“Setting most economic policies on the planet (what and how things are produced) has been the US” may have significantly contributed to many events: triplication of the World population, peace/ greater wellbeing/cultural emancipation in Europe, technological progress, rise of competing powers (like China and Russia), not just destruction of “the ecosystems we require for survival” or its destruction on a “unimaginable scale” (whatever that means). — neomac

It's only within the last 100 years that humans believed species could even go extinct, so what is happening previously unimaginable.

However, if you want to argue climate change isn't happening, species loss isn't happening for this and a bunch of other reasons as well, or this environmental destruction, to the extent you agree it's happening, won't be extremely bad, better to argue that in the climate change thread.

For this thread, I'm sure you can appreciate that someone who concludes the environment has been grossly mismanaged and the US primarily responsible, won't assign much moral superiority to US foreign policy.

Of course, the debate remains, even in your basic framework of "US good", as to whether the war in Ukraine is morally justified if it is sacrificing Ukrainians for this US "rules based order" without any benefit to Ukrainians.

As well, even assuming it's true that it's morally justified to sacrifice Ukrainians (or let them sacrifice themselves for Western purposes), if the war is actually harming Russia and benefiting the US.

As yet, no pro-US policy proponent here has answer the question of how many Ukrainian lives are worthwhile to sacrifice to accomplish what objectives.

Likewise, if Russia survives sanctions, as they seem to be doing, and stabilise the front, which they seem to be doing, and continue their arms manufacturing, which they seem to be doing, how exactly does this war harm Russia's geopolitical standing, compared to increasing power and influence and put them in a position to strike deals with Iran and Saudi Arabia for example?

Now, if Russia is gaining power and but China even moreso, for all the reasons we've discussed and you seem to agree with, ok, sure, maybe Russia's relative power vis-a-vis China is decreased, but if this China led block that includes Russia, in whatever influence you want to assign them, is on the whole increasing in power, how is this good for the US?

Just repeating that US is good and Russia is bad doesn't resolve any of these questions.

First, power struggles do not need moral justification to make sense. And most certainly they do not need to be grounded on your understanding of “moral justification” (which I find questionable for reasons I argued a while ago). — neomac

In philosophy, which to remind you we're on a philosophy forum, any decision reflects the moral reasoning and values of the person making the decision.

If you're doing something to increase your wealth and power, such as building an empire, then empire building would be the justification for the action in such a moral system.

You are obviously a proponent of US foreign policy with regard to this Ukraine war, if your justification is that it's good for US empire then that's your justification.

To say "power struggles do not need moral justification to make sense" is to say they may not make sense for a moral system that is not about gaining as much power as possible, which is to be expected.

You seem to assume I'm asking you to justify things beyond your own justification for things, which is not what I'm asking. I'm asking for your justification, it's not more complicated than a power struggle and you happen to be on one side by virtue of birth, had you been born Russian you'd be on the other side, then you can simply state so.

However we can use the Russian actions to make an educated guess and my view is that the Russians leaving Kherson voluntarily points towards it neither being particularly stragetically relevant, nor the Russians being willing to pay a high cost for holding it. — Tzeentch

Something that is worthwhile to note is that in any city the Russians held and then left, mostly the pro-Russian population would immigrate to Russia.

According to this UNHCR data sheet (https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine), some 2 874 806 Ukrainians have refugee status in Russia.

Since a big part of the value of territory is the people living on that territory, causing these population movements is an equally important method of imperialism as territory, of which the West is equal partner in, nabbing some 5 million Ukrainian refugees to help bolster EU GDP.

, speculative. As mentioned (by a few throughout the thread), there's more to that story.

Pretty much everything discussed in this thread is speculative.

If there's something specific I haven't adressed please state it plainly, because your posts aren't always easy to decipher.

, well, sure, except for observations. It's just that you've expressed the diversion thing as more than plain speculation, while seemingly ignoring other parts of the story. (If you build up a lengthy story, then it matters.)

I'll try to sprinkle some more in my opinion's and in my view's in there, but if you find the logic to sound authoritative then draw your conclusions I suppose.

... while seemingly ignoring other parts of the story. — jorndoe

Just state plainly what you would like me to address.

, this response didn't respond to any of the comment but instead restated what you've mentioned earlier. :shrug: (← need icon :smile:)

I addressed that comment. You seem to believe the Russians may have wanted Kiev, I stated that taking Kiev was never feasible given the size of the invasion force.

I skipped over the bit about Kremlin propaganda, because obviously I'm not going to try and decipher the 'true' meanings behind Kremlin propaganda.

If there are more points hidden in there, you'll have to state them more clearly.

To be clear, I'm not going to read through several articles to try and figure out what point you're trying to make.

However, if you want to argue climate change isn't happening, species loss isn't happening for this and a bunch of other reasons as well, or this environmental destruction, to the extent you agree it's happening, won't be extremely bad, better to argue that in the climate change thread.
For this thread, I'm sure you can appreciate that someone who concludes the environment has been grossly mismanaged and the US primarily responsible, won't assign much moral superiority to US foreign policy. — boethius

I’m neither arguing that “climate change isn’t happening” nor that “won't be extremely bad”. I’m questioning your way of assigning responsibility and its implications.

Of course, the debate remains, even in your basic framework of "US good", as to whether the war in Ukraine is morally justified if it is sacrificing Ukrainians for this US "rules based order" without any benefit to Ukrainians.

As well, even assuming it's true that it's morally justified to sacrifice Ukrainians (or let them sacrifice themselves for Western purposes), if the war is actually harming Russia and benefiting the US. — boethius

I already argued against this miscaracterization of my views.
- my basic framework of "US good” as opposed to your basic framework “Russia good”, “Iran good”, “China good”, “North Korea good”?
- the war in Ukraine is morally justified if it is sacrificing Ukrainians for this US "rules based order” as opposed to “the war in Ukraine is morally justified if it is killing,raping,deporting,destroying Ukrainians for Russia anti-West order?
- "without any benefit to Ukrainians" as opposed to “without any benefit to Russians”?
I questioned the assumption that the West “is sacrificing” the Ukrainians.

As yet, no pro-US policy proponent here has answer the question of how many Ukrainian lives are worthwhile to sacrifice to accomplish what objectives. — boethius

I can’t answer such a question if I don’t know how I am supposed to do the math or if it makes sense. Why don’t you pick whatever historical example and show me how YOU would do the math? Here is an example: ”Civilian deaths during the war include air raid deaths, estimates of German civilians killed only by Allied strategic bombing have ranged from around 350,000 to 500,000.” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_casualties_in_World_War_II). By taking into account that the civilian deaths were estimated in the range of 350,000-500,000, do you calculate that it was morally worth bombing Nazi Germany or not? How did you calculate it?

