We need consciousness to think, therefore we need consciousness to make any inference about consciousness, that's the problem. — Skalidris

You haven't explained why this creates a logical impossibility. — Baden

Skalidris seems to be saying that consciousness, in the form of subjectivity, holds insuperable. If so, then no objective perception of consciousness is possible, and thus the insoluble problem for developing technology that generates subjectivity.

The undecidability of the question of an advanced cyborg having an innate unique selfhood as distinguished from a technology-based simulation of same might be insoluble.

I think AI will go forward to a technology-based simulation of selfhood. Can it somehow deviate from its programming into a unique sentience not programmed? In other words, can programming propagate an emergent and unique selfhood?

Moving towards Bladerunner 2049, can a technology-based emergent selfhood propagate another emergent selfhood in the mode of giving birth to a child?

Existentialism, which is centered on “existence precedes essence,” gives us a way forward with our database of scientific disciplines and their methodologies. We, as existentialists, can assert that we don’t really know the world beyond realistic-seeming narratives that, ultimately, in the absence of epistemological certainty, we hold as true on the basis of faith. Going forward from there, we try our best to have integrity as we hold faithful to our realistic-seeming narratives. — ucarr

The undecidability of the question of an advanced cyborg having an innate unique selfhood as distinguished from a technology-based simulation of same might be insoluble.

I think AI will go forward to a technology-based simulation of selfhood. Can it somehow deviate from its programming into a unique sentience not programmed? In other words, can programming propagate an emergent and unique selfhood?

Moving towards Bladerunner 2049, can a technology-based emergent selfhood propagate another emergent selfhood in the mode of giving birth to a child? — ucarr

So, I predict that technology-based sentience will, per the above speculations, eventually spawn unique sentience not programmed which, in turn, will spawn emergent selfhood in the mode of giving birth to a child.

This tells us that the insuperabillty of subjectivity of selfhood will be preserved across objective propagation of selfhood. So, the seeming-immateriality of selfhood, preserved as technology-based selfhood, will persist, and organic humans will not be any more certain about what it's like to be an independently conscious cyborg than they are certain about what it's like to be another organic human.

There will be difficulties in the organic human_independent cyborg relationships, but these difficulties will, to some extent, parallel the human-to-human relationship problems.

I think your point above makes an important clarification: there's something about the native point of view of the sentient that obstructs, so far, our understanding how (or if) physical processes give rise to the subjective experience. — ucarr

Yes, that's correct.

As I understand you, you're implying that the subjectivity of the sentient is insuperable i.e., it is a container which has no exit. — ucarr

Also correct.

If it’s true that the subjectivity of the sentient is insuperable, that then calls into question the possibility of objectivity in general. If the sentient cannot know what it’s like to be beyond its own subjective being, then it follows that the sentient cannot know what it’s like for anything, other than itself, to be, whether a stone, a galaxy or another person. — ucarr

Because we go by behavior. Lets say I eat a poison apple and get sick. My eyes glaze over, my pulse races, and I start to sweat remnants of the poison. That's a physical reality that does not depend on how the personal is personally experiencing the sensations of being poisoned.

It sounds strange, but, in my context here, when we claim to know the chemical composition/interactions of a rock, we’re also claiming to know “what it’s like to be that rock.” — ucarr

Its not strange at all. We objectively do not know what its like to be that rock. What we do is look at the measurable existence of the rock and 'its behavior'. Since we do not ascribe anything the rock 'does' to an internal locus, we say it doesn't behave like its conscious. But do we objectively know it does not have a subjective experience? No. We simply assume.

To be sure, knowing a rock by knowing its chemical composition/interactions is a much more simple phenomenon than knowing another person by knowing their consciousness, but the difference is a difference of degree, not a categorical difference. — ucarr

The difference is that a human has different behaviors that we ascribe to being conscious. But we cannot objectively know what its like for that other human to have the subjective experience of being themself.

If we’re locked out of objectivity because of insuperable subjectivity, then we’re thrown all the way back to securing our beliefs on the basis of faith rather than on the basis of science. — ucarr

We are locked out of objectivity in determining the subjective experience of any existence. It is faith that you and I share a similar consciousness. We can note that our behavior may be different, but that doesn't mean our subjective experience during that behavior is different or the same. For example, we could both see the color green, but I subjectively experience it differently then you. Indeed, some people are color blind. This means their subjective experience of green is so similar to another set of colors, that they can't really tell much of a difference. But can a color sighted person every objectively know what that's like? No.

Existentialism, which is centered on “existence precedes essence,” gives us a way forward with our database of scientific disciplines and their methodologies. We, as existentialists, can assert that we don’t really know the world beyond realistic-seeming narratives that, ultimately, in the absence of epistemological certainty, we hold as true on the basis of faith. — ucarr

This seems to hold on a surface level. Great points Ucarr!

The difference is that a human has different behaviors that we ascribe to being conscious. But we cannot objectively know what its like for that other human to have the subjective experience of being themself. — Philosophim

If we use the Turing_Chalmers' argument to the effect: a cyborg externally programmed to behave like a conscious human will appear to be conscious i.e., have a selfhood without that actually being the case, then we cannot be certain that an observed person is really internally conscious i.e., in possession of a selfhood.

Let me reverse engineer my argument above to apply to what you also said:

We objectively do not know what its like to be that rock. What we do is look at the measurable existence of the rock and 'its behavior'. Since we do not ascribe anything the rock 'does' to an internal locus, we say it doesn't behave like its conscious. But do we objectively know it does not have a subjective experience? No. We simply assume. — Philosophim

As you say, re: the rock's possible subjective experience, we simply assume not. So, possibly (but unlikely) the rock could be suppressing it's selfhood from expressing as behavior so as to keep its selfhood hidden from observers.

This is why I claim that my selfhood and your selfhood, though non-identical, approximate each other sufficiently generically so that it's correct to say the difference between the two is by degree instead of categorical. For this reason, then, you and I do know, to some practical degree, what it's like to be the other person.

