Now I don't think we're anywhere near a synthesis of consciousness from unconscious compounds, but if seems fairly clear that consciousness is a biological phenomenon. — jkop

Fairly likely, at least.

Moreover, conscious states such as visual experiences have a hierarchical structure in the sense that the experience is not solely a biological phenomenon. It is also causally constrained by the behavior of light, and influenced by the observer's psychology, sociology, language and culture. All of these can be described, but none of them is a complete description of the experience. However, the lack of a single complete description is hardly a problem. — jkop

The problem isn't the lack of a complete description. Rather, it's how we can even talk about all this without importing (as you do) the term "observer". What possible physicalist justification can there be for this, much less an explanation? "Experience" is another imported word. Sure, we can describe a subjective experience, but how do we explain its existence, or why it exists in the way it does and not in another? That's the hard problem.

I know it’s difficult not to associate agency with consciousness...
— Joshs

‘Whereas Barad dilutes the theoretical distinction between mind and matter as well as the distinction between animate and inanimate, the contention here is that it is ethically and politically vital to hold on to a notion of subjectivity understood in terms of the capacity for experience’ - from a critique of Barad’s agential realism.

↪Tom Storm Barad’s ‘agential realism’. Streetlight mentioned it also. As a form of materialism, it is obliged to deny the ontological distinction between animate and inanimate, per the above — Wayfarer

What I’m calling practice theory isn’t restricted to Barad’s work. It includes the projects of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, phenomenology , hermeneutics, poststructuralists like Foucault and Deleuze, as well as enactivists like Evan Thompson. The issue for Thompson isn’t whether the animate and the inanimate are ontologically distinct, but how to understand subjectivity in terms of autonomous processes of self-organization in living systems. Instead of viewing subjectivity as an inner , ineffable content, he views it as the derivative product of distributed neural networks. Subjectivity is a selfless
virtual self , an agent that emerges from a pattern or aggregate of personal processes.

he issue for Thompson isn’t whether the animate and the inanimate are ontologically distinct, but how to understand subjectivity in terms of autonomous processes of self-organization in living systems. — Joshs

But he still differentiates living from non-living right at the outset. 'The living order is characterized by the emergence of a new kind of structure in the physical order.' I can't see how what you're advocating is not reductionist.

But he still differentiates living from non-living right at the outset. 'The living order is characterized by the emergence of a new kind of structure in the physical order.' I can't see how what you're advocating is not reductionist — Wayfarer

Reduction to what? Causal determinism? That’s not what one is left with in Barad’s model , any more than it forms the basis of Thompson’s model of consciousness. And Thompson may not be so far apart from Barad as you might think when it comes to the distinction between the physical and the experiential.

He writes:

"I follow the trajectory that arises in the later Husserl and continues in Merleau-Ponty, and that calls for a rethinking of the concept of “nature” in a post-physicalist way—one that doesn't conceive of fundamental nature or physical being in a way that builds in the objectivist idea that such being is intrinsically of essentially non-experiential. But, again, this point doesn't entail that nature is intrinsically or essentially experiential (this is the line that pan-psychists and Whiteheadians take). (Maybe it is, but I don't think we're now in position to know that.) All I want to say for now (or think I have grounds for saying now) is that we can see historically how the concept of nature as physical being got constructed in an objectivist way, while at the same time we can begin to conceive of the possibility of a different kind of construction that would be post-physicalist and post-dualist–that is, beyond the divide between the “mental” (understood as not conceptually involving the physical) and the “physical” (understood as not conceptually involving the mental)."

Now I don't think we're anywhere near a synthesis of consciousness from unconscious compounds, but if seems fairly clear that consciousness is a biological phenomenon. — jkop

If we could build a working brain our of inorganic parts that was functionally equivalent to a working organic brain, wouldn't the non-biological brain be conscious?

I'll see your Thompson, and raise you one Pattee:

I have made the case over many years that self-replication provides the threshold level of complication where the clear existence of a self or a subject gives functional concepts such as symbol, interpreter, autonomous agent, memory, control, teleology, and intentionality empirically decidable meanings. The conceptual problem for physics is that none of these concepts enter into physical theories of inanimate nature.

Self-replication requires an epistemic cut between self and non-self, and between subject and object.

