“Setting most economic policies on the planet (what and how things are produced) has been the US” may have significantly contributed to many events: triplication of the World population, peace/ greater wellbeing/cultural emancipation in Europe, technological progress, rise of competing powers (like China and Russia), not just destruction of “the ecosystems we require for survival” or its destruction on a “unimaginable scale” (whatever that means). — neomac
First, power struggles do not need moral justification to make sense. And most certainly they do not need to be grounded on your understanding of “moral justification” (which I find questionable for reasons I argued a while ago). — neomac
However we can use the Russian actions to make an educated guess and my view is that the Russians leaving Kherson voluntarily points towards it neither being particularly stragetically relevant, nor the Russians being willing to pay a high cost for holding it. — Tzeentch
However, if you want to argue climate change isn't happening, species loss isn't happening for this and a bunch of other reasons as well, or this environmental destruction, to the extent you agree it's happening, won't be extremely bad, better to argue that in the climate change thread.
For this thread, I'm sure you can appreciate that someone who concludes the environment has been grossly mismanaged and the US primarily responsible, won't assign much moral superiority to US foreign policy. — boethius
Of course, the debate remains, even in your basic framework of "US good", as to whether the war in Ukraine is morally justified if it is sacrificing Ukrainians for this US "rules based order" without any benefit to Ukrainians.
As well, even assuming it's true that it's morally justified to sacrifice Ukrainians (or let them sacrifice themselves for Western purposes), if the war is actually harming Russia and benefiting the US. — boethius
As yet, no pro-US policy proponent here has answer the question of how many Ukrainian lives are worthwhile to sacrifice to accomplish what objectives. — boethius
Likewise, if Russia survives sanctions, as they seem to be doing, and stabilise the front, which they seem to be doing, and continue their arms manufacturing, which they seem to be doing, how exactly does this war harm Russia's geopolitical standing, compared to increasing power and influence and put them in a position to strike deals with Iran and Saudi Arabia for example? — boethius
Now, if Russia is gaining power and but China even moreso, for all the reasons we've discussed and you seem to agree with, ok, sure, maybe Russia's relative power vis-a-vis China is decreased, but if this China led block that includes Russia, in whatever influence you want to assign them, is on the whole increasing in power, how is this good for the US? — boethius
You are obviously a proponent of US foreign policy with regard to this Ukraine war, if your justification is that it's good for US empire then that's your justification. — boethius
I’m neither arguing that “climate change isn’t happening” nor that “won't be extremely bad”. I’m questioning your way of assigning responsibility and its implications. — neomac
I already argued against this miscaracterization of my views.
- your basic framework of "US good” as opposed to your basic framework “Russia good”, “Iran good”, “China good”, “North Korea good”?
- the war in Ukraine is morally justified if it is sacrificing Ukrainians for this US "rules based order” as opposed to “the war in Ukraine is morally justified if it is killing,raping,deporting,destroying Ukrainians for Russia anti-West order?
- without any benefit to Ukrainians: as opposed to “without any benefit to Russians”?
I questioned the assumption that the West “is sacrificing” the Ukrainians. — neomac
I can’t answer such a question if I don’t know how I am supposed to do the math or if it makes sense. — neomac
Why don’t you pick whatever historical example and show me how YOU would do the math? Here is an example: ”Civilian deaths during the war include air raid deaths, estimates of German civilians killed only by Allied strategic bombing have ranged from around 350,000 to 500,000.” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_casualties_in_World_War_II). By taking into account that the civilian deaths were estimated in the range of 350,000-500,000, do you calculate that it was morally worth bombing Nazi Germany or not? How did you calculate it?
Exactly why strategic bombing is so controversial is that it's difficult to argue it saved more lives than it cost, which is the usual framework for these sorts of calculations. The allies needed to let some ships (that they knew would be attacked) sink to the bottom and thousands of sailors dead because keeping the information advantage and destroying the U-boat fleet slow enough for the Nazi's to not realise their communications are compromised would save far more lives in total than maximising the short term benefits of the information, which would have no other explanation than communications had been compromised.
