People aren't interested in conversations where everybody agrees on the issues and perhaps differ only in nuances. Nope. A heated debate is what people want to follow. Even here in PF this is evident: the threads where people disagree get the most comments. — ssu

That’s a very good point to me. I would go further in arguing this. Notice that we are in a philosophy forum and lack of consensus in philosophy is neither a big issue nor uncommon. In Western philosophy, be it metaphysics or ethics or epistemology, there is lots of disagreement, and no matter how weird a philosophical theory may sound, one may find advocates supporting it. And also philosophical debates can get heated due to intellectual straining. I think some disagreement can be found also in the scientific debate, especially in the human and social sciences. And also this disagreements can get heated.
There is a difference however with the kind of disagreement one experiences in political debates. Political debates are more directly and intentionally oriented toward political decisions and actions. And in this case the debates get heated not due to the intellectual effort per se but because people feel more materially threatened in their economic, social, biological conditions and of those they care about.
IN A PHILOSOPHY FORUM, what should be more than welcomed is a more PHILOSOPHICAL approach, not a political one even when we talk about politics and divisive political subjects, like the war in Ukraine or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. So our intellectual efforts shouldn’t move from beliefs to actions/decisions, but the other way around: from actions/decisions to beliefs. We SHOULD NOT GIVE FOR GRANTED notions of human rights, democracy, freedom of speech, international law, nations, self-determination, states, morality,propaganda, etc. we should find ALL OF THEM open for debate. We should SUSPEND our pro-active approach (like the open and crypto-activists in this thread and the like are doing) and dig into our assumptions. Make them explicit and open for questioning, further explanations or justifications.
And such an approach should be backed by adequate means to do that like clarifying ambiguous terminology, articulating reasoning from premises to conclusions, provide accurately reported evidence and source, provide illustrative examples, avoid to replace literal/descriptive language with non-literal/value language, avoid to replace actual arguments with insults and dismissive remarks, avoid to replace DE RE arguments with AD HOMINEM arguments, etc.
Constructive discussions are not necessarily the ones where people converge in conclusions (which is rationally possible when people agree on premises and procedures to get from premises to conclusions like in mathematics or logic) but also the ones where respective views are presented in a way that is rationally compelling and scrutinizible, ALSO WHEN TALKING ABOUT DIVISIVE POLITICAL SUBJECTS WHICH WILL LIKELY REMAIN DIVISIVE.

:100: :up: Right on, @neomac

Indeed not only Merkel has NOT admitted what he claims she has, but it can not even be inferred from what she actually said or equated with what she actually said: reinforcing Ukrainian military not only is not incompatible with pursuing a cease-fire but it could also be instrumental to preserving a cease-fire. — neomac

Just gaslighting apologetics. What does Merkel say:

The 2014 Minsk agreement was an attempt to give time to Ukraine. It also used this time to become stronger as can be seen today. — Merkel

Now this is well into the war. If she wanted to say that the goal of making Ukraine stronger was to deter Russia and so avoid a war ... she would have said that! She's not a moron.

The reinterpretation of what she said as somehow to support a ceasefire through strength, is memory holing the whole episode. Back in autumn 2022 the Western narrative was that Russia was weak, Russia was falling apart, Russia was losing and Ukraine was in the process of inflicting a brilliant victory. The Western talking heads and officials were in a circle jerk of patting each other on the cock in celebration of this brilliant geopolitical strategy, in which the Ukrainian build up, with Western assistance, since 2014 was to credit for Ukraine's extraordinary prowess on the battlefield. Various politicians and officials, in both the West and Ukraine, were taking credit for the brilliant move of using Minsk as a cover to build up Ukraine to defeat Russia.

Merkel in this statement was buying into this narrative of Ukrainian victory and taking a bit of the credit.

And it wasn't just Merkel, plenty did a little victory lap of how Ukraine "outplayed" the Russians and Minsk was part of that deception.

A version of events proudly asserted by Ukrainian politicians even before the larger 2022 war even started:

“From my point of view, the Minsk agreements were born dead,” said Volodymyr Ariev, an MP from Poroshenko’s party. “The conditions were always impossible to implement. We understood it clearly at the time, but we signed it to buy time for Ukraine: to have time to restore our government, our army, intelligence and security system.” — The Guardian

Now, before the war started it would have been controversial for Western politicians to join this narrative, but a few months into the war when the West understood Ukraine and itself to have won, then saying that Minsk was about building up Ukraine into the strong modern nation that is spanking Russia on the battlefield was simply being part of the cool winning club. Seemed at that time (if you believed what you saw everywhere on Western mainstream and social media was even partially correct, that it can't be pure invention) that this duplicitous strategy was working and the people in Ukraine that wanted only to buy time for a big war were correct.

Now, as I mentioned in my comments, more important that what Merkel or anyone else says after the facts, is those facts themselves.

A core element of Minsk was disarming the Nazi groups who literally burned their political rivals (aka. normal fucking people) aline in a building and were constantly shelling civilians.

Western countries had to literally pass laws that arms were not to be transferred to organizations their own governments viewed as Nazi terrorists (which they obviously were). These laws were passed because it's hard to vote against a ban on weapons for Nazis but journalists went regularly to demonstrate the West was not following its own laws much less Ukraine trying to implement Minsk by disarming these non-state groups.

Europe could have put pressure for these kinds of obvious provisions of Minsk to be implemented, which would not only be a demonstration that the agreements were negotiated in good faith and Germany and France doesn't want Nazi's running around with guns and artillery any more than the Russians, but had the various paramilitary explicitly Nazi groups been disarmed and removed from the front lines the actual ceasefire may have been actually implemented by Ukraine professional forces. As important, if you remove fanatical Nazis who explicitly call for a Great War with Russia, explicitly claim war is a way of life for them and they want more of it, don't hesitate to explicitly outline how a war would be a purifying process for the nation, from the front lines then if it is Russia who breaks the ceasefire you could at least plausibly make that claim.

And that's only one element of the agreements that Ukraine did not attempt to implement and the West did not use any leverage to get Ukraine to implement.

You may say "that's what friends do" but the Nazi's aren't "Ukraine's friends", Zelensky even tried going to talk to them to get them to follow orders from the president and they just told him no. Now, had the West put pressure for the disarmament of these groups (i.e. no more weapons until their disarmed and removed from the front lines and the situation on the front professionalized) then that would have actually supported Zelensky's attempt to avoid a war, which I have no problem believing was genuine but it is in fact undermined by not only the West tolerating the arming of literal Nazis but that was clearly the policy in order to "calibrate" a conflict to imposes costs on Russia as the RAND documents happily explains to us.

The continued shelling of civilians made the larger 2022 war inevitable and the West doing nothing to restrain their Nazi dogs is one of the critical contributors to "somewhat higher intensity" fighting that we see.

The position that Merkel was taking credit for Ukrainian "winning" by helping to negotiate a bad faith deal to buy time was not controversial, that was the accepted facts and talking heads didn't hesitate to explain it to us and Merkel didn't run to explain "no, no, no! not strength in the sense of beating the Russians, that we all know is totally happening, but strength to maintain a ceasefire that unfortunately didn't happen!"

The apologetics that Merkel (and plenty of others as seen above) meant something else only arose after it turned out Ukraine wasn't totally and easily beating the Russians and that maybe it would have been better to try to implement Minsk to avoid a giant war that turns out has gotten hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians killed.

You need to reach into the memory hole and dig out what the Western media was essentially playing on loud speaker, on repeat without interruption for months: Ukraine was winning, fighting for the "right to join NATO" (even when you can't actually join NATO because NATO doesn't let you in) is brilliant politics, Russia would collapse any day, and so on, the war was in no way regrettable but "teaching Russia a lesson", and that the West was pure and righteous and never did anything wrong and Ukraine was our innocent child finally taking flight from under our wing and learning to soar on the winds of angelic victory (just as we do since centuries).

Concerning "bad faith" accusations, apparently it's more plausible that Putin (arguably an expert in disinformatia) was duped by the Europeans (however interested in pacifying the conflict to come back to do business as usual with Russia, reason why they have been already rejecting/postponing NATO membership for Ukraine all along), than that Europeans were taking countermeasures against Putin's palpable bad faith back then (having Putin already violated various international and bilateral treaties by illegally annexing the Crimean peninsula and committing acts of armed aggression against Ukraine, and being very much interested in keeping a conflict in Donbas alive, to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, or to allow further annexations). LOL. — neomac

I can't even parse what you're even trying to say ... that concerning bad faith actions Putin was duped by European bad faith actions? Just in a different way than no one made much attempt to implement Minsk (because US policy was to have exactly the conflict we see and European leaders are merely the receptacle of American dick)? Is that what you're trying to say?

You have already quoted the parts of the paper that make clear that it is analysing a course of action where the US intensifies it's efforts. I'm not sure who you're trying to fool by now acting like the paper was an analysis of the existing US policy. Yourself? — Echarmion

The paper is an analysis of existing US policy:

Expanding U.S. assistance to Ukraine, including lethal military assistance, would likely increase the costs to Russia, in both blood and treasure, of holding the Donbass region. — RAND

You need to actually read the paper to play the "what does it say" game.

The word "expand" is used because the existing policy is to assist Ukraine which the paper is analyzing the existing policy of supporting Ukraine to inflict costs, in terms of blood and treasure, on Russia and is considering the possibility of increasing that assistance.

The paper goes onto to consider a bunch of factors, including nuclear deterrence:

Risks
An increase in U.S. security assistance to Ukraine would likely lead to a commensurate increase in both Russian aid to the separatists and Russian military forces in Ukraine, thus sustaining the con- flict at a somewhat higher level of intensity.20 Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, the former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe, argued against giving Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine for precisely this reason.

Alternatively, Russia might counter-escalate, committing more troops and pushing them deeper into Ukraine. Russia might even preempt U.S. action, escalating before any additional U.S. aid arrives. Such escalation might extend Russia; Eastern Ukraine is already a drain. Taking more of Ukraine might only increase the burden, albeit at the expense of the Ukrainian people. However, such a move might also come at a significant cost to Ukraine and to U.S. prestige and credibility. This could produce disproportionately large Ukrainian casualties, territorial losses, and refugee flows. It might even lead Ukraine into a disadvantageous peace. — Extending Russia ,RAND

Moreover, the authors asset very clearly that the risk of a larger conflict exists even without further provocations: that Russia "Russia might even preempt U.S. action, escalating before any additional U.S. aid arrives. Such escalation might extend Russia," which means the existing policy of supporting Ukraine may result in escalation by Russia that comes with significant risks.

The key phase being "significant cost to Ukraine and to U.S. prestige and credibility" and also "This could produce disproportionately large Ukrainian casualties, territorial losses, and refugee flows".

I.e. if you actually read the paper the authors are quite clear that the existing policy of supporting Ukraine may result in a larger war which they see is highly risky for US policy as well as a high cost to Ukraine whatever happens. Their recommendation is to resolve the situation, in which further assistance of threat of assistance could be leverage in a resolution, but the authors are quite clear that the risks are very high, in particular to Ukraine, including of simply continuing the existing policy if you want to pretend the US made no further provocative moves between the paper being written and 2022 when Russia does indeed escalate.

Point of all this being: US policy makers knew what their policy was leading to and that the cost to Ukraine to be used as a tool to extend Russia would be enormous.

More importantly than this paper accurately predicting exactly what the consequences for the policy would likely be, the policy of drip feed of weapons systems to Ukraine is simply irrefutable evidence that the policy isn't and never was for Ukraine to "win" (otherwise you'd pour in everything they could use from day 1) but simply to calibrate the conflict at a "somewhat higher level of intensity" to inflict costs on Russia and, even more importantly than that, profit immensely in terms of arms and gas.

And this is all very obvious in only the most cursory analysis of obvious facts, without even need to get into the US policy clearly to arm the most extreme Nazi groups in Ukraine to ensure both the most bellicose actions possible towards the Russians but also to serve as fascist boots on the ground to deal with any Ukrainian resistance to the policy to march to war with a far more powerful neighbour which would obviously harm the country immensely and get a great many Ukrainians killed.

The reinterpretation of what she said as somehow to support a ceasefire through strength, is memory holing the whole episode. — boethius

Why are you so convinced that you alone have correctly understood what she was referring to?

The paper is an analysis of existing US policy: — boethius

I'm genuinely confused whether you just don't understand English grammar or whether you're just doubling down to avoid admitting that you overstated your case.

"Would" implies a conditional. Doing A would lead to B. Not (currently) doing A leads to B.

Point of all this being: US policy makers knew what their policy was leading to and that the cost to Ukraine to be used as a tool to extend Russia would be enormous. — boethius

Do you genuinely believe US policy makers are so good that they can predict future events with perfect accuracy? Noone, except perhaps the Russian planners, "knew" what would happen in 2022 years in advance.

the policy of drip feed of weapons systems to Ukraine is simply irrefutable evidence that the policy isn't and never was for Ukraine to "win" (otherwise you'd pour in everything they could use from day 1) but simply to calibrate the conflict at a "somewhat higher level of intensity" to inflict costs on Russia and, even more importantly than that, profit immensely in terms of arms and gas. — boethius

Real world policies of states are not monoliths. The goals you're listing are not mutually exclusive.

without even need to get into the US policy clearly to arm the most extreme Nazi groups in Ukraine — boethius

A policy you made up.

fascist boots on the ground to deal with any Ukrainian resistance to the policy to march to war with a far more powerful neighbour which would obviously harm the country immensely and get a great many Ukrainians killed. — boethius

An interesting fantasy but don't you think the fascist boots crossing the border from Russia are a much more effective motivation?

Why are you so convinced that you alone have correctly understood what she was referring to? — Echarmion

Just empty nothingness.

The West had no problem reporting this interpretation and portraying the Minsk agreements as a brilliant move by Ukraine and the West to prepare for an amazing job in the bigger war that was ongoing and understood to be essentially already won by Ukraine at the time.

It is not "I alone" that has this interpretation. Merkel is only one of many data points in evaluating this particular topic, you also have Ukrainian politicians explicitly stating they never intended to implement Minsk. More importantly there's the actual actions of further support to Nazis to shell civilians which is the surest way to provoke a larger war, which is what the US and Ukraine does and the war that would predictably result from doing that then happens.

'm genuinely confused whether you just don't understand English grammar or whether you're just doubling down to avoid admitting that you overstated your case.

"Would" implies a conditional. Doing A would lead to B. Not (currently) doing A leads to B. — Echarmion

As I clearly explain, the "would" is considering expanding an existing policy of supporting Ukraine to drain Russian blood and treasure in the Donbas which the paper has no problem recognizing is the existing policy.

The first sentence I cite is clearly recognizing the existing policy is to support Ukraine to drain Russian blood and treasure and considers the possibility, the "conditional" you are referring to, of expanding that policy.

I am responding to your statement that the authors aren't analyzing US policy at the time at all.

They clearly are (which is amazingly obvious if you read the paper) and they make that clear in stating making it clear that the status quo of the time is to support Ukraine to inflict costs, in blood and treasure, on Russia.

They consider the possibility of expanding that policy to inflict even greater costs and recommend not doing that.

However, they not only clearly recognize the existing policy as made clear in the sentence you are taking issue with:

Expanding U.S. assistance to Ukraine, including lethal military assistance, would likely increase the costs to Russia, in both blood and treasure, of holding the Donbass region. — RAND

"Expanding assistance to Ukraine" (which makes it clear there is already assistance to expand) "would likely increase the costs to Russia, in both blood and treasure" (which makes it clear the existing policy imposes costs which would then increase if the existing policy was expanded).

The meaning is very clear if you understand English and it's made even clearer by the context.

I know you would want to quibble by arguing that "expand" could be somehow ambiguous ... even though it's really not: if I say I want to "expand my restaurant" there is almost no English speaker that would interpret that to mean "I don't have a restaurant but I want to start one, thus expanding from zero restaurant", and if you said you wanted to expand your restaurant and it turns out you din't have a restaurant people would feel misled if it mattered (i.e. you were taking in loans backed by the restaurant you're expanding but also don't have) and would take it as a joke if the context was not serious (haha, good one, expand you're restaurant from zero restaurant to having a restaurant).

The authors talk of expanding assistance to Ukraine because they understand the policy is to assist Ukraine in fighting Russian proxy forces (the authors describe the war as a proxy war).

