Sure. It is just a very simple point, I already gave it away.

אֲבִימֶלֶך

This word in biblical Hebrew means "the/my father is king". The grammar gives the translation the/my because you actually can't tell from the word. It could be both.

;) I dare you to find the different particles in the word. And before you think of it: the ' symbol in the text is a normal letter in the Hebrew alphabet (Jod). You can find this and more examples on page 160 of the grammar I linked before.

Even if we make mistakes, it's still clear what trying to split this stuff up would mean in terms of a language. I doubt you can say the same form Baggs' stimming. — fdrake

What's to prevent her actions from forming the material for a language? I don't think that's what she is doing, but there is no in-principle barrier to her actions being linguistic. It is not the material object that is non-linguistic. Anything can become linguistic, including running your hand under water. It is the non-linguistic intention behind her actions that is non-linguistic.

To what extent is an immediate relationship with our non-human surroundings a language? — Joshs

I lean toward "not" and honestly I'm not sure why the word "language" gets used here. Some of the places where there's a sort of extended use of the word ― a filmmaker's language, a painter's language ― there's still communication, and what we're talking about is something like a repertoire or a toolbox. I think people rightly perceive that a lexicon is a kind of repertoire, as are other elements of language use ― prosody, rhetorical constructions, and so on. But that doesn't make a repertoire or a toolbox linguistic, because it's the other way around.

Anyway, the part of the film ― and thank you for posting it ― I found most interesting was the point that if she doesn't pay attention to the right things and ignore the right things, people assume she's not thinking. That's gold. It's clear that her perception of the affordances in her environment is very different from a neurotypical adult's, but I think it's also clear that a good chunk of that neurotypical perception and behavior is due to enculturation. Children and (non-human) animals have their own sometimes quite different ways of interacting with their environment. (I remember having considerable difficulty convincing a toddler to look out the window at an airport, to see the airplanes. They were more interested in the window.) Animals we can only guess at, and children we mostly treat as imperfect, unfinished adults. Baggs is something else again, a type of mind I doubt I can really understand.

One further thought: all the sorts of minds I've mentioned are related, and there don't seem to be boundaries between them, just patterns and tendencies. Even typical enculturated adults run their hands across the fabric of clothes when they're shopping, or sharing ― here, feel this! A shower isn't always just a minimal and efficient body cleaning, but a chance to stand for a few moments, eyes closed, feeling the water running over you. I think there's probably almost nothing in her video that I haven't done myself, even though I do other things she doesn't, and the place in my life of what we have in common is different.

And it's plain to me this is thinking behavior we're talking about. When I gaze up at the night sky, I'm surely engaging with what I see thinkingly, but it's not always accompanied by thoughts in words, or even by specific feelings. Sometimes there's a definite "sense of wonder," but sometimes I just look and it doesn't have to be anything else, but it's still a sort of thinking.

relationship entails communication, so it is a language. — Pop

That is interesting. As a metaphysical construct.

Relationship is language.
Things speaking, by simply being, related.

;) I dare you to find the different particles in the word. And before you think of it: the ' symbol in the text is a normal letter in the Hebrew alphabet (Jod). You can find this and more examples on page 160 of the grammar I linked before. — KrisGl

All I meant was that there were recognisable units of meaning. The example you gave is a unit of meaning. I would have no idea wtf it means, there are still marks on the page. You even split it up into units of meaning for me.

There are plenty of examples like that, like making the sound iu-a'o in Lojban prior to saying an activity acts as an incredibly specific audible emoji. There isn't a translation of the attitude into English, or of the attitudinal indicator into English - it's still a unit of meaning!

You really don't need fluency, or even much understanding. to detect the presence of units of meaning. The fact that such a thing is so difficult for Baggs' stimming indicates that if it is a language, it is unlikely to be like any hitherto known one. It also will have only one "speaker".

@KrisGl

@fdrake more or less covered it. What Baggs is doing is not language. Strictly speaking, "language" refers to human language, which has quite specific attributes that distinguish it from other forms of communication.* Of course, metaphorically, language can be anything, "the language of love" etc. The metaphorical use reduces language to very generalised forms of communication and human interaction, which adds some colour to the word at the expense of obscuring its actual meaning.

It might help to locate language as a subset of human communication, which is a subset of human expression. Baggs is certainly expressing their self---in way that could be considered artistic or interesting, but what she's communicating if anything remains obscure. And even if she is communicating something and even if you can describe that something in language, it doesn't make their form of expression linguistic.

Suppose, I am in an interview and I fold my arms to communicate my nervousness. That is an expression that communicates something, "discomfort", which is publicly interpretable and which is often described as "body language". But it is not language. Folding one's arms could conceivably be linguistic as part of a system of sign language, but in that case it could mean anything. The severing of the link between the expressive and the semantic is part of what makes language what it is. The very fact that Baggs seems to be freely expressing their self negates her own thesis.