— neomac
It has already harmed Russian’s political standing:
- Reputational costs: e.g. Russian military standing didn’t impress on the battlefield — neomac
- Security costs: e.g. NATO enlargement and the rearming of European countries — neomac
- Economic costs: e.g. economic decoupling between Russia and the West
It’s Russia which increased power and influence, or it’s Iran and Saudi Arabia that increased power and influence over Russia? — neomac
What might be the lesser evil for the US is to break a Western-lead globalization which was benefiting more EU, Russia and China than the US. And re-compact the West in a logic of political, economic, security blocks as in the Cold War. But this attempt may fail not necessarily because of Russia, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia have significantly increased power and influence. But because of EU, in particular Germany and France ,are fed up with the US. Or because of a domestic internal crisis in the US. — neomac
We discussed that already. I’m not a “proponent of US foreign policy”. One thing is to try to make sense of what the US is doing, another is to decide what do about it. As far as I am personally concerned, independently from what the US does, I can only say as much: I’m a person who prefers to enjoy standards of life, freedoms or economic opportunities of avg Western people instead of enjoying standards of life, freedoms or economic opportunities for avg people living in authoritarian regimes like Russia, China or Iran. Therefore I’m inclined to see as a threat an increase of power and aggressiveness of such authoritarian regimes at the expense of the West. If the West can and wants to do something against such threat, then I would welcome it. And since I’m aware of how messy and dirty human history is, I limit myself to reason in terms of lesser evil. — neomac
You also seem to agree the US is the world's super power and global hegemon ... and not merely today but, most critically, in the 1990's after the fall of the Soviet Union and before the rise of China US was even more top dog than it is now, and it's that decade that was the most critical for setting climate and environmental policy.
Why wouldn't the party with the most influence and power in setting a policy, not be the most responsible for the results? — boethius
Would you be willing to sacrifice a million Ukrainians on the battlefield and still lose, a more-or-less fight to the death scenario, as the principle is more important than the result? — boethius
Do you find it acceptable the losses since Russia's offer last spring (assuming the offer was genuine: give-up claim to Crimea, independent Donbas) in the event the lines do not change further? — boethius
Would the losses since the Russian's offer be worth it in the event Ukraine outright loses? — boethius
Finally, to achieve the goal of removing Russia further from Ukraine, both including and excluding Crimea, how many losses would you (if you had to choose) be worthwhile? — boethius
If you want to discuss, don't deflect further with "Ukrainians want to fight it's not my decision, the West is just supplying arms", but engage in the argument and put yourself in the position of choosing the number of lives for the given scenario. Certainly you'd be willing to sacrifice 1 Ukrainian to achieve complete removal of Russia from Ukraine if it was both possible and your decision to make (I'd make the same decision; one life for the complete end of the war? no hesitation, will obviously save many more lives than the war continuing), so just keep increasing the number from there until you either reach a zone where you start to be uncomfortable (100 000, 200 000, 500 000) or then never become uncomfortable and inform us every single Ukrainian life is worth sacrificing to remove Russia from Ukraine. — boethius
And these sorts of decisions are part of NATO military training (which I've done) that the cost in lives must be justified by the worth of the objective achieved. The mere fact the other side is presumably "bad" (otherwise why are we fighting them) does not justify fighting at all cost to both your own troops as well as civilians. We are willing to sacrifice X to achieve Y is the fundamental framework of all military decision making. — "boethius
Then you have no place in policy discussion about warfare, because that's what it's about. — boethius
Why don’t you pick whatever historical example and show me how YOU would do the math? Here is an example: ”Civilian deaths during the war include air raid deaths, estimates of German civilians killed only by Allied strategic bombing have ranged from around 350,000 to 500,000.” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_casualties_in_World_War_II). By taking into account that the civilian deaths were estimated in the range of 350,000-500,000, do you calculate that it was morally worth bombing Nazi Germany or not? How did you calculate it?
Exactly why strategic bombing is so controversial is that it's difficult to argue it saved more lives than it cost, which is the usual framework for these sorts of calculations. — boethius
Certainly Russia's reputation is decreased in the West ... but is it really true world wide? Vis-a-vis China, India, most developing nations? Certainly not enough for these nations to stop trading with Russia.[/quota]
Most likely, Russia looks weaker (than prior to the war) and particularly needy to the Rest too. Indeed, they exploit Russia’s predicament to reap the benefits and blackmail the West. For that reason India and China may want the war to last as long as possible. But without too much exposure so far, indeed if India and China felt so confident to challenge the West, they would support Russia’s war more openly and directly as Iran is doing.