Self-replication requires a distinction between the self that is replicated and the non-self that is not replicated. The self is an individual subject that lives in an environment that is often called objective, but which is more accurately viewed biosemiotically as the subject’s Umwelt or world image. This epistemic cut is also required by the semiotic distinction between the interpreter and what is interpreted, like a sign or a symbol. In physics this is the distinction between the result of a measurement – a symbol – and what is being measured – a material object.

I call this the symbol-matter problem, but this is just a narrower case of the classic 2500-year-old epistemic problem of what our world image actually tells us about what we call the real world. — Howard Pattee

With respect to the Evan Thompson quote, the way I interpret that is in line with phenomenology - it aims to avoid dualistic categorisation by avoiding reduction to purely physical or purely mental. part of 'healing the split' caused by mind-body dualism. But I don't think that supports any form of materialism.

With respect to the Evan Thompson quote, the way I interpret that is in line with phenomenology - it aims to avoid dualistic categorisation by avoiding reduction to purely physical or purely mental. part of 'healing the split' caused by mind-body dualism. But I don't think that supports any form of materialism — Wayfarer

What writers like Thompson, Barad and Deleuze mean by ‘material’ is quite different than the way it is meant in causal reductionism. Materiality has to do with discursive practices , and discourse isn't limited to linguistic practices. Materiality is discursive in the sense that it consists of reciprocal acts of affecting and being affected that form normative systems. For Thompson, material interactions between cognizing agent and environment are about the concrete ways that each defines the other through patterns of exchanges.

Self-replication requires an epistemic cut between self and non-self, and between subject and object.

Self-replication requires a distinction between the self that is replicated and the non-self that is not replicated. The self is an individual subject that lives in an environment that is often called objective, but which is more accurately viewed biosemiotically as the subject’s Umwelt or world image. This epistemic cut is also required by the semiotic distinction between the interpreter and what is interpreted, like a sign or a symbol. In physics this is the distinction between the result of a measurement – a symbol – and what is being measured – a material object. — Howard Pattee

If we compare Pattee’s take on the autonomy of self against its world (‘epistemic cut’) with Thompson’s concept of embodied autonomy as ‘operational closure’, a number of differences emerge. For one thing , Pattee’s distinction between interpreter and interpreted , between cognizer and environment, doesn’t seem to see this relation as reciprocally causal such that the Umwelt is not only defined by the cognizer , but through exchanges between interpreter and world both are continually redefined. This doesn’t lend itself to any neatly defined epsitemic cut on the order of a statistical boundary like a Markov blanket.

Enactivists assert a strong notion of world-involvement,
i.e., processes in the environment play more than informational roles in the consti­tution and actualization of life and mind . To enact a world of significance is to engage in actual acts, which are material events with spreading consequences that are both world-changing and agent-changing. Environmental and biological/cognitive processes are mutually enabled and mutually constituted. They interpenetrate at all scales and they co­ordinate across scales.

Historicity and the co-constitution of organism and environment are internally related in the enactive approach. Concerns about the conservation of organization are mostly linked to the self-production requirement of autopoiesis (the regen­eration of the conditions that continuously give rise to the operationally closed network of processes making up the organism). Concerns about barriers, bound­aries, and in general about an organism’s relation to its environment are mostly linked to the condition of self-distinction in the definition of autopoiesis. From an enactive perspective, self-distinction and self-production are dialectically re­lated, that is, they are mutually dependent, though distinct, mo­ments of autopoiesis. You cannot have one set of processes and not the other as long as the organism lives, yet the processes are not the same. All processes subserving self-distinction are themselves products of self-production

And the fact that it turned out inorganic and organic compounds are not fundamentally different is not evidence that the same answer will apply to the HPoC. — Patterner

Right, conscious states are different from unconscious states, but are they fundamentally different?

A series of biochemical reactions release the energy in nutrients, and ion channels generate electrical signals that pulsate across cell membranes, connect synapses, and fire through neural networks etc. Even if we'd be able to map the entire brain process that is constitutive for, say, a visual experience, it does not include what is seen, e.g. a bird. It makes no sense to look for a neurological version of a bird in the brain when the object of the experience is flying in the sky.