Sentient beings cannot navigate the natural world of other sentients without knowing to a practical degree what it's like to be another sentient. Of course there are many problems in our efforts to understand each other. For this reason, books both fictional and non-fictional are written in numbers counting up into the millions.

...some people are color blind. This means their subjective experience of green is so similar to another set of colors, that they can't really tell much of a difference. But can a color sighted person every objectively know what that's like? No. — Philosophim

I've underlined the part of your above quote wherein you describe what it's like to be a color blind person without being one yourself. How is it that you can do that? You have enough information, both from science and from descriptions given by color blind persons to approximate in your understanding what the experience of color blindness is like. There is presumably some degree of separation between what the actually color blind person experiences subjectively, and your cognitive simulation of that experience but, again, I claim the difference is by a navigable degree, not by an impenetrable categorical difference.

As you say, re: the rock's possible subjective experience, we simply assume not. So, possibly (but unlikely) the rock could be suppressing it's selfhood from expressing as behavior so as to keep its selfhood hidden from observers. — ucarr

Another (unlikely) possibility is the rock subjectively experiences, but has no capability of expressing any behaviors. Maybe it's exactly what we think it is, but conscious.

Yes and No. Yes, we know that it happens in the brain. No, we do not know HOW. That's the HPoC. — Patterner

We're really not that far off from one another. Please don't take my disagreement as hostile. :) The reason why we don't know how is because we cannot currently know what its like to be the thing having the subjective experience. If we could, the hard problem would be solved.

I am the being having the subjective experience. That does not help me understand how it is achieved. — Patterner

Actually, you could determine how you experience. If you were in brain surgery and a doctor stimulated a region of your brain in the same way and you experienced a sensation every time, you would know how to create the sensation by stimulation your brain. In a less sense, we do this with drugs like alcohol, caffiene, or pain killers. You are the only one who knows what it feels like however. We can't take, "the state of Patterner's subjective experience," and say, "Any time a person drinks alcohol, they will have the same subjective experience of being tipsy as Patterner does."

We do not know how to go about the HP. That's why it's named the Hard. Because we don't know. How is all of that subjectively experienced? — Patterner

Right. We're along the same lines here again. This is because we can't know what its like objectively for something else to experience being them. That's all there is to it.

Physicist Brian Greene says there are no known properties of matter that even hint at such a thing. Why do I see red, rather than just perceive different frequencies, the way a robot with an electric eye might? — Patterner

The problem is we're looking at matter and energy externally for behavior. Since we cannot look internally to see what the experience of being that thing is like, we're stuck for now. Do we know how a robot with an electric eye experiences processing? We don't. We can observe behaviors, break it down into its bytes and bits, but when the entire process is running, when the code is flying by at millions of bytes per second, processes being monitored and checked...what is the experience like? We don't know. We currently can't know.

These things can, and do, take place without any subjective experience. — Patterner

Incorrect. We don't know. Just like I don't know if you have a subjective experience that is like mine at all. We do not know if a robot or a program doesn't have a subjective experience. It doesn't behave like a consciousness, but it doesn't mean there isn't a subjective experience. What is it like to be a bacteria? It responds, eats, and divides. What is it like to the be cells in my hands? The blood in my veins? All of these are living things. Do they have a subjective experience of being? We can't tell, because we can't BE the thing we're looking at.

If we use the Turing_Chalmers' argument to the effect: a cyborg externally programmed to behave like a conscious human will appear to be conscious i.e., have a selfhood without that actually being the case, then we cannot be certain that an observed person is really internally conscious i.e., in possession of a selfhood. — ucarr

What we don't know if whether the robot actually has a subjective experience of being a robot. Its does not have to be the consciousness of a human to have a subjective experience. A dog likely has a subjective experience because of its behavior, but we still don't know what its like to BE a dog.

To quote Patterner:

As you say, re: the rock's possible subjective experience, we simply assume not. So, possibly (but unlikely) the rock could be suppressing it's selfhood from expressing as behavior so as to keep its selfhood hidden from observers.
— ucarr
Another (unlikely) possibility is the rock subjectively experiences, but has no capability of expressing any behaviors. Maybe it's exactly what we think it is, but conscious. — Patterner

I've underlined the part of your above quote wherein you describe what it's like to be a color blind person without being one yourself. How is it that you can do that? You have enough information, both from science and from descriptions given by color blind persons to approximate in your understanding what the experience of color blindness is like. There is presumably some degree of separation between what the actually color blind person experiences subjectively, and your cognitive simulation of that experience but, again, I claim the difference is by a navigable degree, not by an impenetrable categorical difference. — ucarr

Its not unnavigatable, its just not objective. We take these conclusions through behaviors, approximations, and logical applications. I can imagine what it is like to be confused about something I see. So I take that feeling, and combine it with colors. Then I imagine two colors, and both are grey. Now I have an approximate understanding of what its like to be color blind, but I still don't have the objective 'subjective experience' of an actual color blind person.

Its like describing an apple to someone. You could probably make a pretty good approximation through descriptions based on what people know that aren't apples. But you wouldn't actually know what an apple was like until you saw it front of you. Until you tasted it yourself.

:up: :cool:

I would agree with ucarr that the basic sense of self is plausibly thought to be the same across species. Obviously this is not an empirically checkable assertion. It seems that almost nothing in philosophy is.
— Janus

I wouldn't say its plausible that the sense of self is the same across species. Even among humans, its known that people have different sense of selves. Did you know that some people cannot mentally visualize? When they close their eyes, all that's there is darkness. That would clearly be a different sense of self then someone who visualizes. Now compare that to a dog, a lizard, and a house fly who have different dna and brain compositions. I'm not saying they don't have a sense of self, but I don't think its plausible that they are the same.

I would argue as well that poor philosophy is that which cannot be verified, or has no pathways to verify it. Good philosophy does, and eventually becomes part of science or is incorporated into culture. — Philosophim

Of course the human sense of self is elaborate. I was referring to the basic sense of self which consists in the sense of being distinct from everything else. It is arguable that this sense comes with being embodied —with the interoceptive and proprioceptive senses that both animals and humans presumably enjoy.

