The choice to say, write your name on the moon, does not belong to anyone. Nobody has a "right" to do so, so we not need to protect anyone's ability to make that choice. — Dan

I really don't think I am understanding what you are saying, but maybe this is the key to why I am having difficulty. Are you proposing a third category of choice here, those which belong to no one? And, any choices made which concern "public property" are choices which belong to no one?

So I conclude that when you say "one's own choice" is a choice which concerns one's own mind, body, and property, "property" is really the defining feature. So if I choose to write my name on the moon (as your example), or just to take a walk in the park, this concerns public property, and so it is no one's choice to make. I would have thought, that walking in the park, or going to the moon, since it concerns doing something with my own body, is my own choice to make. However, I'm now starting to understand that "my own mind and body" are accidentals in the judgement of whether the choice is mine, and property is the essential determining factor. So regardless of the fact that I am using my own body to walk in the park, the property is public, therefore it is a choice I make which does not belong to anyone.

Now, when you say that we need to protect the ability of people to make their own choices, what it means to people like me (who value their mind more than their property), is that you want to protect their rights to do what they want with their own property. To me, this is very problematic, because "one's property is not something static, and we need principles by which one can come to own property, and accumulate it.

I didn't say people don't have common goals. I said I take issue with the idea there is a goal or end that all of humanity is aimed at. Big difference. — Dan

Sure it's different, but the difference is insignificant. Instead of having individuals divided by distinct goals, as I described, your proposal divides by distinct groups, sects of humanity. Individuals cannot cooperate without common goals, and distinct groups or sects cannot cooperate without common goals. So the very same problem persists, but instead of consisting of individuals who cannot cooperate because they do not have the same goals, it consists of groups pf people who cannot cooperate because they do not have the same goals.

Again, in brief (and heavily simplified) I think Hume is broadly right that we should consider rationality more in terms of means-ends, rather than specificying rational goals. — Dan

Oh, that's very problematic. Means are deemed as "good" in relation to goals. If there is no system for judging ends then differing ends will produce inconsistent and conflicting "goods". If we couple this with the principle you propose, of no common goals for all humanity, then humanity becomes disunited, unable to resolve the question of who\s goods are the real goods.

I'm not entirely sure what you mean here. Are you taking issue with me disagreeing with this assumption, or are you claiming that I'm making this assumption? — Dan

Sorry, the double negative threw me off. We may agree here. I disagree that it is irrational to treat your own ends as more valuable than others, but I think this is consistent with traditional moral principles. I do not think it is consistent with your principles. Since, as described above, you value property higher than an individual's mind, you restrict one's choices (and ends) according to property based principles (what we get to do in relation to property). And property based principles require an assumed equality of individuals. Equality of individuals reduces to an equality of ends, what I desire is equal to what you desire, therefore we have equal access to ownership of property.

Mind and body are not at all accidental. Choices about what to happens to do with your own mind, body, and property, are yours. Choices which aren't about that aren't yours. Unless someone has built a park around you such that you can't go for a walk at all without crossing it, then yes walking in the park is a choice about how to use some public property, not about what to do with your body. A choice about what to do with your body might be, for example, whether you want your arm amputated. I would be inclined to agree that one's mind and body are more important than one's property (though exactly how that works I'm not sure, hence the original post).

Sure it's different, but the difference is insignificant. Instead of having individuals divided by distinct goals, as I described, your proposal divides by distinct groups, sects of humanity. Individuals cannot cooperate without common goals, and distinct groups or sects cannot cooperate without common goals. So the very same problem persists, but instead of consisting of individuals who cannot cooperate because they do not have the same goals, it consists of groups pf people who cannot cooperate because they do not have the same goals. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it's not insignificant. I think a lot of people share some common goals, but not that all people share one common goal.

Oh, that's very problematic. Means are deemed as "good" in relation to goals. If there is no system for judging ends then differing ends will produce inconsistent and conflicting "goods". If we couple this with the principle you propose, of no common goals for all humanity, then humanity becomes disunited, unable to resolve the question of who\s goods are the real goods. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not at all, because I don't think morality is the same thing as rationality, so there can be moral good without it being something that all rational agents would agree on as their goal/end.

Since, as described above, you value property higher than an individual's mind, you restrict one's choices (and ends) according to property based principles (what we get to do in relation to property). And property based principles require an assumed equality of individuals. Equality of individuals reduces to an equality of ends, what I desire is equal to what you desire, therefore we have equal access to ownership of property. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, all of this is wrong. I don't 'value property higher than an individual's mind' at all. This is exactly what I mean by you misunderstanding me to such a degree that I wonder if it is intentional. I have never said that, and I think I have been pretty clear that I don't think that. But you keep insisting that I do think that and then running with that assumption. I mean, I don't think what you've said here follows either, but that is all secondary to the fact that the core assertion here, that I value property over individual's minds, is just incorrect.

Mind and body are not at all accidental. Choices about what to happens to do with your own mind, body, and property, are yours. Choices which aren't about that aren't yours. Unless someone has built a park around you such that you can't go for a walk at all without crossing it, then yes walking in the park is a choice about how to use some public property, not about what to do with your body. A choice about what to do with your body might be, for example, whether you want your arm amputated. I would be inclined to agree that one's mind and body are more important than one's property (though exactly how that works I'm not sure, hence the original post). — Dan

This makes no sense at all to me. How is it that choosing to amputate my arm is a choice of what to do with my own body, but choosing to take a walk is not? Is it only choices to injure myself which qualify as choices of what to do with my own body? How can it not be the case that choosing to take a walk is choosing to do something with my own body?

I don't 'value property higher than an individual's mind' at all. — Dan

Your principles clearly demonstrate that you value an individual's property higher than an individual's mind. As we discussed, by your principles, stealing another's property is a choice we do not get to make, it's not one's own choice, but teaching, or corrupting, another's mind is a choice we get to make, as one's own. See, another's property is considered in the judgement, but another's mind is not considered. You argued that teaching is irrelevant, so I assume that giving false information, and lying are also not morally relevant. You argued that making someone angry has no moral relevance.

The latest thing you said, to indicate that you value property higher than body and mind is that a walk in the park is not a choice about the health of one's own mind and body, it's a choice about the public property, the park. You prove this by saying that the choice is no one's because the property is public, even though the choice is about doing something with one's own mind and body. You continually demonstrate this, judging whether a choice is one's own or not, by reference to property, and with complete disregard for what the person is doing with one's mind and body, and how the choice will affect the minds of others. It's very clear evidence that you value property over minds.

This makes no sense at all to me. How is it that choosing to amputate my arm is a choice of what to do with my own body, but choosing to take a walk is not? Is it only choices to injure myself which qualify as choices of what to do with my own body? How can it not be the case that choosing to take a walk is choosing to do something with my own body? — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say choosing to take a walk isn't a choice that belongs to you, but choosing to take a walk in a specific park, as opposed to somewhere else, does not belong to you.

See, another's property is considered in the judgement, but another's mind is not considered. You argued that teaching is irrelevant, so I assume that giving false information, and lying are also not morally relevant. You argued that making someone angry has no moral relevance. — Metaphysician Undercover

Because none of these things involve taking someone's choice about their mind away from them. There are certainly things that might do this, but simply lying to someone, or teaching them something, does not take away their choices about their mind. You might well disagree with me about what constitutes the choices that belong to a person regarding their mind (and it certainly seems that you do) but that doesn't mean I don't value the choices a person has over their minds as much as I do those over their property. I simply don't agree with you that some of these things, such as teaching someone, constitute taking away someone's choice regarding what to do with their mind.

The latest thing you said, to indicate that you value property higher than body and mind is that a walk in the park is not a choice about the health of one's own mind and body, it's a choice about the public property, the park. You prove this by saying that the choice is no one's because the property is public, even though the choice is about doing something with one's own mind and body. You continually demonstrate this, judging whether a choice is one's own or not, by reference to property, and with complete disregard for what the person is doing with one's mind and body, and how the choice will affect the minds of others. It's very clear evidence that you value property over minds. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, this is just incorrect. The choice to take a walk in a specific park very much relies on that specific park. The person doesn't own that park, so that choice does not belong to them. If the park is removed to make way for something else, that person is not wronged by no longer being able to walk in that specific park. If they were not able to go for a walk at all that would indeed be reducing their ability to make their own choices regarding their body, but the choice to go for a walk in a particular park clearly isn't a choice that belongs to the person. It isn't about property mattering more than one's body or mind, it is about being specific about what choices belong to a person and which don't. You are very quick to interpret what I'm saying in a way that supports your assertion that I value choices over property more than choices over body and mind, given that I am telling you that I don't, perhaps it would benefit you to consider whether you might be interpreting me wrong when you keep coming to those conclusions?

I didn't say choosing to take a walk isn't a choice that belongs to you, but choosing to take a walk in a specific park, as opposed to somewhere else, does not belong to you. — Dan

This makes no sense to me. Choosing to take a walk, is a choice of what to do with my own body, how does choosing a specific place to walk change this? Don't we always choose a specific place to walk?

Because none of these things involve taking someone's choice about their mind away from them. — Dan

This is a fine example of the problem you create by discarding your stated definition of one's own choice, and taking up a new problematic self-referential definition. Now, all of a sudden, "one's own mind, body, and property" has no definitional bearing, because you've replaced it with not "taking someone's choice about their mind away from them". But in doing this you negate the original definition as inapplicable, so I have no idea what "someone's choice about their mind" actually means, just a self-referential definition.

simply lying to someone, or teaching them something, does not take away their choices about their mind. — Dan

See, now you've gone completely to the new definition, if the choice one makes "does not take away their choices about their mind", then it does not rob them of the capacity to make their own choices, and therefore it is a choice one can make. However, you've negated the original definition "choice concerning one's own mind, body, and property", so that we cannot even refer to it in our judgement as to whether the choice is truly one's own (by the original definition).