Also, what it feels like to have that visual experience is not necessarily a part of the visual experience. Neurons release dopamine, for instance, which may cause an overlapping or separate experience, but the cause for the release of dopamine can be fixed by expectations, or social pressure to feel a certain way when seeing the bird. The cause of the feeling is then only partly to be found in biochemistry and partly in psychology or sociology or culture. Hence a seeming inability to explain what it feels like in terms of biochemistry.

The problem isn't the lack of a complete description. Rather, it's how we can even talk about all this without importing (as you do) the term "observer". — J

Ok, please explain to me why we can't talk about all this without using the word 'observer'?

Sure, we can describe a subjective experience, but how do we explain its existence, or why it exists in the way it does and not in another? That's the hard problem. — J

For example, a feeling of being drunk (its existence and why it exists the way it does) is uncontroversially explained by the effects that alcohol has on our cognitive functions. One might add descriptions of situations, ambience and memories of previous experiences, expectations etc. to further articulate what it feels like.

In order to make that into a hard problem of consciousness (afaik), we'd have to define the feeling as something that is detached from being drunk, as something that accompanies it. By detaching the feeling from the drunken state, while assuming that the two must still be related somehow, we seem to create the very problem that we are pretending to solve. But the feeling is not necessarily related to the experience. It might be a function of interest of the body to receive awards, e.g. dopamine released by neurons at work whenever the experience satisfies or disappoints. Just a speculation.

If we could build a working brain our of inorganic parts that was functionally equivalent to a working organic brain, wouldn't the non-biological brain be conscious? — RogueAI

I read recently about an artificial model of the brain of a fruit fly. It is supposedly a complete model, but I don't know if or how it works.

If we can manufacture artificial fruit flies, then it seems at least possible to manufacture larger or more complex organisms. But it might be improbable considering the overwhelming complexity of organisms. To simulate a collection of selected functions seems much easier, but a simulation of being conscious is not conscious.

Materiality is discursive in the sense that it consists of reciprocal acts of affecting and being affected that form normative systems. — Joshs

But to me that requires the existence of the kind of agency that only begins to appear with organic life (by no means only conscious agency.) That is the reason I'm open to biosemiosis but not to pansemiosis. The first refers to the process of semiosis (the production and interpretation of signs) specifically within biological systems. It focuses on how living organisms generate, interpret, and respond to signs and signals in their environment—such as how cells communicate or how animals process sensory information - Pattee's area of expertise. The second extends the idea of semiosis beyond biological systems, suggesting that semiosis is a universal feature of reality, occurring at all levels of existence, including inanimate matter. In this view, the entire cosmos can be understood as engaging in some form of sign interpretation or meaning-making, not just living organisms. That doesn't register for me.

The problem isn't the lack of a complete description. Rather, it's how we can even talk about all this without importing (as you do) the term "observer".
— J

Ok, please explain to me why we can't talk about all this without using the word 'observer'? — jkop

Well, try revising your original description (beginning "Moreover, conscious states . . .") but leave out the terms "observer" and "experience." Let's look at the result and see what we think.

For example, a feeling of being drunk (its existence and why it exists the way it does) is uncontroversially explained by the effects that alcohol has on our cognitive functions. — jkop

Once again, "cognitive functions" is imported into the description as if we knew what it meant, in strictly physical terms. Try revising this description in the same way as suggested above.

But to me that requires the existence of the kind of agency that only begins to appear with organic life (by no means only conscious agency.) That is the reason I'm open to biosemiosis but not to pansemiosis. — Wayfarer

I think whether and how living and non-living processes can be integrated within a single overarching framework is secondary to the kind of model we adopt to integrate mind , body and world within a framework that overcomes the dualism implied by the hard problem. Agential realism doesn’t eliminate all distinctions between the living and the non-living, or between human cognition and living self-organization in general. Some phenomenologists , unlike agential realists, reduce the physical and the material to the living consciousness (Henry, Husserl), whereas Heidegger famously said that humans have world, but animals are poor in world and rocks have no world.