Therefore, knowing you would raise such absolutely ridiculous objections I then go onto cite more of the authors statements that further makes it clear they are analyzing the existing policy and it's consequence and risks:

Risks
An increase in U.S. security assistance to Ukraine would likely lead to a commensurate increase in both Russian aid to the separatists and Russian military forces in Ukraine, thus sustaining the con- flict at a somewhat higher level of intensity.20 Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, the former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe, argued against giving Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine for precisely this reason.

Alternatively, Russia might counter-escalate, committing more troops and pushing them deeper into Ukraine. Russia might even preempt U.S. action, escalating before any additional U.S. aid arrives. Such escalation might extend Russia; Eastern Ukraine is already a drain. Taking more of Ukraine might only increase the burden, albeit at the expense of the Ukrainian people. However, such a move might also come at a significant cost to Ukraine and to U.S. prestige and credibility. This could produce disproportionately large Ukrainian casualties, territorial losses, and refugee flows. It might even lead Ukraine into a disadvantageous peace. — Extending Russia ,RAND

Russia may "counter-escalate" and commit "more troops and pushing them deeper into Ukraine" which is exactly what happens. They even identify this as a risk even if the US doesn't even do anything, clearly stating that Russia may "preempt U.S. action".

As mentioned, they make there position even clearer in their recommendation to resolve the conflict, compared to keeping it going (which may result in Russian preemptive escalation) or indeed expanding lethal aid, what the US actually does (which may also result in Russian escalation).

Conclusion
The option of expanding U.S. military aid to Ukraine has to be evaluated principally on whether doing so could help end the conflict in the Donbass on acceptable terms rather than simply on costs it imposes on Moscow. Boosting U.S. aid as part of a broader diplomatic strategy to advance a settlement might well make sense, but calibrating the level of assistance to produce the desired effect while avoiding a damaging counter-escalation would be challenging. — Extending Russia ,RAND

In other words, the authors get it exactly right: inviting escalation (which includes not even doing anything yet) would likely be a U.S. policy setback and come at significant costs to Ukraine, in terms of lives and territories.

The US, since the paper was written, supplied arms to Ukraine, eschewed negotiations, reiterated Ukraine would join NATO (that the authors also note elsewhere is not only escalatory but would surely solicit a response from Moscow), and the result is exactly what the authors of the paper predict: significant costs to Ukraine, inability for the US to have Ukraine prevail and therefore also a US policy setback.

However, if you read the paper and "US policy" in terms of some arguably sane US foreign policy is not your priority, but rather selling gas and arms to Europe, eliminating Europe as a geopolitical rival, as well as a new shiny war to distract the masses from any accountability for the older less-shiny and disastrous wars, and, unlike the authors of the paper, you have zero concern for Ukrainian territory or wellbeing in the slightest, then you would press all the buttons the authors describe that would help provoke a "somewhat higher level of intensity" in the fighting (aka. a giant war).

If you didn't want the conflict to go nuclear, then you'd drip feed your support to Ukraine so that they are never an actual military threat to Russian forces and therefore Russia would have no need to nuclear recourse.

Which is exactly what actually happens.

Of course, the authors are writing in the past but even more importantly explicitly say they're methodology is simply to consider different policy directions (all in the view of extending Russia to coerce compliance, in particular in the information space: i.e. RT hosting US dissidents basically) and recommendations are based on essentially the subjective intuition of the authors and they are explicitly not quantifying anything in this first paper (but further work would be needed to do that); so if you circle back to your earlier objection that the authors don't exactly quantify the larger war that occurs, that is to be expected as they aren't trying to do that but rather evaluate if that policy direction (i.e. expanding assistance to Ukraine to impose greater costs on Russia) would be a good idea or not. Their explicit objective is to try to identify areas of competition with Russian in which the ground is favourable to the US (and, as has been clearly demonstrated, provoking further escalation with Russian in Ukraine is not such a favourable direction).

Do you genuinely believe US policy makers are so good that they can predict future events with perfect accuracy? Noone, except perhaps the Russian planners, "knew" what would happen in 2022 years in advance. — Echarmion

Again, more pointless quibbling.

US policy makers clearly know by being informed by expert analysis such as the paper in question that their propping up Ukraine and also literal Nazis to fight in the Donbas while being vocal about Ukraine joining NATO ... oh, one day, and also withdrawing from the INF treaty (what the authors warn would almost certainly solicit a Russian response) all while rejecting outright negotiating with Russia, are actions that would very likely provoke a larger war between Ukraine and Russia, a war that Ukraine would almost certainly lose at great cost to Ukrainians.

They know what the likely consequence of their actions are because they not only have expert analysis informing them of the likely consequences but it's also common sense. Sending arms, withdrawing from INF, breaking US laws to make sure Nazis get weapons, are all well considered decisions. I know you would like to portray US policy as essentially a series of well meaning whims, but that's just dumb.

No where do I state the likely consequences (such as the likely consequences of different policy decisions that the RAND paper explains) are somehow "certain", but in this case what is likely is what actually happens.

Experts put significant effort into explaining "doing this will result in that" and then US Policy makers go and do this and the that results. The argument that somehow they thought something else would happen is just dumb.

The additional proof they know exactly what is likely to happen and that is the end result they too are looking for is the drip feed policy. If US policy makers actually thought Ukraine could prevail and actually wanted that to happen then they would not drip feed weapons systems all the way to a handful of F16s in 2024, they would have poured in the armour, the HIMARS, the other missile systems, and much more from the beginning, and if a weapons system really was not yet appropriate they would have been trialing those weapons systems to inform tactics and training for when those systems are required (such as when the Soviet equipment does in fact get all blown up).

Instead, not only are the actual facts that the weapons systems are drip fed, i.e. "calibrated" to support a certain level of conflict without escalating further in the language of the RAND document, but US officials are pretty clear in what they are doing as they don't hesitate to explain that they won't provide this or that so as not to escalate, and assert that as common sense for months ... and then one day provide that very thing.

Escalate to what? Obviously Ukraine actually winning.

And why the about face suddenly one day? Because the weapon system under consideration no longer actually risks Ukraine winning.

Even Western talking heads trying to fully back US policy would have trouble parsing this policy and would even ask themselves confusingly what exactly is the escalation the US Is trying to avoid? Of course then they got the memo to just stop asking themselves that question.

Real world policies of states are not monoliths. — Echarmion

Which is why I have no hesitation to really believe that Zelensky really did want to prevent the war from breaking out in doing things like trying to control the Nazis, but other factions in Ukraine prevailed (such as those very Nazis just straight-up telling Zelensky they wouldn't do what he says), and I'd have no problem believing many elites in Europe didn't want this war either but didn't prevail against US proxy politicians in Europe as well as US pressure and direct actions (such as stating Ukraine would join NATO, those 12 or so CIA bases in Ukraine, direct arms supply to Ukraine and so on).

Nowhere do I present state policy as monolithic.

The goals you're listing are not mutually exclusive. — Echarmion

... Yes, obviously the goals of drip feeding weapons to Ukraine to calibrate the conflict at "Ukraine loses" and profiting immensely from the conflict by locking in Europe to US gas exports and also a generalized arms sales bonanza in starting Cold War 2.0 are ... not mutually exclusive gaols.

I'm not sure what you're responding to, but yes, we agree that drip feeding weapons to Ukraine so that they loose, just slowly, is compatible with immense arms industry and fossil industry profits.

Totally agreed.

A policy you made up. — Echarmion

Not made up, I'll go repost the Western media's own investigations into this issue if you really want me to. Journalists go to see if these Nazi groups are getting Western arms and ... immediately verify that as fact ... and then they publish those finding and nothing change so even if you wanted to pretend it wasn't the policy because "they didn't know" ... as even 12 CIA bases literally right there can't "know everything with perfect accuracy" well they obviously know once it's reported in the media.

The policy is super duper clearly provoke a larger war between Russia and Ukraine and therefore in total consistency with that policy the Nazis are supported as they not only do the most provocative things like shell civilians but are also a provocation by just being their wholesome Nazi selves.

An interesting fantasy but don't you think the fascist boots crossing the border from Russia are a much more effective motivation? — Echarmion

Again, I can repost the West's own reporting on these Nazis and their effect on the Ukrainian political process. Every time I do nothing in the videos is ever refuted or discussed further and the topic suddenly switches, but if you really want to get into those pretty clear video reports that show pretty clearly what the Nazis were up to, I am more than happy to post those reportings again (reports made by the West's own mainstream media as no one at that time had yet gotten the memo that "Nazis are in and making any sort of sense is out").

The West had no problem reporting this interpretation and portraying the Minsk agreements as a brilliant move by Ukraine and the West to prepare for an amazing job in the bigger war that was ongoing and understood to be essentially already won by Ukraine at the time. — boethius

I don't remember anything of the sort.

support to Nazis to shell civilians — boethius

You're switching back to full on propaganda here.

I am responding to your statement that the authors aren't analyzing US policy at the time at all. — boethius

Deciding what your interlocutor is saying sure makes arguing easier.

They consider the possibility of expanding that policy to inflict even greater costs and recommend not doing that. — boethius

Great, so we finally agree. Now, as I asked before, can you point out how the US expanded their policy?

In other words, the authors get it exactly right: inviting escalation (which includes not even doing anything yet) — boethius

Nowhere does it say that not changing the policy would also invite escalation.

The US, since the paper was written, supplied arms to Ukraine, eschewed negotiations, reiterated Ukraine would join NATO — boethius

When and how did they "expand" these forms of support? When the paper was published, the US was already directly supplying small arms up to Javelin ATGMs. They only started supplying heavier arms after the invasion.

The only other change was to use the presidential drawdown authority to supply arms to Ukraine, but this only happened in mid 2021 with russian troops massed on the border.

US stance on Ukrainian NATO membership didn't change anywhere between 2014 and 2022.

provoke a "somewhat higher level of intensity" in the fighting (aka. a giant war). — boethius

It's interesting that you're drawing attention to just how silly your equivocation here is.

are actions that would very likely provoke a larger war between Ukraine and Russia, a war that Ukraine would almost certainly lose at great cost to Ukrainians. — boethius

You're using "A war" here to stand in for anything from an escalation of the Donbas war to a full invasion aiming to completely conquer Ukraine. Those are simply not comparable scenarios.

No where do I state the likely consequences (such as the likely consequences of different policy decisions that the RAND paper explains) are somehow "certain", — boethius

Actually you're doing exactly that, and all the time. In this very post you have repeatedly talked about the outcome of the war with complete certainty.

Experts put significant effort into explaining "doing this will result in that" and then US Policy makers go and do this and the that results. The argument that somehow they thought something else would happen is just dumb. — boethius

If that is the case then why did the experts not outright say "Russia is going to commit to total war to conquer Ukraine"? If according to you, that is what they predicted, and they put "significant effort" into making sure it's understood, then surely they'd just have said it.

If US policy makers actually thought Ukraine could prevail and actually wanted that to happen then they would not drip feed weapons systems — boethius

Again there can be different goals at the same time.

Escalate to what? Obviously Ukraine actually winning. — boethius

Do you think pouring all of the West's weapon systems would have no negative consequences at all? Don't you think countries like China might take a rather dim view of it? Or, indeed, the populations of the western countries.

Which is why I have no hesitation to really believe that Zelensky really did want to prevent the war from breaking out in doing things like trying to control the Nazis, but other factions in Ukraine prevailed (such as those very Nazis just straight-up telling Zelensky they wouldn't do what he says), and I'd have no problem believing many elites in Europe didn't want this war either but didn't prevail against US proxy politicians in Europe as well as US pressure and direct actions (such as stating Ukraine would join NATO, those 12 or so CIA bases in Ukraine, direct arms supply to Ukraine and so on). — boethius

See, this makes me very angry.

Russia invaded.

Russia invaded!

Noone else made that decision. No. One. Else.

All these people that died? They'd be alive if Russia just didn't invade. They didn't have to. Not a single Ukrainian or NATO soldier would have set a single foot on russian soil had Russia not invaded.

It was not necessary. The russian leadership is directly and unequivocally responsible for every single life lost in this war. And you don't even mention them with one single word.

Not made up, I'll go repost the Western media's own investigations into this issue if you really want me to. — boethius

These investigations, as you know, do not support the claim you made.

The policy is super duper clearly provoke a larger war between Russia and Ukraine and therefore in total consistency with that policy the Nazis are supported as they not only do the most provocative things like shell civilians but are also a provocation by just being their wholesome Nazi selves. — boethius

Just repeating the claim doesn't make it true. You claim a specific policy: "to arm the most extreme Nazi groups in Ukraine"

That is your claim, or better your lie. Because it's obvious you won't actually be able to defend it with facts.

Again, I can repost the West's own reporting on these Nazis and their effect on the Ukrainian political process. — boethius

The effect they reported was nothing like what you claim here. You're using a bog standard troll tactic where you'll post a "source", wildly misrepresent - or perhaps just outright lie about - what it says and then forever pretend that you proved your point.

You did not prove your point. You repeatedly ignored all the counterarguments.

Indeed not only Merkel has NOT admitted what he claims she has, but it can not even be inferred from what she actually said or equated with what she actually said: reinforcing Ukrainian military not only is not incompatible with pursuing a cease-fire but it could also be instrumental to preserving a cease-fire. — neomac


Just gaslighting apologetics. What does Merkel say:

The 2014 Minsk agreement was an attempt to give time to Ukraine. It also used this time to become stronger as can be seen today. — Merkel


Now this is well into the war. If she wanted to say that the goal of making Ukraine stronger was to deter Russia and so avoid a war ... she would have said that! She's not a moron. — boethius

Or she didn’t say that because just a moron would have thought that buying time was an admission by Europeans that Minsk agreements were deceivingly meant to arm Ukraine in order to initiate/pursue a war against Russia.
Germany’s position was pressed by a strategic dilemma: compromise strategic alliance with Ukraine and the US, and compromise pro-West international order by forcing Ukraine (acknowledged as THE VICTIM AND THE WEAKER party in the conflict) to by caving in to Russia’s demands, or compromise its economic ties with Russia while the anti-NATO/anti-EU wave was rising in the US (see Trump) and also within Europe (see Macron). What should be clear to me is that Germans were very much interested in pacifying the situation and go back to normal business with Russia THAT’S WHY we can believe Merkel’s genuine intention to reach a cease-fire through diplomacy. Yet Germans were cornered by geopolitical circumstances into a role of mediation whose diplomatic efforts could have been weaponised against German strategic interests in any case, and still make the cease-fire impossible to achieve or preserve.
In short, reaching a cease-fire through diplomacy was very much in the interest of Western Europeans, at least for Germany, yet the implementation of the Minsk agreements was very much left onto the Russians and Ukrainians’ initiative because there was no possible mediation between CONTRADICTORY demands by a third party interested in maintaining good terms with both. Indeed, Russians and Ukrainians had strongly competing views about the Minsk agreements, depending on their implementation, seen as capitulation or escalation. There was no viable third option.

Back in autumn 2022 the Western narrative was that Russia was weak, Russia was falling apart, Russia was losing and Ukraine was in the process of inflicting a brilliant victory. The Western talking heads and officials were in a circle jerk of patting each other on the cock in celebration of this brilliant geopolitical strategy, in which the Ukrainian build up, with Western assistance, since 2014 was to credit for Ukraine's extraordinary prowess on the battlefield. Various politicians and officials, in both the West and Ukraine, were taking credit for the brilliant move of using Minsk as a cover to build up Ukraine to defeat Russia.

Merkel in this statement was buying into this narrative of Ukrainian victory and taking a bit of the credit.