Clearly, by the original definition, the choice to teach someone, just like the choice to deceive someone, is a choice about what to do with another person's mind. But we cannot discuss this, because "one's own choice" has been given a new definition, "does not take away another's capacity to make one's own choice", Furthermore, "another's capacity to make one's own choice" is strictly qualified with "one's own property", such that another's choice always concerns one's property, and one's mind is completely irrelevant, as your attitude toward teaching and deceiving reveals.

but that doesn't mean I don't value the choices a person has over their minds as much as I do those over their property. — Dan

It's very clear, that in your judgement, as to which choices qualify as "one's own", property is valued higher than one's mind and body. Look at the example of taking a walk. That's a choice concerning one's own body. However, as soon as we determine the specific property upon which the walk will be taken, the nature of that property takes precedence and becomes the determining factor as to whether the choice is one's own or not. And this is the case in all of your examples, stealing etc., as soon as there is property involved in the choice, ownership of the property overrides all other features of the choice, becoming the determining factor as to whether the choice is one's own or not. But, things involving another's mind, like teaching and deceiving, have no such determining influence.

Again, this is just incorrect. The choice to take a walk in a specific park very much relies on that specific park. The person doesn't own that park, so that choice does not belong to them. — Dan

See, very clear evidence that you prioritize property ownership. The person doesn't own the park so the choice automatically does not belong to them, no exceptions. However, in the case of teaching or deceiving, where the choice clearly involves an intentional effect on another's mind, there is an exception imposed, it is judged as not morally relevant. Why is the choice to use the public park not provided the same exception of not morally relevant?

By the principle you demonstrate here, the choice to speak is not a choice which belongs to a person. The air we breathe is public, just like the park, and choosing to speak into it is not a choice which belongs to the person, just like choosing to walk in the public park does not belong to a person. This is the problem you've caused yourself by giving priority to property as a principle for judgement as to what constitutes one's own choice. Much property is public, and if people have no ownership over their choices to use public property, then the middle category of neither one's own choice, nor not one's own choice, becomes extremely inflated, to the point where the principle "one's own choice" becomes useless.

It isn't about property mattering more than one's body or mind, it is about being specific about what choices belong to a person and which don't. — Dan

This is exactly the problem you have created by replacing the definition of one's own choice, "choices concerning ones own mind, body, and property", with the self-referential definition of not interfering with another's capacity to make one's own choices. Now, it is impossible to be specific about which choices are one's own, because there is no definition. So the judgement is just based in arbitrary, subjective principles and prejudice. You say that having an effect on property which is not your own makes it so the choice does not belong to you, but having an effect on a mind which does not belong to you does not bring about the same judgement call, because you provide an exception. There is no rule, because there is no longer a definition.

This makes no sense to me. Choosing to take a walk, is a choice of what to do with my own body, how does choosing a specific place to walk change this? Don't we always choose a specific place to walk? — Metaphysician Undercover

It's a matter of what constitutes reducing your ability to make a choice. Your choice is to take a walk, so stopping you taking a walk would take that choice away from you. Your choice is not to take a walk in that park, so that park not being there does not reduce your ability to make a choice that belongs to you.

This is a fine example of the problem you create by discarding your stated definition of one's own choice, and taking up a new problematic self-referential definition. Now, all of a sudden, "one's own mind, body, and property" has no definitional bearing, because you've replaced it with not "taking someone's choice about their mind away from them". But in doing this you negate the original definition as inapplicable, so I have no idea what "someone's choice about their mind" actually means, just a self-referential definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not changing any definitions. Again, you seem to be interpreting me in a very strange way. When I say "Because none of these things involve taking someone's choice about their mind away from them" I mean that none of the actions you have mentioned reduce the person's ability to understand or make their own choices.

See, now you've gone completely to the new definition, if the choice one makes "does not take away their choices about their mind", then it does not rob them of the capacity to make their own choices, and therefore it is a choice one can make. However, you've negated the original definition "choice concerning one's own mind, body, and property", so that we cannot even refer to it in our judgement as to whether the choice is truly one's own (by the original definition).

Clearly, by the original definition, the choice to teach someone, just like the choice to deceive someone, is a choice about what to do with another person's mind. But we cannot discuss this, because "one's own choice" has been given a new definition, "does not take away another's capacity to make one's own choice", Furthermore, "another's capacity to make one's own choice" is strictly qualified with "one's own property", such that another's choice always concerns one's property, and one's mind is completely irrelevant, as your attitude toward teaching and deceiving reveals. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, no new definition. The choices one can make are not only their own choices (choices that belong to them). Rather, only one's ability to understand and make one's own choices (choices that belong to them) needs to be protected. You seem to be bulling past this distinction and it is causing confusion. Neither of the things you have mentioned involve taking away someone's ability to understand and make their own choices, so they aren't morally problematic.

It's very clear, that in your judgement, as to which choices qualify as "one's own", property is valued higher than one's mind and body. Look at the example of taking a walk. That's a choice concerning one's own body. However, as soon as we determine the specific property upon which the walk will be taken, the nature of that property takes precedence and becomes the determining factor as to whether the choice is one's own or not. And this is the case in all of your examples, stealing etc., as soon as there is property involved in the choice, ownership of the property overrides all other features of the choice, becoming the determining factor as to whether the choice is one's own or not. But, things involving another's mind, like teaching and deceiving, have no such determining influence. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not "very clear" at all. It is simply not the case. Whether or not other people lie to you is not a choice that belongs to you, so lying to someone does not reduce their ability to understand or make their own choices (by itself, obviously it could in some circumstances). The case of the park is not a case of choices over property trumping choices over one's body, it is simply a case of the choice to do something being different from the choice to do something with a specific thing that isn't yours. For example, the choice for you to swing your arm might be a choice that belongs to you, the choice for you to swing your arm into my face is not. Me not providing my face to be swung into does not reduce your ability to understand and make your own choices, just like your local authority not providing you a park does not reduce your ability to understand and make your own choices. I am merely being specific and you are infering things I am not implying.

However, in the case of teaching or deceiving, where the choice clearly involves an intentional effect on another's mind, there is an exception imposed, it is judged as not morally relevant. Why is the choice to use the public park not provided the same exception of not morally relevant? — Metaphysician Undercover

An effect is not what is at issue. What is important is whether someone's ability to understand and make their own choices is reduced/protected or not. In both the case of not providing a park and the case of lying to someone, it is not.

By the principle you demonstrate here, the choice to speak is not a choice which belongs to a person. The air we breathe is public, just like the park, and choosing to speak into it is not a choice which belongs to the person, just like choosing to walk in the public park does not belong to a person. This is the problem you've caused yourself by giving priority to property as a principle for judgement as to what constitutes one's own choice — Metaphysician Undercover

No, much like choosing to go for a walk is a choice that belongs to a person, choosing to speak also is a choice that belongs to someone. Choosing to speak into that specific air isn't a choice that belongs to someone. If a wind blew past and they were suddenly speaking into different air, that wouldn't wrong them, just like choosing to walk in that specific park is not a choice that belongs to them such that they would not be wronged were that park not there. Seriously, you would find it much easier to understand what I'm saying if you stopped assuming I was suggesting something lunatic. I'm not. I am saying that the choice to walk in a specific park is not one that belongs to you, but the choice to go for a walk is.

This is exactly the problem you have created by replacing the definition of one's own choice, "choices concerning ones own mind, body, and property", with the self-referential definition of not interfering with another's capacity to make one's own choices. Now, it is impossible to be specific about which choices are one's own, because there is no definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, I haven't replaced any definitions. I have been consistent in how I am using these terms throughout.

It's a matter of what constitutes reducing your ability to make a choice. Your choice is to take a walk, so stopping you taking a walk would take that choice away from you. Your choice is not to take a walk in that park, so that park not being there does not reduce your ability to make a choice that belongs to you. — Dan

I don't agree with this. I think choices are very specific, while desires may be more general. I believe the proper representation is that my desire is to take a walk (something general), and my choice is to take a walk in that specific park. The choice is what inclines one to act, and it is always specific, never general. For example, hunger manifests as a general desire to eat, but when a person decides to eat, it always must be a specific thing which they chose to eat.

I believe this difference between the general desire, and the specific choice is very important to moral philosophy. Since desire is general, and choice is specific, this allows us to mitigate the effects of desire, because we can entertain numerous possibilities as to the specific thing which will fulfil the desire. So, in the example of taking a walk in the park, the general desire is to take a walk, but it is not a choice until I choose an actual pace to walk. In the meantime, between desiring to walk, and actually choosing to walk (which requires a specific place to walk), I can consider the moral consequences of the different specific possibilities.

I'm not changing any definitions. Again, you seem to be interpreting me in a very strange way. When I say "Because none of these things involve taking someone's choice about their mind away from them" I mean that none of the actions you have mentioned reduce the person's ability to understand or make their own choices. — Dan

You're obviously not understanding my criticism, so let me put it in another way. When judging whether a choice is one's own or not, you often refer to how the choice affects another's capacity to make one's own choices. This is an overriding principle, it overrides your definition of one's own choice, as a choice which involve one's own mind, body and property. It overrides your definition, because many examples I have given you, of choices which concern my own mind, body, and property, you reject them as my own, on the basis that such a choice would restrict another's ability to make one's own choices. So do you agree, that the true definition of one's own choice, the one which you are actually applying, is a choice which does not limit another's capacity to make one's own choices? But that definition suffers the problem of being self-referential

Again, no new definition. The choices one can make are not only their own choices (choices that belong to them). Rather, only one's ability to understand and make one's own choices (choices that belong to them) needs to be protected. You seem to be bulling past this distinction and it is causing confusion. Neither of the things you have mentioned involve taking away someone's ability to understand and make their own choices, so they aren't morally problematic. — Dan

It is you who is continually ignoring the fact that lying and deception actually do take away peoples' ability to understand and make their own choices. Lying and deception creates misunderstanding which is clearly contrary to someone's ability to understand and make their own choices.

so lying to someone does not reduce their ability to understand or make their own choices (by itself, obviously it could in some circumstances). — Dan

This is obviously wrong. That's exactly what lying and deception does do, reduces their ability to understand and make their own choices, through the means of misunderstanding. How is it possible that misunderstanding does not reduce a person's ability to understand one's choices? To put it in terms of property (which seems to be the only terms you understand), imagine if I give you a car, and I say here, I bought this for you. So you drive it and it turns out that you are driving a stolen car. Doesn't this "misunderstanding" demonstrate clearly to you, how lying and deception reduces the ability to understand one's own choices? And it isn't just in some cases, it's in all cases, because that's what deception is, the creation of misunderstanding for the purpose of manipulating the person's choices.

