So what sort of thing is a concept? — Banno

There's no need to beg the question. If you're looking for a specific answer, then go ahead, provide one.

What more is there to any given concept than what we do? — Banno

Sure; but, words aren't objects. I'm mostly interested in abstract concepts, which science has been elucidating, and providing us with knowledge about the world; but, since this thread is about the point or "need" for therapy, then I would like to return to the topic about whether you think philosophy has taken Wittgenstein's lesson to heart?

Are philosophers still in need of therapy?

If you're looking for a specific answer, then go ahead, provide one. — Shawn

I'm not. I'm wondering about your thinking on the topic, and how it relates to

...the passage of the Philosophical Investigations, I/§383, regarding "concepts as words" and Wittgensteins nominalism. — Shawn

It is clear Wittgenstein is rejecting any notion of treating words as just names, and that concepts are about use, not just grammar.

Are philosophers still in need of therapy? — Shawn

Midgley's plumbing metaphor might show the point better than Wittgenstein's therapy metaphor.

It is clear Wittgenstein is rejecting any notion of treating words as just names, and that concepts are about use, not just grammar. — Banno

Yes, concepts are used in different ways. The way we use words is largely defined by grammar, and that's just a factual definition. So, I don't understand the issue about grammar and use of words, if you may think there is one.

Midgley's plumbing metaphor might show the point better than Wittgenstein's therapy metaphor. — Banno

I think philosophy has a purpose, which, as she describes is of need towards other fields to reinterpret what progress those other fields attain. After all philosophy is probably as old as religion, and is valued for endowing other fields with meaning through its own activities.

concepts are used in different ways. — Shawn

No! That's not what it says. Rather, concepts are what we do. The difference is central. Concepts are not things!

Treat this as an example in which the malady is misunderstanding the notion of concept, and the treatment is to show that concepts are what we do, and not things.

No! That's not what it says. Rather, concepts are what we do. The difference is central. Concepts are not things! — Banno

Yes, well, this is where I agree with universal quantification and would subscribe to some form of ontology to what concepts are and how they derive their meaning.

Treat this as an example in which the malady is misunderstanding the notion of concept, and the treatment is to show that concepts are what we do, and not things. — Banno

Sure, this is again nominalism. So, if all there is to concepts is specific or stipulated use, then do we do away with universal quantification?

...this is again nominalism — Shawn

How?

I've no clear notion of what this has to do with quantification.

I don;t see how one could disagree with universal quantification...

Concepts are not things! — Banno

...this is again nominalism
— Shawn

How? — Banno

If concepts are not things, then they do not have any ontology. The existence of a universal, which concepts would not have, according to what you are saying, would exclude concepts from having any ontology. Thus, one can think, from this, that concepts are criteria or identity features of human abstraction, which I don't really buy into.

I don;t see how one could disagree with universal quantification... — Banno

Yes, well, I will say that if concepts are truth-apt under universal quantification, then it would follow that concepts have the property of being a 'thing'.

if concepts are truth-apt under universal quantification... — Shawn

I've no idea what that might mean. I'll leave you to it.

I've no idea what that might mean. I'll leave you to it. — Banno

Here, I hope you can look at the article on ontological commitment entailed by universal quantification for "concepts":

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-commitment/

I'll point out that if concepts are not things, then what would you identify them as? It seems that I am begging the question, now.

I think we can agree @Banno that concepts are human abstractions, yes?

I'm really not following any of this.

I'm really not following any of this. — Banno

Well, you begged the question so many times about what are concepts, that I'm not surprised.

begged the question — Shawn

I'm not sure you know what that means, in a philosophical context.

I'm not sure you know what that means, in a philosophical context. — Banno

Whatever works. I've seen this countless times of someone pointing out a logical fallacy and the other person just deflecting it. Anyway, thanks for the conversation.

I'll have my folk bill you for the therapy session.

Yet, I feel as though it was a work guided by sheer intelligence, to state what was said. — Shawn

He definitely pushed the experiment of the Tractatus—basically to only state what can be said with absolutely certainty—as far as he could, which demonstrated his intellect but also persistence to carry a line of thought all the way through, past where everyone else might rest on a first impression. Only such a thorough “mistake” (if we would even call it that) could lead to such a monumental revolution as the Investigations.