Likewise, if Russia survives sanctions, as they seem to be doing, and stabilise the front, which they seem to be doing, and continue their arms manufacturing, which they seem to be doing, how exactly does this war harm Russia's geopolitical standing, compared to increasing power and influence and put them in a position to strike deals with Iran and Saudi Arabia for example? — boethius

It has already harmed Russian’s political standing:
- Reputational costs: e.g. Russian military standing didn’t impress on the battlefield
- Security costs: e.g. NATO enlargement and the rearming of European countries
- Economic costs: e.g. economic decoupling between Russia and the West
It’s Russia which increased power and influence, or it’s Iran and Saudi Arabia that increased power and influence over Russia?

Now, if Russia is gaining power and but China even moreso, for all the reasons we've discussed and you seem to agree with, ok, sure, maybe Russia's relative power vis-a-vis China is decreased, but if this China led block that includes Russia, in whatever influence you want to assign them, is on the whole increasing in power, how is this good for the US? — boethius

What might be the lesser evil for the US is to break a Western-lead globalization which was benefiting more EU, Russia and China than the US. And re-compact the West in a logic of political, economic, security blocks as in the Cold War. But this attempt may fail not necessarily because of Russia, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia have significantly increased power and influence. But because of EU, in particular Germany and France ,are fed up with the US. Or because of a domestic internal crisis in the US.

You are obviously a proponent of US foreign policy with regard to this Ukraine war, if your justification is that it's good for US empire then that's your justification. — boethius

We discussed that already. I’m not a “proponent of US foreign policy”. One thing is to try to make sense of what the US is doing, another is to decide what do about it. As far as I am personally concerned, independently from what the US does, I can only say as much: I’m a person who prefers to enjoy standards of life, freedoms or economic opportunities of avg Western people instead of enjoying standards of life, freedoms or economic opportunities for avg people living in authoritarian regimes like Russia, China or Iran. Therefore I’m inclined to see as a threat an increase of power and aggressiveness of such authoritarian regimes at the expense of the West. If the West can and wants to do something against such threat, then I would welcome it. And since I’m aware of how messy and dirty human history is, I limit myself to reason in terms of lesser evil.

I’m neither arguing that “climate change isn’t happening” nor that “won't be extremely bad”. I’m questioning your way of assigning responsibility and its implications. — neomac

Ok, well good to know we agree on the scientific facts.

You also seem to agree the US is the world's super power and global hegemon ... and not merely today but, most critically, in the 1990's after the fall of the Soviet Union and before the rise of China US was even more top dog than it is now, and it's that decade that was the most critical for setting climate and environmental policy.

Why wouldn't the party with the most influence and power in setting a policy, not be the most responsible for the results?

I already argued against this miscaracterization of my views.
- your basic framework of "US good” as opposed to your basic framework “Russia good”, “Iran good”, “China good”, “North Korea good”?
- the war in Ukraine is morally justified if it is sacrificing Ukrainians for this US "rules based order” as opposed to “the war in Ukraine is morally justified if it is killing,raping,deporting,destroying Ukrainians for Russia anti-West order?
- without any benefit to Ukrainians: as opposed to “without any benefit to Russians”?
I questioned the assumption that the West “is sacrificing” the Ukrainians. — neomac

I'm not mischaracterising your views, I'm literally asking questions that you keep deflecting from. That the questions are uncomfortable for you and you prefer not to answer them simply emphasises the incompleteness at best, and inconsistencies at worst, in your position.

You should not have a problem answering the question of how many Ukrainian lives you'd be willing to sacrifice to achieve what. And, for the sake of argument, let's just say you're able to decide the number and the goals. This would be the start of defining your position.

Would you be willing to sacrifice a million Ukrainians on the battlefield and still lose, a more-or-less fight to the death scenario, as the principle is more important than the result?

Do you find it acceptable the losses since Russia's offer last spring (assuming the offer was genuine: give-up claim to Crimea, independent Donbas) in the event the lines do not change further?

Would the losses since the Russian's offer be worth it in the event Ukraine outright loses?

Finally, to achieve the goal of removing Russia further from Ukraine, both including and excluding Crimea, how many losses would you (if you had to choose) be worthwhile?

If you want to discuss, don't deflect further with "Ukrainians want to fight it's not my decision, the West is just supplying arms", but engage in the argument and put yourself in the position of choosing the number of lives for the given scenario. Certainly you'd be willing to sacrifice 1 Ukrainian to achieve complete removal of Russia from Ukraine if it was both possible and your decision to make (I'd make the same decision; one life for the complete end of the war? no hesitation, will obviously save many more lives than the war continuing), so just keep increasing the number from there until you either reach a zone where you start to be uncomfortable (100 000, 200 000, 500 000) or then never become uncomfortable and inform us every single Ukrainian life is worth sacrificing to remove Russia from Ukraine.

And these sorts of decisions are part of NATO military training (which I've done) that the cost in lives must be justified by the worth of the objective achieved. The mere fact the other side is presumably "bad" (otherwise why are we fighting them) does not justify fighting at all cost to both your own troops as well as civilians. We are willing to sacrifice X to achieve Y is the fundamental framework of all military decision making.

For example, I think we'd agree the North Korean government is a terrible dystopian tyranny and if there was some easy way to topple the current government and put in a new one (even just our normal Western track record of how these things go is still likely far better than the current North Korean government). We could get rid of the tyrant, bring some brand of freedom to North Koreans, generations of benefits. So why don't we? Because the evaluated cost is too high. No one's willing to risk Seoul being nuked to free the North Koreans and likely so many North Koreans would die in such a war that the argument that we're helping them is tenuous at best.

I can’t answer such a question if I don’t know how I am supposed to do the math or if it makes sense. — neomac

Then you have no place in policy discussion about warfare, because that's what it's about.

An example of this sort of math is that when the allies cracked enigma in WWII for that to be useful they needed to ensure the Nazi's did not figure out they figured it out.

Therefore, they did the math and calculated how many U-boat attacks they need to let happen in order for the Nazi's to not get too suspicious.

Why don’t you pick whatever historical example and show me how YOU would do the math? Here is an example: ”Civilian deaths during the war include air raid deaths, estimates of German civilians killed only by Allied strategic bombing have ranged from around 350,000 to 500,000.” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_casualties_in_World_War_II). By taking into account that the civilian deaths were estimated in the range of 350,000-500,000, do you calculate that it was morally worth bombing Nazi Germany or not? How did you calculate it?