And it wasn't just Merkel, plenty did a little victory lap of how Ukraine "outplayed" the Russians and Minsk was part of that deception. — boethius

A version of events proudly asserted by Ukrainian politicians even before the larger 2022 war even started:

“From my point of view, the Minsk agreements were born dead,” said Volodymyr Ariev, an MP from Poroshenko’s party. “The conditions were always impossible to implement. We understood it clearly at the time, but we signed it to buy time for Ukraine: to have time to restore our government, our army, intelligence and security system.” — The Guardian — boethius

Nowhere Merkel is talking about Ukrainian victory in that comment. That's your rhetoric manipulation.
Notice that Merkel’s comment about Minsk agreements came in response to the following question: “Do you ask yourself whether the years of relative calm were also years of neglect, and whether you were not just a crisis manager, but also partly the cause of crises?” (https://www.zeit.de/2022/51/angela-merkel-russland-fluechtlingskrise-bundeskanzler/komplettansicht). And which party had more reasons to complain and actually complained about Merkel’s diplomatic approach to the Ukrainian-Russian conflict? Ukrainians of course, not the Russians, NOT only because of their weakest position, territorial losses, strategic stakes, and the fact that the full scale war with Russia happened anyways BUT ALSO because eventually, NATO member states – including Germany – collectively failed to support Ukraine’s efforts to rebuild a credible deterrence in line with Ukrainian expectations, at least until the full-scale invasion was inevitable, from the Ukrainian perspective. Ukraine was denied weapon supplies for eight years to “avoid an escalation of the war” and compelled to sign the Minsk agreements under duress (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/09/can-ukraine-and-russia-be-persuaded-to-abide-by-minsk-accords, https://euromaidanpress.com/2019/10/06/protests-against-steinmeiers-formula-gather-largest-crowd-since-euromaidan/) PRECISELY BECAUSE the West tried to adhere to the intention of such agreements to find a political solution to the war.
So Merkel was simply defending herself against the accusation that Minsk Agreements were a diplomatic failure to which she countered: ”Diplomacy isn't wrong just because it didn't work,” she said, speaking in the interview broadcast on ARD on June 7. "So I don't see why I should have to say that it was wrong and I won't apologize for it.” (https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-war-germany-merkel/31888480.html). From Merkel’s perspective, given the fact that Russians were the aggressors, the strongest party, and that Germans already tried to appease Russia by denying Ukraine NATO membership, it is plausible to assume that the initiative for cooperation was expected from Russia more than from Ukraine (as much as initiative for cooperation is expected by many from stronger Israel wrt weaker Palestinians). And it may also be argued that between Ukraine and Russia, Ukraine was the one which made the greatest efforts in abiding by the Minsk agreements:
https://epicenter.wcfia.harvard.edu/blog/through-ashes-minsk-agreements
https://ecfr.eu/article/ukraine-russia-and-the-minsk-agreements-a-post-mortem/
https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15202.doc.htm
So the least Germans could afford to achieve FOR Ukrainians without forcing Ukraine to capitulate, was what Poroshenko himself admitted and Merkel echoed in her interview: namely to allow Ukraine to get stronger, by regenerating and rebuilding its Armed Force for deterrence. Indeed on the onset of war in 2014 exposed Ukraine as completely unprepared. The Ukrainian Armed Forces were not manned, equipped, or trained to meet Russian aggression.
In short, there is no admission of intentional deception of Russia by Merkel, but explicit refusal to take the blame for the failure of the diplomatic approach (as voiced by the Ukrainians). Merkel failed to reach a cease-fire despite being EXPLICITLY PURSUED (“It was an attempt to prevent precisely such a war”), AND CONSISTENTLY PURSUED wrt the strategic interests of Germany, still Ukraine could benefit from Minsk agreements to counter Russian aggression ("The 2014 Minsk agreement was an attempt to give time to Ukraine. It also used this time to become stronger as can be seen today. The Ukraine of 2014-2015 is not the modern Ukraine.").

Now, before the war started it would have been controversial for Western politicians to join this narrative, but a few months into the war when the West understood Ukraine and itself to have won, then saying that Minsk was about building up Ukraine into the strong modern nation that is spanking Russia on the battlefield was simply being part of the cool winning club. Seemed at that time (if you believed what you saw everywhere on Western mainstream and social media was even partially correct, that it can't be pure invention) that this duplicitous strategy was working and the people in Ukraine that wanted only to buy time for a big war were correct. — boethius

You need to reach into the memory hole and dig out what the Western media was essentially playing on loud speaker, on repeat without interruption for months: Ukraine was winning, fighting for the "right to join NATO" (even when you can't actually join NATO because NATO doesn't let you in) is brilliant politics, Russia would collapse any day, and so on, the war was in no way regrettable but "teaching Russia a lesson", and that the West was pure and righteous and never did anything wrong and Ukraine was our innocent child finally taking flight from under our wing and learning to soar on the winds of angelic victory (just as we do since centuries) — boethius

.

I've questioned many times the logic and the relevance of your "main stream media narrative" counternarrative in countering my own claims. Infowar, deceitful propaganda, and blame game are not uncommon in politics as much as in times of hegemonic competition, so Westerners should not be expected to refrain from infowar, deceitful propaganda, blaming game IN FAVOR OF Russian infowar, deceitful propaganda and blaming game, ESPECIALLY given the asymmetric advantages Russia enjoys in poisoning the Western public debate. The same goes with issues related Western tolerance toward war crimes, neo-nazi militia, military-industrial complex lobbying, democratic backsliding, and forcing people to war.
But, beyond accusations of spinning deceitful propaganda, one has to look deeper into what strategic reasoning may push official propaganda. And to understand that one has to look into the core strategic interests of all involved parties and their own agendas, not only into the US’s.
So until you address my objections, your pro-Ukraine propaganda deconstruction has ZERO appeal to me.

A core element of Minsk was disarming the Nazi groups who literally burned their political rivals (aka. normal fucking people) aline in a building and were constantly shelling civilians. — boethius

Not sure what you are referring to with "Nazi groups who literally burned their political rivals" or with "constantly shelling civilians". Anyways, the purpose of Minsk agreements was mainly to reach a cease-fire through disarming, deescalate, withdrawal ON BOTH sides, not on one side only, and it doesn’t talk specifically about Ukrainian Nazi groups, but more in general about “disarmament of all illegal armed groups” and “the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces, military equipment, as well as mercenaries” (like the Nazi and Imperialist Russian militia which started the conflict) with the aim of reaching a cease-fire and the intervention of third parties like OCSE for monitoring the situation.

Western countries had to literally pass laws that arms were not to be transferred to organizations their own governments viewed as Nazi terrorists (which they obviously were). These laws were passed because it's hard to vote against a ban on weapons for Nazis but journalists went regularly to demonstrate the West was not following its own laws much less Ukraine trying to implement Minsk by disarming these non-state groups. — boethius

So what? The laws were passed prior to the Russian full scale invasion of Ukraine in ’22 and yet Russia invaded anyways . Besides the role of “the Azov Battalion” was understandably instrumental to Ukraine in countering Russian aggression when Ukraine had a weaker army, and especially to counter Russian Imperialist/Nazi militia. Highlighting the Nazi problem is instrumental to Western pro-Russian propaganda (like yours) which also comes from Western far-right and crypto neo-Nazis like AfD (https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/05/14/co-leader-of-germanys-far-right-afd-party-fined-for-using-nazi-slogan). Indeed, there is nothing in your or Russian denunciation of the Ukrainian "Nazi problem" that is inherently anti-Nazi.
So it’s still up for debate for whom the Azov Battalion is a "Nazi problem" and in what sense it’s a problem.

You may say "that's what friends do" but the Nazi's aren't "Ukraine's friends", Zelensky even tried going to talk to them to get them to follow orders from the president and they just told him no. Now, had the West put pressure for the disarmament of these groups (i.e. no more weapons until their disarmed and removed from the front lines and the situation on the front professionalized) then that would have actually supported Zelensky's attempt to avoid a war, which I have no problem believing was genuine but it is in fact undermined by not only the West tolerating the arming of literal Nazis but that was clearly the policy in order to "calibrate" a conflict to imposes costs on Russia as the RAND documents happily explains to us. — boethius

Your rhetoric framing is highly questionable. The integration of the Azov Battalion to the Ukrainian National Guard came with Poroshenko not with Zelensky. And the integration into a regular army in a moment of need WAS already an attempt to make the Azov battalion a depoliticized, professional and accountable force more instrumental to Ukraine defensive needs than to pursuing neo-Nazi propaganda and political agenda: indeed, the unit has been repeatedly reconstituted since then, with its extremist early neo-Nazi leaders like Andriy Biletsky leaving, among others (https://lens.monash.edu/@politics-society/2022/08/19/1384992/much-azov-about-nothing-how-the-ukrainian-neo-nazis-canard-fooled-the-world). So much so that Ukrainian Jews fought in the Azov Regiment, also in the Mariupol siege: https://www.timesofisrael.com/senior-zelensky-adviser-40-jewish-heroes-fighting-in-mariupol-steel-plant/ , https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/article-762000
Besides RAND doesn’t mention the Ukrainian neo-Nazis in the article you posted.

Concerning "bad faith" accusations, apparently it's more plausible that Putin (arguably an expert in disinformatia) was duped by the Europeans (however interested in pacifying the conflict to come back to do business as usual with Russia, reason why they have been already rejecting/postponing NATO membership for Ukraine all along), than that Europeans were taking countermeasures against Putin's palpable bad faith back then (having Putin already violated various international and bilateral treaties by illegally annexing the Crimean peninsula and committing acts of armed aggression against Ukraine, and being very much interested in keeping a conflict in Donbas alive, to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, or to allow further annexations). LOL. — neomac


I can't even parse what you're even trying to say ... that concerning bad faith actions Putin was pseudo-duped by European pseudo-bad faith actions? — boethius

OK let me double down on this point then. The Minsk Agreement did not cover the full scale/scope of the hybrid war Russia was waging in ABSOLUTE BAD FAITH FROM THE START (https://euromaidanpress.com/2019/10/25/leaked-kremlin-emails-show-minsk-protocol-designed-as-path-to-ukraines-capitulation-euromaidan-press-report/, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surkov_leaks).
Russia couldn’t possibly be a credible mediator between belligerents (Ukranian government and pro-Russian separatists) being itself a belligerent party and initiator of the conflict, having already and repeatedly violated previous agreements (Minsk agreements came after the invasion and annexation of Crimea by Russia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Little_green_men_(Russo-Ukrainian_War), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31796226), pushing for further Russification of the occupied territories despite diplomatic negotiations, and being very much interested in exploiting the conflict in Ukraine to prevent Westernisation of Ukraine. On the other side, the Minsk agreements “bought time” also for Russia to prepare for its forthcoming full-scale war while testing the resolve of the West in supporting Ukraine.
So Ukrainians, Europeans and the US had all compelling reasons to believe that Putin was approaching diplomatic solutions IN TOTAL BAD FAITH FROM THE START, and it should be totally expected that Ukrainians, the US and Europeans were compelled to build a credible military deterrent for Ukraine while pushing for a diplomatic solutions to contain Putin’s hegemonic ambitions (as a “carrot and stick” approach suggests). Russia's claim that the West was in bad faith can be a typical example of accusation in a mirror (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accusation_in_a_mirror) as expected by ex-KGB agent expert in disinformatia and historical revisionism (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10509605/, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/vladimir-putins-rewriting-of-history-draws-on-a-long-tradition-of-soviet-myth-making-180979724/, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html).
Your reasoning seems to assume as evidently compelling that the burden of making all necessary efforts to avoid the conflict were only on the US, Europeans, Ukraine, BUT NOT ON RUSSIA, and that such efforts must have been assessed against RUSSIAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS AS PERCEIVED BY RUSSIA not US/European/Ukrainian strategic interests as perceived by US/Europeans/Ukrainians. On what grounds you do that? From a geopolitical and historical point view your assumptions are totally questionable.
Can you parse that better now?

standard troll tactic — Echarmion

Indeed, the dude overly indulges in trolling tactics: framing facts through manipulative labels ("Nazi problem", "Western coup", "Russia legitimate security concerns", "Western propaganda"), misreporting sources and interlocutors' claims, and take others' objections just as a pretext to loop once more into framing facts and distorting others' claims.

I don't remember anything of the sort. — Echarmion

Then you're obviously not really following events and are just wasting time and space.

When the Western media believed Ukraine was "winning" the conversation (in the Western media) was very different than it was now. The faction in Ukraine that wanted to war and for which Minsk was just to buy time to prepare for the inevitable war seemed completely validated by the West and the Western cheerleaders for the war essentially presented these people as geniuses, both diplomatic and militarily.

You're switching back to full on propaganda here. — Echarmion

Neither the Nazis nor the shelling of civilians by said Nazis are propaganda. The West's own institutions and media recorded both.

Now, I suppose you could argue that yes there was and are Nazis and yes the shelling of civilians was a regular feature of the Donbas war but it was actually moderate regular forces that were shelling civilians. If you're taking this position then I am happy to present the argument of why that is a terrible position to take and in contradiction with the available evidence.

Deciding what your interlocutor is saying sure makes arguing easier. — Echarmion

You can literally click through the series of responses to arrive at your comment:

You have already quoted the parts of the paper that make clear that it is analysing a course of action where the US intensifies it's efforts. I'm not sure who you're trying to fool by now acting like the paper was an analysis of the existing US policy. Yourself? — Echarmion

You're literally accusing me of trying "fool" someone by stating the paper analyses existing US policy.

I then demonstrate that the paper quite clearly is analyzing existing US policy and its benefits and risks as well as considering different directions US policy could go.

For the subject at hand, the paper analyses the US policy vis-a-vis support for Ukraine in the Donbas war (that the paper describes as a proxy war), the existing policy of Ukraine joining NATO (... oh ... some day), and the existing policy vis-a-vis the ABM and INF treaty.

The paper describes all these policies as already provocative to Russia and potentially soliciting a Russian escalation (without even doing anything more), but considers doing more such as more arms and assistance for Ukraine (things like 12 CIA bases in Ukraine would also certainly qualify as more assistance), being more vocal about Ukraine joining NATO, as well as withdrawing from INF. All three actions, which the US then does, the paper describes as likely leading to a significant Russian escalation (indeed, the paper correctly predicts that the Russians would likely respond with offensive actions in response to INF withdrawal rather than defensive actions such as inventing in ABM, but also notes that Moscow is already sensitive to the possibility of a decapitation nuclear strike and the possibility of converting ABM bases, deployed after withdrawal from the ABM treaty, to launch nuclear weapons).

In other words, the paper describes the existing US policy on all the areas directly related to conflict in Ukraine as already provocative and already risking a Russian escalation, and then discusses policy changes that would be even more provocative.

The US then does all those things and you want to just keep denying what the paper clearly says in plain English.

It's really impossible to take you seriously at all at this juncture.

If you're willing to deny what you clearly just stated a few comments ago, that the paper doesn't analyze the existing US policy at the time, you're clearly just trying to waste time.

Now, it's not a waste of my time to demonstrate your bad faith and pure idiocy of your positions, but I'll be selective in responding to you going on, only bothering to respond to your comments if it involves points I wish to make anyways.

However, in the event you have some sort of growth of your own soul (from currently empty to "something") then feel free to actually read the entire RAND paper as there's plenty of interesting conversation to be had based on what it actually says rather than simply repeatedly denying what it says and asking me to cite it continuously.

What the paper says vis-a-vis an escalation in Ukraine is also obviously common sense that Russia will have a significant advantage and a bigger conflict will result in significant losses to Ukraine in terms of lives and territory.

The only reason the situation "appeared" to be different in 2022 is first because the Western mainstream media simply ignored completely the Russian conquest of the entire land bridge to Crimea and how that's a major strategic victory that Russia would then need to consolidate, ignoring disproportionate losses for Ukrainians (often by just repeating Ukrainian loss estimates for both sides) and the fact Russia would likely be more conservative with spending lives (giving Ukraine a temporary advantage in the area of willingness to sustain losses, which Russia could easily compensate in other areas such as air power, artillery and building a sophisticated defensive line, but did allow Ukraine to "compete" for a time those losses were indeed available to lose), and ignored the simple fact that Russia is a lot bigger with better demographics (not "great" demographics but far better than Ukraine, and even that made worse by the mass exodus from the country).

Or she didn’t say that because just a moron would have thought that buying time was an admission by Europeans that Minsk agreements were deceivingly meant to arm Ukraine in order to initiate/pursue a war against Russia. — neomac

That's literally what the expression "buying time" means. It doesn't mean "coercive pressure as one component in a diplomatic strategy to establish a lasting ceasefire", which Merkel could have easily expressed that concept in her own words had she wanted to. She would have also been appraised of the situation that Minsk is not being implemented and is unlikely to be implemented during the entire non-implementation of Minsk while she was in office.

When she made these comments the mood in the West, if you can remember those days, was extreme exuberance for Ukrainian war prospects and people were happy to take credit for the happy situation.