What is generally considered good philosophy I think would be that which seems most plausible to the most people in light of the whole more or less coherent picture of the world and our place in it which reigns at any historical period. It seems likely there will never be complete consensus but there may be majority consensus.

As I see it is not a matter of empirical confirmation that distinguishes good from bad philosophy, but rather what is considered to be good philosophy is that which seems to cohere best with the interpretive picture we have built up from those things which can be empirically confirmed.

Why do I see red, rather than just perceive different frequencies, the way a robot with an electric eye might? — Patterner

How would those different frequencies be "perceived" if not in the form of different colours?

Another (unlikely) possibility is the rock subjectively experiences, but has no capability of expressing any behaviors. Maybe it's exactly what we think it is, but conscious. — Patterner

This is an intriguing conjectured phenomenon. One question raised by it that comes to mind is whether or not subjective experience counts as behavior. Usually, when a sentient experiences something, even if it's just observation, that subjective experience triggers physiological reactions that, by definition, are detectable. For example, if a sentient observers the approach of a powerful predator, typical physiological reactions include, acceleration of heartbeat and temperature, dilation of the pupils, and other symptoms of fear and stress. We don't suppose rocks can have such physiological reactions, but as soon as we imaginatively ascribe subjectivity to a rock, assumptions about fight or flight strategies for sake of survival enter the picture.

If the rock is conscious, but we don't know it, then the rock is far from being exactly what we think it is.

Our current turn in the conversation is promising along the lines of further examining the relationship between subjective/objective.

What we don't know if whether the robot actually has a subjective experience of being a robot. Its does not have to be the consciousness of a human to have a subjective experience. — Philosophim

Right. Our necessarily subjective examination of the robot, like our examination of everything else, terminates in a simulation based upon what we perceive concerning its nature and behavior. Ultimately, we're compelled to put faith in the serviceable accuracy of our simulations of the agents populating the world around us.

It must be the case that our objectivity is populated by these simulations.

If a simulation necessarily differs to some degree from its referent, then we can understand that the interface linking self with other is a complicated amalgam of the two. One generalization derivable is that no sentient is totally isolated because even the sentient's own selfhood can be simulated asymmetrically, as evidenced by multiple personality disorder.

If you're going to argue your position convincingly to someone else, you need to be open to tackling them. — Philosophim

And you need to be open to hearing your interlocutor, and I don't believe that you've been doing that.

Chalmer’s argument is directed at the inadequacy of physical accounts to accurately capture first-person experience, yours or anyone else’s.
— Wayfarer

Didn't you and I already address this on your first response to me? My point was that the heart of why this was is because we cannot know what its like to be another subjective individual. — Philosophim

Again, that is not the point of David Chalmer's essay, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. I'm taking issue with your paraphrase of his argument. If you want to argue that this is what he should say, feel free. But it's not what he does say.

And why is it hard to find why these functions are accompanied by conscious experience? Because we cannot know what it is like to BE that other conscious experience. — Philosophim

Again, it's not what he says. He says that there is no satisfactory theoretical account of ANY conscious experience, not just of other people's or of animals. I've said this a number of times, and then you straight away repeat your incorrect interpretation of his argument. You can take issue with his argument, but that's different to misrepresenting it. That's what I mean by 'not hearing'.

Alright, then try to counter these points, because these points note that our autonomy is physical.

1. Drugs that affect mood and decisions. A person getting cured of schizophrenia by medication for example.

2. The removal of the brain or physical processes that result in life from the brain, and the inability of autonomy to persist.

3. Brain damage resulting in differing behaviors and consciousness. — Philosophim

I think by 'autonomy', you mean 'anatomy'.

Certainly, physical influences can affect cognition—there’s no disputing that. Drugs can alter mood and behavior, and brain damage can lead to significant changes in consciousness and personality. But this doesn't demonstrate that consciousness is entirely a product of brain activity. It’s important to recognize that causation can work in both directions. Neuroplasticity—the brain’s ability to reorganize itself by forming new neural connections—shows that consciously undertaken actions and thoughts can have real, measurable effects on the brain’s structure and function. This is an example of top-down causation, where mental processes, such as attention, intention, and practice, influence neurophysiological changes, distinct from the bottom-up causation that is implied by physicalism. Your proposed schema is all 'bottom-up'.

Furthermore, the analogy of the brain as a receiver rather than just the generator of consciousness provides a different way to look at this issue. Just as a radio receives and tunes into waves without generating them, the brain may play a focusing or filtering role, modulating and organizing conscious experience but not wholly creating it. This view contrasts with the dominant idea that the brain produces consciousness in the same way that a factory produces a product. Instead, the brain might serve as a critical instrument through which consciousness manifests and interacts with the physical world. The fact that consciousness can change the brain's configuration through neuroplasticity suggests a dynamic interplay, rather than a one-way causal relationship between the brain and the mind. Besides, the origin of consciousness is arguably coterminous with the origin of life itself, and nobody really knows how that got started.

I don't know if the split-brain research is really relevant to that. In any case, it is discussed in Chapter 1 of Donald Hoffman's book Case Against Reality. He's a cognitive scientist, with a rather radical philosophical view, which I won't try and explain here. But after reviewing the split-brain experimental data, he concludes:

We have no scientific theories that explain how brain activity—or computer activity, or any other kind of physical activity—could cause, or be, or somehow give rise to, conscious experience. We don’t have even one idea that’s remotely plausible. If we consider not just brain activity, but also the complex interactions among brains, bodies, and the environment, we still strike out. We’re stuck. Our utter failure leads some to call this the “hard problem” of consciousness, or simply a “mystery.” ...

What do we want in a scientific theory of consciousness? Consider the case of tasting basil versus hearing a siren. For a theory that proposes that brain activity causes conscious experiences, we want mathematical laws or principles that state precisely which brain activities cause the conscious experience of tasting basil, precisely why this activity does not cause the experience of, say, hearing a siren, and precisely how this activity must change to transform the experience from tasting basil to, say, tasting rosemary. These laws or principles must apply across species, or else explain precisely why different species require different laws. No such laws, indeed no plausible ideas, have ever been proposed. — Donald Hoffman, The Case Against Reality, Pp 18-19

You seem to think that information can only matter if a human is involved. But if information can exist apart from matter and energy, how can this be? — Philosophim

Information doesn't exist in the same way that matter and energy do—it isn't a physical substance or force. Instead, information exists in the relationships between entities, and its significance depends on interpretation. Think of a book: where exactly is the information in that book? The ink on the page is simply matter, but the information arises only when a reader interprets it, and only if they understand the language or code it’s written in. The book itself is not one thing and its meaning another; rather, the meaning emerges through the interaction between the symbols on the page and a mind capable of understanding them.

