but here the point is rhetorical and the usage openly acknowledged.) — Wayfarer

You've made two responses in a single post, the top seems to be your original work and the bottom is entirely chatGPT. I believe this is against the spirit of the prohibition while satisfying its letter.

That's why I deliberately called it out. We're having a debate about whether 'qualia' are real or not. Janus is saying that they are not, they make no difference or have no significance. So I put the 'thought-experiment' to ChatGPT because by definition, an AI system lack qualia or subjectivity. The excerpt I quoted was illustrative of that point. I thought that would be regarded as fair use in the context.

Anyway - the point is made, I'll remove the text and refer to the link.

But, as you well know, that would be described as an intentional activity, revolving entirely around interpretation of meaning, and how that would affect you. As I'm sure you are doing now, as you already said earlier in the thread that you experience 'frustration and impatience' in some of the discussions. They too are not physical states, although they have physical correlates. None of what you're describing can be reduced to, or explained in terms of, physics or physical mechanisms. It would require analysis in terms of linguistics, semiotics, and psychosomatic medicine. The letters and binary code may be physical, but their meaning is not, nor their effects. — Wayfarer

I'm afraid I still disagree. Intentional activities, interpretations and affects can all be understood to be neuronal processes. Of course we don't interpret things in terms of neuronal processes, that would be to commit a category error, but it doesn't follow that interpreting is not a neuronal process. Same for impatience and frustration. You say they are not physical states, but I believe they are neuronal, endocrinally mediated states. although I would use 'process' instead of 'state'.

I believe it is reasonable to think that meaning is understood because of activation of pre-established neuronal networks in the brain. An example would be learning a language. Learning a language sets up neural networks, which are activated when reading or hearing someone speak the learned language. If one has not learned a language at all no understanding is possible.

I'm afraid I still disagree. Intentional activities, interpretations and affects can all be understood to be neuronal processes — Janus

Well, as you never tire of telling me, people tend to believe what suits them. And just because something can be described as 'neurological' doesn't mean that it's wholly physical, unless you're into neural reductionism, which you may well be.

Well, as you never tire of telling me, people tend to believe what suits them. — Wayfarer

I have no emotional investment in believing what I believe. It is simply what I have come to think most plausible. And for the record I say that people generally believe what they think is most plausible. That said, some people are more affected by what they want to believe than others are—I think there is little reason to doubt that.

What effects do you think our (purported) experience of qualia... — Janus

You don't merely think our experience of qualia is redundant? You question that we have these experiences? You don't experience redmess, an additional experience to what an electric eye detects? You don't experience sweetness, an additional experience to what ... uh ... an electric tongue detects?

All that said, I don't think it really makes any difference if people want to have faith in something transcendent if that is what they need and as long as that thinking doesn't negatively impact significant issues in this life on account of them being thought to be of lesser importance. — Janus

I thought I was following you, even if disagreeing, until this paragraph. What impact does that thinking have over and above the effects of the neuronal and bodily processes which seem almost unquestionably to give rise to it? If that's all there is, then how can it have any impact? I see you responding to Wayfarer, saying his (his?) ability to say something to you which would raise your blood pressue and affect your adrenal glands amounts to physical interactions. What if he does, indeed, raise your BP, affect your adrenal glands, and whatever other things. In that state, you might, say, react violently when someone you love does or says something you don't like a few minutes later? Is it not just the physical interactions taking place, having nothing to do with your experience of the sum of all those interactions? What does "as long as" mean in this context?

I have no emotional investment in believing what I believe. — Janus

Right, and furthermore, as you also often say, it doesn’t matter anyway.

You question that we have these experiences? — Patterner

I don't question the idea that we experience things.

In response to your question about people being emotionally affected by things that are said to them or by things they believe; I don't deny any of that—I just think it is all physical processes. So, I'm not understanding your puzzlement. I'm not totally wedded to believing that it is all physical processes, that just seems to me the more plausible option. I don't believe there is any determinable fact of the matter about all this.

Right, and furthermore, as you also often say, it doesn’t matter anyway. — Wayfarer

I don't see the point of this comment. Is it meant to be some kind of criticism? When I say it doesn't matter what I believe I mean that I cannot help being convinced by what I am convinced by, and I also believe that is the case with all of us. We don't choose to find most plausible what we do find most plausible, we just find it most plausible. Although maybe some people are more motivated by what they want to be true than by concerns about plausibility—I don't deny that..

Different people may be more or less free of confirmation bias, but it doesn't follow that they have any choice in the matter of whether or not they are affected by it. People don't always understand their own motivations. I don't deny the possibility that I don't understand my own motivations. I am always willing to change my mind, which I have done a few times in the years since I've been participating in philosophy forums, as well as prior to that, ever since I began thinking about these things and reading philosophy. I wonder if you have ever changed your mind. I've seen no evidence of it.

‘Materialism is the philosophy of the subject who forgets himself’~ Arthur Schopenhauer

I'm a materialist and I haven't forgotten myself—I just think of myself as material because I cannot find any immaterial modality of being in myself.

Do you believe that all materialists have forgotten themselves just because Schopenhauer said so?

I don't believe there is any determinable fact of the matter about all this. — Janus

Surely not. We wouldn't have all these threads about the same thing for years and decades of it was any. :grin:

In response to your question about people being emotionally affected by things that are said to them or by things they believe; I don't deny any of that—I just think it is all physical processes. So, I'm not understanding your puzzlement. — Janus

Aren't you saying the equivalent of, "I don't think comets make any difference, as long as they don't crash into us and negatively impact significant issues"? If we are just the sum of uncountable physical events, then no feelings or beliefs that result from that sum make us any more able to not negatively impact anything than a comet is. Some of us will end up with the feelings and beliefs that don't negatively impact things. But those that end up with the negatively impacting feelings and beliefs are just comets caught in the gravity well. No?