So what's it all about? What sorts of things should we think are more or less real than other things? — Srap Tasmaner

I'll note that I'm inclined to not grant degrees to reality, so I suppose I fit the mold.

But in trying to think of ways to make sense of it....

When I dream of something that's happened before while the dream is real it makes sense to me to say that it's less real than the event I experienced. And the memory of the event could likewise be thought of as less real.

But then, just to head off notions of minds being less real, in this same way I'd say that the answer to a complicated mathematical expression that I'm seeking is more real than my belief when I've made a mistake -- so there could be something to be said for Universals being more real than my opinion, too.

Splendid idea!

The source of the quote is 17th Century Theories of Substance in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

I assume I get to be a substance in some sense, that I am not less real than my mother was because my existence is dependent on her having existed. — Srap Tasmaner

Substance

My understanding is that the term 'substance' in philosophy can be quite problematical. The above article starts with:

In contemporary, everyday language, the word “substance” tends to be a generic term used to refer to various kinds of material stuff (“We need to clean this sticky substance off the floor”) or as an adjective referring to something’s mass, size, or importance (“That is a substantial bookcase”). In 17th century philosophical discussion, however, this term’s meaning is only tangentially related to our everyday use of the term. For 17th century philosophers, the term is reserved for the ultimate constituents of reality on which everything else depends. This article discusses the most important theories of substance from the 17th century: those of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Although these philosophers were highly original thinkers, they shared a basic conception of substance inherited from the scholastic-Aristotelian tradition from which philosophical thinking was emerging.

So, the history of that term, in brief, is that 'substantia' was used to translate Aristotle's 'ousia', from the Greek verb 'to be'. There are entries in SEP and IEP about the term under various headings (for example The Meaning of Being in Plato.)

In the Wikipedia entry on ouisia, I note that 'Heidegger said that the original meaning of the word 'ousia' was lost in its translation to the Latin, and, subsequently, in its translation to modern languages. For him, ousia means Being, not substance, that is, not some thing or some being that "stood" (-stance) "under" (sub-).'

Note for illustrative purposes, that if one simply substituted 'subject' for 'substance' in relation to, say, Spinoza's philosophy, that it carries a very different connotation: "the world comprises a single subject' has a very different sense to 'the world comprises a single substance'. It's not entirely accurate, of course, but it reflects Heidegger's point, which is that substances are somehow, 'beings', not objectively-existent things or kinds of stuff.

Which, in turn, has considerable significance for consideration of the sense in which 'substances' (or is that 'subjects'?) can be understood as constitutive elements of reality. I think, for us, it is almost unavoidable to conceive of such purported constituents as being objectively real in the same sense as the putative objects of physics, but in pre-modern philosophy the meaning is much nearer to 'soul' or psyche.

Hierarchical ontology

In any case, as mentioned, this idea of 'substance as being' is related to the archaic idea of the 'great chain of Being'. The Great Chain of Being is a hierarchical framework originating in classical and medieval thought that envisions the universe as a structured, interconnected whole - the literal meaning of Cosmos - with all beings and entities ranked according to their degree of perfection or closeness to the Divine Intellect. At the top is God, the ultimate source of all existence, followed by angels, humans, animals, plants, and inanimate matter, each occupying a specific place in the cosmic order. This concept, influenced by Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy and later integrated into Christian theology, reflects a worldview in which every entity has a purpose and position within a divinely ordained system. The chain emphasizes continuity and gradation, with no gaps between levels, symbolizing unity and harmony in creation. This is exhaustively described in Alexander Koyré's writings, particularly From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe.

I'm in no way suggesting any kind of 'return' to that pre-modern conception, but I think it's important background in understanding the radical difference that came about through the scientific revolution.

Why I brought it up in the first place, is because the role of there being 'degrees of reality' as providing a qualitative axis, an axis against which terms such as 'higher knowledge' is meaningful. I fully understand this triggers a lot of pushback, as I think it's probably quite inimical to liberalism in some respects (hence the frequent association of traditionalism in philosophy with reactionary politics.) But again, something to reflect on.