Information, in this sense, is relational. It depends on the patterns or structures that carry meaning and on the existence of an interpreter. This makes information fundamentally different from matter and energy—it’s not a physical object but something that manifests through relationships and interpretation. I think this is what Norbert Weiner meant when he said 'information is information, not matter or energy'. And no, not just because he was a poor epistemologist.

What I'm noting is that the standard model of science posits that the brain is the source of human consciousness, at least in terms of behavior. — Philosophim

I think, actually, that you will find that a very difficult claim to support. You assume that this is what science posits, but there's some important background you're missing here.

At the beginning of modern science, proper, 'consciousness' in the first person sense was excluded from the objects of consideration. Proper objects were those which could be defined and analysed in terms of the primary attributes of determinate figure, size, position, motion/rest, and number etc. Qualities such as colour, taste, smell, etc, were deemed secondary or subjective.

Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, Pp35-36

Now, when you say 'the standard model of science', I think this is what you mean. And within that model the only 'real objects' are, well, objects. If 'mind' or 'consciousness' can be said to exist, then it can only be as a product of those objects. That's why you're incredulous at the denial of a causal relationship between brain and mind - to you, it's just 'the way things are'. But I'm afraid it doesn't hold up to philosophical scrutiny.

How would those different frequencies be "perceived" if not in the form of different colours? — Janus

We have machines that can differentiate different frequencies. For them, it's binary code.
BLACK
00000000
00000000
00000000

RED
11111111
00000000
00000000

WHITE
11111111
11111111
11111111

BLUE
00000000
00000000
11111111

I don't know nearly enough of how our visual system works. My Behe quote stops with a current being transmitted down the optic nerve to the brain. I don't know what happens there. But nothing red or blue happens.

Our eyes have photoreceptors called rods and cones. Rods detect shades of grey and cones detect different colours. Presumably a machine that can respond to different wavelengths would have some kind of photoreceptors.

When you talk about how we perceive are you talking about our conscious awareness of our colour perceptions or simply our unconscious responses which arguably go on most of the time? Of course I won't argue that non-biological machines can be consciously aware of their detections of colour differences.

The HPoC is why the unconscious responses are accompanied by the conscious awareness, rather than going on "in the dark." They can go on in the dark, as they do in the non-biological machines we've made that can perceive and differentiate different frequencies of the electromagnetic spectrum, and act in different ways in response to different frequencies. The physical processes that take place within us don't suggest conscious awareness. The physical properties of particles (mass, charge, spinn, etc.) don't suggest conscious awareness. So why the redness of red, or the sweetness of sugar? Why subjective experience at all?

We believe machines don't understand themselves to be consciously experiencing anything. We do understand ourselves to be consciously aware on account of language. How would the thought "I am consciously aware" be possible without language? We reflect on experience and say things like "i saw something red". Perhaps it is that post hoc reflection that makes us think we are sometimes consciously aware. It is only the moments we recall that could make us believe that. Those moments are in the tiny minority. At least for me.

Physical processes don't suggest conscious awareness, unless you mean behavior. The physical processes that don't suggest awareness don't suggest the absence of conscious awareness either. Nor do they suggest that awareness could not arise from physical processes.

You ask why subjective awareness at all. Presuming it is a real thing then why not? We have a subjective prejudice that physical stuff could not have subjective experience. Exactly what would be the argument supporting that conclusion? We have nothing to compare our situation with so it remains just an assumption based on intuitive feelings I think.

How would the thought "I am consciously aware" be possible without language? — Janus

I don't know if it is. It seems very difficulty to separate human thought from human language. However, animals have thoughts that don't seem connected with language. Danger. Safe. Food. Mate. Protect. We would have had at least as many before we developed language. (No way to know, but maybe our ability to have thoughts without language reached the point where it couldn't increase further. One day, something finally triggered in someone's head, and they started creating language.)

We reflect on experience and say things like "i saw something red". Perhaps it is that post hoc reflection that makes us think we are sometimes consciously aware. It is only the moments we recall that could make us believe that. Those moments are in the tiny minority. At least for me. — Janus

I did see something red. And I don't need post hoc reflection on such an experience. I can look at something red right now, and reflect on the experience as I'm having it.

Physical processes don't suggest conscious awareness, unless you mean behavior. The physical processes that don't suggest awareness don't suggest the absence of conscious awareness either. Nor do they suggest that awareness could not arise from physical processes.

You ask why subjective awareness at all. Presuming it is a real thing then why not? We have a subjective prejudice that physical stuff could not have subjective experience. Exactly what would be the argument supporting that conclusion? We have nothing to compare our situation with so it remains just an assumption based on intuitive feelings I think. — Janus

You are right about all that. But here's how I see it. I've used this analogy before.

If I saw a skyscraper made entirely of liquid H2O, I'd be awfully suspicious. To my knowledge, the properties of liquid H2O cannot explain a skyscraper. Do those properties suggest the absence/impossibility of skyscrapers? I suppose not. But I'm still thinking it's suspicious.

Of course, we should look into the properties of H2O. It seems to be the only thing we have to work with, after all. Maybe we just aren't aware of all its properties. Maybe we haven't yet thought of all the ways the properties we're aware of can be combined.

But we try and try, and can't find anything to explain it. We don't even have a theory for how it can be. We just keep assuming it must be nothing but liquid H2O, since we can't find anything else involved. So we assume if we gather enough water, we'll eventually see how it makes skyscrapers.