Exactly why strategic bombing is so controversial is that it's difficult to argue it saved more lives than it cost, which is the usual framework for these sorts of calculations. The allies needed to let some ships (that they knew would be attacked) sink to the bottom and thousands of sailors dead because keeping the information advantage and destroying the U-boat fleet slow enough for the Nazi's to not realise their communications are compromised would save far more lives in total than maximising the short term benefits of the information, which would have no other explanation than communications had been compromised.
— neomac

It has already harmed Russian’s political standing:
- Reputational costs: e.g. Russian military standing didn’t impress on the battlefield — neomac

Certainly Russia's reputation is decreased in the West ... but is it really true world wide? Vis-a-vis China, India, most developing nations? Certainly not enough for these nations to stop trading with Russia.

- Security costs: e.g. NATO enlargement and the rearming of European countries — neomac

Is there any scenario in which Finland / Europe is going to invade Russia? Does any of that actually matter in the current geopolitical "power struggle" as you put it?

- Economic costs: e.g. economic decoupling between Russia and the West
It’s Russia which increased power and influence, or it’s Iran and Saudi Arabia that increased power and influence over Russia? — neomac

That's how political blocks work. If you are in a geopolitical power struggle with the West, then being economically tied to the West exposes you to coercion (the whole point of the sanctions). Sure, Iran and Saudi Arabia (and obviously China and India) have more influence with Russia, but there's no evidence right now these parties are seeking to harm Russia through those economic ties and influence, whereas that's very clearly the West, and in particular the US', stated policy since decades (containment, no "peer competitors" can rise in any region etc.).

In short, I'm not at all convinced the war has increased Western power and influence in the world and decreased Russia's. If you want to point out China's power and influence has increased even more than these parties, I'd agree, but I don't see how that's good imperial stewardship on the US's part.

What might be the lesser evil for the US is to break a Western-lead globalization which was benefiting more EU, Russia and China than the US. And re-compact the West in a logic of political, economic, security blocks as in the Cold War. But this attempt may fail not necessarily because of Russia, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia have significantly increased power and influence. But because of EU, in particular Germany and France ,are fed up with the US. Or because of a domestic internal crisis in the US. — neomac

The primary reason Germany and France would be fed up with the US is that the US creates this mess in Ukraine and then also blows up European infrastructure.

But, otherwise, I agree that the US' main competitor in this conflict is the EU and the possibility of the Euro emerging as a "peer competitor" to the USD.

We discussed that already. I’m not a “proponent of US foreign policy”. One thing is to try to make sense of what the US is doing, another is to decide what do about it. As far as I am personally concerned, independently from what the US does, I can only say as much: I’m a person who prefers to enjoy standards of life, freedoms or economic opportunities of avg Western people instead of enjoying standards of life, freedoms or economic opportunities for avg people living in authoritarian regimes like Russia, China or Iran. Therefore I’m inclined to see as a threat an increase of power and aggressiveness of such authoritarian regimes at the expense of the West. If the West can and wants to do something against such threat, then I would welcome it. And since I’m aware of how messy and dirty human history is, I limit myself to reason in terms of lesser evil. — neomac

It's difficult to interpret this as something other than being a proponent of US foreign policy.

But if you really want to believe yourself to be some impartial observer, then we can discuss on that basis. If that's true you should have even less problem answering questions of what you feel is a reasonable sacrifice to achieve what, as you can be more objective in evaluating the costs and the benefits.

You also seem to agree the US is the world's super power and global hegemon ... and not merely today but, most critically, in the 1990's after the fall of the Soviet Union and before the rise of China US was even more top dog than it is now, and it's that decade that was the most critical for setting climate and environmental policy.

Why wouldn't the party with the most influence and power in setting a policy, not be the most responsible for the results? — boethius

The shortest answer is that to assess such responsibility one should be able to distinguish what is feasible (by the ruler) from what is desirable (by whom? The ruler? Humanity? You?). Being the most influent and powerful ruler on an “anarchic” international system doesn’t necessarily imply that the ruler has enough power to reset the world according to what is desirable on a global scale (BTW the scientific investigations on the global environmental effects of human development, its promotion and popularisation are all integral part of the US-led world, so global environmental self-awareness are also a product of the evil American demiurge).

Would you be willing to sacrifice a million Ukrainians on the battlefield and still lose, a more-or-less fight to the death scenario, as the principle is more important than the result? — boethius

Who would?

Do you find it acceptable the losses since Russia's offer last spring (assuming the offer was genuine: give-up claim to Crimea, independent Donbas) in the event the lines do not change further? — boethius

Who would?

Would the losses since the Russian's offer be worth it in the event Ukraine outright loses? — boethius

Why would they?

Finally, to achieve the goal of removing Russia further from Ukraine, both including and excluding Crimea, how many losses would you (if you had to choose) be worthwhile? — boethius

Give the example and tell me how many losses would be worthwhile to you (if you had to choose)?

If you want to discuss, don't deflect further with "Ukrainians want to fight it's not my decision, the West is just supplying arms", but engage in the argument and put yourself in the position of choosing the number of lives for the given scenario. Certainly you'd be willing to sacrifice 1 Ukrainian to achieve complete removal of Russia from Ukraine if it was both possible and your decision to make (I'd make the same decision; one life for the complete end of the war? no hesitation, will obviously save many more lives than the war continuing), so just keep increasing the number from there until you either reach a zone where you start to be uncomfortable (100 000, 200 000, 500 000) or then never become uncomfortable and inform us every single Ukrainian life is worth sacrificing to remove Russia from Ukraine. — boethius

Give the example and tell me what’s the number you start feeling uncomfortable with.

And these sorts of decisions are part of NATO military training (which I've done) that the cost in lives must be justified by the worth of the objective achieved. The mere fact the other side is presumably "bad" (otherwise why are we fighting them) does not justify fighting at all cost to both your own troops as well as civilians. We are willing to sacrifice X to achieve Y is the fundamental framework of all military decision making. — "boethius