Now, having opened this exceedingly large can of worms, I'm going to be scarce for a couple of days, due to familial obligations. But I hope that provides grist to the mill.

I'll go one step further. A deeper question is whether the spectrum of reality is continuous. As Einstein inferred, the moon exists - and our imaginations exist. What is in between?

Why I brought it up in the first place, is because the role of there being 'degrees of reality' as providing a qualitative axis, an axis against which terms such as 'higher knowledge' is meaningful. I fully understand this triggers a lot of pushback, as I think it's probably quite inimical to liberalism in some respects — Wayfarer

I wonder which respects. I'm assuming you mean "liberalism" as a political philosophy, not the conventional, rather crude binary of liberal vs. conservative. I'm trying to picture what John Rawls might object to about a "qualitative axis" . . . The point of classical liberalism is that we allow, politically, for differences of opinion about this; we don't say that no opinion is or can be correct.

Now, having opened this exceedingly large can of worms, I'm going to be scarce for a couple of days, due to familial obligations. But I hope that provides grist to the mill. — Wayfarer

Your worms are good grist! (Mixed Metaphor of the Week Award goes to Wayfarer . . . :wink: )

It's very difficult for me to imagine what it might mean to have a degree of reality, in contrast to an existent which has a property of a given intensity. Like a remarkably red apple makes red "exist more" because its red is remarkable. But that's about the redness, not about the apple.

Degrees also seem like a quantitative concept - as if one thing can exist more than another, or exist harder in a given way. As opposed to a qualitative one - like an idea might exist in a different sense to a cup. The former corresponds to changes in degree of reality within a type, the latter corresponds to differences type. Compare heights and masses, two different quantitative axes, differences of degree. Ideality and materiality, two different seemingly binary properties, differences in kind.

What can you accomplish with different degrees of reality that you can't accomplish with a predicate with an intensity eg "Sally is 1m tall", or alternatively a standard predicate label, say "Sally is tall"? Open question.

The point of classical liberalism is that we allow, politically, for differences of opinion about this; we don't say that no opinion is or can be correct. — J

Not that aspect, more that the individual as the arbiter of value, and that all individuals are equal in principle. Within an heirarchical ontology, there are also degrees of understanding, where individuals might have greater or lesser insight. I had a rather terse exchange about that in your other thread from which this one was spawned (here). That said, I hasten to add that I support the aspect of liberalism as the ability to accomodate a diversity of opinions, but not necessarily that it means that every opinion is equal, just because someone holds it.

I'm also bearing in mind that many of the advocates of the perennial philosophy and 'traditionalism' (René Guenon and others of that ilk) were often associated with reactionary politics (Julius Evola being a prime example.) Mark Sedgewick's book on them is called Against All Modernity.

I think there must be an inevitable degree of friction, if not conflict.

It's very difficult for me to imagine what it might mean to have a degree of reality, in contrast to an existent which has a property of a given intensity. — fdrake

Say as a crude example, that a delusional subject has an inadequate grip on reality. There are of course degrees, ranging from severe mental illness through to narcissistic personality disorder, for instance. I think in classical philosophy, there is at an least implicit principle that the philosopher is less subject to delusion than the untrained mind - the hoi polloi, if you like. They are more highly realised, they have a superior grip on reality.

In the quote you provide, what are the modes referred to? — Srap Tasmaner

From @Wayfarer's source:

For the philosophers we will discuss, at the very deepest level the universe contains only two kinds or categories of entity: substances and modes. Generally speaking, modes are ways that things are; thus shape (for example, being a rectangle), color (for example, redness), and size (for example, length) are paradigm modes. As a way a thing is, a mode stands in a special relationship with that of which it is a way. Following a tradition reaching back to Aristotle’s Categories, modes are said to exist in, or inhere in, a subject. Similarly, a subject is said to have or bear modes. Thus we might say that a door is the subject in which the mode of rectangularity inheres. One mode might exist in another mode (a color might have a particular hue, for example), but ultimately all modes exist in something which is not itself a mode, that is, in a substance. A substance, then, is an ultimate subject. — 17th Century Theories of Substance | IEP

not necessarily that it means that every opinion is equal, just because someone holds it. — Wayfarer

God, no. We tolerate every species of fool in my country; dunno about yours. But tolerate them we do, because freedom of speech is a rights-based equality, available to all.