The case of the park is not a case of choices over property trumping choices over one's body, it is simply a case of the choice to do something being different from the choice to do something with a specific thing that isn't yours. — Dan

You are ignoring the comparison. Choosing to deceive, and choosing to educate are both choices concerning doing something with something that isn't yours. You are doing something with the mind of another. Yet you allow that choosing to do these things with the minds of others are choices which belong to a person. However, when it's something like walking in the park, you say that it is not a choice which belongs to the person because it involves property which does not belong to the person. Clearly, "property" is valued higher than "minds". To do something with property which does not belong to you is not your own choice, but to do something with a mind which doesn't belong to you is your own choice.

An effect is not what is at issue. What is important is whether someone's ability to understand and make their own choices is reduced/protected or not. In both the case of not providing a park and the case of lying to someone, it is not. — Dan

See, there you go, switching definition. What is important, according to your definition, is whether the choice concerns one's own mind, body, and property. Now you say, "what is important is whether someone's ability to understand and make their own choices is reduced/protected or not". Which is the defining feature? They are not the same. You simply switch back and forth, as convenient, and in this way you avoid the criticism. When it suits you, one's own choice is a choice concerning one's own mind, body and property, but then other times it serves you better to say that one's own choice is a choice which doesn't reduce another's ability to make one's own choices. The latter is a self-referential definition.

No, much like choosing to go for a walk is a choice that belongs to a person, choosing to speak also is a choice that belongs to someone. Choosing to speak into that specific air isn't a choice that belongs to someone. If a wind blew past and they were suddenly speaking into different air, that wouldn't wrong them, just like choosing to walk in that specific park is not a choice that belongs to them such that they would not be wronged were that park not there. Seriously, you would find it much easier to understand what I'm saying if you stopped assuming I was suggesting something lunatic. I'm not. I am saying that the choice to walk in a specific park is not one that belongs to you, but the choice to go for a walk is. — Dan

I'm starting to think you really are suggesting lunacy.

I don't agree with this. I think choices are very specific, while desires may be more general. I believe the proper representation is that my desire is to take a walk (something general), and my choice is to take a walk in that specific park. The choice is what inclines one to act, and it is always specific, never general. For example, hunger manifests as a general desire to eat, but when a person decides to eat, it always must be a specific thing which they chose to eat.

I believe this difference between the general desire, and the specific choice is very important to moral philosophy. Since desire is general, and choice is specific, this allows us to mitigate the effects of desire, because we can entertain numerous possibilities as to the specific thing which will fulfil the desire. So, in the example of taking a walk in the park, the general desire is to take a walk, but it is not a choice until I choose an actual pace to walk. In the meantime, between desiring to walk, and actually choosing to walk (which requires a specific place to walk), I can consider the moral consequences of the different specific possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

But the choice which belongs to you is the choice to take a walk, not to take a walk in that specific park. Though any exercise of that choice might involve a specific destination, the destination is not the thing that belongs to you, and no particular destination (as opposed to any other) is required for you to exercise that choice.

You're obviously not understanding my criticism, so let me put it in another way. When judging whether a choice is one's own or not, you often refer to how the choice affects another's capacity to make one's own choices. This is an overriding principle, it overrides your definition of one's own choice, as a choice which involve one's own mind, body and property. It overrides your definition, because many examples I have given you, of choices which concern my own mind, body, and property, you reject them as my own, on the basis that such a choice would restrict another's ability to make one's own choices. So do you agree, that the true definition of one's own choice, the one which you are actually applying, is a choice which does not limit another's capacity to make one's own choices? But that definition suffers the problem of being self-referential — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure that I do this at all. I'm not necessarily opposed one's own choices being in part determined by whether those choices belong to someone else, but I think I have been fairly consistent that your own choices are those regarding what happens to your own mind, body and property. I don't think I have introduced an overriding principle so much as you have claimed that you stealing my car is your choice to make because it involves your own body, when it is clearly a choice of what to do with my car.

It is you who is continually ignoring the fact that lying and deception actually do take away peoples' ability to understand and make their own choices. Lying and deception creates misunderstanding which is clearly contrary to someone's ability to understand and make their own choices. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is only contrary when the person is decieved about the nature of the choice they have to make. Decieving them about other things (even things that might influence what choice they make) does not reduce this ability. There's quite a good paper by Hallie Liberto regarding sexual consent that could potentially help clarify this discussion a bit if you don't mind some homework.

This is obviously wrong. That's exactly what lying and deception does do, reduces their ability to understand and make their own choices, through the means of misunderstanding. How is it possible that misunderstanding does not reduce a person's ability to understand one's choices? To put it in terms of property (which seems to be the only terms you understand), imagine if I give you a car, and I say here, I bought this for you. So you drive it and it turns out that you are driving a stolen car. Doesn't this "misunderstanding" demonstrate clearly to you, how lying and deception reduces the ability to understand one's own choices? And it isn't just in some cases, it's in all cases, because that's what deception is, the creation of misunderstanding for the purpose of manipulating the person's choices. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a fine example of deception being wrong. The person thinks they are making one kind of choice but they are actually making another. That's fine. I have no issue with deception sometimes being wrong, I'm just pointing out that it often isn't. To use a different example, imagine you buy me a car which I accept because I believe it to be a gift in good faith. Unbeknown to me, you have chosen this car because you wish to ruin my reputation. Perhaps it has been recently voted the worst car for the environment and you intend to smear me for being irresponsible. You lying to me about your reasons does not reduce my ability to understand and make the choice to accept the car. Your reasons were never my choice to make.

This is a bit of a silly example, but there are plenty of sensible ones we could use too. For example, imagine you tell people at a party that you are an olympic athlete so they will think you are cool. This does not reduce their ability to understand or make their choice to spend time with you (I think I would say that the nature of this choice that belongs to you is de re, rather than de dicto). This is a much more realistic example of lying not reducing a person's ability to understand and make their own choices.

Further, I think it is you who are getting too caught up on property. You keep asserting that it is all I care about, but it just isn't.

You are ignoring the comparison. Choosing to deceive, and choosing to educate are both choices concerning doing something with something that isn't yours. You are doing something with the mind of another. Yet you allow that choosing to do these things with the minds of others are choices which belong to a person. However, when it's something like walking in the park, you say that it is not a choice which belongs to the person because it involves property which does not belong to the person. Clearly, "property" is valued higher than "minds". To do something with property which does not belong to you is not your own choice, but to do something with a mind which doesn't belong to you is your own choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

I wouldn't categorize choosing to try to decieve as a choice regarding what to do with someone else's mind. It might affect them, but it isn't a choice of what to do with them. Same for education. For example, I might continually tell you that I don't value property more highly than mind or body, but I can't make you learn that.

See, there you go, switching definition. What is important, according to your definition, is whether the choice concerns one's own mind, body, and property. Now you say, "what is important is whether someone's ability to understand and make their own choices is reduced/protected or not". Which is the defining feature? They are not the same. You simply switch back and forth, as convenient, and in this way you avoid the criticism. When it suits you, one's own choice is a choice concerning one's own mind, body and property, but then other times it serves you better to say that one's own choice is a choice which doesn't reduce another's ability to make one's own choices. The latter is a self-referential definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not switching the definition, I'm talking about two different things. Whether a choice belongs to someone is about whether it is a choice of what to do with their mind, body, or property. Whether a choice is right or wrong (or good or bad) is about whether it reduces or protects (or neither) someone's ability to understand and make those choices that belong to them. Same definitions as always.

I'm starting to think you really are suggesting lunacy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Given what you are inferring from everything I say, I don't doubt it. What I would ask is to read what I've written with the assumptions that I am being consistent and am at least moderately intelligent. This will likely lead to fewer misunderstandings.

But the choice which belongs to you is the choice to take a walk, not to take a walk in that specific park. Though any exercise of that choice might involve a specific destination, the destination is not the thing that belongs to you, and no particular destination (as opposed to any other) is required for you to exercise that choice. — Dan

I don't agree with your description of "choice", as I explained. I choose to take a walk in a specific place, the specific place is an essential part of the choice. Without it, I would not walk anywhere because i would not have decided on a place to walk. Since I would not walk anywhere, this cannot be a choice to take a walk. What you call "the choice to take a walk" is not a choice at all, it's just a general desire, the desire to take a walk, which does not become a choice until a specific place to walk is chosen. Only when I have a specific place chosen to walk, do I have a choice to take a walk, because without choosing a direction, a walk will not follow.

but I think I have been fairly consistent that your own choices are those regarding what happens to your own mind, body and property — Dan

The issue is as I've shown, that not every choice regarding what happens to one's own mind, body and property, is one's own choice. In many cases (examples I have provided), you have said that a choice regarding one's own mind, body, and property, will have an effect on others, which makes you judge the choice as not one's own, due to that effect. So you negate your own definition, with a whole slew of exceptions, principally if the choice restricts another's capacity to understand and make one's own choices, then the choice does not belong to the person. You really do override your own definition. How does it make sense to you, to define one's own choice as a choice regarding one's own mind, body and property, and then proceed to dismiss a whole bunch of choices regarding one's own mind, body and property, as not qualifying to be one's own choice, for some other reason.