In Thompson’s Mind in Life book, he writes approvingly of Pattee’s approach, so my question is to what extent your thinking , or Donald Hoffman’s thinking, is on the same page as Pattee and Thompson with regard to the relation between mind, body and world, and to Thompson’s biological panpsychism. I think Hoffman learns the wrong lessons from evolutionary theory. He says that the fitness payoff function of evolution contains no information about reality ‘as it is’, so the cognizing subject remains on the appearance ( or ‘illusion ‘ as he call it) side of the appearance-reality distinction, thanks to the gimmick of evolution. I don’t know about Pattee, but Thompson would never describe sense-making in these dualistic terms. Sense-making isnt the result of an arbitrarily produced evolutionary mechanism that just happens to be adaptive for survival, but instead is based on the the fundamental living principle of self-organization To be a living system is to maintain a normative pattern of interacting with an environment in the midst of changing conditions. Sense-making is about pragmatically relevant actions , not concordance with ‘reality as it is’, whatever that’s supposed to mean. This doesn’t make what sense-making reveals as an illusion, or mere appearance as opposed to the really real. It shows us that this is what ‘reality as it is’ IS in itself.

leave out the terms "observer" and "experience." Let's look at the result and see what we think. — J

Ok, let's see:

visual ..... have a hierarchical structure in the sense that the ..... is not solely a biological phenomenon. It is also causally constrained by the behavior of light, and influenced by the .....'s psychology, sociology, language and culture. All of these can be described, but none of them is a complete description of the ....... — jkop

But what does it show? That we can't investigate the nature of the observer and experience without using the words 'observer' and 'experience'? It depends on how we use the words, of course. For example, we can distinguish between different senses of the word 'experience' in order to avoid circular or ambiguous fallacies of reasoning.

It's the dualism implied by the (I think unwarranted) assumption that consciousness is non-material which makes it seem hard. For monists or biological naturalists consciousness is an empirical or conceptual problem, until we know enough. Ignorance is no reason for assuming that consciousness is non-material.

I'm sorry, I wasn't clear. I didn't mean simply omit the terms! I meant rewrite the thesis but avoid using those terms. Give a description you believe is accurate but that doesn't have recourse to "observer" or "experience" .

m. I think Hoffman learns the wrong lessons from evolutionary theory. — Joshs

Possibly. I’m pretty confused about aspects of his theories. The reason I mentioned him was as a foil to the last paragraph of the OP that appeals to evolutionary biology in support of scientific realism. I was pointing out that Hoffman’s evolutionary cognitive theory doesn’t support realism.

Not so sure about "logical ideas" (maybe just "ideas"?) but otherwise I agree. — J

I included "logical" because you mentioned "rules" where 22 people are following some rules. So minds follow rules that we call logic as 22 people follow rules that we call soccer.

At this point we need to make sure it's not just a dispute over terms. What do we want "phenomenon" to designate? I vote for something like "appearance to a mind," so that the 22 people and the soccer game are two different phenomena. On that understanding, I want to say that neurons and consciousness are also two different phenomena, appearing from two different perspectives. But notice that it doesn't really matter how we understand "phenomenon" here. We could go the other way and stipulate that "phenomenon" designates a single event in time, in which case the soccer game and consciousness are now redescriptions of "the same phenomenon." Either way, we're left with the hard problem. I know many people want to do some arm-waving here and say, "Well, it's two different descriptions, what more do you need to know?" but surely the answer is, "A lot. Why are these descriptions as they are? What allows the passage from one description to another? Are we right in believing that the mental-level description is grounded in, but not caused by, the physical-level description? Does the physical-level description have a "translation" into Mentalese? When we encounter something as extraordinary as subjective experience, what else do we need to say about it to fill out the experience? Yes, consciousness is, in a sense, "only" a description of how things look to a subject, but don't we feel it's a lot more than that too -- somehow constitutive of identity?" etc. etc. — J

I don't know what "appearance to a mind" means. It seems to imply that a mind can be independent from some appearance as if something appears to a homunculus in the brain. It seems to me that some appearance is part of a mind, or is a necessary constituent of a mind.

Any appearance in the mind is the result of some measurement in that the brain measures and interprets wavelengths of light and sound and these measurements are the means by which we interact with the world. An interpretation of quantum mechanics includes the observer problem where the act of observing changes what is being observed and the measurement problem where we don't directly see the collapse of a wave function and the idea that mutually incompatible quantum states result in the concrete nature of the world once observed or measured.