— boethius
- Security costs: e.g. NATO enlargement and the rearming of European countries — neomac
Is there any scenario in which Finland / Europe is going to invade Russia? Does any of that actually matter in the current geopolitical "power struggle" as you put it? — boethius
That's how political blocks work. If you are in a geopolitical power struggle with the West, then being economically tied to the West exposes you to coercion (the whole point of the sanctions). Sure, Iran and Saudi Arabia (and obviously China and India) have more influence with Russia, but there's no evidence right now these parties are seeking to harm Russia through those economic ties and influence, whereas that's very clearly the West, and in particular the US', stated policy since decades (containment, no "peer competitors" can rise in any region etc.). — boethius
The primary reason Germany and France would be fed up with the US is that the US creates this mess in Ukraine and then also blows up European infrastructure. But, otherwise, I agree that the US' main competitor in this conflict is the EU and the possibility of the Euro emerging as a "peer competitor" to the USD. — boethius
It's difficult to interpret this as something other than being a proponent of US foreign policy.
But if you really want to believe yourself to be some impartial observer, then we can discuss on that basis. If that's true you should have even less problem answering questions of what you feel is a reasonable sacrifice to achieve what, as you can be more objective in evaluating the costs and the benefits. — boethius
The Russians “have an absolute obligation to ensure that civilians are cared for and to not deprive them their ability of a livelihood and an ability to feed themselves,” said David Crane, a veteran prosecutor who has been involved in numerous international war crime investigations. “It’s just pure pillaging and looting, and that is also an actionable offense under international military law.”
However, Russia will likely reap the benefit of a significant portion of the close to 27-million-ton wheat crop, said Skakun. The analysis showed that 5.8 million tons of wheat was harvested from areas that were not under Ukrainian control. That represents a loss of at least $1 billion, Abbassian noted.
Russia's agriculture and foreign ministries did not immediately respond to requests for comment for this story. In May, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov described as "fake" the allegations Russia has stolen grain during what it calls its special military operation in Ukraine.
A military recruitment sign in Moscow reads "Our profession - is defending Motherland." Ads like this have increasingly been popping up in recent months.
“Did you dream of becoming this kind of a defender?” the advertisement asks as it shows the security guard manning an entrance to a grocery shop, next to a produce stand.
Yeah, thieves grabbed more than land. For some reason, I'd (personally) prefer the "breadbasket" under Kyiv than the Kremlin, regardless of what Ukraine is the "breadbasket" of. Poor assessment on my part? — jorndoe
it's about whether the chance of achieving those preferences by use of conventional land war is worth the cost. — Isaac
That's a difficult calculation, and no one can be sure of the numbers that lie in the future. — unenlightened
given the particular history of Ukraine under Soviet rule, I can understand any Ukrainian's calculation that a few million dead is a price well worth paying. — unenlightened
if that was my history and someone was offering me some arms, I wouldn't be questioning their motives before accepting the offers. — unenlightened
well go tell them to stop fighting then. Shoo, off you go. — jorndoe
having wheat production in the hands of Ukraine rather than Russia — Isaac
There are potential concerns that may or may not have eluded you, say, suggested by — jorndoe
Either way, the Ukrainians said no. — jorndoe
Then what? — just above
↪Isaac, goodie, a do'er; what about support of, or something against, the autocracy then? Either way, the Ukrainians said no. — just above
The shortest answer is that to assess such responsibility one should be able to distinguish what is feasible (by the ruler) from what is desirable (by whom? The ruler? Humanity? You?). Being the most influent and powerful ruler on an “anarchic” international system doesn’t necessarily imply that the ruler has enough power to reset the world according to what is desirable on a global scale (BTW the scientific investigations on the global environmental effects of human development, its promotion and popularisation are all integral part of the US-led world, so global environmental self-awareness are also a product of the evil American demiurge). — neomac
Why wouldn't the party with the most influence and power in setting a policy, not be the most responsible for the results? — boethius
Who would? — neomac
Give the example and tell me how many losses would be worthwhile to you (if you had to choose)? — neomac
Give the example and tell me what’s the number you start feeling uncomfortable with. — neomac
Conclusion: I don’t answer your questions not because I’m emotionally uncomfortable, but because I’m intellectually uncomfortable to answer heavily framed questions for which I can't provide a meaningful answer (even if I was tempted to answer them exactly the way you would answer them). I’m interested to argue about morality and geopolitics, not about morale and military. — neomac
I discuss policies as any avg dudes who is neither a politician nor an activist. And since I’m in a philosophy forum, I’m interested to explore assumptions and implications without feeling pressed by political/military/economic urgency, or frustrated out of lack of expertise. — neomac
Concerning the question about Finland/Europe, you shouldn’t ask me, you should ask Russia. To your questions, I would add mine: e.g. was there any scenario in which Ukraine was invading Russia? Was there any scenario in which NATO or the US was going to invade Russia?