The propaganda and cheerleading in both Western mainstream and social media was extreme with mass Ukrainian flag emojis everywhere you looked. I would go so far as to describe the emotion as catharsis with continued reenactments of Churchillian speeches and steady drip of a little of that VE-Day glorious celebration.

The narrative that Ukraine was just "buying time" for a bigger war preexisted the 2022 bigger war and supported by Ukrainian officials and voices of various sorts, as I cited above. Merkel would have known this faction in Ukraine that actually wants a bigger war with Russia existed and at the time she made her comments it seemed this factions view was validated.

We can go back to those days if you want to be extremely sure that the narrative that Merkel was just decrying a failed bid to maintain a ceasefire is an apologetic invented after battlefield conditions soured, and not before, but the general point that Minsk was not a good faith agreement is supposed anyways by plenty of Ukrainian actions and, more importantly, plenty of Ukrainian and Western actions.

Nowhere Merkel is talking about Ukrainian victory in that comment. That's your rhetoric manipulation. — neomac

She says "buying time" ... buying time for what? To become "stronger as we see today".

The far bigger war with Russia is at that time underway. By "strong" she is obviously implying "able to win on the battlefield".

Otherwise her comments would make absolutely no sense: Minsk was to buy time for Ukraine to be strong ... but alas obviously not strong enough and therefore to ultimately be severely damaged by Russia and forced to sign unfavourable peace terms?!

The sentence clearly and unambiguously is describing "buying time" to successfully deal with Russia in military terms, which nearly the entire West completely believed was happening in December 2022.

You don't "buy time" to suffer the same consequences later, perhaps even worse, you "buy time" to prepare a more favourable outcome. Using a negotiation to "buy time" would be understood by anyone in diplomatic, legal, and/or political circles as the goal is to buy time to prepare for an escalation of the conflict and not buy time in order to implement the spirt of the agreement (which makes no sense: you do not "buy time" in signing an agreement with the intention of fulfilling the agreement, just not now but maybe later?! It's not how anyone speaks with even a cursory experience with this kind of discourse).

Had Merkel actually thought Ukraine negotiated Minsk with the intention to avoid a bigger war and was therefore implementing Minsk with the goal of avoiding a bigger war, but that, alas, supplying arms to Ukraine as part of that diplomatic strategy didn't work but fortunately Ukraine is now better able to deal with Russian bad faith vis-a-vis Minsk, she would have said something along those lines, but she doesn't because she knows very well it is Ukraine the obstacle for either implementing Minsk or then trying to renegotiate it, and likewise the West is an obstacle in rebuking any attempts at a larger negotiation with the main Western powers to arrive at an understanding.

The reason there's no negotiations directly with the West concerning the situation in Ukraine is because the West, in particular the US, knows that Ukraine cannot effectively use Western leverage in a negotiation.

As the RAND paper makes clear, the West was pressuring Russia on several military and economic domains. To take two important domains: in the ABM and INF situation, the West could offer in a negotiation to assuage Russian concerns of nuclear first strike, even in mutual beneficial ways that aim to create a new non-proliferation treaty architecture that is favourable also to the US (vis-a-vis not only Russia but also other nuclear or would-be-nuclear powers); and in the economic sphere obviously the West could approve Nord Stream II that Russia spent some 10 billion dollars building. In direct bilateral negotiations Ukraine cannot offer either of these things as leverage, only in negotiations that involve (at the least) the US and Germany could ABM, INF and Nord Stream II be on the table.

Now, it was presented by Western officials and media at the time that the reason to rebuke any Russian invitations to negotiate all the issues in play, a "new European security architecture" was that this was essentially as a favour to Ukraine in that the West wouldn't go "behind Ukraine's back" and negotiate things with the Russians.

What the West, in particular the US obviously making these decisions on behalf of everyone in NATO and the EU, was actually doing in rebuking direct negotiations with Russia was minimizing the leverage Ukraine had to negotiate a resolution to the disputes in Ukraine. Russia may very well have agreed to favourable terms for Ukraine in not only the Donbas but even Crimea could have changed status (some sort of strange quasi status is had been floated at the time), if Nord Stream II was approved and also some nuclear deescalation (or then at least avoiding further nuclear escalation) which presumably the West should also want. Obviously plenty of other issues such as NATO and so on.

I say all this not only because it is apropos but also Merkel would have known the purpose of US policy was to be provocative and not to try to reach a resolution with Russia.

It's Markel and Holland trying to talk Bush out of declaring Ukraine would join NATO all the way back in 2008, so she is fully aware of the trajectory.

To circle back to her comment of Minsk being used to buy time, she is not some kindergarten level intellect considering only a few surface level facts, appearances and straight-up lies, Western media permits to be discussed (the kind of intellect that truly believes fighting for "the right to join NATO" makes sense). She has a great deal of insight into actors in the West and Ukraine, and in autumn 2022 perhaps antagonizing Russia was still not her "ideal preference" but it did seem to be at least working, everyone was happy about it, and therefore she did not have a problem with saying the truth in a phone call she was unaware was being recorded.

And it is the actual facts which best serve to understand Merkel's meaning. There are no facts available in which to base an opinion that the West was doing everything possible to resolve conflict with Russian in Ukraine and instead there are a plethora of facts available to demonstrate the West, in particular the US, is escalating conflict with Russia (Ukraine being only one area: there's also Libya and Syria, and economic conflict and continuously accusing Russia of meddling in US elections which turn out to be 200 000 USD of Facebook adds purchased by a clickbait farm; though what US elites actually meant when they say things like Russia is winning the information war is that Russia was hiring US dissidents and giving them a platform; i.e. exactly what the West did to the Soviet Union and was good value for money).

If we assume Markel isn't an idiot with kindergarten level reasoning skills and absolutely clueless and oblivious to what was going on during her entire political career, then it is a very safe assumption that Merkel understood correctly the goal of US foreign policy and also the goal of the dominant faction in Ukraine (in line with US foreign policy and CIA assistance) was to have a much larger war with Russia, which they got, seemed to be doing well in, seemed "strong" and it was safe to just say the truth (especially in a conversation that she understood was casual and not recorded).

It's an interesting topic but there's also plenty of other evidence in which to base the opinion that Ukraine was not trying to resolve hostilities in the Donbas but maintaining them while building up their forces for a larger war with Russia.

Now, perhaps the Ukrainian people didn't want the resulting war, and perhaps Zelensky was completely honest in his platform of making peace with Russia, but when you have fanatical paramilitary forces that are outside the control of the central government then what the people want and what their president wants are not necessarily determining factors.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEIZURE WARRANT (case 24-mj-1395)
^{— U.S. Department of Justice · Sep 4, 2024}
U.S. Seizes 32 Pro-Russian Propaganda Domains in Major Disinformation Crackdown
^{— Ravie Lakshmanan · The Hacker News · Sep 5, 2024}
The Lies Russia Tells Itself
^{— Thomas Rid · Foreign Affairs · Sep 30, 2024}

Living behind the new curtain is subject to heavier measures.

Арендатор шахт ЛНР начнет экспорт угля через Мариуполь (en)
^{— RBC · Sep 30, 2024}

Land — wheat homes¹²³ art coal — grab.
Expansion.

Then you're obviously not really following events and are just wasting time and space. — boethius

Or your very idiosyncratic perception of events is simply not the same as other people's.

When the Western media believed Ukraine was "winning" the conversation (in the Western media) was very different than it was now. The faction in Ukraine that wanted to war and for which Minsk was just to buy time to prepare for the inevitable war seemed completely validated by the West and the Western cheerleaders for the war essentially presented these people as geniuses, both diplomatic and militarily. — boethius

I can't think of a specific example for what you're describing here, but even if, for the sake of argument, I assume that's true, what you're describing is media reacting to what seems to be great successes. Why would that not validate the hawks?

Now, I suppose you could argue that yes there was and are Nazis and yes the shelling of civilians was a regular feature of the Donbas war but it was actually moderate regular forces that were shelling civilians. If you're taking this position then I am happy to present the argument of why that is a terrible position to take and in contradiction with the available evidence. — boethius

Obviously neither of us knows every single soldier involved in the campaign. But I would very much like to see evidence that "Nazis" were in control of most or all Ukrainian artillery fire during the Donbas war.

You're literally accusing me of trying "fool" someone by stating the paper analyses existing US policy.

I then demonstrate that the paper quite clearly is analyzing existing US policy and its benefits and risks as well as considering different directions US policy could go. — boethius

The paper was not an analysis of existing US policy but an analysis of a series of future possibilities.

But obviously by analysing some future policy you're going to reference the current policy.

If I were to say something like "they aren't analysing US policy at all" that'd falsely imply that there's no connection between current and future policies. I didn't mean to imply that so I rejected your phrasing of my position.

Now in an ordinary conversation this would not need to be said, but here we are.

The paper describes all these policies as already provocative to Russia and potentially soliciting a Russian escalation (without even doing anything more), — boethius

I don't see how it does.

as well as withdrawing from INF. — boethius

The paper doesn't link Ukraine and the INF.

The US then does all those things and you want to just keep denying what the paper clearly says in plain English. — boethius

It didn't do "all these things". I've explained why I think that and you haven't responded to the specific points.

a major strategic victory that Russia would then need to consolidate, — boethius

Consolidate how?

ignoring disproportionate losses for Ukrainians (often by just repeating Ukrainian loss estimates for both sides) and the fact Russia would likely be more conservative with spending lives (giving Ukraine a temporary advantage in the area of willingness to sustain losses, which Russia could easily compensate in other areas such as air power, artillery and building a sophisticated defensive line, but did allow Ukraine to "compete" for a time those losses were indeed available to lose), — boethius

Oh, so you have access to classified military documents which allow you to judge - better than the very sophisticated OSINT projects monitoring the military developments - exact loss figures and military strength?

I'll only respond to the stupidest part of your comments:

The paper was not an analysis of existing US policy but an analysis of a series of future possibilities. — Echarmion

First you claim the paper is not an analysis of US foreign policy:

You have already quoted the parts of the paper that make clear that it is analysing a course of action where the US intensifies it's efforts. I'm not sure who you're trying to fool by now acting like the paper was an analysis of the US policy. Yourself? — Echarmion

I then explain why it definitely is analyzing existing US foreign, which you have issue with and I respond to with the parts of the paper clearly analyzing existing US foreign policy and the risks already inherent in the existing policy.

Clarifying the purpose of my points with:

I am responding to your statement that the authors aren't analyzing US policy at the time at all. — boethius

To which you then cite this sentence and rebuttal with:

Deciding what your interlocutor is saying sure makes arguing easier. — Echarmion

Since you are unable to deal with the fact the paper obviously does analyze existing US foreign policy at the time.

The paper is not discussing things in some sort of hypothetical vacuum but takes as it's starting point existing relations with Russia and analyses those existing policies as a basis to then consider different policy moves and the benefits and risks of those moves. However, it also considers the benefits and risks of the existing policies, such as the Donbas war already imposing a cost on Russia and that Russia may anyways decide to preempt US actions and counter escalate. Why the paper recommends trying to resolve the Donbas conflict, in which expanding US assistance to Ukraine could be one bargaining chip in a larger diplomatic project. For, although the authors recognize escalation by Russia in Ukraine would be further cost to Russia it evaluates the risks to US foreign police (and also Ukrainian lives and territory) to be not-worth it (noting elsewhere that increasing conflict with a nuclear armed rival for conflicts sake doesn't make any sense).

To sum up:

1. First you deny the paper analyses US foreign policy, which if obviously does
2. Then you can't deal with the direct citations of the paper analyzing the existing US foreign policy of the time (of which I only provided a couple of examples, which is sufficient to disprove your claim the paper doesn't do so)
3. So you deny you ever said that when I explain that it does analyze existing foreign policy, that I'm just randomly deciding what you're saying.
4. Then I cite you your own words quite clearly stating "I'm not sure who you're trying to fool by now acting like the paper was an analysis of the US policy. Yourself?"
5. Now you just circle back to claiming the paper doesn't analyze US foreign policy.

Obviously, being demonstrated to be such a transparently bad faith actor, you're trying to move the goal posts from stating the the paper doesn't analyze US policy (and to claim it does is trying to "fool" people) to that's not the main objective of the paper.

However, saying "the paper doesn't do X" is not stating "the objective of the paper is to do X".

If you say a "paper doesn't mention Paris" and someone can cite the paper in question literally talking about Paris, that is sufficient to disprove the claim that the "paper doesn't mention Paris"; to then try to move the goalposts to "the paper doesn't primarily talk about Paris" is just dumb.

I am aware of the objectives of the authors because I read the paper, and they literally describe the methodology in a section literally titled "Methodology":

After identifying Russia’s perceived anxieties and vulnerabilities, we convened a panel of experts to examine the economic, geopoliti- cal, ideological, informational, and military means to exploit them. Drawing on these expert opinions and on current policy debates, we developed a series of potential measures that could extend Russia. After describing each measure, we assessed the costs and risks associated with each and the prospect of success. Could the measure impose a disproportional burden on Russia, and what are the chances of it doing so? — Extending Russia, RAND

Notice they are basing their work on "current policy debates" which, if you can read English, is another way of saying "analysis of existing US policy", which is what current policy debates are about.

So we not only have the words of the authors describing what they are doing, but then plenty of examples of them actually doing it (i.e. actually analyzing existing US foreign policy) such as statements like:

Rather than returning to compliance with the INF Treaty, Russia might instead interpret U.S. R&D as a sign that the United States is preparing to unilaterally breach or withdraw from the treaty, the way it did in 2002 with the ABM Treaty. — Extending Russia, RAND

They have a footnote for this sentence which reads as follows:

73 Terence Neilan, “Bush Pulls Out of ABM Treaty; Putin Calls Move a Mistake,” New York Times, December 13, 2001. — Extending Russia, RAND

Which is a demonstration of doing what they say they will do "drawing on these expert opinions on current policy debates" in literally citing these experts they are drawing on (i.e. analyzing the existing policy as a starting point).

Notice how this sentence in question does both: it represents an analysis of the policy of withdrawing from the ABM treaty (by simply citing an expert analysis they are going with in their analysis) to evaluate the likely Russian reaction to withdrawing from the INF treaty.

This example not only demonstrates one of many example of analyzing existing policy (along with the previous examples I gave) but is also topical to the original disagreement of whether US action (since the paper) was provocative towards Russia. After this paper is written the US does withdraw from the INF treaty and US policy makers clearly know that it further provocation likely to solicit a response from Russia.

A significant part of the paper, perhaps the majority though I haven't counted, is focused on economic relations. Indeed the very first paragraph of the paper in the summary, page xi, states:

The maxim that “Russia is never so strong nor so weak as it appears” remains as true in the current century as it was in the 19th and 20th.1 In some respects, contemporary Russia is a country in stagnation. Its economy is dependent on natural resource exports, so falling oil and gas prices have caused a significant drop in the living standards of many Russian citizens. Economic sanctions have further contributed to this decline. — Extending Russia, RAND

Which is clearly commenting on the existing US policy of sanctions against Russia, crediting the sanctions to contribution to Russian stagnation, which the paper puts significant focus in further analysis of these economic policies and options to expand sanctions them.

In other words, the paper is not some sort of hypothetical exercise drawing on lessons of history of similar great power conflict or simply positing fictions scenarios, but takes the existing US foreign policy and situation with and in Russia as a starting point to then consider different policy moves from the current situation.

In line with this objective the paper considers the impact (benefits and risks) of existing policies, such as the existing sanctions and existing support to Ukraine.

The authors literally say that's what they are going to do, "drawing on these expert opinions and on current policy debates" (i.e. analyzing existing US policy), and then they go and actually do that. They sometimes even consider different contradicting expert opinions and then give their own opinion about the matter, one topical example is:

Some analysts maintain that Russia lacks the resources to escalate the conflict. Ivan Medynskyi of the Kyiv-based Institute for World Policy argued, “War is expensive. Falling oil prices, economic decline, sanctions, and a campaign in Syria (all of which are likely to continue in 2016) leave little room for another large-scale military maneuver by Russia.”22 According to this view, Russia simply cannot afford to maintain a proxy war in Ukraine, although, given Russia’s size and the importance it places on Ukraine, this might be an overly optimistic assumption. — Extending Russia, RAND

Demonstrating that they are clearly aware of different expert opinions exist, worth considering but they politely make their own position clear that they do not agree with this opinion but find it unconvincing. Of course they use polite diplomatic language as is usual for these kinds of papers, but considering they explicitly state elsewhere the risk of not only Russia escalating in Ukraine in response to US actions in Ukraine but consider is also a risk of Russia even preempting those actions and escalating first anyways.