So, how can a concept stand for a word? This strikes me as pragmaticism. Is this really an implicit reference to pragmatism in the Philosophical Investigations? — Shawn

“Concept” for Wittgenstein is just a term for any practice: pointing, following a rule, noticing an aspect, seeing, understanding, apologizing, naming, knowing, etc. What he claims is that we can look at what we say and learn from that how we judge what it is. The “use” he is referring to of a word is the sense that it makes in a situation, what we would identify it as, when it is said, where, to whom (“I'm sorry” as an apology, an overture, a threat). That “I know” has multiply senses: “I know my way around” is judged differently than “I know your pain” than “I know what is best for this company”. “Use” is not how a word is wielded (as if we use words), like a tool, for its consequences, its practical outcomes. Wittgenstein is looking at the mechanics of our interest and judgment through a concept—how it is identified, distinguished, satisfied.

Wittgenstein's suggestion that 'The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology' is an important statement. That is because the source human thinking is a central area for psychological investigation. This is at the core of the different models of psychology..

As far as the idea of philosophy needing therapy, what this signifies is for a thinker to be more aware of the psychological basis of one's ideas and beliefs. Human motives and factors in socialisation are central to our philosophical understanding, alongside cultural beliefs. Being able to reflect on these aspects of one's beliefs and thoughts has an important place in philosophy.

When I was undertaking some psychotherapy training, having therapy was seen as vital. That is because it enabled one to be aware of the 'blindspots' of thinking and one's beliefs. This is a significant area for philosophy, especially in self-knowledge, biases and becoming aware of one's own 'blindspots' , which can be a stumbling block to clear thinking.

He definitely pushed the experiment of the Tractatus—basically to only state what can be said with absolutely certainty—as far as he could, which demonstrated his intellect but also persistence to carry a line of thought all the way through, past where everyone else might rest on a first impression. Only such a thorough “mistake” (if we would even call it that) could lead to such a monumental revolution as the Investigations. — Antony Nickles

It was hardly a mistake, as some might think it was. Wittgenstein stated in the Investigations that many of his thoughts had been continued and expanded on from the Tractatus to the Investigations. I don't think he thought of the Tractatus as entirely a mistaken work; but, certain elements of it, such as the picture theory of meaning, were not adequate to answer the questions that occupied Wittgensteins mind.

Wittgenstein is looking at the mechanics of our interest and judgment through a concept—how it is identified, distinguished, satisfied. — Antony Nickles

Yes, although it would seem as though that the mechanics of what concepts are, are to this day a point in question. As I already stated, grammar seems to be the path to greater understanding rather than route logic which had been trying to solve as Wittgenstein sought out.

Wittgenstein's suggestion that 'The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology' is an important statement. That is because the source human thinking is a central area for psychological investigation. This is at the core of the different models of psychology.. — Jack Cummins

I think that what one can figure from stating psychology in this way is that by having a body of knowledge upon which we can formulate bedrock beliefs or hinge propositions, one would be able to achieve the certainty that Wittgenstein sought in his own preponderance about psychology. After all, he wrote a whole book about certainty, which he needed for reasons only he would be able to explain.

As far as the idea of philosophy needing therapy, what this signifies is for a thinker to be more aware of the psychological basis of one's ideas and beliefs. Human motives and factors in socialisation are central to our philosophical understanding, alongside cultural beliefs. Being able to reflect on these aspects of one's beliefs and thoughts has an important place in philosophy. — Jack Cummins

Yes, socialization seems important; but, is it more important than individualization?

When I was undertaking some psychotherapy training, having therapy was seen as vital. That is because it enabled one to be aware of the 'blindspots' of thinking and one's beliefs. This is a significant area for philosophy, especially in self-knowledge, biases and becoming aware of one's own 'blindspots' , which can be a stumbling block to clear thinking. — Jack Cummins

I haven't encountered such a term as "blindspots" in therapy. I have heard about cognitive distortions or biases or thought patterns that are negative... Seems interesting to say that when philosophers engage in weltanschauung's or systems of thoughts one can fall into all sorts of mistaken beliefs or erroneous conclusions about how to perceive or "think about", as such.