It might be more accurate to define one's own choice as a choice regarding one's own mind, body, and property, which does not interfere with another's choice regarding one's own mind, body, and property. But this would be very problematic, because most choices interfere with others, in some way or another. That would leave "one's own choice" as a rather useless principle. So you have described a special type of interference, and this becomes the base of your exceptions. The problem which you and I have, is that we do not agree on when the named boundary, outlining the exceptions, has been crossed. And, there can be no clear solution here due to the issue of self-reference. Therefore we will likely always disagree and there will be no principles available to resolve the disagreement.

It is only contrary when the person is decieved about the nature of the choice they have to make. Decieving them about other things (even things that might influence what choice they make) does not reduce this ability. There's quite a good paper by Hallie Liberto regarding sexual consent that could potentially help clarify this discussion a bit if you don't mind some homework. — Dan

We clearly disagree about the nature of deception. I think that you do not understand it at all, trying to belittle its effect. I don't think homework on my part will resolve this, I think you need to look more closely at what deception really is, rather than just considering one very uncommon type, being "deceived about the nature of the choice they have to make". This doesn't even make sense. Convincing a person that they "have to make" a specific choice, is an act of deception itself.

This is a fine example of deception being wrong. The person thinks they are making one kind of choice but they are actually making another. That's fine. I have no issue with deception sometimes being wrong, I'm just pointing out that it often isn't. — Dan

The issue is not whether deception is "wrong". The issue is whether it restricts another's capacity to understand and make one's own choices. And, regardless of the fact that your refuse to recognize this, the answer is yes, it does. Deception creates misunderstanding therefore it restricts a persons capacity to understand and make one's own choices. On the contrary, education increases one's capacity to understand and make one's own choices, but faulty education, even if it's not intentional deception, restricts that capacity by creating misunderstanding.

You lying to me about your reasons does not reduce my ability to understand and make the choice to accept the car. — Dan

Of course it does. Can't you see that? Me lying to you about the car caused you to misunderstand the gift, which you accepted, but you may not have accepted it if you knew the truth. You had a lack of understanding within your own choice to accept the gift

This does not reduce their ability to understand or make their choice to spend time with you — Dan

Of course it reduces their ability to understand and make their own choice. When they believe the lie, their choice is based in a misunderstanding. This explicitly means that their understanding has been reduced. How can you think otherwise?

I wouldn't categorize choosing to try to decieve as a choice regarding what to do with someone else's mind. It might affect them, but it isn't a choice of what to do with them. Same for education. For example, I might continually tell you that I don't value property more highly than mind or body, but I can't make you learn that. — Dan

You are flatly denying what is obvious. A choice to educate another person is a choice to do something with that person's mind, just as much as a choice to steal another's car is a choice to do something with another's property. That it must makes sense to the person to be able to teach it to the person, does not imply that teaching isn't doing something with another's mind. It's just a condition, like in order for me to steal your car I need to be in the proximity of it.

I'm not switching the definition, I'm talking about two different things. Whether a choice belongs to someone is about whether it is a choice of what to do with their mind, body, or property. Whether a choice is right or wrong (or good or bad) is about whether it reduces or protects (or neither) someone's ability to understand and make those choices that belong to them. Same definitions as always. — Dan

This is incorrect. You very clearly said that when I use my own mind, body, and tools, to take your car, this is not a choice which belongs to me, even though I am using my own mind, body, and property. But when using my own property has an effect on your property which is morally irrelevant, then you allow that it is my own choice. Clearly you allow whether you believe that a choice is right or wrong, to influence your judgement as to whether the choice belongs to the person.

Given what you are inferring from everything I say, I don't doubt it. What I would ask is to read what I've written with the assumptions that I am being consistent and am at least moderately intelligent. This will likely lead to fewer misunderstandings. — Dan

I always assume consistency until I encounter what appears to be inconsistency. Then I ask the author to clarify. If the author cannot clarify, I conclude inconsistency. What I've discovered with you is that you have proposed a concept "one's own choice", with specific precepts. However, the concept is not viable under the precepts you assume ought to constitute it. So the proposed concept gets lost and is not viable.

The issue is as I've shown, that not every choice regarding what happens to one's own mind, body and property, is one's own choice. In many cases (examples I have provided), you have said that a choice regarding one's own mind, body, and property, will have an effect on others, which makes you judge the choice as not one's own, due to that effect. So you negate your own definition, with a whole slew of exceptions, principally if the choice restricts another's capacity to understand and make one's own choices, then the choice does not belong to the person. You really do override your own definition. How does it make sense to you, to define one's own choice as a choice regarding one's own mind, body and property, and then proceed to dismiss a whole bunch of choices regarding one's own mind, body and property, as not qualifying to be one's own choice, for some other reason.

It might be more accurate to define one's own choice as a choice regarding one's own mind, body, and property, which does not interfere with another's choice regarding one's own mind, body, and property. But this would be very problematic, because most choices interfere with others, in some way or another. That would leave "one's own choice" as a rather useless principle. So you have described a special type of interference, and this becomes the base of your exceptions. The problem which you and I have, is that we do not agree on when the named boundary, outlining the exceptions, has been crossed. And, there can be no clear solution here due to the issue of self-reference. Therefore we will likely always disagree and there will be no principles available to resolve the disagreement. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure you have shown this. There are potentially some complicated cases, but I don't think the ones you have suggested, such as stealing my car, are among them. These seem pretty clear.

We clearly disagree about the nature of deception. I think that you do not understand it at all, trying to belittle its effect. I don't think homework on my part will resolve this, I think you need to look more closely at what deception really is, rather than just considering one very uncommon type, being "deceived about the nature of the choice they have to make". This doesn't even make sense. Convincing a person that they "have to make" a specific choice, is an act of deception itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not "have to" in the sense of must. "have to make" in the sense of the choice that they have. I can give some examples that don't involve property if you like, though they can get a bit distasteful as sexual consent is the next most obvious case.

The issue is not whether deception is "wrong". The issue is whether it restricts another's capacity to understand and make one's own choices. And, regardless of the fact that your refuse to recognize this, the answer is yes, it does. Deception creates misunderstanding therefore it restricts a persons capacity to understand and make one's own choices. On the contrary, education increases one's capacity to understand and make one's own choices, but faulty education, even if it's not intentional deception, restricts that capacity by creating misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

It might create misunderstanding, but unless it creates misunderstand about what choice the person is making (or what it is to make such a choice), then it doesn't reduce their ability to understand and make that choice.

Of course it does. Can't you see that? Me lying to you about the car caused you to misunderstand the gift, which you accepted, but you may not have accepted it if you knew the truth. You had a lack of understanding within your own choice to accept the gift — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't misunderstand the choice to accept the car though. I understood what I was accepting, which was the choice that belonged to me. I didn't understand your nefarious plans to ruin my reputation and, had I understood this, I might not have accepted the gift, but whether or not you set out on such a plot was not a choice that belonged to me. The choice that was mine to make was whether to accept the car you are presenting me with, possibly in a certain condition specified by you, and your deception didn't make me misunderstand that choice.

Of course it reduces their ability to understand and make their own choice. When they believe the lie, their choice is based in a misunderstanding. This explicitly means that their understanding has been reduced. How can you think otherwise? — Metaphysician Undercover

They might make their choice based on a misunderstanding, but it is not a misunderstanding of what choice they are making. It is only the person's ability to understand and make the choices that belong to them that is being used as the measure of value here. I think you think I am setting a higher bar here than I am.

You are flatly denying what is obvious. A choice to educate another person is a choice to do something with that person's mind, just as much as a choice to steal another's car is a choice to do something with another's property. That it must makes sense to the person to be able to teach it to the person, does not imply that teaching isn't doing something with another's mind. It's just a condition, like in order for me to steal your car I need to be in the proximity of it. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I choose to educate you, you might simply walk away, or not check my post, or simply ignore what I'm saying. Unless I am strapping you to a chair and forcing you to listen, then I'm not taking your choice away. Can you see how this is quite clearly different from you taking my car?

This is incorrect. You very clearly said that when I use my own mind, body, and tools, to take your car, this is not a choice which belongs to me, even though I am using my own mind, body, and property. But when using my own property has an effect on your property which is morally irrelevant, then you allow that it is my own choice. Clearly you allow whether you believe that a choice is right or wrong, to influence your judgement as to whether the choice belongs to the person. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, because it's a choice about what to do with my stuff. Choices of what to with your own stuff belong to you, choices of what to do with mine (or anyone else's) don't. Think of it this way: There are things that belong to you, specifically your mind, body, and property. Where only those things are concerned, you get to make all the decisions. When it comes to other people's stuff, such as their minds, bodies, and property, those choices belong to them. Is that a clear way of thinking about it? I can give you a more formal definition if it would help.

I'm not sure you have shown this. There are potentially some complicated cases, but I don't think the ones you have suggested, such as stealing my car, are among them. These seem pretty clear. — Dan

I used that example, as an extreme, to bring to your attention the complexity of human interactions with "property" as the medium. If you dismiss the car stealing example, because the intent of the thief is to do something with the other's property, even though the thief is using one's own property (tools) to do this, then we also need to dismiss cases of purchasing, where on uses one's own property (money) with the intent of doing something with another's property (what is purchased).