Personally, I believe that irreconcilable differences between quantum physics and classical physics will be resolved with a proper explanation of consciousness.

To be a living system is to maintain a normative pattern of interacting with an environment in the midst of changing conditions. Sense-making is about pragmatically relevant actions , not concordance with ‘reality as it is’, whatever that’s supposed to mean. This doesn’t make what sense-making reveals as an illusion, or mere appearance as opposed to the really real. It shows us that this is what ‘reality as it is’ IS in itself. — Joshs

Point well made.

The world is independent of a map as well so this does not really get at what it means to be objective vs subjective.
— Harry Hindu

Consider cities and landscapes and most of the environments that people live in. Large parts of our lived world depend on the maps and drawings after which they were built. Those are parts of the actual world, and it is in this sense that the world depends on maps for being such a world. Without maps it would be a different world. — jkop

And the world would be different without humans and their minds, so I don't see how you've made any sensible distinction between what it means to be subjective vs objective.

..as if humans have this special quality of the world being independent from us.
— Harry Hindu
I can't make sense of that. — jkop

You said,

The world is objective in the sense that it is independent of us, and available for all of us. Also maps of the world have this objective mode of existing. — jkop

I was pointing out that the mind is not special in having things independent of it, so you have failed to make any sensible distinction between what is objective and subjective.

That's not what I say. Many humans and other animals are conscious. Consider the events in your physiology when you are having the conscious awareness of a tickle. Others may have similar events, but not those that exist in your physiology. The tickle exists whenever you feel it, and when you no longer feel it, then it doesn't exist anymore. This mode of existing is radically different from the way the world exists or the map — jkop

This can be said of anything, not just human bodies and their minds. An apple that is rotten is no longer ripe, yet it is still an apple.

To be a living system is to maintain a normative pattern of interacting with an environment in the midst of changing conditions. Sense-making is about pragmatically relevant actions , not concordance with ‘reality as it is’, whatever that’s supposed to mean. This doesn’t make what sense-making reveals as an illusion, or mere appearance as opposed to the really real. It shows us that this is what ‘reality as it is’ IS in itself. — Joshs

So sense-making is (part of) reality as it really is?

I don't know what "appearance to a mind" means. It seems to imply that a mind can be independent from some appearance as if something appears to a homunculus in the brain. — Harry Hindu

I know, the right language is hard to find. What I think we want to describe is the subjective event that occurs when, say, I think of a purple cow. The image of the cow is rather like something that "appears to a mind" but if that seems too Cartesian-theater, no matter. We can perhaps find better language, but I hope the target concept is clear enough: First the cow isn't there (for me), and then it is, not as a pattern of neurons but as a cowish purply image. What has happened? That's the event we're concerned about, which I'm suggesting we could call a "phenomenon".

Any appearance in the mind is the result of some measurement in that the brain measures and interprets wavelengths of light and sound and these measurements are the means by which we interact with the world. — Harry Hindu

The problem here is that, in order to get from "brain measurements of wavelengths of light and sound" to "an appearance in the mind" and the idea that "we" interact with the world, we have to import some new concepts. Mind? We? Where did this subjectivity come from? Once again, the hard problem: How do we get from here to there? Why should there be anything like an appearance in the mind, if the brain seems ideally equipped to do the measuring on its own and respond accordingly?

Personally, I believe that irreconcilable differences between quantum physics and classical physics will be resolved with a proper explanation of consciousness. — Harry Hindu

I have the same hunch. Ever read The Emperor's New Mind by Roger Penrose?

Sense-making is about pragmatically relevant actions , not concordance with ‘reality as it is’, whatever that’s supposed to mean. This doesn’t make what sense-making reveals as an illusion, or mere appearance as opposed to the really real. It shows us that this is what ‘reality as it is’ IS in itself. — Joshs

I’ve learned that the principle is called ‘relevance realization’ or ‘the salience landscape.’ It’s a guiding principle for all organic life. But self-aware rational beings might have requirements beyond those of other life-forms - think Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Other organisms are not able to consider the nature of existence in the way h.sapiens is, so questions of truth or falsehood don’t arise as part of their ‘salience landscape’.