Your questions are all heavily framed to hint an obvious answer.
But I’m questioning the framing for the following reasons:
1 - Context: as the Multivac would answer, “insufficient data for meaningful answer.” (cit.). Am I the president of Ukraine or some avg non-Ukrainian dude? What does “lose” mean? Just lose a battle or the war, and what does losing the war implies? What principle are we talking about? The principle of of being free to buy a second mobile phone or the principle of keeping the nation free from subjugation, exploitation, or genocide? What does “at all cost” mean? Context is always much richer of relevant details, constraints and uncertainties that are relevant for decision making, than your framed & simplistic hypothetical scenarios may suggest. Besides many assessments can be done only a posteriori, if done in advance they may be speculations as plausible as others, even if they turned out to be the best approximation to reality, later on.
2 - “Morale” vs “moral”: to me, the two notions may be related but they do not refer to the same things. “Morale” is a psychological condition. It has to do with motivation, emotional resilience, discipline, "having the guts". It’s unreasonable to expect/require that an avg dude not directly involved in the war has the “morale” or can empathise with the “morale” of those involved in the war. It’s unreasonable to expect/require that ordinary individuals have the “morale” of trained and leading political/military/decision-maker figures (it’s not by chance that division of labor and labor specialization exist also in the political and military context).
“Moral” has to do with reasons to act in a certain way. One may have “morale” to pursue “immoral goals“ and one may not have the “morale” to pursue “moral goals“. The result of your psychological test may be good to assess “morale” or capacity of empathising with involved parties’ morale (I even doubt that because we are talking about hypothetical scenarios), but it doesn’t equate to a moral assessment of the reasons behind a war.
3 - “Military” vs “geo/political”: to me, the two notions may be related but they do not refer to the same things. A geo/political strategy doesn’t coincide with a military strategy. Military strategies are way more constrained than geopolitical strategies, and also subordinated to geopolitical strategies. "War is the continuation of policy with other means" (cit.). I’m obviously very much interested in military arguments from experts, and military analysis about how much the Ukrainians can afford to sacrifice as a function of military objectives. And I do not mean to discount them at all, but they are one aspect of a geopolitical strategy. An example is the Bakhmut battle, which is said by many military analysts to be of little strategic importance to justify the heavy losses on both sides, yet it has now gained great political importance (for its reputational costs? For the morale of all supporters within and outside Ukraine?).

Conclusion: I don’t answer your questions not because I’m emotionally uncomfortable, but because I’m intellectually uncomfortable to answer heavily framed questions for which I can't provide a meaningful answer (even if I was tempted to answer them exactly the way you would answer them). I’m interested to argue about morality and geopolitics, not about morale and military.

Then you have no place in policy discussion about warfare, because that's what it's about. — boethius

I discuss policies as any avg dudes who is neither a politician nor an activist. And since I’m in a philosophy forum, I’m interested to explore assumptions and implications without feeling pressed by political/military/economic urgency, or frustrated out of lack of expertise. As I argued in other occasions, I think all these points need to be addressed to make sense of the impact of a policy:
1. Values: saving lives may not be all that matters. Freedoms and welfare count too.
2. Present vs future: saving life or standard of life now as compared to saving future lives and standard of life.
3. Actual vs counterfactual: saving life or standard of life by actually doing X vs saving life or standard of life by counterfactually doing Y
4. Strategy: the relative risk&payoff of a strategy (relative to other players’ strategy) is more relevant than its absolute risk&payoff of that strategy.
5. Bounded rationality/morality: all relevant actors have a limited cognitive resources to process consequences of different strategies, and will to respond adequately to moral imperatives. The cumulative effects of all these limits introduce imponderable constraints in all policies.
6. Matrix of competitive/cooperative strategies: every individual and group of individuals is immersed in a multi-dimensional matrix of cooperative and competitive games which are totally a-priori uncoordinated (precisely because coordination is the more or less stable result of how these games are actually played)
7. History: historical legacies (power relations, bad habits, bad memories, historical debts) from past generations hunt current generations despite their current dispositions.
8. Decision process: how much the decision is concentrated in the hands of few and hierarchical the chain of command.

But I don’t see how all such points can neatly fit into a reliable mathematical formula that gives anybody the best moral guidance in quantifiable terms (like a body count) easily computable by anybody. To have something quantifiable one needs to give for granted lots of shared assumptions on a computable set of variables. In other words, as far as I’m concerned, it’s IMPOSSIBLE to calculate and execute an optimal strategy in practical sense, and a certain degree of fault-tolerance for mistakes and even big mistakes may be required because nobody can prove to be able to do better just “in theory”. For that reason, I’m skeptical about responsibility attributions which do not take into account such predicament, but instead look for a convenient scapegoat to blame for man-made world catastrophes.
In any case, if I do not have place in policy discussion about warfare in moral terms WITH YOU because that’s what it’s about TO YOU, why do you keep addressing my comments?

Why don’t you pick whatever historical example and show me how YOU would do the math? Here is an example: ”Civilian deaths during the war include air raid deaths, estimates of German civilians killed only by Allied strategic bombing have ranged from around 350,000 to 500,000.” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_casualties_in_World_War_II). By taking into account that the civilian deaths were estimated in the range of 350,000-500,000, do you calculate that it was morally worth bombing Nazi Germany or not? How did you calculate it?

Exactly why strategic bombing is so controversial is that it's difficult to argue it saved more lives than it cost, which is the usual framework for these sorts of calculations. — boethius

OK, give me a historical example of hundred of thousands of innocent civilians killed were morally worth the cost, because my suspect is that you are NOT doing any math. You are simply convinced that there is no historical example of wars with massive casualties also among innocent civilians that was morally worth fighting. But if that is the case, you are offering an argument against wars (defensive and offensive), not against this war, and independently from who started it or provoked it.

Certainly Russia's reputation is decreased in the West ... but is it really true world wide? Vis-a-vis China, India, most developing nations? Certainly not enough for these nations to stop trading with Russia.[/quota]

Most likely, Russia looks weaker (than prior to the war) and particularly needy to the Rest too. Indeed, they exploit Russia’s predicament to reap the benefits and blackmail the West. For that reason India and China may want the war to last as long as possible. But without too much exposure so far, indeed if India and China felt so confident to challenge the West, they would support Russia’s war more openly and directly as Iran is doing.

— boethius

- Security costs: e.g. NATO enlargement and the rearming of European countries — neomac

Is there any scenario in which Finland / Europe is going to invade Russia? Does any of that actually matter in the current geopolitical "power struggle" as you put it? — boethius

Concerning the question about Finland/Europe, you shouldn’t ask me, you should ask Russia. To your questions, I would add mine: e.g. was there any scenario in which Ukraine was invading Russia? Was there any scenario in which NATO or the US was going to invade Russia?
NATO enlargement can grow the military and reputational costs and threats against Russia’s imperialism. That’s the point.

That's how political blocks work. If you are in a geopolitical power struggle with the West, then being economically tied to the West exposes you to coercion (the whole point of the sanctions). Sure, Iran and Saudi Arabia (and obviously China and India) have more influence with Russia, but there's no evidence right now these parties are seeking to harm Russia through those economic ties and influence, whereas that's very clearly the West, and in particular the US', stated policy since decades (containment, no "peer competitors" can rise in any region etc.). — boethius

The Rest is not an economic-military-technlogical integrated block yet as much as the West. And again power must be understood in relative advantages, timing, trends. You are unnecessarily focused in the present (which is not what geopolitical agents do when engaged in power struggles). Things my look very differently over the next decades depending on how this war ends.
Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have increased their influence in the Middle East (e.g. Syria), Central Asia (e.g. Armenia vs Azerbaijan), and Africa (e.g. Sudan) at the expense of Russia.
China looks still interested to keep relations with the EU and to protract the Ukrainian war at the expense of the US, but not to the point of escalate it and be heavily dragged into the Ukrainian war by Russia. So if the EU (more precisely France and Germany) find a way to mediate between China and the US, that too might be bad for Russia too.