"There are potentially some complicated cases" is a gross understatement. The reality is that the vast majority of human interactions are "complicated cases", making your simple principle "one's own choice", completely ineffective, and unsuitable for the task you assign to it, due to the subjectiven, and arbitrary principles which you are forced to apply in your judgements as to whether a choice fulfills the criteria of "one's own". In reality, you simply apply some preconceived ideas about morally good and bad, to make that judgement, even though you insist that it is not. Then, "protecting one's ability to understand and make one's own choices" turns out to be nothing more than encouraging moral restraint, as I pointed out earlier.

Not "have to" in the sense of must. "have to make" in the sense of the choice that they have. I can give some examples that don't involve property if you like, though they can get a bit distasteful as sexual consent is the next most obvious case. — Dan

The point I am making is that we do not need to involve property or human bodies in these examples. We have three distinct items named, mind, body, and property. Without involving property, or body, we can discuss mind to mind relations, which occur through the medium of communication. These interactions consist primarily of one mind affecting another mind, and as such are morally relevant.

However, you dismiss these, and refuse to discuss them as morally relevant because (I assume), you cannot see and observe the consequences of these interactions (that is your consequentialist bias). The only observable part is the physical symbols (language) used in these intentional acts, and it is apprehended as innocuous. But these physical symbols are simply the tools by which the perpetrator carries out the intended act, just like the thief uses tools to steal the car. Therefore to be consistent you need to consider the intended consequences within the other's mind, in the case of communications, just like you consider the intended consequences to another's property, in the case of stealing the car. It is apparent, that since these consequences are unobservable, you dismiss them as not relevant.

It might create misunderstanding, but unless it creates misunderstand about what choice the person is making (or what it is to make such a choice), then it doesn't reduce their ability to understand and make that choice. — Dan

Obviously, deception creates exactly that type of misunderstanding. For example, when I am choosing which park to walk in, you lie to me and tell me park X is currently closed, this creates misunderstanding about the choice I am making, reducing my understanding of the choice I am making. I would go so far as to say that all cases of deception do this or something similar, that's what deception does, creates misunderstanding in the person concerning choices they are making. Even in the innocuous joke deception like April Fools day, the "joke" is brought about by making a public display of how the person misunderstands one's own choice in reaction to the deception.

f I choose to educate you, you might simply walk away, or not check my post, or simply ignore what I'm saying. Unless I am strapping you to a chair and forcing you to listen, then I'm not taking your choice away. Can you see how this is quite clearly different from you taking my car? — Dan

This goes back to what I said at the beginning of the thread, which you seemed to have difficulty understanding. Every choice which an individual makes limits the person's future choices, by determining the person's current situation. So, if you offer to educate me, just like if you are a scammer and offer me something but it's really a scam, I can choose to proceed with you, or turn away. That choice is a reflection of my attitude toward future relations with you, and the choice hardens my position, one way or the other, thus limiting my future choices.

If I walk away, then you have not educated or scammed me. That is not the situation I am talking about though. I am talking about the situation when I do not walk away. After choosing to engage you, I have limited my own future choices accordingly. I can proceed with extreme caution, exercising principles of skepticism, or I can throw care to the wind and suck up everything you say. Again, this is an attitudinal choice which I must make, and most of us are inclined toward the principles described by Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, following an intermediary path, not too skeptical, not to rash.

Now, my examples concern cases where you actually do educate me, or you actually do deceive me, so all those past choices, where you say that I could have walked away, and I limited my own freedom through my own choices, are irrelevant now, even though your approach had a great effect on this limiting. We are in the position where you have engaged me and I have chosen to listen.

It is unwise for you to dismiss this situation, when a person is listening to another to be educated, as the fault of the student, for allowing oneself to listen to the other. When an individual "takes one's own choices away", due to the attitudinal nature of being human, with the desire to know, this is no less forceful than strapping the person to the chair. In fact, in this situation it is much more forceful, because strapping to the chair does not force them to listen and accept, but the person's disposition does force them to listen and accept.

So, I don't see the distinction you are trying to make between my mind, and your car. In one case, the object of my intention is your property, your car. In the other case, the object of your intention is my mind, to educate it. In the former case, if you are worried about your property, you will go through extreme measures to protect it from my advances, and I will simply find another easy target. In the latter case, if I am extremely worried about false information, I will take extraordinary measures to resist all attempts by you to educate me, and you will end up leaving me alone. In principle the two are very similar.

Yeah, because it's a choice about what to do with my stuff. Choices of what to with your own stuff belong to you, choices of what to do with mine (or anyone else's) don't. Think of it this way: There are things that belong to you, specifically your mind, body, and property. Where only those things are concerned, you get to make all the decisions. When it comes to other people's stuff, such as their minds, bodies, and property, those choices belong to them. Is that a clear way of thinking about it? I can give you a more formal definition if it would help. — Dan

As I said, this principle you are trying to impose, "one's own choice" is not viable for the reason's I have described. In your attempt to make it viable you give preference to a person's property rights, "stuff", and you completely ignore what one person does to another person's mind through communication, claiming this is not morally relevant. I believe that this is due to your consequentialist bias. When the effects of a person's acts are within another's mind (education, deception, etc.), these consequences cannot be observed, and so they are dismissed as not morally relevant (effectively, there are no consequences). Then, when the person who has been so affected (educated, deceived, brainwashed, etc.) acts in the world, the consequences of the person's acts are judged as the products of that person's choices, without respect for the "education" which that person underwent to get into that attitudinal head space.

You ought to be able to conclude that this is very problematic because it provides no bridge between "final cause", which is the product of one's wants, desires, ideologies, and other immaterial, "mental" principles, and "efficient cause", which is the results of one's actions in the world. The results of one's actions in the world (efficient cause) are judged as morally relevant. However, the results of a person's actions which affect the minds of others, to influence the ideologies, desires and wants of those others, which ultimately have great influence over the person's actions in the world, are dismissed as not morally relevant.

Obviously, deception creates exactly that type of misunderstanding. For example, when I am choosing which park to walk in, you lie to me and tell me park X is currently closed, this creates misunderstanding about the choice I am making, reducing my understanding of the choice I am making. I would go so far as to say that all cases of deception do this or something similar, that's what deception does, creates misunderstanding in the person concerning choices they are making. Even in the innocuous joke deception like April Fools day, the "joke" is brought about by making a public display of how the person misunderstands one's own choice in reaction to the deception. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is neither obvious nor the case. People are capable of misunderstanding a great many things beyond just the nature of the choices that belong to them.

It is unwise for you to dismiss this situation, when a person is listening to another to be educated, as the fault of the student, for allowing oneself to listen to the other. When an individual "takes one's own choices away", due to the attitudinal nature of being human, with the desire to know, this is no less forceful than strapping the person to the chair. In fact, in this situation it is much more forceful, because strapping to the chair does not force them to listen and accept, but the person's disposition does force them to listen and accept. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes it is. It is entirely less forceful. Making your own choices is not being forced. It is not reducing your freedom. It is using it. I feel like we have been over this point quite a bit, and we are in danger of devolving into nuh-uh territory, but I absolutely do not agree to your categorizing of someone making a choice as them being "forced by their disposition". Rather, I think they have free will, and have exercised that free will in this case.

and you completely ignore what one person does to another person's mind through communication, claiming this is not morally relevant. I believe that this is due to your consequentialist bias. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't ignore this, nor is my view due to any "consequentialist bias". Rather, I simply disagree that these cases constitute taking away someone's ability to understand and make their own choices. As I have explained to you. That you seem to be dismissing my stated reasons and asserting that I have hidden motives for this (and other things) is, to my mind at least, not a very useful way of discussing something. Imagine if I were to dismiss your stated reasons for everything you have said and ascribe to you some sinister ulterior motive, perhaps one you are not even aware of. I think this is unlikely to further the discussion.

However, the results of a person's actions which affect the minds of others, to influence the ideologies, desires and wants of those others, which ultimately have great influence over the person's actions in the world, are dismissed as not morally relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not necessarily. It might be morally relevant if a person convinces someone else to do something immoral by providing them misinformation. This information doesn't need to cause them to misunderstand their choice, it could still be immoral if it leads to bad consequences. This is entirely consistent with consequentialism. But giving other people information, whether true or not, is not in itself taking away a choice that belongs to them.

Yes it is. It is entirely less forceful. Making your own choices is not being forced. It is not reducing your freedom. It is using it. I feel like we have been over this point quite a bit, and we are in danger of devolving into nuh-uh territory, but I absolutely do not agree to your categorizing of someone making a choice as them being "forced by their disposition". Rather, I think they have free will, and have exercised that free will in this case. — Dan

You're working from a false assumption. It is not force which restricts freedom, it is impossibility which restricts freedom. We can find our way around force, and even use it to our advantage toward getting what we want. This is the case with our use of "energy". Force is power, which may be used to assist us with our freedom when we understand it properly. To portray "force" as that which restricts freedom is a mistaken conception which demonstrates the misunderstanding of "freedom" which you have, and I've been trying to help you to see, and to address.

I don't ignore this, nor is my view due to any "consequentialist bias". — Dan

You clearly have a "consequentialist bias". Your stated moral framework is consequentialism, and you refuse to think outside the box, closing your mind to the possibility that consequentialism is woefully inadequate as a moral philosophy. See below.

Rather, I simply disagree that these cases constitute taking away someone's ability to understand and make their own choices. — Dan

We disagree because you present an ill-defined concept of making one's own choices. As I said you override the stated definition with principles which force the employment of subjective and arbitrary judgement. Naturally we disagree.