I think the case for consciousness is even more difficult to explain. At least H2O and skyscrapers both have physical properties, and no suggestion of non-physical properties. Even processes like flight, metabolism, and vision can be seen to come from purely physical foundations. Subjective experience cannot. The properties of matter that we know of, and have measured to an amazing degree, do not suggest subjective experience.

The argument for reductionism I hear most often is, just because we haven't figured it out with our sciences yet, doesn't mean we won't. My opinion is the fact that we haven't should not be considered evidence that we will. Nor is there evidence that the things we are aware of because of our sciences are the only things that exist. The different nature of subjective experience, on the other hand, suggests something different is involved.

It seems very difficulty to separate human thought from human language...animals have thoughts that don't seem connected with language. Danger. Safe. Food. Mate. Protect. We would have had at least as many before we developed language... — Patterner

All members of the animal kingdom make audible utterances in response to what they're experiencing. As cognitive capacity increases going upward along the food chain, the audible utterances in response to cognitive experiences become more complicated.

Audible utterances for a specific type of experience are repeated as that type of experience repeats. The mind of the creature takes memory impressions of a specific type of experience matched to a specific type of utterance.

At the human level, this same general process of memorization of audible utterance patterns matched to corresponding experiences generates words and sentences shared by members of the group experiencing these audible utterance_experience duets.. Language.

Human language is merely the more intricately detailed deluxe version of sound patterns matched to experiences practiced by the entire vocal subset of the animal kingdom.

Language, like human thought, is material_physical. The continuum running from the current_voltage variations of neuronal circuits to the vibrating vocal chords of utterance to the receptive hearing of listeners followed by their own symmetrical mirroring of same within themselves is material_physical.

Perhaps it is that post hoc reflection that makes us think we are sometimes consciously aware. It is only the moments we recall that could make us believe that. — Janus

I did see something red. And I don't need post hoc reflection on such an experience. I can look at something red right now, and reflect on the experience as I'm having it. — Patterner

There is the question whether experience of direct sensory input is incomprehensible_inexpressible stimulation_perturbation of a material_physical state, with this brute force registration of a now altered state -- perhaps somewhat parallel to an electron hit by a photon and then elevated to a higher orbital shell in its now excited state -- causing a memory circularity that is the reflection Janus refers to above.

So, by this continuity, consciousness is rooted in circularity_redundancy and, like Wayfarer's point about the meaning of a printed book being inter-relational -- as in the waveform of mass, i.e., energy as distinguished from the particle form of mass, i.e., matter -- does not possess a discretely resolved position and direction; consciousness, like in the reading of a book, does not have a discrete vector measurement possible, and so it appears as if pre-QM science cannot measure consciousness.

QM, however, can and does measure the probability clouds of energetically perturbed elementary particles. Also, the whereness of vector-measurable phenomena is addressed as waveform-like probability graphs in a theater of action that allows existential ambiguities of the physical_material. It's math that currently makes the closest approach to the physical_material status of consciousness.

We must continue to mine math's ability to measure things we can't imagine experientially.

How did quantum mechanics come up?

Neurons have 100 trillion atoms so I don't see the mechanism of consciousness at the atomic or quantum level at all.
...just neurons operating at the scale of neurons seems to be the right scale of consciousness.

And consciousness has a non-physical component.

If you recall what you were doing ten years ago that is part of your personal consciousness.
The physical reality of ten years ago doesn't exist.
It's just a memory. Non-physical information.
I think most of us would classify a memory as both information and a component of consciousness.

So the logic is given memories of the past are know to be not physical then consciousness is known to have non-physical components supported by brain biology. To me that's where the logic leads.
Chalmers didn't do anyone any favors in setting up the hard problem.
I just disregard him.

Again, that is not the point of David Chalmer's essay, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. I'm taking issue with your paraphrase of his argument. If you want to argue that this is what he should say, feel free. But it's not what he does say. — Wayfarer

As I've noted before, I'm not quoting Chalmers. I appreciate the point out to Chalmer's words, but I'm simply noting the underlying support and reason for the hard problem. Think of it this way. Lets say that we could examine a brain, and objectively know exactly what it feels like when that brain functions in a particular way. The hard problem would disappear. But as long as we can never objectively know what its like to have the subjective experience of another being, the hard problem stays.

Again, it's not what he says. He says that there is no satisfactory theoretical account of ANY conscious experience, not just of other people's or of animals. — Wayfarer

Again, I'm not quoting Chalmers. As to what he's talking about, its not behavior. Its the fact that we cannot experience the subjective experience of another being. We are not in disagreement on this.

Drugs can alter mood and behavior, and brain damage can lead to significant changes in consciousness and personality. But this doesn't demonstrate that consciousness is entirely a product of brain activity. — Wayfarer

True, but do we have evidence of something independent of the brain in regards to consciousness?

Neuroplasticity—the brain’s ability to reorganize itself by forming new neural connections—shows that consciously undertaken actions and thoughts can have real, measurable effects on the brain’s structure and function. — Wayfarer

The fallacy here is the assumption that consciousness is independent of the brain. If it is not, and simply a result of the brains functions, it is the brain affecting the brain. While an interesting avenue to look into something independent of the brain, we need evidence of that something for this to be a viable point.

This is an example of top-down causation, where mental processes, such as attention, intention, and practice, influence neurophysiological changes, distinct from the bottom-up causation that is implied by physicalism. Your proposed schema is all 'bottom-up'. — Wayfarer

My proposal doesn't use top or bottom. I simply believe that physical matter and energy can have subjective experiences. It is a property of matter like, dry, wet, sandy, etc. It is what it is 'to be'. To what point? I don't know. That's the hard problem. We can't know what its like for a skin cell to be that skin cell. At what point does a clump of brain cells have a subjective experience? Is the subjective experience of being drunk the same across every individual? We can't objectively know.

Furthermore, the analogy of the brain as a receiver rather than just the generator of consciousness provides a different way to look at this issue. Just as a radio receives and tunes into waves without generating them, the brain may play a focusing or filtering role, modulating and organizing conscious experience but not wholly creating it — Wayfarer

Sure. I have no problem with this idea. But do we have evidence that the brain is only a receiver? We do have evidence in regards to how the senses are processed. So in that regard, it is. But as for consciousness, where does the brain receive this? How? Is there some type of measurement we can find that shows there is something independent of the brain affecting the brain? For that, we don't. So while its a nice idea to explore, the lack of evidence leads this to a dead end.