The primary reason Germany and France would be fed up with the US is that the US creates this mess in Ukraine and then also blows up European infrastructure. But, otherwise, I agree that the US' main competitor in this conflict is the EU and the possibility of the Euro emerging as a "peer competitor" to the USD. — boethius

Until EU will build enough unity to support of common foreign strategy and cumulate deterrent/coercive power against competitors like Russia, China and the US.
This war suggests that the EU is not only far from that, but things may go awfully wrong if the alliance with the US will break. The void or significant weakening of American hegemony in Europe can likely boost the economic/military/ideological competition between European countries (the premises are already there, see the divergence between the UK and the EU, Eastern European countries and Western European Countries wrt the war in Ukraine, the rivalries between north Europe and South Europe about the immigrants) which can’t rely on the Western-lead international order, and between global powers (now including the US) which will bring their competition in the heart of Europe worse than in the past decades (including during the Cold War). And will more likely encourage authoritarianism even in Europe, to control ensuing social unrest (the right-wing turn in many European countries may favour this trend).

It's difficult to interpret this as something other than being a proponent of US foreign policy.

But if you really want to believe yourself to be some impartial observer, then we can discuss on that basis. If that's true you should have even less problem answering questions of what you feel is a reasonable sacrifice to achieve what, as you can be more objective in evaluating the costs and the benefits. — boethius

I don’t claim to be an impartial observer if that means that I do not have preferences or that I didn’t pick a side: I prefer an avg life in the West than an avg life in China, Russia or Iran. I side with a strategy that weakens Russia’s aggressiveness as much as possible. But this partiality is perfectly compatible with objectivity in understanding how the game is being played by competitors. And presenting it as honestly as possible (at least if one is not doing propaganda!).
“A proponent of US foreign policy” to me means being engaged in political propaganda as an activist or a politician to support the US in general or in this war. I’m neither. I’m not here to fix the world. To solicit people in this thread to press our politicians to support more the US in Ukraine or to express my moral outrage against those who oppose the US in Ukraine or to spread memes boosting “morale” for one party against the other. That’s not what I’m doing. That’s the kind of activity you and your sidekicks are doing.
I’m here just for the fun of re-ordering my beliefs and assumptions in a more rationally compelling format, while challenging other interlocutors to do the same.
Finally, to repeat it once more, I can try to answer only questions that at least make sense to me: e.g. asking what you feel is a reasonable sacrifice to achieve what doesn’t “feel reasonable” to me. And it's symptomatic that you didn't answer it either.

Once the called the "breadbasket" of the Soviet Union, then of Europe, moving control thereof from Kyiv to the Kremlin would be a win for Putin, both in terms of economy, control and political stature at home.

Russia smuggling Ukrainian grain to help pay for Putin's war
^{— Michael Biesecker, Sarah El Deeb, Beatrice Dupuy · AP News · Oct 3, 2022}

The Russians “have an absolute obligation to ensure that civilians are cared for and to not deprive them their ability of a livelihood and an ability to feed themselves,” said David Crane, a veteran prosecutor who has been involved in numerous international war crime investigations. “It’s just pure pillaging and looting, and that is also an actionable offense under international military law.”

Larger Wheat Harvest in Ukraine Than Expected
^{— NASA · Dec 4, 2022}

However, Russia will likely reap the benefit of a significant portion of the close to 27-million-ton wheat crop, said Skakun. The analysis showed that 5.8 million tons of wheat was harvested from areas that were not under Ukrainian control. That represents a loss of at least $1 billion, Abbassian noted.

Exclusive: Crimea showers Syria with wheat, Ukraine cries foul
^{— Jonathan Saul, Maha El Dahan, Maya Gebeily, Nigel Hunt, Pavel Polityuk, Frank Jack Daniel · Reuters · Dec 19, 2022}

Russia's agriculture and foreign ministries did not immediately respond to requests for comment for this story. In May, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov described as "fake" the allegations Russia has stolen grain during what it calls its special military operation in Ukraine.

Yeah, thieves grabbed more than land. For some reason, I'd (personally) prefer the "breadbasket" under Kyiv than the Kremlin, regardless of what Ukraine is the "breadbasket" of. Poor assessment on my part?

Will this work? What do you think?

The Kremlin wants ‘real men’ to prove themselves by joining the fight in Ukraine
^{— Yuliya Talmazan · NBC News · Apr 22, 2023}

A military recruitment sign in Moscow reads "Our profession - is defending Motherland." Ads like this have increasingly been popping up in recent months.

“Did you dream of becoming this kind of a defender?” the advertisement asks as it shows the security guard manning an entrance to a grocery shop, next to a produce stand.

Defending, defender? How about attacking and attacker? Or be "real men" like Navalny or Kara-Murza?

Anyway, hard to assess whether these moves are telling of the situation. Running low on mercs?

Yeah, thieves grabbed more than land. For some reason, I'd (personally) prefer the "breadbasket" under Kyiv than the Kremlin, regardless of what Ukraine is the "breadbasket" of. Poor assessment on my part? — jorndoe

What an offensively ignorant comment. Acting as if we were allocating ownership like an interview board assessing candidates.

There is a cost to keeping it in the hands of Kyiv. This is the cost...



The question, which everyone here is so studiously avoiding, is not "who would we prefer in control of wheat production", nor "whose flag would we prefer over parliament", nor "which group would we prefer consulted over the future of the region". It's not about our preferences - anyone with a modicum of intelligence and decency can see that Russia are worse than Ukraine - it's about whether the chance of achieving those preferences by use of conventional land war is worth the cost.

Can you answer that? Your preference for having wheat production in the hands of Ukraine rather than Russia - Is it worth the cost of a protracted land war? Do the benefits actually outweigh the harms? Is there a less harmful route to the same ends?

It's a pathetic indictment of the level of intellectual discussion that this thread keeps getting dragged back round to the sort of debate a three-year-old might have about who's the bad guy.

Related to the geopolitical conflict the Ukraine war is a part of;

As the US is increasingly tied down by the war in Ukraine on one hand, and the geopolitical rivalry with China on the other, the chance of dormant conflicts starting to re-emerge elsewhere in the world is going to significantly increase.