Also, the first couple of lines of her speech show they don't know what language is, don't care, or perhaps are deliberately misleading their audience (I'm not making any presumptions, just describing possibilities). What they are doing might or might not be significant artistically or psychologically or socially (in terms of understanding how better to relate to the autistic community) or it might just be someone trying to get attention by making an outlandish claim and leveraging their obvious vulnerability in doing so, but in no sense does it suggest a rethinking of language because what they are doing has nothing to do with language except in the metaphorical sense.

*Here's a basic list of the major properties of language:

https://www.ff.umb.sk/app/cmsFile.php?disposition=a&ID=6765#:~:text=These%20six%20properties%20of%20displacement,core%20features%20of%20human%20language.

Edited: for preferred pronouns

And it's plain to me this is thinking behavior we're talking about. When I gaze up at the night sky, I'm surely engaging with what I see thinkingly, but it's not always accompanied by thoughts in words, or even by specific feelings. Sometimes there's a definite "sense of wonder," but sometimes I just look and it doesn't have to be anything else, but it's still a sort of thinking. — Srap Tasmaner

I would call this "language" it is just not as prominent and familiar to many because we are told what "language" is and what "grammar" is. I can absolutely think without words and form ideas and images in my head that play out without any need for worded thought.

People can communicate extremely complex ideas in other forms than worded language. It just so happens that worded language is extremely efficient. Writing is something we learn, but we do not really 'think' about it once the skill is acquired.

It seems to me that some people who are more sensitive are simply more directly tapped into sensory input others have filtered out since childhood. Ironically, in some ways, it is the 'normal' people that are more narrowly tuned into the world than those we often regard as fixated. I think in many cases they can just 'see' what we no longer can.

I would call this "language" it is just not as prominent and familiar to many because we are told what "language" is and what "grammar" is. I can absolutely think without words and form ideas and images in my head that play out without any need for worded thought. — I like sushi

What puzzles me is that you seem to be offering the second sentence as a reason supporting the first. My inclination is just to say that thought need not be linguistic, but I get the impression you want to claim thought without words or grammar is still linguistic, so what's left? Conceptualization? Logic? Is what's left inherently linguistic?

People can communicate extremely complex ideas in other forms than worded language. — I like sushi

Same question. Why not just say not all communication is linguistic?

The whole thread is just littered with equivocation between the literal and metaphorical meanings of "language". Disentangle those and the debate ends. And it doesn't take a whole lot to do that: e.g. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language .

Some linguists are happy to say bees have a language. I guess others insist on this or that definition. Even Wittgenstein fell prey to saying there can be no private language, after defining language as not being private. For some reason people took that hook line and sinker.

I think the application of Logic to language has perhaps made ideas about it more rigid.

See above. Some linguists are happy to use the term more broadly. I see no real problem with this if it is made explicit.

Bees communicate but it's not through language: https://www.csun.edu/~vcoao0el/webct/de361s41_folder/tsld007.html

Provide your academic sources that claim they do.

It's the same type of mistake that would claim body language is language by the way. It's not. It's just communication. (That can be subcategorised into nominal, expressive etc. See also: https://www.csun.edu/~vcoao0el/webct/de361s41_folder/tsld001.html )

The whole thread is just littered with equivocation between the literal and metaphorical meanings of "language". — Baden

I don't think that's it really. I think the disagreement is between (1) those of us who think language is primarily and originally for mediating the connection of one mind to another (communication); and (2) those who think language primarily mediates the connection of a mind to the world. Each camp allows that the other function exists, but it's treated as secondary or derivative or parasitic.

(I framed (1) as I did for contrast, but better would be something like, connecting one mind to another with regard to the world.)

If you spend a lot of time thinking about poetry, in particular, it's hard not to think of language as this quasi-magical means of reaching out to the world, to things themselves, as the man says. The social-use-first view feels a bit deflationary by comparison.

Or avail yourselves of this excellent paper by Sally Haslanger that discusses different approaches to answering "What is X?" questions. The "what is a language" question in this thread is a classic example of what she's discussing. (If you're not interested in her opening issues, concerning the language of race and gender, you can skip to p. 12, where she lays out her overall strategy.)

Can you summarize her main point and how it relates to this?

If you spend a lot of time thinking about poetry, in particular, it's hard not to think of language as this quasi-magical means of reaching out to the world, to things themselves, as the man says. The social-use-first view feels a bit deflationary by comparison. — Srap Tasmaner

True. And we can reach out into the world in different ways. I like what Baggs does and I find it interesting from an artistic perspective. But I wanted to clarify it's not language. However, you can't make people follow standard word usages so... Anyway, I'll come back to this tomorrow.

you can't make people follow standard word usages — Baden

Or stipulated, scientific definitions.

