While this theory remains speculative, it offers a compelling perspective on the intertwined evolution of religion and science. I think further research should investigate correlations between intelligence, existential awareness, and religious/scientific development. — ContextThinker

I think a helluva has already been looked into. Undoubtedly people will look to this or that idea to fortify their sense of reality. Modern religious traditions can offer this by steering away from cold hard facts that serve little to no purpose to those who care more about things like beauty or love. Science is useful.

You might be interested in reading a book called "In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion," by Scott Atran. It offers a reasonable survey of many common ideas put forward about how religion has developed.

This is not only not reassuring, it makes man entirely helpless, and it makes all of reality bottom out in the completely unintelligible and unfathomable. — Tom Storm

Sounds like Calvinism to me.

Sounds like Calvinism to me. — Wayfarer

Could be. But knowing Calvinists, it's hard to argue that they don't derive succour and meaning and purpose from their beliefs.

It was a flippant line, poor form on my part considering the topic. Although there is some factual basis, it’s not coincidental that Calvin has been parodied as ‘The Ayatollah of Geneva’. That book I often mention (Tim Wood also mentions it upthread) Theological Origins of Modernity by M A Gillespie lays out a superb case of the watershed in intellectual history, when Ockham’s nominalism, and theological voluntarism, displaced scholastic realism at the centre of Western thought. From a reader review:

Gillespie turns the conventional reading of the Enlightenment (as reason overcoming religion) on its head by explaining how the humanism of Petrarch, the free-will debate between Luther and Erasmus, the scientific forays of Francis Bacon, the epistemological debate between Descartes and Hobbes, were all motivated by an underlying wrestling with the questions posed by nominalism, which according to Gillespie dismantled the rational God and Cosmos of medieval scholasticism and introduced (by way of the Franciscans) a fideistic God-of-pure-will, born out of a concern that anything less than such would jeopardize His divine omnipotence. (In other words, a God not bound to observe logic and no respecter of reason.)

Subsequent intellectual history is, in Gillespie's reading, a grappling with the question of free will and divine determinism. Protestantism involved at its core fideistic, denying free will will in order to preserve God's absolute power. However, this in turn culminated in an ambivalence about salvation. If God simply wills whom to save, human action has no real merit (ex. Luther's "sin boldly"). Gillespie's chapter on the debate between Erasmus-Luther was among the most interesting in bringing this out.
Also fascinating is Gillespie's detailed analysis of Rene Descartes and Thomas Hobbes. The latter is usually depicted as an atheist (or his religiosity dubious at best) and his philosophy as chiefly political but Gillespie believes him sincerely religious (if not exactly orthodox) and reveals the underlying metaphysical concerns behind his thought.

And so Gillespie says, even in modern times, we are bequeathed with a similar wrestling between humanity's political ambitions (the expansion of freedom) and the inability to reconcile this with science's inherent determinist worldview. Likewise, in the post-9/11/ confrontation with Islam (which makes a brief appearance at the end) we are again confronted with the fideism and absolutism of Islam which sees the West's assertion of individual autonomy as a challenge to God's omnipotence, for whom our only response ought to be obedience.

Gillespie writes: the apparent rejection or disappearance of religion and theology in fact conceals the continuing relevance of theological issues and commitments for the modern age. Viewed from this perspective, the process of secularization or disenchantment that has come to be seen as identical with modernity was in fact something different than it seemed, not the crushing victory of reason over infamy, to use Voltaire’s famous term, not the long drawn out death of God that Nietzsche proclaimed, and not the evermore distant withdrawal of the deus absconditus Heidegger points to, but the gradual transference of divine attributes to human beings (an infinite human will), the natural world (universal mechanical causality), social forces (the general will, the hidden hand), and history (the idea of progress, dialectical development, the cunning of reason). …

That the deemphasis, disappearance, and death of God should bring about a change in our understanding of man and nature is hardly surprising. Modernity … originates out of a series of attempts to construct a coherent metaphysic specialis on a nominalist foundation, to reconstitute something like the comprehensive summalogical account of scholastic realism. Th e successful completion of this project was rendered problematic by the real ontological differences between an infinite (and radically omnipotent) God and his finite creation (including both man and nature).

We’re all caught up in the throes of this, every day.