It seems Sudan could possibly be the first instance of this happening - a country rich in natural resources like crude oil, gold and uranium, and one that has been plagued by ethnic conflict for many decades.

it's about whether the chance of achieving those preferences by use of conventional land war is worth the cost. — Isaac

That's a difficult calculation, and no one can be sure of the numbers that lie in the future. But given the particular history of Ukraine under Soviet rule, I can understand any Ukrainian's calculation that a few million dead is a price well worth paying. And if that was my history and someone was offering me some arms, I wouldn't be questioning their motives before accepting the offers.

That's a difficult calculation, and no one can be sure of the numbers that lie in the future. — unenlightened

Nonetheless. Throwing our hands in the air and pretending there's no cost to consider isn't an option.

given the particular history of Ukraine under Soviet rule, I can understand any Ukrainian's calculation that a few million dead is a price well worth paying. — unenlightened

Funny how when justifying war, evidence from 1930 suddenly becomes relevant, but when talking about the state of the Far-Right in Ukraine, apparently 2014 is too far in the past to be relevant.

We have, as I've repeatedly mentioned, a direct, relevant and current example of Russian occupation. Crimea has been occupied by Russia for eight years. It's part of Ukraine.

It's telling that to justify a position you're having to draw in evidence from a completely different government in a completely different era and ignore the direct evidence of this exact government going exactly the thing we're discussing barely a few years ago.

Do the Russians have good reason to fear German military involvement in Poland? Afterall, I'm sure they all remember Stalingrad.

It's borderline racist to claim that because people in the past who just happen to be from the same country committed some atrocity, their decedents are likely to do the same. Imagine if I tried to claim some justification for Brexit on the grounds of the Germans having been Nazis.

if that was my history and someone was offering me some arms, I wouldn't be questioning their motives before accepting the offers. — unenlightened

Yes. But I'm not talking to Ukrainians. I'm talking to Westerners. What is it with this bizarre trend toward the absolution of all moral duty into "whatever the Ukrainians want"? It's morally bankrupt.

Some polls of varying quality, but there you have them:

Donbas → Russia in 2014: 35% :up:, 65% :down: ^{(May 12, 2020)}
Donbas → Russia in 2015: 19% :up: ^{(Feb 5, 2015)}
Donbas → Russia in 2021: 25% :up: ^{(Apr 16, 2021)}
Donbas + Crimea → Russia in 2022: 77% :down: ^{(May 24, 2022)}
Donbas + Crimea → Russia in 2022: 87% :down: ^{(Aug 23, 2022; Sep 15, 2022; Sep 16, 2022)}
Zaporizhzhia + Kherson → Russia in 2022: 30% :up:, 30% :down: ^{(Aug 5, 2022; Aug 5, 2022; Sep 1, 2022)}


↑ Sep 2-11, 2022

There are of course a lot more details than this brief summary. Who was polled exactly, who polled, where when, circumstances, methods, etc.

Feel free to add some, if nothing else just to get an overall impression of what's (been) going on.


, well go tell them to stop fighting then. Shoo, off you go. Then what?
(I guess we can re-repeat some cruft that apparently hasn't sunk in?)

well go tell them to stop fighting then. Shoo, off you go. — jorndoe

Well, I was actually thinking of lobbying my politicians to stop drip feeding them weapons, stop discouraging negotiations, stop promoting the approach with propaganda and censorship...

But you know, I'm sure your 'shoo' idea is really good, I'll certainly give it some serious consideration.

having wheat production in the hands of Ukraine rather than Russia — Isaac

Nah, your questions aren't necessarily others' questions, except in your head. There are potential concerns that may or may not have eluded you, say, suggested by

Latest on the Ukraine war: Russia warns grain deal in peril
^{— Yuliya Talmazan · Reuters · Apr 24, 2023}

... And after tomorrow, with the regressing ↓ autocracy (apparently (self-)perceived as inviolable)?

_{Political freedom in Russia
^{— European Council on Foreign Relations · 2016}
A Tear for Mother Russia’s Children – A Study of Democratic Deficit, Human Rights Violations and Militarism within the Russian Federation [around 28 ±]
^{— Mark O'Doherty · 2017}
Freedom in the World
^{— Freedom House · 2018}
Why Putin Is Not Okay
^{— Tyler Roylance · Freedom House · Jul 11, 2018}
Do not call Ukraine invasion a ‘war’, Russia tells media, schools [just for the follow-up ↓ below]
^{— Al Jazeera · Mar 2, 2022}
Russia has reasserted state control over the country's major media companies
^{— Steve Inskeep, Charles Maynes · NPR · Mar 7, 2022}
Putin signs expanded anti-LGBTQ laws in Russia, in latest crackdown on rights
^{— Ivana Kottasová, Anna Chernova, Clare Sebastian, Uliana Pavlova, Rob Picheta · CNN · Dec 5, 2022}
Putin declares ‘war’ – aloud – forsaking his special euphemistic operation [↑]
^{— Mary Ilyushina · The Washington Post · Dec 22, 2022}
Russia crosses new lines in crackdown on Putin's enemies
^{— Mark Trevelyan, Guy Faulconbridge, Philippa Fletcher · Reuters · Apr 21, 2023}
(can't be bothered with (or to repeat) more, though parts of the considerations)}

, goodie, a do'er; what about support of, or something against, the autocracy? Either way, the Ukrainians said no.

There are potential concerns that may or may not have eluded you, say, suggested by — jorndoe

Yep. So... Do they justify the cost of war? Same question. It's no good just listing a load of bad stuff and not weighing it in any way against the cost of the course of action you're advocating.

Either way, the Ukrainians said no. — jorndoe

What's with this obsession with what 'The Ukrainians' say? It's our decision to send weapons, our decision to support propaganda efforts, our decision to supply intelligence, our decision to avoid and block negotiations... these are all our decisions.

Stop hiding under the skirts of what 'The Ukrainians' say and have the balls to make up your own fucking mind.

Wait, that annoys you , bothers you, irritates your bones, rankles your wit, ... :D Well, get to it then...

Then what? — just above

Moldova goes the same way, down the Kremlin drain. Others? (South Korea to hand the keys over to Kim Jong-un if under ☢ threat?) I'm guessing Navalny and Kara-Murza (along with whoever else) would be disappointed, and there are apparently a few Ukrainians with similar (and non-irredentist) sentiments, contrary to Putin's preparatory efforts.

The continuing attacks continue to spread hate and degrade chances of diplomacy.

Putin has chosen, the Ukrainians have chosen, the UN voted, and a somewhat impressive amount of others have chosen (repeatedly).

Whatever others don't or do, matter as well. Looks like your thing (numbers game?) will have them all wrong, except it happens to be more or less what just one of them wants, denying the rest, abandoning the defenders, leaving the "then what?" hanging.