Not necessarily. It might be morally relevant if a person convinces someone else to do something immoral by providing them misinformation. This information doesn't need to cause them to misunderstand their choice, it could still be immoral if it leads to bad consequences. This is entirely consistent with consequentialism. But giving other people information, whether true or not, is not in itself taking away a choice that belongs to them. — Dan

This is more evidence of the consequentialist bias in your moral principles. It is not the act of providing false information which you judge as immoral, it only becomes immoral if it has observable consequences which are judged as immoral. This is the gap you create between final cause and efficient cause. Whenever a link between the teaching (misinformation), and the acts which follow, cannot be adequately established, so as to be able to decisively say that the person "convinces" someone else, then the teaching is judged as not morally relevant, due to an inability to establish the link between the teaching and the acting. This renders the majority of teaching (all that is not forcefully "convincing" another to make an act with bad consequences) as morally irrelevant. But in reality, teaching is the most morally relevant thing there is, and you simply turn a blind eye to this fact, refusing to accept the significance of ideology.

@Dan
My last post shows the two significant problems with your thesis, the faulty assumptions you work from.
1. You misrepresent "freedom".
2. You misrepresent "morality"

You seem to be claiming a consequentialist bias because I am a consequentialist. I suggest that this is not bias but rather a considered evaluation that consequentialism is the appropriate form a moral theory should take. You seem convinced that consequentialism must be concerned with "observable" consequences. While it is certainly the case that observable consequences are much eaiser to measure, they are not the only ones which can be morally relevant for a consequentialist theory. Also, you accuse me of not considering an act itself immoral regardless of its consequences. Well yeah, no kidding. That is not a consequentialist "bias," that is just what consequentialism is. The morality of actions is determined by their consequences, that's very much the whole thing.

Force very much does restrict freedom. It does so very often. When people are murdered, when they have their bodies maimed and their property destroyed by explosives, when they are captured and held against their will, these are all examples of their freedom being reduced by force employed by another party. But presumably all of this is obvious.

Again, I have not had to overide any definitions. I have offered to provide a formal definition, but heard nothing back on the matter.

I would say that morality is the way in which persons ought to be or act, where "ought" is understood in a universal and objective sense. We have already discussed at length your issues with me using the word "freedom." I have attempted to be specific in what I mean, but you still seem to be caught on the word, rather than the concept. I think "freedom" is the most appropriate word for the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, but you are welcome to disagree (and indeed you have). However, I have been pretty clear in how I am using the word throughout this discussion.

I would say that morality is the way in which persons ought to be or act, where "ought" is understood in a universal and objective sense. — Dan

Can i clarify something here (not realated to any previous discussions)?

Is this to insinuate that you can only conceive of "universal or objective" morality, or simply that the concept of Morality is this - and so, whether or not any theory obtains is irrelevant?

You seem to be claiming a consequentialist bias because I am a consequentialist. I suggest that this is not bias but rather a considered evaluation that consequentialism is the appropriate form a moral theory should take. You seem convinced that consequentialism must be concerned with "observable" consequences. While it is certainly the case that observable consequences are much eaiser to measure, they are not the only ones which can be morally relevant for a consequentialist theory. Also, you accuse me of not considering an act itself immoral regardless of its consequences. Well yeah, no kidding. That is not a consequentialist "bias," that is just what consequentialism is. The morality of actions is determined by their consequences, that's very much the whole thing. — Dan

I suggest that your conclusion, "that consequentialism is the appropriate form a moral theory should take" restricts your ability to understand the true nature of freedom. "Freedom" in it's normal usage, also the sense of "free will" denies the necessary relation between posterior and prior (after and before). This means that the concept of "freedom" does not accept as true, the determinist proposition that after is determined by before. Because of this, consequentialism, which bases its judgement of before, on after, is not suited to any moral philosophy which accepts "free will" as true,

What you do, is that instead of accepting this incompatibility, which ought to force you to choose one or the other (freedom or consequentialism), or neither, you propose a compromised sense of "freedom". This is a restricted sense of "freedom", qualified by "to make one's own choices". Here, "one's own choices" is defined by consequentialist principles. So your proposition is a sense of "freedom" which is defined by consequentialist principles. However, since "freedom" in the sense of "free will" is incompatible with consequentialist principles, your proposition consists of a freedom which is incompatible with free will.

Force very much does restrict freedom. It does so very often. — Dan

Here's a fine example. In this statement, "very often" is the important, or significant qualifier. The truth and reality that force very often restricts freedom does not necessitate the inductive conclusion "Force restricts freedom". The qualifier "very often" does not provide the necessity required for a valid inductive conclusion. So the evidence you present as cases in which force does restrict freedom, do not serve to justify your proposition "force restricts freedom", as a valid, evidence based, inductive principle.

This is an example of how consequentialism relies on faulty inductive propositions. The determinist principles at work here, are as follows. We see that in the particular case, and even specific cases, the posterior is determined by the prior. In these cases, force is what restricted freedom. Because we see a causal relation we say that force caused restricted freedom. This is a case of looking backward in time. We can look at a multitude of such events which have occurred, without comparing the type of force, degree of force, and a slew of other factors, and we see that force "very often" restricts freedom. This commonly referred to as "cherry picking" which supports faulty induction. Then we see the cause/effect relation which creates the appearance of necessity, and we are inclined toward the faulty inductive conclusion "force restricts freedom".

But if we look toward the future, instead of looking toward the past, we see the inevitable nature of "force". Force itself is necessary, as inevitable, an unescapable aspect of reality. However, we understand ourselves as beings with free will, who can understand, and often avoid the restrictive aspect of force. We can even strategize and use force to our advantage. Looking at the future, from the perspective of "free will", nullifies, and invalidates, the faulty inductive conclusion "force restricts freedom". This is because from the perspective of "free will", what happens after what is happening now, is never necessitated by what is happening now. The concept of free will breaks that necessity, that the posterior (the after) will be determined by the prior (the before). The concept, "free will", allows that a freely chosen choice, at any moment in time, can affect what occurs afterward, in a way which is not determined by what occurred before. This breaks the inductive necessity of the cause/effect determinist assumption, that the after will be determined by the before. Without this necessity, inductive propositions like the one in your example, and similar one's employed by consequentialism, do not qualify as valid moral principles.

This is commonly understood as the gap between is and ought. The inductive principles state what "is the case", at the present, based on observations of the past. But moral principles look to the future and state what ought to be. So moral philosophy seeks to have an effect on the approaching time, in a way which is not determined by past observations, "what is", but by freely chosen choices, guided by knowledge and understanding, which produces "ought".

I would say that morality is the way in which persons ought to be or act, where "ought" is understood in a universal and objective sense. — Dan

What you call "universal and objective sense" has been revealed as faulty inductive reasoning.

This is to clarify that when I am discussing morality and theories thereof, this is what I am talking about.

I suggest that your conclusion, "that consequentialism is the appropriate form a moral theory should take" restricts your ability to understand the true nature of freedom. "Freedom" in it's normal usage, also the sense of "free will" denies the necessary relation between posterior and prior (after and before). This means that the concept of "freedom" does not accept as true, the determinist proposition that after is determined by before. Because of this, consequentialism, which bases its judgement of before, on after, is not suited to any moral philosophy which accepts "free will" as true,

What you do, is that instead of accepting this incompatibility, which ought to force you to choose one or the other (freedom or consequentialism), or neither, you propose a compromised sense of "freedom". This is a restricted sense of "freedom", qualified by "to make one's own choices". Here, "one's own choices" is defined by consequentialist principles. So your proposition is a sense of "freedom" which is defined by consequentialist principles. However, since "freedom" in the sense of "free will" is incompatible with consequentialist principles, your proposition consists of a freedom which is incompatible with free will. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is almost quite an interesting point here, but free will doesn't require that nothing is caused by anything, only that our choices are not wholly caused by preceding factors. It is not incompatible with consequentialism (and in fact, I would say that consequentialism is incompatible with a lack of free will inasmuch as all morality is) because the consequences of our actions are still caused by those actions. Though, admittedly, consequences such as other people acting immorally is quite weird to determine given that you can't really cause other people to make immoral decisions if you assume free will in the libertarian sense (which I do), but you can certainly contribute to such decisions, such as by providing them information (false or otherwise) without which they would not have made that decision. For example, providing the whereabouts of a abused spouse to their abuser would contribute to the immoral action of that abuser continuing to abuse their victim or indeed killing them etc.

Here's a fine example. In this statement, "very often" is the important, or significant qualifier. The truth and reality that force very often restricts freedom does not necessitate the inductive conclusion "Force restricts freedom". The qualifier "very often" does not provide the necessity required for a valid inductive conclusion. So the evidence you present as cases in which force does restrict freedom, do not serve to justify your proposition "force restricts freedom", as a valid, evidence based, inductive principle.

This is an example of how consequentialism relies on faulty inductive propositions. The determinist principles at work here, are as follows. We see that in the particular case, and even specific cases, the posterior is determined by the prior. In these cases, force is what restricted freedom. Because we see a causal relation we say that force caused restricted freedom. This is a case of looking backward in time. We can look at a multitude of such events which have occurred, without comparing the type of force, degree of force, and a slew of other factors, and we see that force "very often" restricts freedom. This commonly referred to as "cherry picking" which supports faulty induction. Then we see the cause/effect relation which creates the appearance of necessity, and we are inclined toward the faulty inductive conclusion "force restricts freedom".

But if we look toward the future, instead of looking toward the past, we see the inevitable nature of "force". Force itself is necessary, as inevitable, an unescapable aspect of reality. However, we understand ourselves as beings with free will, who can understand, and often avoid the restrictive aspect of force. We can even strategize and use force to our advantage. Looking at the future, from the perspective of "free will", nullifies, and invalidates, the faulty inductive conclusion "force restricts freedom". This is because from the perspective of "free will", what happens after what is happening now, is never necessitated by what is happening now. The concept of free will breaks that necessity, that the posterior (the after) will be determined by the prior (the before). The concept, "free will", allows that a freely chosen choice, at any moment in time, can affect what occurs afterward, in a way which is not determined by what occurred before. This breaks the inductive necessity of the cause/effect determinist assumption, that the after will be determined by the before. Without this necessity, inductive propositions like the one in your example, and similar one's employed by consequentialism, do not qualify as valid moral principles.