We have no scientific theories that explain how brain activity—or computer activity, or any other kind of physical activity—could cause, or be, or somehow give rise to, conscious experience. We don’t have even one idea that’s remotely plausible — Donald Hoffman, The Case Against Reality, Pp 18-19

Correct, and I am not disagreeing with this. What he is not saying is, "Consciousness is not physical." What he's really asking implicitly is, "Why is consciousness physical?" Why can something physical have a subjective experience? To me, its like asking why water is wet. Why does a rock exist at all? Why is there something instead of nothing? It is the mystery of being.

What do we want in a scientific theory of consciousness? Consider the case of tasting basil versus hearing a siren. For a theory that proposes that brain activity causes conscious experiences, we want mathematical laws or principles that state precisely which brain activities cause the conscious experience of tasting basil, precisely why this activity does not cause the experience of, say, hearing a siren, and precisely how this activity must change to transform the experience from tasting basil to, say, tasting rosemary. These laws or principles must apply across species, or else explain precisely why different species require different laws. No such laws, indeed no plausible ideas, have ever been proposed. — Donald Hoffman, The Case Against Reality, Pp 18-19

Again, nothing that I've said contradicts this. At the crux of it all, why is this? Because we cannot objectively determine what its like to have the subjective experience of tasting basil. I can know what its like for me, and you can know what its like for you. But we can't objectively know what its like for the other person.

Information doesn't exist in the same way that matter and energy do—it isn't a physical substance or force. Instead, information exists in the relationships between entities, and its significance depends on interpretation. — Wayfarer

And yet wasn't there a relationship between the radio waves, the radio, and then the sound played? Isn't an interpretation a physical response to stimulus or an event?

The book itself is not one thing and its meaning another; rather, the meaning emerges through the interaction between the symbols on the page and a mind capable of understanding them. — Wayfarer

Your book example is spot on. And I can agree that we can have an interpretation of information as both a medium which exists, and the interplay between that medium and an interpreter. What hasn't been shown is the noun or the interpretation of information that isn't through some physical medium. Can you think of one?

Information, in this sense, is relational. It depends on the patterns or structures that carry meaning and on the existence of an interpreter. This makes information fundamentally different from matter and energy—it’s not a physical object but something that manifests through relationships and interpretation. — Wayfarer

What are thing things in relationship, and what is doing the interpreting? What is easier to state with what we know, is that matter and energy can hold particular states (information as noun) and can have reactions when that state collides with another state which we call an interpreter (information as relation). What is wrong with saying that this is an aspect of the physical world, when we have evidence of a radio interpreting waves?

What I'm noting is that the standard model of science posits that the brain is the source of human consciousness, at least in terms of behavior.
— Philosophim

I think, actually, that you will find that a very difficult claim to support. You assume that this is what science posits, but there's some important background you're missing here.

At the beginning of modern science, proper, 'consciousness' in the first person sense was excluded from the objects of consideration. — Wayfarer

I want to be clear again, I am noting that science can measure consciousness as behavior, and agree 100% with you that it cannot currently objectively know the first person sense of it. As for behavior, the entirety of neuroscience, pharmacology, and psychiatry operates and functions as if consciousness as a behavior is an objective result of the mind. Without this, the entirety of modern medicine would not work.

Now, when you say 'the standard model of science', this is what you mean (whether you're aware of it or not.) And within that model the only 'real objects' are, well, objects. If 'mind' or 'consciousness' can be said to exist, then it can only be as a product of those objects. That's why you're incredulous at the denial of a causal relationship between brain and mind - to you, it's just 'the way things are'. But I'm afraid it doesn't hold up to philosophical scrutiny. — Wayfarer

I don't believe its a product of these objects. I believe it is the experience of being these objects. If it was a product, we could see it. We can't see it, because we aren't 'what it is like to be that'. The radio exists. What is it like to be it? The cells in your feet exist. What is it like to be those living cells? Its not a product, its an aspect of being that matter and energy has. The only way to know, is to be it.

Does this sound far fetched? Go with me for a second and take the idea that you're a physical being. Then you are 'something'. You are the existence of that. Not a chair over there, or the light bouncing around. You are a physical human being, and that is what it is like for you to exist. If you were 'something else' then you would be what it is like to be 'that something else'. Why keep introducing 'something else' when we have no evidence for it? Why introduce unnecessary complexity when we have the simple answer in front of us that works in accordance near perfectly with the behavior aspect of consciousness as well?

Regardless Wayfarer, thank you for tackling those points again. You're an intelligent and well spoken person, and I do enjoy reading your perspective even if I don't always agree on it. We also may be going around and around at this point, and if you feel we're rehashing old ground, you have my respect if you feel there is nothing more to add.

Physical processes don't suggest conscious awareness, unless you mean behavior. The physical processes that don't suggest awareness don't suggest the absence of conscious awareness either. Nor do they suggest that awareness could not arise from physical processes.

You ask why subjective awareness at all. Presuming it is a real thing then why not? We have a subjective prejudice that physical stuff could not have subjective experience. Exactly what would be the argument supporting that conclusion? We have nothing to compare our situation with so it remains just an assumption based on intuitive feelings I think. — Janus

Well said Janus.

we can't objectively know what its like for the other person. — Philosophim

Hoffman's theory is that there's no plausible theory that links the physical causes with the experiential feeling.

Why introduce unnecessary complexity when we have the simple answer in front of us that works in accordance near perfectly with the behavior aspect of consciousness as well? — Philosophim

The 'unnecessary complexity' you're referring to is philosophy, growing from the awarness that we're not simply physical things.

Regardless Wayfarer, thank you for tackling those points again. You're an intelligent and well spoken person, and I do enjoy reading your perspective even if I don't always agree on it. — Philosophim

:pray: Kind of you to say so.