Putin + compadres declared "the West" an enemy (or the enemy, don't forget the prep moves). ⊕ We've seen the regress (reeee-peatedly), shamming with consequences, anti-democracy, whatever. They rolled their brainwashing/re-enculturation machine out; exposed, didn't flinch. They threatened to the left and right including ☢. The imperfect though at least trying Ukrainians won't be part thereof, refused.

Should an invading force (like what the Ukrainians are facing) try to take over around here, then I'd likely put up a fight of some sort (goes for both places I call home), though it'd be an annoying disruption of my daily goings-and-doings. I'd have a hard time flirting with complicity to such a takeover attempt, the downslope of not standing up to such bulging of the dehumanizing rule and land grabbing aggressor, leaving it to subsequent generations. But to each their own. Go lobbying (not that it matters but I'd welcome it, I think).

You (also) missed the part before the Ukrainians part:

↪Isaac, goodie, a do'er; what about support of, or something against, the autocracy then? Either way, the Ukrainians said no. — just above

The shortest answer is that to assess such responsibility one should be able to distinguish what is feasible (by the ruler) from what is desirable (by whom? The ruler? Humanity? You?). Being the most influent and powerful ruler on an “anarchic” international system doesn’t necessarily imply that the ruler has enough power to reset the world according to what is desirable on a global scale (BTW the scientific investigations on the global environmental effects of human development, its promotion and popularisation are all integral part of the US-led world, so global environmental self-awareness are also a product of the evil American demiurge). — neomac

This does not in anyway even contradict the my statement:

Why wouldn't the party with the most influence and power in setting a policy, not be the most responsible for the results? — boethius

Everything you said doesn't comment on who's most responsible for the result of a policy. Sure, the most influent party does not control events, but they would still be most responsible. If all the nation-states together push for this policy (to do nothing about environmental catastrophe) the most influent party would still be the most responsible.

The idea that environmentalism is a US policy to begin with is truly remarkable, but we could continue that discussion in the climate change thread.

Who would? — neomac

The question is not who would, the question is "would you?"

You can answer no. Now, I'm pretty sure many members of the Nazi community in Ukraine would genuinely have no upper bound on the sacrifice of Ukrainians they are willing to make to fight the Russians.

Give the example and tell me how many losses would be worthwhile to you (if you had to choose)? — neomac

Deflection, deflection, deflection, as soon as it's "what cost is reasonable" it's somehow all of a sudden a ephemeral netherworld of philosophical speculation we can hardly even scratch the surface of.

I don't think the scenario of removing Russia from Ukraine is feasible, so this question is more relevant to people who think it is feasible, who support the Western policy that explicitly has this as the goal.

However, I have no problem answering these sorts of questions on the premise it was feasible.

I'd be willing to sacrifice 30 000 troops if that would achieve removing Russia from Ukraine entirely and completely end the war that way. Beyond 30 000 I would start to be uncomfortable that the cost is worth the outcome and would believe it is better to give up territory to preserve lives and end the war that way.

However, if there was some credible way to just remove Russia from Ukraine and completely end the war and achieve peace (something that I don't believe is actually feasible, but if I'm assuming it is) then 30 000 killed I'd find a reasonable cost, I'd hope for less but be satisfied if spending 30 000 lives achieved this military objective and bought peace with such methods.

In the real world, an attempt to remove Russia entirely from Ukraine by force I would expect would cost hundreds of thousands of lives and not succeed, and, even if it did, would not result in peace but the war would still be on.

I'd also expect Russia to deploy nuclear weapons effectively, if such a campaign were to start to succeed, bringing an end to the campaign and getting more people killed for the foolishness of Ukrainian and Western leaders.

Give the example and tell me what’s the number you start feeling uncomfortable with. — neomac

Obviously, negotiating a resolution based on the accepting the Russian's offered terms before the war, the main one being not joining NATO (which is only useful to join before the war ... not after the war), is my first choice.

However, if I was in Ukrainian government and was advising negotiation and the war breaks out anyways because no one listens to me, I'd be comfortable with a few thousand losses to arrest the initial Russian invasion and stabilise lines. This is a reasonable objective due to the logistics of invasion.

There is some value in "national pride" and contract soldiers sign up to do this particular duty, so it is, to an extent, part of the social contract. Of course, the point of arresting the initial invasion, of a larger force that cannot be defeated in any reasonable analysis (there is no scenario where Ukraine marches on Moscow), is to create negotiation leverage by demonstrating the capacity and will to fight.

The larger force can very likely win, true at massive losses to your own side but nevertheless substantial losses to the invading force as well, that represents both military and political risks of all kinds. There are big incentives to reach a resolution even if the larger force can likely win by brute force.

Losses beyond this I would be uncomfortable with. The negotiation position does not get better and simply gets worse the more the war continues. A resolution after a few days has the big advantage to the invading force that the cost has been very low, therefore they do not need to gain much for it to be a win for the domestic population. The higher the cost paid, the more the stronger party requires compensation for the cost, not less.

Of course, I don't like the Nazi's in Ukraine but they can be dealt with in another way; it's not reasonable to get ten's of thousands or hundreds of thousands of people killed and traumatise and displace millions simply because some Nazi's would die too.

Had the negotiation at the start of the war succeeded, and 2000 to 3000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed, I'd be satisfied with the result and military performance and it a reasonable cost in lives to negotiate independence and a lasting peace for the rest of Ukraine.

What you want to achieve militarily and politically in this sort of situation is stable lines by falling back, inflict cost but preserve forces, rely on logistics stabilising lines anyways, and then negotiating the best possible deal with the leverage one has.

If the deal isn't "what is desirable" as the least influent party in the situation, that's just how politics goes sometimes.

Conclusion: I don’t answer your questions not because I’m emotionally uncomfortable, but because I’m intellectually uncomfortable to answer heavily framed questions for which I can't provide a meaningful answer (even if I was tempted to answer them exactly the way you would answer them). I’m interested to argue about morality and geopolitics, not about morale and military. — neomac

Your analysis made no sense and I'll ignore it, does not support your conclusion, and your conclusion is false anyways.

These are not heavily framed question, it is the business of war to sacrifice lives to achieve military outcomes by force. You cannot speak of outcomes without also speaking of the lives reasonably sacrificed to achieve those outcomes. That's what war planning and the consideration of war is about: we are wiling for these people to die to achieve these objectives. That's what sending soldiers to die is premised on: that it is a reasonable sacrifice and the people making the decisions are comfortable with the expected results.

Can unexpected things happen and more people die than is reasonable? Yes. That is called a mistake, disaster, catastrophe. Why? Because more people died than is reasonable to achieve insufficient objectives.

However, to start the analysis an idea of what amount of lives is worthwhile to spend to achieve what must be posited.