Now, to remind anyone following along and actually interested in honest debate, the reason for these absurd denials about what the paper quite clearly states, is that the position that the US decision makers know that:

A. Their actions (at the time of the paper and since) were provoking Russia into a larger war: the existing support to Ukraine risked a larger war and in particular actions since the paper was written (in which arms assistance to Ukraine was increased, US more vocal about Ukraine joining NATO, and withdrawing from the INF treaty, all identified as significant risk of provoking Russia into significant escalation).

B. That the likely outcome, according to experts, of a larger escalation of the Donbas war was Ukrainian losing territory and lives and Russia would likely prevail and impose a disadvantageous peace on Ukraine and that would be a setback for US foreign policy.

C. It is highly risky to increase competition with a nuclear armed adversary.

Most of the steps covered in this report are in some sense escalatory, and most would likely prompt some Russian counter-escalation. In addition to the specific risks associated with each measure, there- fore, there is additional risk attached to a generally intensified competition with a nuclear-armed adversary to consider. Consequently, every measure needs to be deliberately planned and carefully calibrated to achieve the desired effect. Finally, although Russia would bear the cost of this increased competition less easily than the United States, both sides would have to divert national resources from other purposes. Extending Russia for its own sake is, in most cases, not a sufficient basis to consider the steps outlined here. Rather, these need to be considered in the broader context of national policy based on defense, deterrence, and—where U.S. and Russian interests align—cooperation. — Extending Russia, RAND

US decision makers (i.e. whoever is calling the shots in the Biden administration) obviously know all this because they or their assistants read these kind of RAND papers.

It's also just common sense that doing things like military and covert assistance to Ukraine, like building 12 CIA bases in Ukraine, are provocative actions, along with withdrawing from INF and doubling down on Ukraine joining NATO, refusing to discuss, much less any real negotiation, for a broader European security architecture are provocative.

The US own top tier analysis says all this is provocative, that Ukraine will lose significantly in an escalation, that Russia will likely prevail, that the end result is also bad for US policy and prestige, and that obviously you can't go too far in intensifying a conflict with Russia because they have nuclear weapons.

Now, propagandists such as @Echarmion just want to deny the obvious fact that the US knew it's actions were provoking a larger war in Ukraine and that the US knew the super duper likely result of Russia winning such an escalation at significant cost to Ukraine in both lives and territory. Why this denialism is so important as to get to the absolutely stupid situation that @Echarmion needs to then deny his denialism only to go onto deny his denialism of his denialism is that it is so obvious.

You cannot read this RAND paper and then have even a cursory knowledge of the facts (not only arms supply to Ukraine military but to Nazi groups that Western journalists go and verify for us is definitely happening despite Western laws past to make that explicitly illegal), CIA bases in Ukraine, withdraw from INF, being vocal about Ukraine joining NATO "oh ... someday", and so on, and conclude there's not only no provocation but the facts are simply inline with someone reading this RAND report and then simply pushing on all of the buttons the authors identify as likely to provoke a Russian escalation in Ukraine.

You can also not read this paper and conclude that the policy since the war started of drip feeding arms to Ukraine was somehow due to an honest belief that the expert opinion as represented in the RAND paper was somehow wrong and that Ukraine could in fact prevail in a larger war with Russia. The policy of drip feeding weapons to Ukraine is not compatible with the belief Ukraine can "win" despite the extreme disadvantageous position the RAND paper points out, but rather represents the "calibration" of support the paper describes to increase costs on Russia while avoiding an out of control escalation (such as nuclear exchange); of course, a calibration of the conflict far beyond what the authors recommend but nevertheless implementing their basic framework of controlling the escalation so as not to get out of hand.

Likewise, US decision makers are clearly cognizant of the risk of nuclear escalation and their policies clearly reflect avoiding nuclear escalation ... by drip feeding weapons to Ukraine and forbidding Ukraine to use Western weapons to strike deep in Russia, which is another way of saying that US policy makers "calibrate" the conflict at "Ukraine loses" so as to avoid the risk of nuclear escalation.

Now, considering the paper is pretty clear doing all this is bad for US foreign policy, the choice is that US policy makers are just stupid with a kindergarten level intellect (as always promoted in the Western mainstream media when Western policy is counter-productive to any reasonable understanding of Western interests) or then they know what they are doing, as they can read these kinds of papers and know there's no "counter analysis" out there that says differently, but their priority is not some arguably objective US, or West in general, interest.

If you're goal is to have another war to:

1. Distract from the disastrous ending of the last wars and avoid any introspection or accountability.
2. Keep the gravy train of military spending flowing.
3. Sell gas to Europe.
4. Have a "rally around the flag" effect that comes with a righteous war.

And you simply do not care about US long term interests, just making bank for your friends and backers and winning the next election (i.e. the policy need not be "successful" just appear to be successful until 2024), then it would make complete sense to read the paper and then simply push all the buttons that maximize escalation with Russia but nevertheless still calibrate things short of a nuclear war (since fortunately, and credit where credits due, you are not so pathologically insane as to actually want a nuclear exchange with Russia).

If your goals are partisan and special interest, as outlined above, you would not ask yourself the question "can Ukraine prevail so that it's no embarrassing for US policy and prestige?" but rather "can Ukraine seem to prevail, at least 'enough', to get to election 2024? afterwhich we can drop them like a hot pierogi and move onto the next war, as, yeah, sure, maybe 'losing' war after war is 'bad' for the US in the long term but it's highly profitable in the meantime".

For those interested, the authors even make a power-point style summary document of their 324 page (not counting the introduction and other pages outside the main text) where they make all these points super clearly, stating:

Providing lethal aid to Ukraine would exploit Russia’s greatest point of external vulnerability. But any increase in U.S. military arms and advice to Ukraine would need to be carefully calibrated to increase the costs to Russia of sustaining its existing commitment without provoking a much wider conflict in which Russia, by reason of proximity, would have significant advantages. — Overextending and unbalancing Russia Brief, RAND

And they assess the risk to doing so as "high" and likelihood of success as "moderate".

Increasing lethal aid to Ukraine does not even make it to their "Most-Promising Cost-Imposing Options" that they list at the end of the document.

The measures the authors identify that are "most promising" all have a greater favourability than moderate likelihood of success but high risk.

The only high risk option they include is further sanctions but they rate that as having high likelihood of success and high benefits, all the other options being at worst moderate risk but high likelihood of success or then moderate likelihood of success but low risk.

Obviously US policy makers in the Biden administration (which I guess is probably mostly Biden's wife, but who knows) don't follow the recommendations of the paper, but they also do nothing to "change the game" as it were to somehow prove the authors wrong, such as pouring in advanced weapons systems into Ukraine day 1 of the war without restriction in order to prove that Ukraine can indeed win and Russian nuclear weapons are of no concern to them.

Indeed, the US administration explicitly tells us that "why not this weapon system or why not that weapons system" is to not escalate further ... but escalate to where? Obviously Ukraine winning, or even risking that outcome, that's what would be "escalation" in the proxy war with Russia. There is simply no way to cause Ukraine to start winning on the battlefield but also that not being the escalation they are talking about avoiding.

Even Western talking heads would confuse themselves in trying to grapple with what this "avoid escalation" meant in the context of a giant war the US was nominally trying to help Ukraine win. Then they'd confuse themselves even more when the exact escalatory thing that was proposed as "common sense" obviously we can't supply to Ukraine one day was supplied to Ukraine the next day.

There is no theory ever proposed which would demonstrate a pathway to proving the authors of the RAND paper wrong much less any action in accordance with such an alternative theory.

The paper describes what will likely happen if the US policy provoked Russia into a larger war (including just maintaining the existing policy, why the paper recommends trying to resolve the Donbas war and not even just maintain the status quo), the US then does those provocative things the paper describes as bad ideas, the US explicitly tells us aid to Ukraine is limited to avoid "escalation", and then exactly what the authors predict from a major escalation is what occurs: significant costs to Ukraine in terms of lives and territory and also a US policy setback and embarrassment (i.e. loss of prestige).

The idea that US policy makers don't understand their own policy analysts is simply dumb.

The theory that coheres with all the facts is that US policy makers know what they are doing, know it's bad for Ukraine and also US long term interests, but do it anyways for other reasons (partisan, special interests, being pro-evil generally speaking).

The paper is not discussing things in some sort of hypothetical vacuum but takes as it's starting point existing relations with Russia and analyses those existing policies as a basis to then consider different policy moves and the benefits and risks of those moves. — boethius

Yes, obviously. As I pointed out normally this is common sense that does not need pointing out. But since you are constantly twisting everyone's words around to fit into your preordained conclusions we're now at the point where you spend several paragraphs explaining something utterly trivial. No doubt under the impression that you're somehow proving a point.

It's simple: Yes any evaluation of possible future policies includes, as it's baseline, the current policy. That does not mean that an analysis of future policies is also simultaneously an analysis of the current policy. The two are related, they're not the same thing.

However, it also considers the benefits and risks of the existing policies, such as the Donbas war already imposing a cost on Russia and that Russia may anyways decide to preempt US actions and counter escalate. — boethius

It doesn't. There is no chapter in the paper analysing the contemporary situation, nor does the paper state anywhere what the risks and benefits of the current policy are.

You can argue that those risks and benefits can be inferred from what the paper discusses. But yo say that "the paper is analysing the current policy" is and remains wrong.

2. Then you can't deal with the direct citations of the paper analyzing the existing US foreign policy of the time (of which I only provided a couple of examples, which is sufficient to disprove your claim the paper doesn't do so) — boethius

I have no idea what the text looks like in your mind, but the text that I read has no "direct citations analysing the existing US policy".

There is a difference between "talking about" something and "analysing" it. My best guess is you simply assume that just referencing the current US policy counts as an analysis.

Notice they are basing their work on "current policy debates" which, if you can read English, is another way of saying "analysis of existing US policy", which is what current policy debates are about. — boethius

This is just false. "Current policy debates" does not refer just to "debates about the current policy". It's more broad and would include both debates about current policies as well as debates about possible future policies.

Which is a demonstration of doing what they say they will do "drawing on these expert opinions on current policy debates" in literally citing these experts they are drawing on (i.e. analyzing the existing policy as a starting point). — boethius

You realise that the footnote does not reference some expert analysis of US policy, but simply a news report about Putin's statement?

A note more relevant to the actual situation:

Apparently Putin announced a few days ago that Russia is planning to change it's nuclear doctrine:
AP News: Putin lowers threshold of nuclear response

As various commentators have pointed out, the change is clearly intended to make the doctrine more vague. It's also pretty much a direct warning to not allow Ukraine to strike targets on Russian territory using western weapons.

This seems a fairly big step for Russia, which seems to indicate that they're really concerned about possible long range strikes. It also demonstrates the bargaining power Russia's nuclear capabilities still represent.

Ultimately I agree with the view that, no matter what Russia says their nuclear doctrine is, there is just nothing to be gained from using nuclear weapons over Ukraine. Nuclear weapons are a powerful threat to a country's population and infrastructure, but their direct military use is limited unless you intend to absolutely obliterate an area. Using nuclear weapons directly against Ukraine would create more problems than it solves. Using them against anyone else would just be plain stupid and amount to suicide.

Yes, obviously. As I pointed out normally this is common sense that does not need pointing out. — Echarmion

So, I'm trying to "fool" people by pointing out this common sense thing?

The conversation is just dumb, and it's also not common sense that the paper would take an analysis of existing US policy as a starting point.

As I mentioned, it is entirely possible to do entirely hypothetical analysis or then historical analysis or, indeed, as you first claimed: analysis of different things the US could do and what might happen afterwards, without commenting on existing US policy.

However, the paper does analyze existing US policy as starting point to evaluate different policy options, as the paper explicitly says is their goal.

It doesn't. There is no chapter in the paper analysing the contemporary situation, nor does the paper state anywhere what the risks and benefits of the current policy are. — Echarmion

This is even dumber. You literally just offer the rebuke that the paper taking the existing policy situation as a starting point in their analysis is common sense and not worth mentioning ... and you're next point is directly contradicting the point you just made.

We're literally on a descent into stupid.

That the paper is not organized in chapters about the contemporary situation and chapters considering future action does not remotely entail the paper does not consider and analyze the contemporary situation.

To take the Paris example of debating a paper that does talk about Paris but you continuously deny, simply because a paper does not have a chapter literally entitled "Paris" does not mean the paper does not mention Paris and simply citing the paper discussing Paris should be sufficient evidence to satisfy everyone in a discussion that yes indeed the paper does talk about Paris: maybe doesn't talk primarily about Paris and maybe doesn't have a chapter literally titled "Paris" but does mention Paris nonetheless and that can be verified by directly citing the paper using the word "Paris" and clearly talking about the city of Paris in doing so.

The paper is organized thematically on each dimension of competition with Russia.

Each dimension or area the paper considers (and there's many as the paper is nearly 300 pages long) the authors take the contemporary situation and their analysis of it in order to then consider changes to that status quo and analyze to arrive ultimately at their recommendations (which, topical for this discussion, does not include Ukraine at all).

It is neither common sense that the authors would necessarily do this (plenty of ways to provide policy analysis without considering the contemporary situation; either as a sort of "blue skies" thinking, or then go into fine detail on just one thing that could be done without considering the broader consequences, or then for the purposes of creating a longer term view of imperial competition generally speaking to generate timeless lessons of imperial exploitation). All of which is analysis that exists and people produce all the time. To give one example, militaries routinely create contingency planning for a wide variety of events and policy changes without any relation to contemporary policy (such as detailed plans on invading various countries without anyone involved in that analysis believing that would actually happen in the short or long term), and it is also obviously that they didn't do this thing you claim is obvious they would do ... simply because they have no chapter literally called "the contemporary situation and how we got here".

I have no idea what the text looks like in your mind, but the text that I read has no "direct citations analysing the existing US policy". — Echarmion

It's honestly just bizarre.

Within the same comment, you literally start with:

Yes, obviously. As I pointed out normally this is common sense that does not need pointing out. — Echarmion

In response (directly citing me) making the point:

The paper is not discussing things in some sort of hypothetical vacuum but takes as it's starting point existing relations with Russia and analyses those existing policies as a basis to then consider different policy moves and the benefits and risks of those moves — boethius

Which, to repeat myself, is not obvious as there are plenty of ways to analyze policy options without considering the existing policy and situation as a starting point.

And then after claiming my pointing out the paper is not hypothetical but takes it's starting point as an analysis of existing policies, you say that doesn't need being pointed out ... and then, in the same comment, contradict yourself in claiming no where does the paper do that:

I have no idea what the text looks like in your mind, but the text that I read has no "direct citations analysing the existing US policy". — Echarmion

I guess you're trying to move the goalposts from analysis to "direct citations" of US policy. The paper does not need to make direct citations of "US policy" (which is often not actually written anywhere in some monolithic "US policy" document but requires considerable analysis to even come up with an educated guess what the policy even is).

The reason the paper doesn't make many direct citations is because the paper is delivering the conclusions of experts and is meant to taken as authoritative. For example, when the paper discusses the US withdrawing from the ABM treaty, the point of doing so and Russias reaction to then go onto consider further ABM and nuclear technologies competition, it's presumed the authors are authoritative enough to not require "proving" that the US did indeed withdraw from the ABM treaty, "proving" why, "proving" the Russian response so far to that, and so on.

Now, if you're dissatisfied that the analysis presented in the near 300 page paper isn't detailed enough for you, that is a weakness of the paper the authors recognize and quite literally point that out and then recommend a second phase of the analysis be carried out that goes more into detail, in particular to try to quantify in dollar terms the costs of each policy option (both to the US and to Russia).

The authors are quite clear on this:

Importantly, due to space and resource constraints, we do not quantitatively cost out each measure to extend Russia; instead, we relied on more-qualitative judgments of the researchers. While we believe that these judgments accurately capture whether each measure would be cost-imposing or cost-incurring for the United States, future analysis would benefit from estimating the dollar amounts involved more rigorously. — Extending Russia, RAND

And yes, simply because the document also contains "judgements" it is still an analysis paper and both providing analysis explicitly to us on occasion, directly citing the prior analysis they make reference to, as well as also delivering the results of their analytical deliberations they've had as experts to come up with authoritative statements and judgements.