I find this particularly unconvincing as respects "afterlife" beliefs because many ancient visions (and the dominant modern vision) of the afterlife seem significantly more unpleasant than just ceasing to exist. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep. :up:

The OP concerns "why religion exists", not what is the origin, development and/or consequences of "altered states of consciousness" (e.g. religious experiences). My excerpts are links (via usename) to prior thread discussions in order to prompt / tease with sketches other (e.g. cognitive) ways of thinking about the topic.

We’re all caught up in the throes of this, every day. — Wayfarer

No idea - is that what the discussion in this thread is about?

If the argument is that gods and religions are 'invented' to help us manage reality in some way, I see no reason why we would only invent comforting stories. Happy bedtime stories are not the only way to make meaning.

Well, yes, agree.

:up:

It was the backstory to my remark about Calvin.

If you don't dig deeper you miss the entire point. "Religion" is not a solid concept. If you wish not to engage in my point no need to.

Why religion exists (as per evolutionary explication) has been examined in numerous ways. I mentioned a book that covers a lot of it, and have rad some of Dunbar's ideas too.

The underlying point as to why it exists is because it has developed from useful functions that were not necessarily about woo woo, but more or less about passing on knowledge effectively and reinvigorating the conventions of social groups to allow for adaptation through playing with taboos and generally seeking out novel experiences (exploratory drives).

Stories are not just stories. They are meant to teach not necessarily comfort.

Literacy is a relatively recent invention. This is something I do not believe the OP addresses nor sees as significant?

A subsidiary role at best I would say. The whole "opiate of the masses" idea is dubious, but not without effect. Undoubtedly anything that falls into the realm of politics will be bent to serve some means of controlling others - it is hardly specific to religion nor any more significant.

I am thinking in particular of a person I know who I've discussed this with at length, but one can certainly find this in some forms of Reformed theology (certainly not all, some in the Calvinist tradition even came round to a sort of universalism through Barth), and you can find it in some forms of Manualist Catholicism from what I understand (a tiny minority view today, no doubt, but at one point more influential).

Historically, this arises out of the pivot to the univocity of being. If God is one being among many then any freedom for creatures is a subtraction from divine sovereignty. At the same time, if analagous predication of God is no longer an option, it starts to look like only total equivocity is left. This is indeed Hume's argument, although it seems to simply be ignorant of the analogical option that prevailed for millennia (even in Pagan philosophy) and which was still the norm in the theologies embraced by the churches of most Christians in Hume's time (and today).

want to attack the notion that this idea is an evolutionary adaptation.

All species develop coping mechanisms, from viruses to us. Some of the species die in the process of natural selection and thems who chose the environmentally-conditioned adaptations which effect reproduction positively for the species are thems who developed the coping mechanisms that passed on.

But evolution has nothing to do with religion, in my opinion. Once we acquired the ability to speak language -- well, I think that's more in the ballpark of why religion exists. But it's pretty hazy since it's not like any of us were there at the dawn of talking/writing. — Moliere

While it's true that all species develop coping mechanisms, the Evolutionary Coping Mechanism Theory (ECMT) specifically addresses the unique complexities of human cognition and cultural evolution. ECMT doesn't suggest that religion itself is an evolutionary adaptation, but rather that the cognitive and cultural processes underlying religiosity emerged as coping mechanisms in response to existential anxiety.

Language acquisition undoubtedly played a pivotal role in the development of complex societies and religiosity. However, ECMT posits that language served as a catalyst, enabling the expression and transmission of coping mechanisms, rather than being the sole driver of religiosity. The universality of religiosity across cultures hints at an underlying psychological or cognitive basis. Moreover, religious beliefs and practices often provide emotional comfort, social cohesion, and moral frameworks, which can enhance individual and group fitness.

Studies on primates and early human societies reveal precursors to religious behaviors, such as ritualized behaviors and symbolic expression. Additionally, humans exhibit cognitive biases like agency detection and pattern recognition that facilitate religious beliefs. The cultural evolution of religiosity across cultures reflects changing environmental pressures and social complexities. ECMT integrates these factors, suggesting that religiosity emerged as a coping mechanism in response to existential anxiety, facilitated by language and cognitive adaptations.

ECMT acknowledges the complexity and haziness surrounding religiosity's origins but offers a framework for understanding its evolution and persistence. By considering the interplay between cognition, culture, and environment, ECMT provides a more comprehensive explanation for religiosity's emergence and persistence.
.