I like what Baggs does and I find it interesting from an artistic perspective. But I wanted to clarify it's not language. — Baden

I agree, but I'm curious about some people's strong intuition to call this behavior linguistic. On the one hand, I'm biased against that usage, but on the other I can almost understand it. (Some people would no doubt object to my somewhat wide use of "thinking" nearby.) There's a part of me that would love to call this "language" but I can't figure out why I would do that.

You really don't need fluency, or even much understanding. to detect the presence of units of meaning. — fdrake

"Салам, куыдтæ дæ?"

What are the distinct symbol groups in that? Clearly, "Салам", "куыдтæ" and "дæ". It has a question mark at the end, so presumably it is a question. — fdrake

Did you know that spaces and punctuation were a later addition to written language? Kinda blows up your whole theory about "units of meaning."

I'll try. Haslanger argues that there are four main approaches used to answer "What is X?" questions: conceptual, descriptive, ameliorative, and genealogical.

A conceptual approach would ask "What is our concept of X?" and looks to a priori methods such as introspection for an answer. This approach assumes a sort of "common knowledge" about a concept, at least as it's understood in some dialogical arena. Taking into account differing intuitions about cases and principles, the conceptual approach hopes eventually to reach a reflective equilibrium, with basic agreement on what the concept means.

A descriptive approach is concerned with what kinds (if any) our vocabulary about X tracks. The task is to hold the descriptions as givens, and develop potentially more accurate concepts through careful consideration of the phenomena in question, usually relying on empirical or quasi-empirical methods. In other words, we can change the concept based upon new information.

An ameliorative approach begins by asking: What is the point of having the concept in question—for example, why do we have a concept of "language"? What are we using it to talk about? What concept (if any) would do this conversational work best? Is "language" that concept? This approach often ends by proposing a better or more useful understanding of a concept, in terms of getting the job done. Or it may recommend abandoning the concept entirely and replacing it with another that gets better results.

A genealogical approach explores the history of a concept, not in order to determine its true meaning by reference to origins ("truth by etymology"), and not for "sheer historicist fascination," but in order to understand how the concept is embedded in evolving social practices. What role does the concept play in our web of beliefs?

So, for this thread, consider one of the opening questions:

What is the difference between language and communication, if any? — KrisGl

What kind of question is this? What sort of "difference" is being examined?

We could start by asking, "Which of the above approaches are you using to ask this question? Are you interested in how our language-using community of philosophers defines these two concepts (conceptual approach)? Are you asking what sorts of things fall under the heading of 'language' and 'communication,' with an eye toward refining the concepts accordingly (descriptive approach)? Are you asking why we need to have these two concepts in the first place, and perhaps proposing a useful discrimination between them in order to achieve our goals (ameliorative approach)? Or are you interested in knowing how the two terms have evolved within a matrix of social practices here in the U.S. (or the West, or whatever social group seems relevant) (genealogical approach)?"

This hardly does justice to Haslanger, but at least it gives you the flavor. She is pointing out how often we charge into some Big Question about, e.g., language, without first clarifying the kind of inquiry we're making. Is it about words? concepts? practices? best practices? You mentioned metaphorical and literal uses of "language," and that's just the sort of issue that could be approached by asking, "OK, what would 'a literal use of language' be? What concept of language are we going to be talking about here? Is it written in conceptual stone, so to speak? Is there somewhere we could look it up? Maybe we could come up with a better, more descriptive, more useful definition..." etc etc.

I think it is right to say that the OP is not language, but I think @fdrake, @Baden, and perhaps @Srap Tasmaner are working with mistaken premises in drawing that conclusion.

It's the same type of mistake that would claim body language is language by the way. It's not. It's just communication. — Baden

Suppose, I am in an interview and I fold my arms to communicate my nervousness. That is an expression that communicates something, "discomfort", which is publicly interpretable and which is often described as "body language". But it is not language. Folding one's arms could conceivably be linguistic as part of a system of sign language, but in that case it could mean anything. — Baden

Why isn't it language? You used a sign intentionally to communicate something to others. You folded your arms "to communicate." This looks like a form of sign language or body language, in a non-metaphorical sense. The only quirk is that the interpreters may interpret the sign non-intentionally, in which case it would be more manipulation than language. But they may interpret the sign intentionally. They may know what it means and cognize its meaning, and they may even recognize that you are intending to communicate nervousness (or something else like reticence). If someone with a great deal of self knowledge folds their arms I am given to know that it is not unintentional.

Same question. Why not just say not all communication is linguistic? — Srap Tasmaner

If someone thinks in pictures is their thought process therefore non-linguistic? Part of this is definitions, but some definitions will fare better than others.