If you're issue is this is not an academic dissertation filled to the brim with citations to attempt to prove every step in the thesis, it's because this is not an academic paper but the target audience are policy makers (politicians, bureaucrats of various kinds etc. to get a broad overview of both the situation with Russia and what experts have to say about it and what options are available and their comparative likely fruitfulness: benefits, cost and risks).

This is just false. "Current policy debates" does not refer just to "debates about the current policy". It's more broad and would include both debates about current policies as well as debates about possible future policies. — Echarmion

"Current policy debates" are about "current policy": i.e. the starting point is what is the current policy.

Whether an author or team is analyzing the history of a current policy, the impact of a current policy, the ethics of a current policy, the cost of a current policy, the trend of where the current policy is going, as well as how the current policy could be changed or anything else we may wish to discuss about a current policy, the common denominator about these various "current policy debates" is the "current policy".

By explicitly telling us they are drawing on "current policy debate" they are making it clear the paper strives to start with the current policy.

More importantly, the authors then go and do exactly this, analyze the current situation in each area they consider, evaluate the existing policy (such as for our purposes stating the war in Donbas already imposing a cost, in blood and treasure, on Russia when the paper is written), with plenty of footnote references they refer to in establishing their current policy positions.

The style of the paper is very fluid and conversational weaving together the collective wisdom of the authors for the purposes of delivering said wisdom to the reader, mostly presuming the reader is going to go ahead and trust the experts know what they are talking about (and so do not go into the minutiae of exactly how we know when, how, who and what happened next with existing policies such as withdrawing form the ABM treaty, but the authors assume readers will trust their report and ideas about this existing policy experience).

Nevertheless, the authors do not expect the reader to trust-but-not-verify, and conveniently provide us 116 footnotes with references to other expert work supporting their points, and also for our convenience include a comprehensive list of all their references in 41 pages of references at the end of the book.

In other words, the analytical work the authors provide us is very thorough and in drawing on "current policy debate" the authors go ahead and all analyze for us the current policies.

In reading the paper, which I suggest you actually do, it is quite clear that the authors strive to present an analysis of the current situation so the reader has a good idea of "where we are" before considering different policy options that would go in different directions to evaluate their costs, benefits and risks (that the authors put in super clear colour coded tables in the brief of the paper).

To circle back to the point that started this expedition into the depths of what about the paper can easily be established by simply citing examples from the paper, the authors do indeed (as they explicitly tell us they intend to do) draw on the "current policy debate" vis-a-vis Ukraine, siding on the side of experts that believe Russia can commit to and sustain a larger war, and also consider the risks of the current policy of supporting Ukraine in a proxy war in the Donbas, that it does extend Russia in blood and treasure but comes at considerable risk of escalation even sans-US-doing-anything more in that Russia may anyways preempt any such actions and escalate in Ukraine, which the authors evaluate the likely result will be that Russia has a significant advantage (due to proximity) and there would be significant loss of Ukrainian lives and territory as well be a US policy setback and loss of US prestige.

Please feel free to continue to go in circles to simply avoid dealing with what the paper obviously says and therefore US policy makers obviously know in deciding to push on all the escalation buttons the paper explicitly says risks a major Russian response, likely offensive: more arms to Ukraine, withdrawing from INF and being more vocal about Ukraine joining NATO.

Obviously it doesn't serve any purpose for you to continue to go around in circles of denialism and then denying your denialism and so on, but it is somewhat humorous to watch.

A note more relevant to the actual situation: — Echarmion

If you're interested in the actual situation you should start with:

1. Ukraine is in the collapse phase on the losing end of a war of attrition, which was entirely foreseeable.
2. Striking infrastructure and civilian populations deep inside Russia is essentially the only military move or point of leverage Ukraine has left.
3. The West has not wanted to "escalate" to that point because the West is absolutely content with Ukraine losing the conflict.

Notice how at no point does the West have any problem with Israel "escalating" with Western weapons to the point of levelling entire apartment blocks filled with civilians.

Why? Because the West wants Israel to "win" and therefore do whatever is necessary to "win" (I put win in quotes as Western leaders may not have a clear idea of what a winning end-state would be, but whatever seems like winning and Israel wants to do is fully supported).

Why maintain the asymmetry that Russia can disable Ukrainian infrastructure across the entire country but Ukraine can't do likewise to Russia is to "calibrate" the conflict at a "somewhat higher level of intensity" without escalating too far (i.e. escalating to a point where Ukraine maybe winning on the battlefield).

As I've pointed out since the beginning of the conflict, the reason the West does not "escalate" to actually threatening Russia (in terms of battlefield loss in Ukraine or damaging Russian infrastructure on a mass scale) is nuclear weapons.

As various commentators have pointed out, the change is clearly intended to make the doctrine more vague. It's also pretty much a direct warning to not allow Ukraine to strike targets on Russian territory using western weapons. — Echarmion

It may surprise you but at the start of the war many here, and elsewhere, argued that Russian nuclear weapons were of essentially no meaning in the conflict and did not shape Western policy and shouldn't shape Western policy: i.e. I argued that Russian nuclear weapons does and obviously should deter Western escalation, while others argued it doesn't and it shouldn't ("we cannot let them get away with nuclear blackmail!" was the battle cry of this camp).

Nearly 2 years later and this is not the common sense position even in the Western mainstream media that nuclear weapons are indeed a significant deterrent to "winning".

This seems a fairly big step for Russia, which seems to indicate that they're really concerned about possible long range strikes. It also demonstrates the bargaining power Russia's nuclear capabilities still represent. — Echarmion

This is not a significant step. Russia has already signalled the threat of nuclear weapons use since the start of the conflict, they are just making it more explicit now to make it even clearer that they aren't bluffing. The policy doctrine before was also vague in that wasn't clear what "existential threat" for the Russian state actually meant.

Ultimately I agree with the view that, no matter what Russia says their nuclear doctrine is, there is just nothing to be gained from using nuclear weapons over Ukraine. Nuclear weapons are a powerful threat to a country's population and infrastructure, but their direct military use is limited unless you intend to absolutely obliterate an area. Something Russia really cannot afford to do in Ukraine. — Echarmion

First, you literally just made the point that "It also demonstrates the bargaining power Russia's nuclear capabilities still represent" so obviously they are useful as leverage, and they are useful as leverage because they can be practically used in response to different actions (such as a large attack on Russian infrastructure).

Second, nuclear weapons ability to obliterate an entire area has many military uses, in particular obliterating entire NATO bases, which is what the Russian doctrine change is referring to.

A large scale conventional attack on Russian infrastructure would be a major problem for Russia risking the collapse of the state. It's not a similar major problem for Ukraine because the West underwrites the Ukrainian government, military, pays pensions, ensures supplies of essentials and so on (of course it will be a "major problem" the moment the West stops funnelling cash into Ukraine to prop it up).

Russia is therefore making it clear that if the West were to organize such a major missile strike, intended to cause systemic damage to Russian infrastructure, that Russia will start nuking the NATO infrastructure that supports such missile supply and operation.

The West might not be that deterred if it thought Russia would respond with Nuclear weapons only in Ukraine, as obviously Ukrainian wellbeing is not a priority, but it is a much more significant deterrent the prospect of NATO bases being nuked.

The basic problem, as I've elaborated on many times since the first phases of the war, is that the West would be unable to strike Russia with nuclear weapons in-kind without that escalating to a general nuclear exchange.

So, it is a lose-lose situation. If they organize a large scale missile strike on Russia and Russia then nukes a NATO base and the US does not respond with nuclear weapons, that would be definitely losing the exchange, and if the US does respond with nuclear weapons that would very likely lead to a general nuclear exchange which isn't exactly good for the US just right now.

Therefore, the threat of nuclear weapons effectively deters the West from causing any significant harm, or even risk of significant harm, to Russian state power in Ukraine or indeed in Russia.

The US does not face similar escalation risks in the middle-east and therefore it is not effectively deterred and so does not place similar constraints on the use of Western arms by Israel.

The conversation is just dumb — boethius

Oh I agree wholeheartedly.

To take the Paris example — boethius

From my perspective what's happening here is that you're showing me a guide to the city of Bordeaux and telling me it's a guide to the city of Paris. When I point out that the guide is about Bordeaux and not Paris, you keep pointing out all the places where the guide talks about how to get to Bordeaux from Paris, or where it compares locations in the two cities.

That's the end of that discussion as far as I'm concerned.

1. Ukraine is in the collapse phase on the losing end of a war of attrition, which was entirely foreseeable. — boethius

Sure, the collapse phase that's been going on for months now. One wonders why the Russians don't just take over all of Ukraine.

2. Striking infrastructure and civilian populations deep inside Russia is essentially the only military move or point of leverage Ukraine has left. — boethius

No it's not, but since you don't actually know anything about the military situation it's not surprising that you're just making stuff up.

Notice how at no point does the West have any problem with Israel "escalating" with Western weapons to the point of levelling entire apartment blocks filled with civilians.

Why? Because the West wants Israel to "win" and therefore do whatever is necessary to "win" (I put win in quotes as Western leaders may not have a clear idea of what a winning end-state would be, but whatever seems like winning and Israel wants to do is fully supported). — boethius

You have the start of an interesting discussion here, but rather than actually engaging with the different strategic and political contexts of the conflicts, you're content to just assume it must somehow be "what the west wants".

Why maintain the asymmetry that Russia can disable Ukrainian infrastructure across the entire country but Ukraine can't do likewise to Russia is to "calibrate" the conflict at a "somewhat higher level of intensity" without escalating too far (i.e. escalating to a point where Ukraine maybe winning on the battlefield).

As I've pointed out since the beginning of the conflict, the reason the West does not "escalate" to actually threatening Russia (in terms of battlefield loss in Ukraine or damaging Russian infrastructure on a mass scale) is nuclear weapons. — boethius

But, according to you, Ukraine cannot possibly win. So what you actually mean is that western leaders don't declare war on Russia and destroy it's military capacity.

And of course you know full well the reason they're unlikely to do that.

There's many problems with your conception of the conflict but perhaps the most important one is that you've never seriously considered what "winning" means for either side.

You've constructed for yourself a framework where the only way for Ukraine to win is an impossible scenario, yet you also consistently treat the western powers' unwillingness to pursue this impossible scenario as evidence of their duplicity.

It may surprise you but at the start of the war many here, and elsewhere, argued that Russian nuclear weapons were of essentially no meaning in the conflict and did not shape Western policy and shouldn't shape Western policy: i.e. I argued that Russian nuclear weapons does and obviously should deter Western escalation, while others argued it doesn't and it shouldn't ("we cannot let them get away with nuclear blackmail!" was the battle cry of this camp).

Nearly 2 years later and this is not the common sense position even in the Western mainstream media that nuclear weapons are indeed a significant deterrent to "winning". — boethius

The general views on russian nuclear threats has not changed. Most analysts and military professionals don't credit them, but popular opinion remains scared of them.

The reason western politicians don't ignore the popular worries even if they're not supported by professional analysts should be obvious.

Anyways my previous point about you not properly considering what "winning" could mean also applies here.

First, you literally just made the point that "It also demonstrates the bargaining power Russia's nuclear capabilities still represent" so obviously they are useful as leverage, and they are useful as leverage because they can be practically used in response to different actions (such as a large attack on Russian infrastructure). — boethius

They're useful for scaring people.

Russia is therefore making it clear that if the West were to organize such a major missile strike, intended to cause systemic damage to Russian infrastructure, that Russia will start nuking the NATO infrastructure that supports such missile supply and operation. — boethius

The idea of an infrastructure campaign against Russia in the same vein of Russia's attacks against Ukraine is not credible. The debate is not about weapons that can hit factories near Moscow or in the Urals but about weapons which can hit russian supply dumps.

And "Russia will start nuking NATO infrastructure" means global nuclear war and the destruction of Russia.

The basic problem, as I've elaborated on many times since the first phases of the war, is that the West would be unable to strike Russia with nuclear weapons in-kind without that escalating to a general nuclear exchange. — boethius

This is silly. If Russia starts attacking NATO bases with nukes that is the start of a general nuclear exchange. This is exactly how nuclear deterrent works: Both sides making clear that they'll respond to a nuclear attack in kind.

So, it is a lose-lose situation. If they organize a large scale missile strike on Russia and Russia then nukes a NATO base and the US does not respond with nuclear weapons, that would be definitely losing the exchange, and if the US does respond with nuclear weapons that would very likely lead to a general nuclear exchange which isn't exactly good for the US just right now. — boethius

If Russia nukes a NATO base Russia is at war with NATO. Even if a general nuclear exchange is somehow averted, at the very least any russian troops in Ukraine would be flattened by the combined NATO airforces and the russian leaders responsible would shortly after drop from a window.

Do you think that if Russia uses a nuke on NATO territory everyone will just shrug and do nothing?

Therefore, the threat of nuclear weapons effectively deters the West from causing any significant harm, or even risk of significant harm, to Russian state power in Ukraine or indeed in Russia. — boethius

You don't need a successful first strike scenario for nuclear weapons to be a threat. During the cold war, one of the pillars of nuclear deterrence was that no side could develop an effective missile defense system.

The deterrent effect from nuclear weapons isn't based on the fact that they make you win the war. It's based on the fact that they'll make your enemy lose.

And this is also the reason why the west doesn't "want Ukraine to win" as you understand it.

The US does not face similar escalation risks in the middle-east and therefore it is not effectively deterred and so places similar constraints on the use of Western arms by Israel. — boethius

Oh? Didn't you write earlier:

Why? Because the West wants Israel to "win" and therefore do whatever is necessary to "win" — boethius

Oh I agree wholeheartedly. — Echarmion

Then maybe you're becoming self aware.

From my perspective what's happening here is that you're showing me a guide to the city of Bordeaux and telling me it's a guide to the city of Paris. When I point out that the guide is about Bordeaux and not Paris, you keep pointing out all the places where the guide talks about how to get to Bordeaux from Paris, or where it compares locations in the two cities. — Echarmion

Just more very dumb trying to move the goalposts.

These are your central claims on this issue:

The paper was not an analysis of existing US policy but an analysis of a series of future possibilities. — Echarmion

You have already quoted the parts of the paper that make clear that it is analysing a course of action where the US intensifies it's efforts. I'm not sure who you're trying to fool by now acting like the paper was an analysis of the US policy. Yourself? — Echarmion

I then cite where the paper clearly takes positions on the existing US policy of the time, in line with what the authors explicitly set out to do in drawing from "existing US policy debates" with their 116 footnotes and over 40 pages of references.

I not only cite directly where the authors are clearly analyzing the existing policy of the time but also citing them explaining that is their methodology and summarizing as follows:

The paper is not discussing things in some sort of hypothetical vacuum but takes as it's starting point existing relations with Russia and analyses those existing policies as a basis to then consider different policy moves and the benefits and risks of those moves. — boethius

You then directly cite this sentence and rebuttal with:

As I pointed out normally this is common sense that does not need pointing out. — Echarmion

And so moving the goalposts from I'm literally trying to fool people by pretending the paper consider existing US policy all the way to that claim is obvious and does not need pointing out!?

Now, why are we having this incredibly stupid exchange that is easily resolved by simply directly citing the paper?

Because you were unable to deal with the obvious fact that Russia was extremely very likely to prevail in Ukraine if there was an escalation and obviously US elite know that because they read their own elite think tank policy papers, such as this RAND papers which makes this point extremely clearly.

Your first bad faith propaganda strategy was to just keep denying that the US did anything escalatory between the paper being written and the larger war in 2022 (which they obviously do such as withdrawing from the INF treaty but you can't deal with that so you just ignore that part) to then pretend that these expert authors do not support my position (which, to be clear, is the super obvious common sense position that Russia is extremely very likely to prevail in Ukraine, and whatever the result would be at a massive cost to Ukraine in terms of lives and terriroty), but that debate about how provocative US actions where between 2019 and 2022 isn't even necessary as the authors make clear that Russian may escalate anyways, preempting any US escalatory action, resulting in the same risks of Russia prevailing, significant cost to Ukraine in lives and territory and a setback for US policy and prestige.