Thanks. (I was at work when I asked, so not chasing links.)

It sounds so very much like subject & predicate, the small, boring result of a long and tangled history, I'm sure.

There is a sort of example that comes to mind that only fits this paradigm in a particular way.

Say I have three pretty straight sticks, and I arrange them to make a pretty good triangle on the ground. Does the triangle exist? Surely. Does it exist in the same way the sticks do? ― Apparently not. The sticks can be arranged in other ways, and remain relatively invariant throughout the process of arranging them, but the triangle ― well, the triangle only exists just so. It is apparently somewhat more ephemeral than the sticks.

One other point about this "arrangement of things" sort of example: no matter how they are arranged, not one of the sticks can bear the predicate "triangular". You might say that a given stick "becomes" an edge, or an edge of a triangle, something like that, and that's interesting. (What happens to the edges when you pick up the sticks?) But to get something that "is a triangle" you have to first take the collection of sticks altogether; you have to grant that "these three sticks" is the sort of thing that can take predicates like "make up a triangle". And what kind of reality does "these three sticks" have?

So shall we say that the collection of sticks and the triangle made from them have less reality than the individual sticks do? I could see it. It's hard for me to see why I'd want to say it, rather than make the specific spatial and temporal distinctions I can make, but there's something to it.

Anyway, none of this is about modes or predicates and what sort of existence they might have. Collections and arrangements have a different shadowy sort of existence. But they're all clearly related too.

When I dream of something — Moliere

(There's a thread over there about non-existent objects, but I haven't looked at it. ― No, there's two of them.)

Sometimes workbooks for children have a kind of puzzle in them, where you're given a little group of pictures and are told to put them in order to make a story. They often rely on thermodynamics ― you're supposed to know that broken pieces of a vase don't rise from the ground (defying gravity as well) and assemble themselves into a vase on the table.

Let's call the world where that sort of thing doesn't happen "the real world." If you tend to tell yourself and others stories where that sort of thing does happen, then I'd be tempted to say your world is "less real" than mine. And insofar as people's beliefs are real, or at least a useful way of categorizing their behavior, and insofar as their behavior has consequences in the real world, I'd be tempted to say that people are capable of increasing or decreasing the reality of situations they are involved in. (It's like the response to "facts are theory-laden": let's make sure our theories are fact-laden.)

If we start with social groups and their behavior ― instead of starting with epistemology or cognitive science, and whatever conclusions we draw from that ― why shouldn't we make good use of words like "realistic" and "unrealistic"? Some people bring more reality to our discussions and our decisions; some people sap reality from our deliberations, lead us step by step into a fantasy world that is just less real, even though the actions we take in our fantasy world ― taking a stand against the baddies ― may have counterparts in the real world, like locking up real Japanese-Americans.

I also have in mind the sort of thing you can see in Peter Jackson's film Heavenly Creatures, where the characters begin to slip back and forth between the real world and their own fantasy world. We all do a bit of this, and it seems quite natural to put how much we do it on a scale. Mistaking a windmill on the horizon for a grain elevator is one thing; mistaking it for a dragon is another. At least grain elevators are real, and windmills and grain elevators are both members of "rural towers". But dragons ...

I can make no sense at all of "degrees of reality". Reality is not something that can be measured, the idea 'real' is the binary opposition to 'iimaginary' or 'artificial'. Something cannot be partly real and partly imaginary or artificial in its wholeness.