@fdrake seems stuck on non-necessary norms of interpretation, such as spacing and punctuation. I would suggest that he think about coded language, such as encryption or the hidden signs involved in a football game or military strategy, where the linguistic matter is supposed to be unrecognizable according to standard norms.

Are you interested in how our language-using community of philosophers defines these two concepts (conceptual approach)? Are you asking what sorts of things fall under the heading of 'language' and 'communication,' with an eye toward refining the concepts accordingly (descriptive approach)? Are you asking why we need to have these two concepts in the first place, and perhaps proposing a useful discrimination between them in order to achieve our goals (ameliorative approach)? Or are you interested in knowing how the two terms have evolved within a matrix of social practices here in the U.S. (or the West, or whatever social group seems relevant) (genealogical approach)? — J

That sounds wonderful. In that order please!

:up:

I started a thread once on how Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument(s) seem like they could simply be dismissed as question begging by the "Language of Thought"/Augustinian folks, but I didn't get much interest.



Well, that certainly seems to be much of it. What is x and what is only x by analogy is a similar sort of question.

For instance, semiotics has been brought up here. But on the wider Augustinian/Peircrean view of semiotics, all sorts of things are semiotic, so that isn't all that informative on as to language.

For instance, semiotics has been brought up here. But on the wider Augustinian/Peircrean view of semiotics, all sorts of things are semiotic, so that isn't all that informative on as to language. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I still think I identified the crux here. It is intentional sign use (language) vs mere sign use. The trick is that a mere sign ("folding your arms") can be always be coopted as an intentional sign.

For example, is the person in the OP praying?* Then it could be language. I don't think they are, but the distinction is subtle. If I groan only as a response to pain then I am not linguistically engaged. If I groan to tell someone else that I am in pain, then I am linguistically engaged, even if that aspect of the groan is not a necessary condition for this act of groaning.

To say that the person in the OP is not linguistically engaged requires a number of assumptions, but I think all of those assumptions are plausible.

* Or what if they are a pantheist or a panpsychist?


Edit: Further, is Tallis' Lamentations of Jeremiah or Górecki's Symphony of Sorrowful Songs language, even for the non-Latin or non-Polish speaker? Is the music itself an intentional sign communicating sorrow?

Indeed! Which points up that these approaches all have their merits, and none excludes the others.

If someone thinks in pictures is their thought process therefore non-linguistic? — Leontiskos

I mean, it depends, right? But I think Wittgenstein is right, that it doesn't just depend on the thinker's intention. There's some obvious wiggle room here, which you can see clearly with novel uses of words. There you already have in place the linguistic habits of a community, and novel uses rely on that. Some novel uses catch on and some don't; some are intended to catch on and some are just mistakes, and some mistakes catch on. But I think we're by and large right to reject Humpty-Dumpty-ism as a theory of language or language use. It's not enough.

I mean, it depends, right? — Srap Tasmaner

What specifically do you think it depends on?

specifically — Leontiskos

Whether the picture is being used as a picture or a sign. Writing, for example, seems to begin pictorially, but then become simplified, stylized, and conventionalized. Even alphabetic letters are just special little pictures that are not intended or expected to resemble anything. It's not part of their use.

Is that the kind of answer you were looking for?

Further reply with example.

Sometimes maps for children will have little pictures. At Paris, a little Eiffel Tower; at South Dakota, a little Mount Rushmore. Here the picture is a straightforward representation of a thing, but used by a sort of metonymy to mean the whole place where that thing is. So in such a case, both.

Is that the kind of answer you were looking for? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, thanks.

Whether the picture is being used as a picture or a sign. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, but there is an underlying idea in this thread that if a sign does not signify arbitrarily then it is not a real sign. This is captured by 's claim that, "Folding one's arms could conceivably be linguistic as part of a system of sign language, but in that case it could mean anything." This is similar to your premise that if a picture is being used as a picture then it must not be being used as a sign. That is the premise I am picking at.

Is a picture already a sign, albeit a non-arbitrary sign? Does intentionally recording a dance add a sign-layer to the dance? The point here is that we think we know what a sign or a piece of language signifies, but upon closer inspection we may be much less sure. In the first place I would want to say that "leaf" and a picture of a leaf are both signs of a leaf; one arbitrary and one non-arbitrary.

-

Edit:

Further reply with example.

Sometimes maps for children will have little pictures. At Paris, a little Eiffel Tower; at South Dakota, a little Mount Rushmore. Here the picture is a straightforward representation of a thing, but used by a sort of metonymy to mean the whole place where that thing is. So in such a case, both. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay good, so you anticipated my objection to some extent. Metonymy is an interesting deviation from a simple picture or image.