NATO enlargement can grow the military and reputational costs and threats against Russia’s imperialism. That’s the point. — neomac
The Rest is not an economic-military-technlogical integrated block yet as much as the West. And again power must be understood in relative advantages, timing, trends. You are unnecessarily focused in the present (which is not what geopolitical agents do when engaged in power struggles). Things my look very differently over the next decades depending on how this war ends. — neomac
Until EU will build enough unity to support of common foreign strategy and cumulate deterrent/coercive power against competitors like Russia, China and the US.
This war suggests that the EU is not only far from that, but things may go awfully wrong if the alliance with the US will break. The void or significant weakening of American hegemony in Europe can likely boost the economic/military/ideological competition between European countries (the premises are already there, see the divergence between the UK and the EU, Eastern European countries and Western European Countries wrt the war in Ukraine, the rivalries between north Europe and South Europe about the immigrants) which can’t rely on the Western-lead international order, and between global powers (now including the US) which will bring their competition in the heart of Europe worse than in the past decades (including during the Cold War). And will more likely encourage authoritarianism even in Europe, to control ensuing social unrest (the right-wing turn in many European countries may favour this trend). — neomac
I don’t claim to be an impartial observer if that means that I do not have preferences or that I didn’t pick a side: I prefer an avg life in the West than an avg life in China, Russia or Iran. I side with a strategy that weakens Russia’s aggressiveness as much as possible. But this partiality is perfectly compatible with objectivity in understanding how the game is being played by competitors. And presenting it as honestly as possible (at least if one is not doing propaganda!). — neomac
“A proponent of US foreign policy” — neomac
What's with this obsession with what 'The Ukrainians' say? It's our decision to send weapons, our decision to support propaganda efforts, our decision to supply intelligence, our decision to avoid and block negotiations... these are all our decisions.
Stop hiding under the skirts of what 'The Ukrainians' say and have the balls to make up your own fucking mind. — Isaac
The West has managed to develop "woke warmongering" somehow. — boethius
It's like someone invents a super weapon which changes the fortunes of any war, they go bankrupt and no-one else even bothers to pick up the patent. — Isaac
Abstract. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine emphasises the role social media plays in modern day warfare, with conflict occurring in both the physical and information environments. There is a large body of work on identifying malicious cyber-activity, but less focusing on the effect this activity has on the overall conversation, especially with regards to the Russia/Ukraine Conflict. Here, we employ a variety of techniques including information theoretic measures, sentiment and linguistic analysis, and time series techniques to understand how bot activity influences wider online discourse. By aggregating account groups we find significant information flows from bot-like accounts to non-bot accounts with behaviour differing between sides. Pro-Russian non-bot accounts are most influential overall, with information flows to a variety of other account groups. No significant outward flows exist from pro-Ukrainian non-bot accounts, with significant flows from pro-Ukrainian bot accounts into pro-Ukrainian non-bot accounts. We find that bot activity drives an increase in conversations surrounding angst (with p = 2.450 × 10−4 ) as well as those surrounding work/governance (with p = 3.803 × 10−18). Bot activity also shows a significant relationship with non-bot sentiment (with p = 3.76×10−4 ), where we find the relationship holds in both directions. This work extends and combines existing techniques to quantify how bots are influencing people in the online conversation around the Russia/Ukraine invasion. It opens up avenues for researchers to understand quantitatively how these malicious campaigns operate, and what makes them impactful. — The interaction of bots and humans in discussion of the Russia-Ukraine war
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