The differences between the assumptions or theoriesof 'mind' have a large impact on the nature of certainty and uncertainty. Also, some may be able to tolerate than others, or it can be a process of learning to live with it, which may in itself be a therapeutic quest.

There is both the task of socialisation and individuation. They run parallel and different cultural groups may value strict adherence to group norms or individual uniqueness. The value of individual uniqueness is likely related to greater tolerance of uncertainty, rather than fixed, prescriptive roles and ideas of human development.

The idea of 'blindspots' comes from the psychodynamic as opposed to cognitive behavioural school of thought. They are frequently contrasted, including ideas about the 'subconscious' in the psychodynamic vs core beliefs in CBT, among other aspects. There are differences, but it is possible that the two are compatible, but come from different linguistic conceptions inherent in the models. As far as the experience of therapy, a lot may depend on the understanding of the therapist, probably similar to the journey towards understanding of a philosopher.

I don't think he thought of the Tractatus as entirely a mistaken work; but, certain elements of it, such as the picture theory of meaning, were not adequate to answer the questions that occupied Wittgensteins mind. — Shawn

I would not call the work in the Tractatus a waste. Of course we could call the picture theory a “mistake”, but I’m thinking more of the mistaken desire for purity that that theory, or any theory, would try to satisfy. If we call that a desire for pure (singular, universal) logic, then he does abandon that goal in the PI, however, the varied grammar he sees in each concept has its own internal logic, though not foundational, so he does continue a rigorous, precise, intelligibility in the PI.

Yes, although it would seem as though that the mechanics of what concepts are, are to this day a point in question. As I already stated, grammar seems to be the path to greater understanding rather than route logic which had been trying to solve as Wittgenstein sought out. — Shawn

You’d have to explain why there is a question of the mechanics of concepts, though I would say the criteria of how to judge, say, a correct apology, or distinguish between a mistake and an accident, are part of the fabric of our history and lives together. And I don’t think we can say that there isn’t a logic to those criteria, though not formal logic (I don’t know what would make it “route” logic). The point of the PI is that we don’t need pure formal logic to have a workable rational world.

With the "not wanting to spare anybody from thinking", there is introduced an element which my teachers of Wittgenstein emphasized. The benefit from the way out is only helpful for those who sincerely have the problems, If we can stand outside of the circle and express superiority over the poor fucks who suffer that sort of thing, then that would be a kind of psychology.

- A psychological clique that thinks of itself as True Philosophy? They are a dime a dozen.

The idea of 'blindspots' comes from the psychodynamic as opposed to cognitive behavioural school of thought. They are frequently contrasted, including ideas about the 'subconscious' in the psychodynamic vs core beliefs in CBT, among other aspects. — Jack Cummins

I'm quite interested in your take on what psychodynamics is about. It seem like a field with a higher difficulty rating than Jung or Freud with simple ideas about what governs one's psychology.

Of course we could call the picture theory a “mistake”, but I’m thinking more of the mistaken desire for purity that that theory, or any theory, would try to satisfy. — Antony Nickles

Yes, well it was a book written, with the intent to put philosophy in the right category of thought, as I understand it. From what I gather the name and form of the book was inspired after Spinoza's own Tractatus. I view the work as concerned, more than any other work in philosophy even to this day, with explaining the various areas touched by the book via a method or school of thought called 'logical atomism'. Logical atomism could be viewed as a philosophy inherited from Leibnitz. Bertrand Russell called his philosophy the philosophy of Leibnitz, which I believe Wittgenstein further adopted from Russell upon their friendship.

If we call that a desire for pure (singular, universal) logic, then he does abandon that goal in the PI, however, the varied grammar he sees in each concept has its own internal logic, though not foundational, so he does continue a rigorous, precise, intelligibility in the PI. — Antony Nickles

I wouldn't call it an internal logic; but, a logic derived from context and use. The desire for a pure and singular logic to understand the world, which I think Wittgenstein was influenced by Frege and the Vienna Circle, is a goal that got superseded by Godel's Incompleteness Theorems.