Yes, I did think of that, and I agree with you that it might be plausible in some contexts. Animism is the norm both in early cultures and early childhood, e.g. "the river floods because it wants to." And there is a clear path from this to positing supernatural entities.

But the idea that this is an "adaptive coping mechanism," then makes no sense in terms of some later religious developments, because they make the world both terrifying and unintelligible, the result of an unfathomable God who is beyond all human notions of good and evil, totally obscured by total equivocity. In these extreme voluntarist theological contexts God has also revealed that God intends to consign most of humanity to eternal torment, saving a small remnant, based on "His own good pleasure," for reasons "beyond human comprehension." And to top it all off, God has predestined everything, including our own acts and thoughts, according to his unfathomable will, which is, as mentioned, beyond all human comprehension (save miraculous illumination).

This is not only not reassuring, it makes man entirely helpless, and it makes all of reality bottom out in the completely unintelligible and unfathomable. Through the obsession with divine sovereignty, all of existence becomes a pantheistic expression of the divine will, which is itself beyond comprehension.

It seems to me like the opposite of a coping mechanism. "Nightmare fuel," would be a better term. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Your critique highlights the seemingly counterintuitive aspects of certain religious developments, particularly within voluntarist theology. The concept of an unfathomable God, predestination, and eternal torment appears to exacerbate existential anxiety rather than alleviate it. However, this complexity can be reconciled within the Evolutionary Coping Mechanism Theory (ECMT) framework.

Consider the cultural context in which these theological developments emerged. They responded to societal pressures, power struggles, or intellectual debates, serving adaptive functions such as social control, emotional regulation, and cognitive resolution. Emphasizing divine sovereignty and predestination reinforced social hierarchies and authority, while the promise of salvation for a select few provided emotional comfort and hope. The notion of an unfathomable God resolved cognitive dissonances surrounding evil, suffering, and uncertainty.

ECMT acknowledges evolutionary trade-offs, where coping mechanisms have unintended consequences. In this case, emphasizing divine sovereignty may have provided short-term benefits (e.g., social cohesion) at the cost of long-term existential anxiety. Comparing ancient Near Eastern afterlives, which reflected societal structures, provides insight into the complex interplay between cognition, culture, and environment.

These theological developments can be seen as attempts to address the problem of evil and create meaning in a chaotic world. Even "nightmare fuel" scenarios serve as coping mechanisms for individuals or groups struggling to make sense of their existence. By acknowledging darker aspects of human experience, these beliefs provide a twisted sense of control or purpose.

ECMT doesn't imply all religious developments are adaptive or reassuring. Instead, it recognizes the dynamic interplay leading to diverse coping mechanisms.

Consider the cultural context in which these theological developments emerged. They responded to societal pressures, power struggles, or intellectual debates, serving adaptive functions such as social control, emotional regulation, and cognitive resolution. Emphasizing divine sovereignty and predestination reinforced social hierarchies and authority, while the promise of salvation for a select few provided emotional comfort and hope. The notion of an unfathomable God resolved cognitive dissonances surrounding evil, suffering, and uncertainty.

But the Reformation didn't reinforce hierarchies of authority. It often led to their apocalyptic breakdown, e.g. the siege of Munster. The "adaptive evolution" kicked off and sustained wars that were cataclysmic even by the standards of 1914-1945. The Thirty Years War alone killed a almost two and a half times the share of the German population as both World Wars combined. At the outset of the French Wars of Religion France had a population 33% lower than Syria in 2011. Consider how apocalyptic the war in small Syria has been with 600,000 dead. The wars in France killed 3-4+ million. Some areas of Europe were essentially depopulated on a scale only matched by the Black Death. Traditional authority was challenged throughout the period, by popular peasant revolts, by challenges to the Holy Roman Emperor and Papacy, and even in a related regicide in England.

The rationalization that this all fits a general scheme of adaptive behavior to maximize well being seems sort of post hoc. I mean, would any development in religion not fit the theory? What would be an example of a possible falsifying development in world religion?

Your OP (original post) and subsequent posts provide almost no specific information. They include a vague and undetailed description of the elements of your ECMT and it's supporting information. You claim it is testable and makes specific predictions but you don't describe any specific hypotheses or how they might be tested. — T Clark

Yeah. No accusations, but sounds AI-ish, like a corporate memo.

Yeah. No accusations, but sounds AI-ish, like a corporate memo. — Hanover

I understand what you mean, but I think even a Chat GPT writeup would provide more detail that what the OP did.