This is commonly understood as the gap between is and ought. The inductive principles state what "is the case", at the present, based on observations of the past. But moral principles look to the future and state what ought to be. So moral philosophy seeks to have an effect on the approaching time, in a way which is not determined by past observations, "what is", but by freely chosen choices, guided by knowledge and understanding, which produces "ought". — Metaphysician Undercover

Lot going on here. First, necessity is not required for inductive reasoning. Second, "force restricts freedom" does not imply that force always restricts freedom and is in fact technically true if it occurs even occasionally, let alone very often. Third, you kind of lose me when you start talking about force itself as this seems very divorced from the concrete reality of examples like "if you cut off my arm, you reduce my freedom over my arm". Fourth, as mentioned above, free will isn't incompatible with consequentialism because consequentialism doesn't require everything to be casually determined, only that consequences can result from actions. There might well be breaks in causality when it comes to free agents decision points, and what we should say about this is potentially an interesting topic, but it certainly seems that we can agree that actions can have consequences, so it seems that those actions can be assessed by reference to those consequences. Fifth, that isn't really what the is-ought gap is at all.

What you call "universal and objective sense" has been revealed as faulty inductive reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not even sure what you mean by this, but I'm fairly sure it's incorrect.

this is what I am talking about. — Dan

I was trying to clarify what you think the Bold is. It is getting less clear as this discussion goes on. I've taken long leave, re-read the parts I was involved in, continued through pages and still cannot grasp exactly what you're getting at.

It may be the case that you are, in fact, being insufficiently clear, or not noticing hte flaws in your grounding such as to make it really, really difficult to actually discuss what you're trying to discuss (because it is insufficiently clear what that is, in the same sense as the 'this' above).

Onward, I guess..

I would say that morality is the way in which persons ought to be or act, where "ought" is understood in a universal and objective sense.
— Dan

Can i clarify something here (not realated to any previous discussions)?

Is this to insinuate that you can only conceive of "universal or objective" morality, or simply that the concept of Morality is this - and so, whether or not any theory obtains is irrelevant? — AmadeusD

What I mean to say is that this (the definition given in the quote you have used here) is what I take morality to be and what I mean when I am discussing morality. I do not mean to insinuate that this is the only definition of the word "morality" I could concieve of, though I might say that morality defined thusly (or perhaps very similarly) is the kind worth discussing.

I'm not sure what you mean by "and so, whether or not any theory obtains is irrelevant" so I've left that alone as I feel you might need to explain your reasoning a bit more there before we can discuss it.

There is almost quite an interesting point here, but free will doesn't require that nothing is caused by anything, only that our choices are not wholly caused by preceding factors. It is not incompatible with consequentialism (and in fact, I would say that consequentialism is incompatible with a lack of free will inasmuch as all morality is) because the consequences of our actions are still caused by those actions. — Dan

We can take this as a true proposition, that the consequences of our actions are caused by our actions, and apply it as the foundation for a moral philosophy, but that would produce an inadequate moral philosophy. This is because of the gap between efficient cause and final cause, which I've been referring to.

There are causes of freely willed actions, which are "not wholly caused by preceding factors". We understand these causes as intentions, or in the classical terms, "final cause". Since these causes, final causes, are the principal causes, the most significant causes, of a freely willed act, they are the subject of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy seeks to induce good actions, therefore the subject matter of moral philosophy, is the cause of those freely willed actions, which we know of as intentions, or final cause.

In your portrayal of consequentialism, you describe the consequences of an action as the subject of moral philosophy. From an examination of the consequences, one can make a judgement as to whether or not the act was good. Notice that this is a judgement of something which has occurred, in the past, a fact, what "actually is". From this perspective, there is nothing to induce us, persuade us, or even force us, to do what is good. It simply provides the means by which we can judge actions as good or bad. Because of this, it is not a moral philosophy at all, it is more like a science of morality. There are theories concerning what constitutes good and bad (such as your principle of protecting one's own choices), and there are principles provided, by which actions can be judged according to consequences, but there is nothing to incline or inspire people to act in the way which fits the description of good. To incline and inspire people to act in the way which fits the description of good, is the goal of moral philosophy.

This is why consequentialism is not a moral philosophy. It offers us no way to shape or form a person's disposition, one's character, attitude toward actions. And that is what defines moral philosophy, it's capacity to provide us with formative principles, upon which we educate human beings so that they are inclined to act in the way that we believe is proper. The difference between moral philosophy and consequentialism, is that the former has as its subject, intentions and final cause, while the latter has as its subject, the consequences of actions, and the efficient cause relation of the consequences to the actions.

Though, admittedly, consequences such as other people acting immorally is quite weird to determine given that you can't really cause other people to make immoral decisions if you assume free will in the libertarian sense (which I do), but you can certainly contribute to such decisions, such as by providing them information (false or otherwise) without which they would not have made that decision. For example, providing the whereabouts of a abused spouse to their abuser would contribute to the immoral action of that abuser continuing to abuse their victim or indeed killing them etc. — Dan

This is how the focus on efficient causation, which is taken for granted as the principal form of causation by consequentialism, completely misleads us into misunderstanding. Since the "necessity" which is required for a judgement of of "cause" by the concept of efficient causation, is not present in the case of final causation, due to the fact that the will is free, then we cannot allow final cause, or intention, to be a valid cause. This is an issue with the "scientific" approach to morality, as science focuses on efficient causation. On the other hand, moral philosophy apprehends intention or final cause as a valid form of causation, it seeks to understand this type of causation, and work with it to inspire goodness in humanity.

So for example, you state here, "you can't really cause other people to make immoral decisions if you assume free will in the libertarian sense (which I do), but you can certainly contribute to such decisions, such as by providing them information". In this statement, you simply exclude final cause as a real form of causation when you say "you can't really cause other people to...". However, when I have a specific goal, or intention in my mind, and I communicate this goal to you, so that you carry out the means to that end for me, (I may offer to compensate you, or we may just have a friendly relationship), then I have caused you to do something. That's plain and simple, if final cause is accepted as causation. However, restricting causation to efficient cause, and not allowing final cause as a real form of causation, induces you to say that this is not "really" a case of causing.

Now there is a serious hole in your moral philosophy, which I will call it "the abyss". Your scientific approach to morality has inclined you to exclude final cause as a real form of causation. However, your common sense, and intuition, allow you to temper your scientific approach with an appeal to "libertarian free will". Your real, lived experience, 'forces you' to accept the reality of freely willed choices. Now, your adherence to the idea that efficient cause is the only real type of causation, makes libertarian free will completely incomprehensible. People influence the choices of others all the time. However, this cannot be "causation" or else your idea of libertarian free will would be excluded. That reinforces the belief that all real causes are efficient causes. But it also renders a libertarian free will choice as nothing but random chance. You see, you have no way to account for the supposed "influence". Libertarian free will excludes the possibility of it being causation, and so it is morally irrelevant to you. A person still chooses freely, despite being "influenced", so the "influence" is not morally relevant.

The abyss is this "influence". The scientific approach denies that it is causation, because it's not efficient cause, and the libertarian free will approach endorses this scientific approach, by saying that it cannot be causation or else free will would be negated. But that renders the "influence" as completely unintelligible, and dismissed as irrelevant. It doesn't fit into the scientific approach of efficient causation and consequentialism, nor does it fit into the libertarian free will side of things. So it's discarded as not morally relevant, and dismissed, even though it is what moral philosophy considers as its subject. Therefore you loose the entire content of moral philosophy into this abyss you have created by rejecting final cause as a real form of causation. What's the point to your project, morality without content? Al the real content of moral philosophy has been rejected as not relevant.

Second, "force restricts freedom" does not imply that force always restricts freedom and is in fact technically true if it occurs even occasionally, let alone very often. — Dan

If you are stating "force restricts freedom", as a proposition, a premise for a logical proceeding, then it is implied that force always restricts freedom. And if what you meant was "force sometimes restricts freedom", then please state it that way. The problem though is that if you did state it that way, it wouldn't carry the logical force required for your argument, and that's why you stated it the other way.

I think calling intentions a final cause might be quite different from how that term is generally used. I confess I'm not entirely sure what you mean by the term in this context as you seem to be using it in quite a different way from the teleological sense. Also, I don't think intentions are or should be the focus of morality (which will come as no surprise given I am a consequentialist).

Consequentialism does indeed judge whether actions are good based on their consequences, but consequentialism by itself isn't a moral theory. Utilitarianism, freedom consequentialism, even egoism, give moral guidance for what actions should be done based on either their consequences or their expected consequences (there's a whole discussion to be had about expected value vs actual value here, but let's not get into that).

I don't think the primary goal of moral philosophy is to incline or inspire people to act well. I think it is determine what it is to act well. While it is reasonable to say that a goal of moral philosophy is to share moral truths with people, I would say its primary goal is to discover them in the first place.

I don't think I said that influencing people to do immoral things is not morally relevant. I think I said that libertarian free will makes this complicated as the consequences of someone else's actions are caused by them, not by you, though you seem very clearly to have contributed to them. It's potentially a difficult question to pin down, and I would freely admit that I don't really know how free will works (assuming we have it). But I don't think the issue is in not having enough causes in our proposed ontology, I think it is that free will is weird.

If you are stating "force restricts freedom", as a proposition, a premise for a logical proceeding, then it is implied that force always restricts freedom. And if what you meant was "force sometimes restricts freedom", then please state it that way. The problem though is that if you did state it that way, it wouldn't carry the logical force required for your argument, and that's why you stated it the other way. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am fairly sure that what I said, and what I meant, was that force very often restricts freedom. You were the one that suggested that force does not restrict freedom, I was simply pointing out that this is not the case because it often does. I need not show that it always does to show that you are wrong, only that it sometimes does. In this case, it often does.