The point of the PI is that we don’t need pure formal logic to have a workable rational world. — Antony Nickles

It would seem as though the world could not be understood as philosophers would have wanted it to. If so, then where does one go from here?

The perspective which I am familiar with in psychodynamic therapy is one applied in clinical practice. It draws on certain ideas of Freud, such as his concepts of id, ego and superego and the understanding of defence mechanisms. It draws on a number of other writers, including Donald Winnicott, Wilfred Bion and Melanie Klein. It involves a way of looking beyond the surface of communication.

The ideas of Melanie Klein are particularly important and her concept of 'splitting' in the early developments of childhood. It is connected to the process of differentiation from the mother, the construction of self and otherness. Central to this understanding is the concept of projection or projective identification. In the process, one internalises others as inner objects. This involves particular divisions into good and evil for differentiating aspects of life.

The nature of projection is particularly important in thinking of beliefs. In a sense of identifying certain ideas as being right or wrong, one may divide the world. This is especially true in black and white thinking of rigid beliefs. It can be bound up with a sense of being 'right' as an ego position, projecting faults onto others. It comes into philosophy and politics.

A sense of certainty is involved in the dynamics of projection and this may have been why Wittgenstein focused on certainty. To withdraw projections one is almost forced to question and look at one's own beliefs critically, as an encounter with uncertainty.

I have just realised that I left out a major aspect of psychodynamic therapy. That is the idea of transference. That is based on the relationship with the therapist, which is believed to go back to the child's relationship with parents.

Psychodynamic therapists work with the transference, focusing upon what is evident in the relationship with the therapist in the sessions. Thinking about this and repairing this is seen as important, with the therapist enabling the client to reflect upon what is happening. There is also the idea of the countertransference, which involves the therapist's experience and feelings about the client.

Actually, if one wants to be more precise or factual, then, why was Wittgenstein obsessed with treating the study of philosophy as in need of therapy. — Shawn

You misunderstand what Wittgenstein was saying. It is not the case that philosophy is in need of therapy, it is the case that philosophy is the therapy. Look at the quote from @Banno.

255 . The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness. — Philosophical Investigations

See, the illness inheres within the general population, as a deficiency in the way that we think, and it is exemplified by the way that we use language, common usage. Philosophy is the therapy which is required to treat this ailment. That is why Wittgenstein engaged in philosophy, rather than simply accepting the mistaken ways of thinking which he noticed as abundant, and thereby becoming a part of the disease, he wanted to be a part of the cure, and act as a philosopher.

It is a fine line to distinguish the boundary between the cure and the disease, as Plato found out in trying to distinguish the philosopher from the sophist. The therapy then, philosophy itself, is shown to be this activity of distinguishing the afflicted thinking. Apprehending the mode by which the illness is recognized, is the therapy, and this distinguishes the philosopher from the sophist. As Wittgenstein explains it involves understanding the role of "purpose", what Plato called "the good".

It would seem as though the world could not be understood as philosophers would have wanted it to. If so, then where does one go from here? — Shawn

If we are to cure the urge for perfection—in this instance, as we will have to in other instances—then maybe we have to turn away from it, figuratively, say, from Plato’s sun, and take his shadows seriously, take his interlocutors as speaking truly. Emerson says if the world is surfaces (appearances), we should skate them well. Wittgenstein looks at our expressions to learn about the workings of each thing, because, he says, that shows what is essential about that practice/thing (PI, #371). This is not mathematical certainty, crystalline purity, nor universal, predictive, foundational, normative, etc., but it is precise, specific, rational, workable, flexible, extendable, capable of encapsulating error.

What I meant by “internal” logic was that each practice has a true/false kind of rationality that is based on its own criteria, and so not judged by a standard from outside it, but that its logic is self-referential, or “internal”. An apology has certain criteria by which we judge if it was done correctly (truly) or not (was false, as an apology). This is in the league of identity, as we judge a dog from a wolf, with there being a grey area in between, even as an apology can be incomplete, yet accepted (the ultimate means of judgment).