//

There are a few more points I will make:

I'm simply noting the underlying support and reason for the hard problem. — Philosophim

You're not, though. You say:

The idea that consciousness is caused by our physical brains is the easy problem. — Philosophim

That is not what Chalmer's says at all. So stop saying that you're 'interpreting' or 'supporting' Chalmer's argument, when you're actually disagreeing with it. If you were honest, what you would say is 'there is no hard problem as Chalmers describes it'.

I can agree that we can have an interpretation of information as both a medium which exists, and the interplay between that medium and an interpreter. What hasn't been shown is the noun or the interpretation of information that isn't through some physical medium. Can you think of one? — Philosophim

Information itself is not a medium. If I transmit information electronically, the medium is copper or electromagnetic waves, or through speech as sound waves in the air. They are physical media. But the interpretation of information is not a physical process, and information is not physical. Again this is why Norbert Weiner says that 'information is not matter or energy'.

What is wrong with saying that this is an aspect of the physical world, when we have evidence of a radio interpreting waves? .. wasn't there a relationship between the radio waves, the radio, and then the sound played? Isn't an interpretation a physical response to stimulus or an event? — Philosophim

Humans build radios to do that and then interpret the sounds as meaningful. There is nothing in the 'physical world', if you mean the world outside human affairs, that will do that.

For decades, radio telescopes have been scanning the universe looking for signals from intelligent life. Overall, they've found none (with one possible exception.) All the signals so far have a physical or natural origin. If they found a signal originated by an alien intelligence, it would be something other than physical or natural.

As for behavior, the entirety of neuroscience, pharmacology, and psychiatry operates and functions as if consciousness as a behavior is an objective result of the mind. Without this, the entirety of modern medicine would not work. — Philosophim

As noted, psychosomatic medicine, the placebo effect, etc, undercut physicalist accounts of mind.

But the interpretation of information is not a physical process, — Wayfarer

Not information created and interpreted by humans. And I know that's what you're talking about. But what about other kinds of information?

For many tiny critters, light hits an eyespot, which sends signals to flagella, which react according to that information.

DNA is a better example. The information encoded in it is the blueprint for amino acids and proteins. The interpretation of that information and the production of the amino acids/proteins is the same process.

Please don't take my disagreement as hostile. :) — Philosophim

It had not crossed my mind. No worries at all.

DNA is a better example. The information encoded in it is the blueprint for amino acids and proteins. The interpretation of that information and the production of the amino acids/proteins is the same process. — Patterner

Quite agree! That's why biosemiotics and information biology is such a big deal.There's a biological theorist called Marcello Barbieri who addresses this exact point in What is Information? He distinguishes two competing paradigms, the 'chemical' and 'informational' paradigm, the former being more materialist of the two.

the ontological claim of the chemical paradigm (is) the idea that all natural processes are completely described, in principle, by physical quantities. This view is also known as physicalism, and it is based on the fact that biological information is not a physical quantity. So, what is it? A similar problem arises with the rules of the genetic code: they cannot be measured and cannot be reduced to physical quantities, so what are they?

According to physicalism, biological information and the genetic code are mere metaphors. They are like those computer programs that allow us to write our instructions in English, thus saving us the trouble of writing them in the binary digits of the machine language. Ultimately, however, there are only binary digits in the machine language of the computer, and in the same way, it is argued, there are only physical quantities at the most fundamental level of Nature.

He distinguishes that from the infomation paradigm:

Ernst Mayr, one of the architects of the modern synthesis, has been one of the most outspoken supporters of the view that life is fundamentally different from inanimate matter. In The growth of biological thought [15], p. 124, he made this point in no uncertain terms: ‘… The discovery of the genetic code was a breakthrough of the first order. It showed why organisms are fundamentally different from any kind of nonliving material. There is nothing in the inanimate world that has a genetic program which stores information with a history of three thousand million years!’

The idea that ‘life is chemistry plus information’ implies that information is ontologically different from chemistry, but can we prove it?

I'll leave it to you to read it, but it's a deep question. Suffice to say, I'm more persuaded by what he calls the informational view. But then, I believe there's a real distinction - an ontological distinction - between inorganic matter and life itself, which is why I'm not a materialist. Materialism must deny that distinction, as for it, there is only one kind of substance, and living forms are just 'arrangements of matter'.

Don't expect a resolution anytime soon.

I'll leave it to you to read it, but it's a deep question. — Wayfarer

I have. Biosemiotics, beginning with that page in particular, was one of the first things I learned after coming to TPF.

That is not what Chalmer's says at all. So stop saying that you're 'interpreting' or 'supporting' Chalmer's argument, when you're actually disagreeing with it. If you were honest, what you would say is 'there is no hard problem as Chalmers describes it'. — Wayfarer

I decided to get Chalmer's words himself.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=yHTiQrrUhUA

Check out around 6:40. His notes are:

"The hard problem is concerned with phenomenal consciousness: what its like to be a subject.

At 8:26 he goes into the Easy problem. Again, this is about consciousness as behavior.

We have to be careful when we speak of consciousness to understand the implicit aspect that we're talking about. When I say, "Consciousness is your brain" I'm talking about the behavioral aspect of consciousness, which has not been refuted as of today.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bejm1mYsr5s

In this video at about 5:40 to the end, he covers what he means by 'consciousness as a subjective experience is immaterial'. He notes its like space, time, etc. Of this, I have no problem. This is a question I've been asking for some time now from you Wayfarer, "What is it for consciousness to not be physical?" Here Chalmers gives a clear reply. And this definition of 'not physical', I have no problem with. Its a classification of category, not a claim that, "It is not matter and energy". Just like we cannot have space without matter, and time without matter, it is not a claim that we can have consciousness without matter. This definition of 'immaterial' is perfectly fine for me. This is because it is the creation of a concept within reality that does not care as to the specifics of its makeup. As long as one does not conclude from this that consciousness exists as some essence apart from the physical reality we live in, its fine.

Information itself is not a medium. If I transmit information electronically, the medium is copper or electromagnetic waves, or through speech as sound waves in the air. They are physical media. But the interpretation of information is not a physical process, and information is not physical — Wayfarer

If it is not a physical process, then what is it Wayfarer? I've already described a radio. I've already noted the brain processes information through the senses, and I don't think you deny those are physical. Its fine to claim its not physical, but if you can not demonstrate it as something else, then I don't see it being viable.