I think calling intentions a final cause might be quite different from how that term is generally used. — Dan

Final cause is defined by Aristotle as that for the sake of which. The example given is that health is the final cause of the man walking. Why is he walking? To be healthy. The reason he is walking is to be healthy, he is walking for the sake of his health. That really seems like "intention" to me. It's what Plato called "the good".

It seems we're very far apart as to what moral philosophy is. I think its principal function is to teach, you think it's principal function is to learn. I suppose it must involve both, because learning is necessary for teaching, but until you recognize the importance of teaching, there's not much for us to discuss.

In Plato's cave allegory, the philosopher escapes the cave out into the sunlight, and recognizes the sun. The sun is analogous with "the good", as that which makes visible objects visible, in the same way that the good makes intelligible objects intelligible. After seeing the light, the philosopher does not just sit around and bask in its glow, he must return to the cave, and teach the others what has been revealed to him. That, I believe is the position of moral philosophy.

I am fairly sure that what I said, and what I meant, was that force very often restricts freedom. You were the one that suggested that force does not restrict freedom, I was simply pointing out that this is not the case because it often does. I need not show that it always does to show that you are wrong, only that it sometimes does. In this case, it often does. — Dan

The point is, that we cannot proceed from this proposition "force restricts freedom", as a premise, because it is a false proposition. Therefore if we want to understand how freedom is restricted, and proceed with a true premise about this, we really need to look elsewhere.

I think 'goal' might be more appropriate there as I think Aristotle would say that things can have a final cause without the capacity for intentions, but for moral agents I think I see what you mean. Though I wonder whether that means you think you can't have a final cause you are unaware of, or if you think this amounts to being unaware of your intentions.

I don't think I dismissed the importance of teaching.

In Plato's cave the prisoners refuse to listen to the escapee. They think the sun has ruined his eyes for he cannot see the shadows with the same clarity they can. Plato seems to be making the point that the enlightened cannot necessarily share their wisdom with those who see only shadows. I'm not saying I agree, just that I'm not sure you analogy is doing the work you want it to.

The point is, that we cannot proceed from this proposition "force restricts freedom", as a premise, because it is a false proposition. Therefore if we want to understand how freedom is restricted, and proceed with a true premise about this, we really need to look elsewhere. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the point is that you claimed that one thing does not cause another. I pointed out that it often does.

As for understanding how freedom is restricted, it seems that it is restricted in lots of ways, and that an understanding of what it means for it to be restricted is probably more useful to recognizing them than making sweeping generalizations. That being said, as a broad generalization, we could do a lot worse than 'force restricts freedom'. As a heuristic, this seems like it would get us to the right answer more often than not, given that 'forcing' someone to do something is pretty directly opposed to them having a choice in the matter.

In Plato's cave the prisoners refuse to listen to the escapee. — Dan

That's human nature, people hold fast to the beliefs they have. Because of this, I think moral philosophy is the most difficult field You are not listening to me. I am not listening to you. I think the analogy is good.

No, the point is that you claimed that one thing does not cause another. I pointed out that it often does. — Dan

Are you not listening, in denial, or do you seriously not understand this point? The fact that force often appears to restrict freedom does not justify the proposition "force restricts freedom".

Exceptions to the rule indicate that the rule is faulty. What is required is a comparison of cases where force does restrict freedom to cases where it does not restrict freedom, and this will reveal what really restricts freedom, and why there is the appearance that it is force which restricts freedom.

What I suggest, is that if you look closely at the relationship between force and freedom, you will first see the inherent contradiction, (which I referred to earlier), inhering within the idea that force restricts freedom. "Free" implies a state of being unrestricted, yet we are surrounded by forces. So if forces are restrictions, we could not be free. Therefore, if our primary premise is that the agent is free, we need to assign freedom to the agent, and then develop the relationship between the agent and forces from this premise.

That the agent is free implies that it is impossible that forces restrict the agent, because this would contradict the agent's freedom. Therefore we must conclude that the free agent's response to forces, (which create the appearance that the agent is being restricted by the forces), are really free choices made by the agent, decisions made as to how deal with the forces.

See how the contradiction is resolved? The agent remains free. Forces surround the free agent. The agent responds to the forces freely. The free response of the agent to a force creates the appearance that the agent is being restricted by that force. This is the first lesson from Plato's cave allegory, to learn how to distinguish appearance from reality. The sensible world which we observe is the realm of appearance. We need to look into the mind to access the real.

That's human nature, people hold fast to the beliefs they have. Because of this, I think moral philosophy is the most difficult field You are not listening to me. I am not listening to you. I think the analogy is good. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I think you're half right.

Are you not listening, in denial, or do you seriously not understand this point? The fact that force often appears to restrict freedom does not justify the proposition "force restricts freedom".

Exceptions to the rule indicate that the rule is faulty. What is required is a comparison of cases where force does restrict freedom to cases where it does not restrict freedom, and this will reveal what really restricts freedom, and why there is the appearance that it is force which restricts freedom. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not suggesting "force restricts freedom" as a rule. You suggested a rule and I am pointing out that it isn't accurate.

"Free" implies a state of being unrestricted, yet we are surrounded by forces. So if forces are restrictions, we could not be free — Metaphysician Undercover

This sounds like equivocation to me. Surely you don't mean to equate "force" as in to force someone to do something with "forces" as in the physical forces of the universe.

This sounds like equivocation to me. Surely you don't mean to equate "force" as in to force someone to do something with "forces" as in the physical forces of the universe.
11 hours ago — Dan

When someone forces someone to do something, they are using the physical forces of the universe to their advantage. So from the perspective of the person who is said to be forced, the two are the same in principle. In the first case, the person being forced by physical forces has to understand and deal simply with those forces of the universe. In the other case, the person has to deal with the forces of the universe being directed by another's intent. This makes the latter type of force more complex, therefore more difficult to understand and deal with, because intention is an integral part of it and intention is difficult to understand.

This is why I say that you need to look closely at the relationship between the free agent, and force, to understand that force cannot actually restrict the free agent. And this is regardless of the type of force. So if the free agent is restricted, this is a feature of the agent itself, making it not truly free. And this feature creates challenges for the agent in dealing with forces (that includes all types of forces, including physical and the intent of another). It is not the case that a specific type of force restricts the agent, it is the case that the agent has restrictions inherent within (making it less than free), which renders it vulnerable to specific types of forces.

But if this is the case, then we must drop the premise that the agent is free, and adopt the premise that it is inherently restricted. Then we would need to analyze the nature of the agent to see what sort of restrictions inhere within.

Again, to be a free agent is to have free will, even if your freedom is restricted.

Also, I think this way of thinking about restrictions is just incorrect. If someone has locked you in a room, that is not a restriction inherent within you. That is a restriction that someone has imposed upon you. I mean, there's a sense in which you wouldn't be restricted by this were it not for your inability to pass through solid matter. Is this the kind of thing you are raising, that the things that restrict our freedom are contingent upon various physical facts about us?

Again, to be a free agent is to have free will, even if your freedom is restricted. — Dan

OK, but since "freedom is restricted" is a blatant contradiction, and you seem to believe that "restricted" represents the truth in this matter, we need to start with the premise that the agent is not free. The agent is restricted. Whether or not you believe in free will is irrelevant now, what you believe is that the agent is restricted, and therefore not free. Now we can proceed to outline the nature of the restrictions.

I believe, as I said earlier, the most important and significant restriction is the nature of time. It is impossible to alter the past. And, it's not the case that this type of restriction is not morally relevant, because this restriction affects everything we do, that which is morally irrelevant, as well as that which is morally relevant.

If someone has locked you in a room, that is not a restriction inherent within you. — Dan

That's a good example. What you signify is that something has happened to the person, "someone has locked you in a room". This past act has created a describable situation now, the person is locked in a room. No one can change the past, so as much as "you" dislike the situation you are in, you cannot change it. The restriction is a feature of time.

However, going forward in time, such restrictions can be dealt with. "You" can pull out your phone and call someone. "You" can look around the room for a tool to get you out. "You" can look at leaving through a window. "You" can try to kick a hole through the door, or wall. These are all possibilities, choices which the person who is locked in the room might consider, and many others depending on the particulars of the situation.

Now, notice that all the choices reference the future. They all concern what the person might do in the future. Also, notice that in this specific example, what is indicated is a desire to be rid of a particular restriction. That is a key point in relation to freedom, as much as we premise that the agent is not free, (is restricted), there is a desire for freedom. This desire is reflected in the agent's intentions. So, having a desire for freedom, the agent makes choices from a multitude of future possibilities, with the intention of ridding oneself of various restrictions, in the quest for freedom.

The other significant point is that most thoughts about the past, "I wish I hadn't done this or that", "I wish so and so hadn't done this or that, are completely useless in relation to this desire for freedom. This is not to say that they are all useless, because a few select ones are extremely useful. These are the ones that indicate something important about how the restrictions were applied to the restricted person. Therefore another selection process is required from the agent. From one's past experience, memories etc., the agent must select from a vast multitude, a very few select thoughts which are applicable to the present situation, and the quest for freedom.

That is a restriction that someone has imposed upon you. — Dan

This qualification, "that someone has imposed upon you" such and such restriction, is generally insignificant, and unimportant. Consider that you suddenly find yourself locked in a room. And, your desire is to be free. Look at the possibilities for the means to freedom, which I mentioned above. That someone has imposed the restriction on you is completely irrelevant. However, when we look at the memories from the past experience, this qualification may be significant. If you think you might call the person on your phone, and get them to let you out, then it would be important. But this is unlikely, so the qualification that it "is a restriction that someone has imposed upon you", is probably completely irrelevant to your desire for freedom.