Now, I understand that your aim was to engage in stupid quibbling that the US didn't arm Ukraine "even more" between 2019 and 2022, and simply ignore the US being more vocal about Ukraine joining NATO (one other major escalatory action the authors describe) as well as the US withdrawing from ING (what the authors describe the Russians as particularly sensitive about and would certainly undertake counter-escalation, likely offensive, in that event).

Rest assured it is quite easy to demonstrate that the US policy decisions between 2019 and 2022 are exactly the kind of escalatory action the authors describe, but if your aim is to unwind the stupidity then you can simply accept that the authors position was that the status quo in the Donbas was anyways a risk of Russian escalation, which the authors are quite clear is in the US interest, and certainly the Ukrainian interest, to try to avoid through a diplomatic resolution.

We now see exactly the expected results the authors describe: significant loss of Ukrainian lives and territory, very likely leading to an even more disadvantageous peace (i.e. losing), and it is indeed a US policy setback and loss of prestige (Russian weapons pawned US weapons in Ukraine; Russia can deal with US intelligence, the US cannot do what it said it would do in supporting Ukraine "whatever it takes" and "as long as it takes" until victory).

Therefore, the purpose of provoking the war and propping up Ukraine with cash and a drip feed of weapons systems, was not to advance US policy and prestige (in any arguably objective "national interest" sense) and much less to help out Ukraine, but was for partisan and special interest purposes (i.e. corrupt profiteering as well as have a bit of "war time administration" until the next election).

If Russia nukes a NATO base Russia is at war with NATO. Even if a general nuclear exchange is somehow averted, at the very least any russian troops in Ukraine would be flattened by the combined NATO airforces and the russian leaders responsible would shortly after drop from a window.

Do you think that if Russia uses a nuke on NATO territory everyone will just shrug and do nothing? — Echarmion

Why would this happen? How exactly would Russian troops be flattened in Ukraine?

Even if we ignore the fact that nuclear use would make NATO conventional war on Ukraine less, rather than more, likely, what you describe is simply propaganda.

NATO would have the exact same problem, just a lot worse, that the Russian airforce had in 2022 and 2023 (and still has in 2024, just less) in that surface to air missiles (A2/AD bubbles in the modern parlance) are highly effective against airplanes and not many are needed to deny access to an airspace.

Stealth is not some magical invisible technology and Russians have had decades to develop systems to defeat US stealth systems.

Then there's the problem that the Russians in Ukraine are in basements and bunkers and dugouts and spread out and you still need to actually find them to be able to drop bombs on.

In other words, even if we pretended Russian anti-air assets had zero effectiveness (which would not be the case), air supremacy doesn't win wars anyways: right now Israel can drop US bombs at will on Lebanon and Gaza and that has not delivered victory.

But most importantly, let's say Russian A2/AD simply doesn't work, and you can also turn the tide of the war in Ukraine thanks to this bombing, Russia can still continue to nuke things.

If your response to a NATO base getting nuked is conventional, Russia can just nuke more things.

So there's the high risk that NATO planes in Ukraine don't have the desired effect of "flattening" all the Russian troops there but instead planes start to be downed and NATO needs to fall back to standoff positions just as the Russians did in 2022 due to Ukraine anti-air assets, and then even if that doesn't happen there's the risk of NATO planes not actually turning the tide of the war, and finally the risk that Russia just nukes more things in response to this conventional air assault.

And in all of these strikes and counter-strikes a general nuclear exchange would be on a knifes edge as each side would be paranoid of the other side launching first. Planes and missiles flying everywhere are not going to reduce tensions.

At the end of the day, Europe, and the US for that matter, knows that the US is less committed to the conflict than is Russia and that the US has no interest in even a major risk of a general nuclear exchange with Russia. Even if European leaders were willing to have nuclear strikes on their territory for the sake of defending "Ukrainian sovereignty", which honestly many Europeans seems dumb enough to actually want, they know that the US doesn't actually want that: that Ukraine as a useful proxy force to accomplish some objectives for a time and at no point is the US going to "risk anything" for Ukraine.

Therefore, if the US did escalate to the point of Russia using a nuclear weapon to reestablish deterrence both the US and the Europeans know that the US has no rational response.

In this scenario, the situation, at the end of the day, would be US and NATO (mostly the UK) firing missiles at Russian critical infrastructure, an attack Russia needs to respond to, with nuclear weapons if that is the only option. Therefore, the solution would be for the US and NATO to stop attacking Russia to end the nuclear war. The only other option would be to simply continue the nuclear war; Russia would be in the same position of needing to resort to nuclear weapons to reestablish deterrence and therefore the only actual alternative to the US stopping the cycle of escalation would be to simply escalate to a nuclear war.

Actually attacking Russia is no longer deterrence it is simply straight-up attacking Russia resulting in Russia needing to respond to reestablish deterrence.

Which is why at the end of the day US elites do follow the RAND paper basic framework of "calibrating" the intensity of the conflict to avoid unwanted escalation; the intensity of violence needing to calibration to achieve that is Russia prevailing in Ukraine without systemic risk to Russian critical infrastructure.

The Russians can tolerate NATO weapons being used in Ukraine because at the end of the day they choose to be there, Russian critical infrastructure is not impacted, and defeating those weapons and prevailing in Ukraine has some advantages (from the Russian imperial perspective).

You don't need a successful first strike scenario for nuclear weapons to be a threat. During the cold war, one of the pillars of nuclear deterrence was that no side could develop an effective missile defense system.

The deterrent effect from nuclear weapons isn't based on the fact that they make you win the war. It's based on the fact that they'll make your enemy lose.

And this is also the reason why the west doesn't "want Ukraine to win" as you understand it. — Echarmion

As mentioned above, if you are attacking the other sides critical infrastructure (what the Ukrainians want permission to do with NATO missiles) this is no longer a mutual deterrence situation: you are being attacked, therefore use of nuclear weapons is either the only recourse or then is believed would reestablish deterrence.

It's like if you had a gun and I had a gun and then I knife you in the stomach so you shoot me and then we're both dying and I'm like "what gives!? I thought we had deterrence??"

And this is also the reason why the west doesn't "want Ukraine to win" as you understand it.

The US does not face similar escalation risks in the middle-east and therefore it is not effectively deterred and so places similar constraints on the use of Western arms by Israel.
— boethius

Oh? Didn't you write earlier:

Why? Because the West wants Israel to "win" and therefore do whatever is necessary to "win"
— boethius — Echarmion

The first sentence is ambiguous in that the negative is meant to apply both to being not deterred and the placing of constraints.

I have edited the post to clarify by repeating the negative.

Obviously the US does not place similar constraints on Israel: flattening entire apartment blocks, carrying out a genocide, raping prisoners and proud of it, and so on.

The difference in the situation being that Iran has no nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis the US.

The Israeli vs "the Curse" war may indeed escalate to Tel Aviv being nuked, whether soonish or then eventually depending on the state of Iran's nuclear program, but even in that situation the US does not risk much being nuked itself and if Israel gets themselves nuked that's not really a US problem.

Because you were unable to deal with the obvious fact that Russia was extremely very likely to prevail in Ukraine if there was an escalation — boethius

Why would I be unable to deal with that? Yes most everyone assumed that Russia would easily prevail over Ukraine if it committed serious resources (at least initially). But it turned out that Ukraine had more teeth than most anyone assumed.

Your first bad faith propaganda strategy was to just keep denying that the US did anything escalatory between the paper being written and the larger war in 2022 — boethius

That's a strawman. I asked you specifically how the US escalated in Ukraine. You never were able to answer those questions.

as the authors make clear that Russian may escalate anyways — boethius

No they don't.

Now, I understand that your aim was to engage in stupid quibbling that the US didn't arm Ukraine "even more" between 2019 and 2022, and simply ignore the US being more vocal about Ukraine joining NATO (one other major escalatory action the authors describe) — boethius

I pointed out the facts to you already, you ignored them. At this point I'm just going to call this an intentional lie.

Rest assured it is quite easy to demonstrate that the US policy decisions between 2019 and 2022 are exactly the kind of escalatory action the authors describe — boethius

Of course, you're just not going to do this very easy demonstration. Because you're lying.

Therefore, the purpose of provoking the war — boethius

Russia invaded.

Why would this happen? How exactly would Russian troops be flattened in Ukraine? — boethius

The two biggest airforces on the planet, plus the European air forces?

Even if we ignore the fact that nuclear use would make NATO conventional war on Ukraine less, rather than more, likely — boethius

That's the thing you don't get about nuclear deterrence. Once you actually use a nuclear weapon, you've shot your bolt. There's no escalation ladder from there. Either you'll immediately cause a general nuclear exchange or you're going to cause a situation where any additional threats you make will cause a nuclear attack on your country.

The reason is that once you use one nuke, you're announcing to the entire world that nuclear weapons are now fair game. At that point noone can afford to allow you to get off a second shot.

That's why there was never a limited nuclear war during the cold war. There's just no way to control the situation if you press the button once.

NATO would have the exact same problem, just a lot worse, that the Russian airforce had in 2022 and 2023 (and still has in 2024, just less) in that surface to air missiles (A2/AD bubbles in the modern parlance) are highly effective against airplanes and not many are needed to deny access to an airspace.

Stealth is not some magical invisible technology and Russians have had decades to develop systems to defeat US stealth systems. — boethius

I think that the airforces which have been designed to penetrate such defensive systems will not be quite so easy to shrug off.

Then there's the problem that the Russians in Ukraine are in basements and bunkers and dugouts and spread out and you still need to actually find them to be able to drop bombs on.

In other words, even if we pretended Russian anti-air assets had zero effectiveness (which would not be the case), air supremacy doesn't win wars anyways: right now Israel can drop US bombs at will on Lebanon and Gaza and that has not delivered victory. — boethius

In this case though, there would already be an army on the ground.

If your response to a NATO base getting nuked is conventional, Russia can just nuke more things. — boethius

That'd be suicide, as I pointed out above.

And in all of these strikes and counter-strikes a general nuclear exchange would be on a knifes edge as each side would be paranoid of the other side launching first. Planes and missiles flying everywhere are not going to reduce tensions.

At the end of the day, Europe, and the US for that matter, knows that the US is less committed to the conflict than is Russia and that the US has no interest in even a major risk of a general nuclear exchange with Russia. Even if European leaders were willing to have nuclear strikes on their territory for the sake of defending "Ukrainian sovereignty", which honestly many Europeans seems dumb enough to actually want, they know that the US doesn't actually want that: that Ukraine as a useful proxy force to accomplish some objectives for a time and at no point is the US going to "risk anything" for Ukraine.

Therefore, if the US did escalate to the point of Russia using a nuclear weapon to reestablish deterrence both the US and the Europeans know that the US has no rational response. — boethius

You've got this backwards though. It is precisely because the US and the west are less committed to the conflict that no rational Russian government would ever use nuclear weapons in this conflict.

You keep saying that the west is content to see Ukraine lose. And although you keep stretching the evidence far beyond what it actually supports, there is an element of truth in this. The west faces no existential risk over the outcome of the Ukraine war and so it's determination to support Ukraine remains limited.

If Russia were to use a nuclear weapon, especially if they were to use it directly against NATO, it would create an existential risk. At that point the West would be forced to strain every sinew to eliminate the government responsible for the attack.

It is a very, very bad idea.

In this scenario, the situation, at the end of the day, would be US and NATO (mostly the UK) firing missiles at Russian critical infrastructure, an attack Russia needs to respond to, with nuclear weapons if that is the only option. Therefore, the solution would be for the US and NATO to stop attacking Russia to end the nuclear war. The only other option would be to simply continue the nuclear war; Russia would be in the same position of needing to resort to nuclear weapons to reestablish deterrence and therefore the only actual alternative to the US stopping the cycle of escalation would be to simply escalate to a nuclear war.

Actually attacking Russia is no longer deterrence it is simply straight-up attacking Russia resulting in Russia needing to respond to reestablish deterrence. — boethius

But you run into the classic problem: both sides understand the logic of the situation. Both sides know that whoever stops the cycle of escalation loses. And whoever escalates into a general nuclear exchange also loses. The only winning move is not to play.

Which is why at the end of the day US elites do follow the RAND paper basic framework of "calibrating" the intensity of the conflict to avoid unwanted escalation; the intensity of violence needing to calibration to achieve that is Russia prevailing in Ukraine without systemic risk to Russian critical infrastructure.

The Russians can tolerate NATO weapons being used in Ukraine because at the end of the day they choose to be there, Russian critical infrastructure is not impacted, and defeating those weapons and prevailing in Ukraine has some advantages (from the Russian imperial perspective). — boethius

The point though is that Russia is already achieving that effect with just threats. No-one is even considering a large scale strike at russian critical infrastructure using western weapons. It is the strange logic of deterrence that using a weapon is less effective than threatening it's use.

As mentioned above, if you are attacking the other sides critical infrastructure (what the Ukrainians want permission to do with NATO missiles) — boethius

No, Ukraine wants permission to attack specific military targets (airbases, air defences, supply dumps).

The difference in the situation being that Iran has no nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis the US. — boethius

That's one difference. There are many others as well. It's not just that Iran has no nukes. It doesn't have all that much economic or political capital to throw around either. Plus Iran's main ally is Russia while China has other priorities.

Why would this happen? How exactly would Russian troops be flattened in Ukraine? — boethius

Ukraine has been able to invade Russia and hold a chunk of its territory indefinitely. If NATO forces entered the fray, Russian forces would be rolled up like a wet carpet. You really dispute this?

Apparently Putin announced a few days ago that Russia is planning to change it's nuclear doctrine:
AP News: Putin lowers threshold of nuclear response

As various commentators have pointed out, the change is clearly intended to make the doctrine more vague. It's also pretty much a direct warning to not allow Ukraine to strike targets on Russian territory using western weapons.

This seems a fairly big step for Russia, which seems to indicate that they're really concerned about possible long range strikes. It also demonstrates the bargaining power Russia's nuclear capabilities still represent. — Echarmion

What's bizarre is that, according to Russia's official position, Ukraine has been striking Russian territory with Western weaponry for more than a year, since when it first started using it against targets in Crimea. When Russia formally annexed more Ukrainian territories, those strikes expanded accordingly. So, as far as Russia is concerned, there would be no major escalation if Western donors permitted Ukraine to use their weapons with fewer geographic restrictions.

Besides, the Russians have been crying wolf for far too long for such theatrics to look credible. They've been insisting that the West was at war with them since even before the invasion. They've been issuing dire threats against the West since before the invasion. And they've been repeating basically the same things at regular intervals all throughout the campaign. Unfortunately, the West all too often plays an obliging dupe to such crude intimidation tactics.

Palpable hand wringing as the clowns refuse to face the music. :lol:

Palpable hand wringing as the clowns refuse to face the music. — Tzeentch

Hand wringing is how the copium is purified and refined from the raw hopium flowers that blossom after cultivators carefully plant the seeds of magical thinking in the fertile bullshit on the foggy mountains of ego preserving delusion; before being dried, packaged and trafficked to the network of dealers and pushers around the world.

You keep saying that the west is content to see Ukraine lose. And although you keep stretching the evidence far beyond what it actually supports, there is an element of truth in this. The west faces no existential risk over the outcome of the Ukraine war and so it's determination to support Ukraine remains limited. — Echarmion

Right.

Yet, the Kremlin circle getting their way like so strengthens their ways for Putin's regressive Russia, strengthens their (aggressive) power, impunity, propaganda/rhetoric. Heck, Putin might be revered as a hero by some, perhaps enough to make a difference.

He was right! — some might then proclaim

Others are taking notes. It would be a victory of sorts for posturing, opacity, suppression, regression, anti-democracy, kratocracy, authoritarianism, and proliferation thereof.

He did it!

Ukraine's supporters might as well be deemed impotent (or cowards). After all, combined, Ukraine's supporters have markedly more resources than Putin's Russia.

He stood up to them all and showed them!

Democracy, freedom, human rights, respect for law, whatever, would take some further hits, as would Ukraine's efforts.

It's the choice of a down-slope that our children's children would have to deal with; we already have historical parallels to learn from. (Not much new here; unlike @boethius, I wouldn't say that "the West" doesn't care.)

Why would I be unable to deal with that? Yes most everyone assumed that Russia would easily prevail over Ukraine if it committed serious resources (at least initially). — Echarmion

If by "most everyone" you mean just common Westerners that believe what they're told on television, then yes they believed what the television told them.