God, no. We tolerate every species of fool in my country; dunno about yours. But tolerate them we do, because freedom of speech is a rights-based equality, available to all. — J

Right, and outside of particular contexts there are no degrees of knowledge. One can be a better physicist or mathematician than another, but there is no measure to determine purportedly different degrees of "insight into reality itself', as opposed to insight into or knowledge of real things.

We tolerate every species of fool in my country; dunno about yours. — J

Oh, we have plenty.

Say I have three pretty straight sticks, and I arrange them to make a pretty good triangle on the ground. Does the triangle exist? Surely. Does it exist in the same way the sticks do? ― Apparently not. — Srap Tasmaner

And therein lies a considerable proportion of semiotics, among other things.

:up:

Really no idea, at this point, why this OP got started.

Say as a crude example, that a delusional subject has an inadequate grip on reality. There are of course degrees, ranging from severe mental illness through to narcissistic personality disorder, for instance. I think in classical philosophy, there is at an least implicit principle that the philosopher is less subject to delusion than the untrained mind - the hoi polloi, if you like. They are more highly realised, they have a superior grip on reality. — Wayfarer

A deluded person's grip on reality is a property of them, not of the delusions. It would be the delusions that would need to admit of degrees of reality, rather than the degree of delusion of the subject. Paradigmatically though, delusions are that which are not real and we staunchly believe despite evidence.

IE that's an example of a predicate with an intensity parameter - a person's degree of grip on reality. And it's also not a degree of reality of what that person grasps.

Yes, I suppose that is a poor example. I suppose what I was driving at, is the various degrees of the grasp of reality, not degrees of reality per se.

I think a better one is more traditionally Aristotelian. Going back to the hierarchical ontology, E F Schumacher presents a version of that in his Guide for the Perpexed (1977). Schumacher articulates a version of traditional ontology where each level includes but transcends the attributes of the one preceeding.

"Mineral" = m (mineral - acted upon but inactive)
"Plant" = m + x (vegetative - organic but insentient)
"Animal" = m + x + y (organic, motile and sentient)
"Human" = m + x + y + z (organic, motile, sentient and rational)

These factors (x, y and z) represent ontological discontinuities. Schumacher argues that the differences can be likened to differences in dimension, and that humans manifest a higher degree of reality insofar as they uniquely exhibit life, consciousness and rational self-consciousness. Schumacher uses this perspective to contrast with the materialist view, which argues that matter alone is real and that life and consciousness can be reduced to it.

Which in turn suggests degrees of agency, the ability for automous action, on the one hand - minerals having none, and animals having ascending degrees of it - and also degrees of self-organisation, which likewise increase with degrees of sentience.

That's certainly a perspective.

"wall" = w
"beige wall" = wall + beige

Walls have a higher degree of reality when painted beige? I suppose that just means some properties are privileged, because no one wants to believe that.

I don't understand why anyone would want to say "higher degree of reality" when they mean "has more characteristic predicates applying to it", could you spell that out for me? What makes a predicate make something it applies to more real?

I think it is simply a question of through what lens we are looking at any particular phenomenon. Phenomenologically there is no distinction, yet in empirical science there is.

I don't understand why anyone would want to say "higher degree of reality" when they mean "has more characteristic predicates applying to it", — fdrake

I suppose in line with what Schumacher says, 'more real' in the sense of possessing a greater degree of organisation, and a greater degree of agency as does matter. So in that sense evolution reveals greater horizons of possibility. But as noted at the outset, one of the characteristics of modern culture is the 'flattening' of ontology.

But as noted at the outset, one of the characteristics of modern culture is the 'flattening' of ontology. — Wayfarer

I think you can have hierarchical organisation of predicates without being committed to reality degrees. Like everything which is red is coloured - the former is on a "lower rung", or "higher rung" on a ladder of predicates, than the latter. Much like plant is on a lower or higher rung than the mineral. Why equate the concepts?

Why equate the concepts? — fdrake

I'm sorry, I don't understand the question.

What sorts of things should we think are more or less real than other things? — Srap Tasmaner

Balance is a relation that seems to arise and exist in degrees. Relevance and significance are other examples.