Humans build radios to do that and then interpret the sounds as meaningful. There is nothing in the 'physical world', if you mean the world outside human affairs, that will do that. — Wayfarer

Ok, but you're not countering the point that information can be interpreted by physical things. If humans are physical, then there is nothing odd with them interpreting information either. I think the only way this works for you is if its assumed that humans aren't physical. Since this is not the general viewpoint, we need to provide evidence that they aren't physical. Otherwise my point that information can exist a physical medium and physical interpretation holds.

For decades, radio telescopes have been scanning the universe looking for signals from intelligent life. Overall, they've found none (with one possible exception.) All the signals so far have a physical or natural origin. If they found a signal originated by an alien intelligence, it would be something other than physical or natural. — Wayfarer

I was with you until you said it had to be something other than physical. We don't even know if something other than the physical exists.

As noted, psychosomatic medicine, the placebo effect, etc, undercut physicalist accounts of mind. — Wayfarer

This does not if one assumes that consciousness is an aspect of physical reality like 'wetness'. In which case consciousness is also a part of physical reality, and conscious thoughts could affect the brain and body.

First up, great work reviewing those videos and taking it on.

This is a question I've been asking for some time now from you Wayfarer, "What is it for consciousness to not be physical?" Here Chalmers gives a clear reply. And this definition of 'not physical', I have no problem with. Its a classification of category, not a claim that, "It is not matter and energy"...Check out around 6:40. His notes are:

"The hard problem is concerned with phenomenal consciousness: what its like to be a subject. — Philosophim

Right - and he says, straight out:

7:05: Lawrence Robert Kuhn: "is your consciousness immaterial?"

David Chalmers: "It's not physical"

He says 'there are properties of the world that go beyond atoms and space and time'. It is a claim that whatever consciousness is, it's not included in space-time-matter-energy. He says outright (7:16) we need to add a further property to our inventory of the world's properties, namely, 'consciousness'. He then says, it doesn't mean it has to be located 'up in heaven' or 'in some wholly different realm' - he says it might be an additional property that is associated with matter (a position which is called 'panpsychism'). But it's crucial to recognise that he doesn't say it can be explained in terms of known physical properties. He says that science has to admit consciousness as a fundamental property. By that he means it is irreducible, it can't be explained in terms of something else.

This definition of 'immaterial' is perfectly fine for me — Philosophim

Well, that's progress, so long as you understand what you're agreeing with.

I was with you until you said it had to be something other than physical. We don't even know if something other than the physical exists. — Philosophim

I keep trying to explain that this is because of the way that we conceive of 'something other than physical'. As I said already, we see it the way we do, because of the way modern thought has divided the world into 'the physical' (the things science can examine, matters of objective fact) and 'the subjective' (mind, thought, etc), following Descartes, who called the mind 'res cogitans' or 'thinking substance'.

Notice that Chalmer's says that the fact consciousness is not physical doesn't mean it's (7:26) 'up in heaven' or 'in the land of ectoplasm'. He says that because we're inclined to concieve of 'the non-physical' in those terms - ghostly ethereal stuff, thinking substance. So it's a trap! Chalmers is pointing out that we have to approach the whole question in a different way: neither 'physicalism', nor 'immaterialism' in that archaic sense.

Just like we cannot have space without matter, and time without matter, it is not a claim that we can have consciousness without matter. — Philosophim

Right. There's your 'thinking stuff' again.

It's great you're digging into this, but you will need to understand that you can't both agree with Chalmer's argument, and also hold that consciousness is physical.

//here is another essay (in .pdf) by Chalmers with a round-up of the various arguments for and against materialism in philosophy of mind. It's quite long but clearly written and may be a useful reference.//

I decided to get Chalmer's words himself.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=yHTiQrrUhUA — Philosophim

Thanks for this! I've seen several of his videos, but hadn't seen this one before.

As long as one does not conclude from this that consciousness exists as some essence apart from the physical reality we live in, its fine. — Philosophim

I can't watch it now. Pushing midnight. So I don't know exactly what he's says, although I've heard and read some of him. But no, that's not there idea. The idea is that, in addition to the physical properties of matter we're familiar with - mass, charge, spin, etc. - properties that we can measure and study with our physical sciences, there is a mental property. Not being physical, we cannot measure and study it with our physical sciences. It is no more removable from matter than mass is. Even though it is not physical, it is not "apart from the physical reality we live in."

The idea is that, in addition to the physical properties of matter we're familiar with - mass, charge, spin, etc. - properties that we can measure and study with our physical sciences, there is a mental property. Not being physical, we cannot measure and study it with our physical sciences. It is no more removable from matter than mass is. Even though it is not physical, it is not "apart from the physical reality we live in." — Patterner

I'd sign off on that as in interpretation of Chalmers.

Another, from Bernardo Kastrup:

Chalmers basically says that there is nothing about physical parameters – the mass, charge, momentum, position, frequency or amplitude of the particles and fields in our brain – from which we can deduce the qualities of subjective experience. They will never tell us what it feels like to have a bellyache, or to fall in love, or to taste a strawberry. The domain of subjective experience and the world described to us by science are fundamentally distinct, because the one is quantitative and the other is qualitative. It was when I read this that I realised that materialism is not only limited – it is incoherent. The ‘hard problem’ of consciousness is not the problem; it is the premise of materialism that is the problem.

Then, as somebody with a strong analytic disposition, I immediately felt a gaping abyss in my understanding of the world. So I started looking for an alternative, correcting those previously unexamined assumptions – materialist assumptions – that I was making, replacing them with what I thought was a more reliable starting point and trying to rebuild my understanding of the world from there. I ended up as a metaphysical idealist – somebody who thinks that the whole of reality is mental in essence. It is not in your mind alone, not in my mind alone, but in an extended transpersonal form of mind which appears to us in the form that we call matter. Matter is a representation or appearance of what is, in and of itself, mental processes.