As for the ‘in itself’ that has been construed in diverse ways throughout history. In philosophy the problem arises from the intuition that the way humans construe the nature of existence might be obscured by some deep-seated cognitive error. That was the fundamental insight behind the origin of the Western metaphysical tradition with Parmenides. But philosophy in that sense seems impossible in the age in which we live, burdened as we are by the enormous accumulation of facts and theories that no single individual can hope to comprehend.

Ever read The Emperor's New Mind by Roger Penrose? — J

Tried and failed. The maths was beyond me. I’ve often enjoyed Sir Roger’s talks on other topics. I’ve recently written a Medium essay about his views on QM.

Right, conscious states are different from unconscious states, but are they fundamentally different? — jkop

I am conscious as I type this. In a couple hours, I will be unconscious. The states are fundamentally different. Aside from differences in brain activity, however, a physical exam of me in each state of consciousness would find very little different.

You correctly identified the error of mixing 1st and 3rd person view. But then, you step into this trap yourself.

consciousness, understood as the ability to sense stimuli — Wolfgang

"sense stimuli", I believe, can only be interpreted from a 1st person's perspective. As soon as I read it, what I do mentally is, scan my memory for own experiences. And I only have ever sensed my own stimuli. But describing consciousness as an ability, that seems to me a 3rd person's view.

I’ve learned that the principle is called ‘relevance realization’ or ‘the salience landscape.’ It’s a guiding principle for all organic life. But self-aware rational beings might have requirements beyond those of other life-forms - think Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Other organisms are not able to consider the nature of existence in the way h.sapiens is, so questions of truth or falsehood don’t arise as part of their ‘salience landscape’. — Wayfarer

It’s true that most philosophers make qualitative distinctions between human and non-human mental processes. For instance, Joseph Rouse, who embraces Barad’s agential realism, argues that non-human animals have what he calls one-dimensional normativity, an ability to organize their thinking intentionally on the basis of normative goals. But for any given species, the overarching goals don’t change over the course of their life, so the only meaning of correctness or incorrectness for them is survival of their way of life. To reset their goals they would need the capacity for two-dimensional conceptual normativity, which only humans have.

Most organisms act to maintain and reproduce their lineage through ongoing responsiveness to life-relevant features of what thereby becomes their biological environment. Con-ceptually articulated ways of life are two-dimensional in the deeper sense that they are oriented not only toward continually maintaining their biological lineage but also toward determining what that way of life is and will be. This sense of two-dimensionality is “deeper” in that it enables those organisms to differentiate how they take their environment to be from how it is.

I think this is the latest version of ‘man the rational animal’ , and given how the supposed gap between human and non-human mental capabilities has had to be continually adjusted lower over the years, I suspect that Rouse’s distinction will eventually prove to be untenable.

I meant rewrite the thesis but avoid using those terms. Give a description you believe is accurate but that doesn't have recourse to "observer" or "experience" . — J

Recall I asked you to explain to me why we can't use those words, but you didn't.

The assumption that consciousness is material leads to empirical or conceptual problems to be solved. The assumption that consciousness is non-material leads to the hard and probably insurmountable problem, because of the dualism that it implies.

Out of everything in our universe, some carbon based organisms on this planet happen to have the ability to be conscious. And that's supposed to be a fundamental property of the universe? I don't think so. There's a lot more for us to learn about the universe, and so far there is little reason to split it in two.

And the world would be different without humans and their minds, so I don't see how you've made any sensible distinction between what it means to be subjective vs objective. — Harry Hindu

It should be clear by now, that it depends on whether we use those words in their ontological sense or their epistemic sense.

I was pointing out that the mind is not special in having things independent of it, so you have failed to make any sensible distinction between what is objective and subjective. — Harry Hindu

The mind is special in the sense that its existence is observer-dependent, unlike the world. The world doesn't depend on an observer to exist. They have different modes of existing.

I am conscious as I type this. In a couple hours, I will be unconscious. The states are fundamentally different. Aside from differences in brain activity, however, a physical exam of me in each state of consciousness would find very little different. — Patterner

They're fundamentally different under the assumption that consciousness is non-material, which implies dualism, i.e. that we split the world in two, which is implausible.