However, actual military experts did not believe this 3 days scenario but that Ukraine had a sizeable military, could and would likely fight (as that's what soldiers are trained to do and usually do), and was also supported by US and NATO intelligence.

Then there was the size of the Russian regular forces which were and still are insufficient to simply conquer all of Ukraine.

In addition to military operations having fundamental logistical limitations.

Without even getting to the part of the West flooding in arms, such as shoulder launched anti-armour and anti-air missiles (which aren't sufficient to win the war but highly effective defensively).

But it turned out that Ukraine had more teeth than most anyone assumed. — Echarmion

Completely false.

What has occurred is what experts predicted was the maximum war aim Russia could reasonably accomplish with its initial force: securing the land bridge to Crimea.

Here's just one paper of actual experts analyzing things before the war occurred (published in December 2021).

Likely Ukrainian Initial Responses to Full-Scale Invasion
The Ukrainian military will almost certainly fight against such an invasion, for which it is now preparing. Whatever doubts and reservations military personnel might have about their leaders or their prospects, the appearance of enemy mechanized columns driving into one’s country tends to concentrate thought and galvanize initial resistance. It collapses complexities and creates binary choices. Military officers and personnel are conditioned to choose to fight in such circumstances, and usually do, at least at first. There is no reason to think the Ukrainian military will perform differently in this case. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War

In the same paper they describe Putin's "most attractive option":

The operation to establish a land bridge from Rostov to Crimea is likely the most attractive to Putin in this respect. It solves a real problem for him by giving him control of the Dnepr-Crimea canal ,which he badly needs to get fresh water to occupied Crimea. It would do fearful damage to the Ukrainian economy by disrupting key transportation routes from eastern Ukraine to the west. He could halt operations upon obtaining an important gain, such as seizing the canal and the area around it or after taking the strategic city of Mariupol just beyond the boundary of occupied Donbas. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War

The paper also explains exactly the problem Russia would have in actually conquering significant parts of Ukraine:

Russia does not adhere to American counter-insurgency doctrine, to be sure, but the counter-insurgency ratio identified in that doctrine was derived from the study of many insurgencies, not just those in which America was engaged. That ratio—of one counter-insurgent per 20 inhabitants—would suggest a counter-insurgency force requirement on the order of 325,000 personnel just for those cities. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War

Hence why the authors identify the most "attractive option" as establishing the land bridge to Crimea which solves a "a real problem" after which he could "halt military operations" and "declare victory".

A significant part of the paper is devoted to analyzing the possibility of Russia conquering all of Ukraine, which the authors recognize Russia could do but that it would pose so many military and political problems that they describe such a move as irrational, even putting in bold:

Putin certainly could find ways to govern a conquered Ukraine, and he might well decide to pay the prices and take the risks considered above in return for completing this vital part of his legacy. But such decisions would be fundamental deviations from the patterns of thought, behavior, and action he has pursued for two decades. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War

Followed immediately by:

They would be, in many respects, irrational, driven by an ideological need and psychic urge to take real risks and pay real prices for abstract benefits. People change, of course, especially toward the ends of their lives. But we should look for solid evidence that Putin’s thought process and calculations really have changed so fundamentally that he would either overlook these problems or accept these costs before accepting at face value the invasion plan he is ostensibly pursuing. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War

The core thesis of the paper is:

We continue to assess for all these reasons that Putin does not, in fact, intend to invade unoccupied Ukraine this winter despite the continued build-up of Russian forces in preparation to do so. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War

The terminology the authors use is "invade unoccupied Ukraine" refers to conquering all of Ukraine, and anything less being a limited operation which they predict is in fact likely:

A full-scale Russian invasion would consist of numerous discrete operations, almost every one of which could also be conducted independently of the others to achieve more limited objectives at lesser cost and risk. The most salient of those operations include, in order from most- to least-likely:

• Deploying Russian airborne and/or mechanized units to one or more locations in Belarus that would support a planned attack on Ukraine as well as pose other threats to NATO member states;
• Deploying Russian mechanized, tank, artillery, and support units overtly into occupied Donbas;
• Breaking out from occupied Donbas to establish a land bridge connecting Russian-occupiedCrimea with Russian territory near Rostov along the northern Sea of Azov littoral, as well as seizing the Kherson region north of Crimea and securing the Dnepr-Crimea canal;
• Conducting airborne and amphibious operations to seize Odesa and the western Ukrainian Black Sea coast; and
• Launching a mechanized drive to seize the strategic city of Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War

The authors also conclude that the "leaked plan" to conquer all of Ukraine is likely a ruse (by either Russian or Western intelligence) as well as the obvious fact the Russians could implement different operations as ultimately feints (either planned that way from the start or then pulled back if losses are too high).

Point being, experts definitely expected Ukraine to fight and that Russia conquering and occupying all of Ukraine to be so infeasibly militarily given Russias available forces as to be irrational, but that what does make sense is securing the land bridge to Crimea which is what ultimately happens.

All this has been discussed multiple times since the start of the war and in particular since the Russian withdrawal from North Ukraine.

That's a strawman. I asked you specifically how the US escalated in Ukraine. You never were able to answer those questions. — Echarmion

We can definitely get into the escalations in Ukraine itself, such as those 12 CIA bases and supplying more weapons including to Nazis if you really need it.

But this is the kind of kindergarten logic that I simply need to push back against. Escalating militarily with Russia in terms of being more vocal about Ukraine joining NATO (what the RAND authors point out would likely solicit a Russian counter-escalation) and also withdrawing from INF, of which NATO intermediate range missiles being stationed in Ukraine is what Russia would be most concerned about in the scenario of Ukraine joining NATO, are both escalations in Ukraine.

This kindergarten logic that withdrawing from INF is not technically happening "in Ukraine" as it happens on paper in the abstract and so "shouldn't" involve Ukraine, is just stupid (at an adult level; if actual kindergarteners had these sorts of conceptual divisions that would be ok).

Whole reason Russia is so concerned about Ukraine joining NATO is the possibility of stationing intermediate range nuclear weapons now, and it was already essentially taken for granted even by Western talking heads that one reason to maintain a proxy war in the Donbas was to impede Ukraine joining NATO.

We can get into the funding passed in 2017 of military assistance to Ukraine if you want which would be the escalation in Ukraine, but as the authors of the RAND paper make pretty clear the Russians are particularly sensitive to the nuclear issue and potential for a decapitation strike and use pretty strong language to point out Russia would likely respond to both being more vocal about Ukraine joining NATO as well as withdrawing from INF.

Of course, you're just not going to do this very easy demonstration. Because you're lying. — Echarmion

What facts? Literally what the hell are you talking about?

Ok, well if you're going to call me a liar without even the cursory research into what you're talking about, the military assistance to Ukraine and the intelligence assistance (eventually revealed as 12 CIA forward operating bases) are not disputed facts except by you.

Here's an article from Politico from 2019 describing the situation:

For the 2019 fiscal year, lawmakers allocated $250 million in security aid to Ukraine, including money for weapons, training, equipment and intelligence support. Specifically, Congress set aside $50 million for weaponry. — Trump holds up Ukraine military aid meant to confront Russia, Politico

Which is what is called escalation in Ukraine, continuing year after year thus building up capacity and escalating further.

If you are unaware of such basic facts you are clearly not actually interested in the topic but just want to engage in denialism, which is just dumb.

Russia invaded. — Echarmion

That's what the purpose of provocation is.

The two biggest airforces on the planet, plus the European air forces? — Echarmion

Russia has a massively superior Air Force to Ukraine and yet it does not have uncontested air supremacy. After 2 years Russia has been able to degrade / attrit Ukrainian A2AD enough to be able to launch glide bombs from dozens of kilometres out.

The reason is that planes are incredibly vulnerable to surface to air missiles, and these systems can be highly mobile, hidden, dispersed and turned on only long enough to engage a target and then moved.

Not that this debate matters, but the idea NATO could destroy all Russian anti-air assets essentially overnight is ludicrous. Without nuclear weapons it would be an immense and long battle of attrition. NATO has a greater airforce but Russia would have a defending advantage of NATO needing to fly into Russian A2AD and not vice-versa.

You've got this backwards though. It is precisely because the US and the west are less committed to the conflict that no rational Russian government would ever use nuclear weapons in this conflict. — Echarmion

This makes literally no sense.

The more committed party is the party more likely to resort to more extreme force, the less committed party the party more likely to backoff and not escalate further.

Hence, it is because US and the West are less committed and Russia is super committed to winning the conflict that the US and the West knows if they actually did pour in enough weapons soon enough to actually threaten Russian forces, or then allow Ukraine to attack critical Russian infrastructure, that Russia is likely to resort to nuclear weapons which they have no response to being the less committed party.

You keep saying that the west is content to see Ukraine lose. And although you keep stretching the evidence far beyond what it actually supports, there is an element of truth in this. The west faces no existential risk over the outcome of the Ukraine war and so its determination to support Ukraine remains limited. — Echarmion

Limited support = content to see Ukraine lose.

That is literally the definition of limited support.

It honestly seems borderline miraculous that you have been able to realize essential fact of the conflict, which explains pretty much all the other facts.

If Russia were to use a nuclear weapon, especially if they were to use it directly against NATO, it would create an existential risk. At that point the West would be forced to strain every sinew to eliminate the government responsible for the attack.

It is a very, very bad idea. — Echarmion

Using a nuclear weapons against a NATO base in Europe supporting attacks on Russian critical infrastructure would not be an existential risk to NATO, and far less the US.

What would create an existential risk, in particular for the US, is to counter-attack Russia with a nuclear weapon or even more massive conventional attack.

If the process is Russia strikes a NATO base with a nuclear weapon and then the US does not respond in kind, then that is not an existential risk to the US and no US territory has even been damaged. Striking in kind on the other hand is an existential risk as that may lead to a further cycle of escalation towards a general nuclear exchange (where US cities would be hit) or then Russia may simply preempt that cycle of escalation by jumping right to general exchange (to have first strike advantage).

It of course makes zero sense for the US to risk actual existential risks to protect Ukrainian sovereignty either by directly intervening or then supplying Ukraine with weapons and intelligence that would put Russian critical interests at risk (in this case mostly prevailing in Ukraine as well as critical infrastructure within Russia).

Therefore, there being no way to mortally wound Russia without significant risk of Russian resorting to nuclear weapons to reestablish nuclear deterrence (which is of course already there, just in this scenario one side is choosing to ignore it for a period of time), the only rational move is to not cross a threshold of escalation that would lead to nuclear use.

Which is exactly what we see! NATO tanks, NATO planes, NATO missiles (and all the top shelf stuff not even what Ukraine eventually gets) could have been supplied to Ukraine day 1. The argument that it "wasn't useful" at the time is just gaslighting. Optimum military strategy would be to start transitioning to those systems starting day 1, which means fielding units with that equipment to start 1. gaining experience to workout optimal tactics to 2. more importantly to have a cadre of experienced Ukrainian troops on these equipments in order to train others when the day comes to scale up, to 3. even more importantly smoothly transition from old systems to new systems without a collapse in capacity and in fact increasing capacity. What NATO does instead is drip feed weapons systems into Ukraine, far from top shelf stuff, introducing each weapon system when previous capacity essentially collapses and then "calibrating", to use the RAND author terminology, the supply to not escalate to a "larger conflict" (i.e. one that risks nuclear weapons use).

But you run into the classic problem: both sides understand the logic of the situation. Both sides know that whoever stops the cycle of escalation loses. And whoever escalates into a general nuclear exchange also loses. The only winning move is not to play. — Echarmion

Well now you're getting it. The US is choosing not to play the nuclear escalation game by not supplying Ukraine in a way that risks critical Russian interests such as the bulk of their territorial gains in Ukraine or then critical infrastructure at home.

The US, understood as rational imperial interests (much less rational actual Americans interests), doesn't gain anything from doing this, it is a US policy setback and loss of prestige to lose the confrontation, but rather massive profits are made and natural gas is supplied to Europe and a new Cold War is started to ensure even more massive profits.

The kindergarten logic that you present here, just repeating Western talking heads propaganda, is the idea that because Russia is also deterred by Western nuclear weapons means that we can therefore do anything to Russia and they would not retaliate.

This is obviously not true. Attacking Russian critical interests, whether directly with NATO planes or then through supplying the Ukrainians with the right weapons and right permissions and intelligence to do so, is no longer a situation of mutual deterrence but one of simply attacking the Russians. If the attack approaches risk and losses comparable to a nuclear strike then this is simply starting the nuclear escalation cycle just using conventional weapons, on the basis that talking heads with kindergarten level logic can say things like "Russia is bluffing! We have nuclear weapons too!" or then "Ukraine has a right to attack Russian infrastructure! It's a war!"

However, what Western talking heads and their parrots on social media say doesn't constrain Russia. If we start a nuclear war it doesn't matter if Western talking heads feel the West was following some sort of rule book that allows it to attack Russian critical interests without the Russians retaliating. These kindergarten level logic developed by Western talking heads does not matter on the battlefield.

If the West, directly or through Ukraine, with conventional, nuclear or unconventional weapons, attacks Russian critical interests in which their only recourse is nuclear weapons or then risk collapse of the state, they will of course resort to nuclear weapons in order to stop the attack.

There's no "we have a right to attack you in a special way as outlined by our talking heads where you don't have a right to retaliate but just need to accept collapse of your entire economy and state".

What matters is not the methods but the end results. There's not "special way of murdering someone" where you get to get away with murder because "technically they pulled the trigger" and all you did was put them in a device that forced them to pull the trigger or then "all I did was leave some poisonous drink around and I didn't anyone to drink anything". These obviously stupid loopholes that obviously don't matter in the real world is the kindergarten level logic that Western talking heads keep repeating.

However, obviously Western policy makers, while happy to have these talking points repeated over and over so that the obvious problem with the policy of supporting Ukraine isn't scrutinized (that the West obviously is deterred by Russian nuclear weapons and therefore we are simply propping up Ukraine to receive harder punches), don't actually believe this kindergarten logic. When they tell us directly that this weapons system or that weapons system can't be supplied or these missiles can't be used to strike Russia, as to not "escalate", they are simply explicitly telling us that they are deterred in their choices by Russian nuclear weapons and therefore won't risk an nuclear escalation: how is that achieved? By not supplying Ukraine or permitting Ukraine to do anything that would actually risk Russian critical losses in personnel, material and infrastructure.

The point though is that Russia is already achieving that effect with just threats. No-one is even considering a large scale strike at russian critical infrastructure using western weapons. It is the strange logic of deterrence that using a weapon is less effective than threatening it's use. — Echarmion

Again, you follow literally zero events. You do zero reproach. You simply randomly deny things.

Which, if there was still interest in the conversation by others I'd just ignore you, but you are at least a useful foil in order to explain things I'm happy to explain anyways.

Striking Russian infrastructure with Western missiles is exactly what Ukraine has been asking! That's what Western talking heads keep repeating that Russia attacks Ukrainian infrastructure all the time and so the framework that Ukraine isn't allowed to do likewise to Russia isn't fair, Ukraine "has a right" blah blah blah.

No, Ukraine wants permission to attack specific military targets (airbases, air defences, supply dumps). — Echarmion

Again, you follow zero events, what Zelensky and others have been quite clearly stating is that Russia is only going to give up once the Russians in Moscow "feel" the war, which is achieved by attacking critical infrastructure, which obviously the Russians do in Ukraine all the time so obviously if you believe in "fairness" it's common sense that Ukraine would be allowed to retaliate in kind.

However, the West does not believe in fairness, but believes Russia would resort to nuclear weapons and so these permissions aren't given.

Since I know you'll just keep denying these obvious facts until I spoon-feed them to you.

The title of this BBC article is literally "Russia must feel war consequences, says Zelensky amid Ukrainian attack".

Russia must feel war consequences, says Zelensky amid Ukrainian attack — Russia must feel war consequences, says Zelensky amid Ukrainian attack, BBC

Which you may say "that's not specifically about missiles!"

Ok sure:

The Ukrainian leader previously called this the "one decision" that could prevent the Russian army from advancing further into Ukraine, adding, "If our partners lifted all restrictions on long-range capabilities, Ukraine would not need to physically enter the Kursk region to protect Ukrainian citizens in the border area and destroy Russia's potential for aggression." — US Maintains Stance on Strikes Inside Russia Despite Ukrainian Pleas

But even if you're right, that just demonstrates NATO is deterred by Russian nuclear weapons as I explain.