I discuss policies as any avg dudes who is neither a politician nor an activist. And since I’m in a philosophy forum, I’m interested to explore assumptions and implications without feeling pressed by political/military/economic urgency, or frustrated out of lack of expertise. — neomac

Well, thanks for clarifying you have no idea what you are talking about.

However, if you're interested in assumptions, the assumption of commanding soldiers to fight in a war is that there is something that can be achieved militarily and the cost in lives is reasonable. The implication of war is people die.

If there is a way to avoid more people dying through talk that is preferable. Sometimes it is not possible, the Nazi's could not be talked out of their mission and neither the Japanese, insofar as there was the slightest hope of victory. However, the Russian-Ukraine war is far closer to a border dispute than a campaign of world or hemispherical conquest, there is no pathway to outright victory (except Russia employing nuclear weapons, which they are unlikely to do) and so talk is the only viable pathway to peace and will happen sooner or later.

Concerning the question about Finland/Europe, you shouldn’t ask me, you should ask Russia. To your questions, I would add mine: e.g. was there any scenario in which Ukraine was invading Russia? Was there any scenario in which NATO or the US was going to invade Russia?
NATO enlargement can grow the military and reputational costs and threats against Russia’s imperialism. That’s the point. — neomac

You made the claim Finland joining NATO is some big geopolitical strategic loss to Russia, I pointed out it doesn't really change anything ... and now you say I should ask Russia about it?

The difference with Ukraine compared to Finland is that there is an important Naval base in Crimea, there are lot's of Russian speakers in Ukraine, Ukraine is a former soviet republic, and there is first and foremost an economic conflict over Ukraine (spheres of influence of the major powers).

Finland was never part of the Soviet Union, was squarely part of "the West" and never part of Russia's sphere of influence. There is no conflict between the West and Russia over Finland.

This conflict is the US wanting to expand it's imperial influence in Ukraine and diminish Russia's imperial influence, made the bold move of orchestrating a coup to replace a legitimate leader willing to compromise with Russia (i.e. not insane and in power because many Ukrainians did, maybe still do, support compromise with Russia over conflict and warfare).

There are two empires sorting out the question of who indeed does have more influence over what happens in Ukraine at the end of the day.

Neither empire has a moral case.

The Rest is not an economic-military-technlogical integrated block yet as much as the West. And again power must be understood in relative advantages, timing, trends. You are unnecessarily focused in the present (which is not what geopolitical agents do when engaged in power struggles). Things my look very differently over the next decades depending on how this war ends. — neomac

That's because actual evidence exists in the present and only speculation exists about the future.

To conclude one speculation is better than another, turns out requires evidence in the present to support.

Until EU will build enough unity to support of common foreign strategy and cumulate deterrent/coercive power against competitors like Russia, China and the US.
This war suggests that the EU is not only far from that, but things may go awfully wrong if the alliance with the US will break. The void or significant weakening of American hegemony in Europe can likely boost the economic/military/ideological competition between European countries (the premises are already there, see the divergence between the UK and the EU, Eastern European countries and Western European Countries wrt the war in Ukraine, the rivalries between north Europe and South Europe about the immigrants) which can’t rely on the Western-lead international order, and between global powers (now including the US) which will bring their competition in the heart of Europe worse than in the past decades (including during the Cold War). And will more likely encourage authoritarianism even in Europe, to control ensuing social unrest (the right-wing turn in many European countries may favour this trend). — neomac

This seems accurate.

I don’t claim to be an impartial observer if that means that I do not have preferences or that I didn’t pick a side: I prefer an avg life in the West than an avg life in China, Russia or Iran. I side with a strategy that weakens Russia’s aggressiveness as much as possible. But this partiality is perfectly compatible with objectivity in understanding how the game is being played by competitors. And presenting it as honestly as possible (at least if one is not doing propaganda!). — neomac

This literally means:

“A proponent of US foreign policy” — neomac

If you are supporting the arms supply to Ukraine and the policy of not-negotiating, even frustrating any attempt to do so, but "let them fight".

If you are starting to doubt if the lives this policy costs are worthwhile to spend, then "preferring the Western avg life" does not exclude the idea that Western intervention in Ukraine is not leading the avg Ukrainian to the avg Western life, but to trauma and sadness and death.

What's with this obsession with what 'The Ukrainians' say? It's our decision to send weapons, our decision to support propaganda efforts, our decision to supply intelligence, our decision to avoid and block negotiations... these are all our decisions.

Stop hiding under the skirts of what 'The Ukrainians' say and have the balls to make up your own fucking mind. — Isaac

The West has managed to develop "woke warmongering" somehow.

Not-supplying-arms would be a micro-aggression against the mythical representation of the oppressed Ukrainian: all further discussion is taboo.

More of the same.

Yes, we get that Russia is bad, that invading places is bad. The question is what we do about it, not whether it's bad or not.

The West has managed to develop "woke warmongering" somehow. — boethius

Yes, this really is the pinnacle of media psy-ops - to make war-mongering, not only acceptable, but actually to have people advocating peaceful methods of conflict resolution seem as though they're the oppressors...

As I believe I've mentioned before - does anyone know what happened to Cambridge Analytica? A company credited with altering the course of no fewer than three national elections, as well as countless smaller influences... then suddenly they're out of the picture and apparently no-one else has taken up the reins? I find that hard to believe.

It's like someone invents a super weapon which changes the fortunes of any war, they go bankrupt and no-one else even bothers to pick up the patent.

The Cambridge Analytic methodology worked. It's not hard to copy. I'd be very surprised in no-one was doing so.

It's like someone invents a super weapon which changes the fortunes of any war, they go bankrupt and no-one else even bothers to pick up the patent. — Isaac

Abstract. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine emphasises the role social media plays in modern day warfare, with conflict occurring in both the physical and information environments. There is a large body of work on identifying malicious cyber-activity, but less focusing on the effect this activity has on the overall conversation, especially with regards to the Russia/Ukraine Conflict. Here, we employ a variety of techniques including information theoretic measures, sentiment and linguistic analysis, and time series techniques to understand how bot activity influences wider online discourse. By aggregating account groups we find significant information flows from bot-like accounts to non-bot accounts with behaviour differing between sides. Pro-Russian non-bot accounts are most influential overall, with information flows to a variety of other account groups. No significant outward flows exist from pro-Ukrainian non-bot accounts, with significant flows from pro-Ukrainian bot accounts into pro-Ukrainian non-bot accounts. We find that bot activity drives an increase in conversations surrounding angst (with p = 2.450 × 10−4 ) as well as those surrounding work/governance (with p = 3.803 × 10−18). Bot activity also shows a significant relationship with non-bot sentiment (with p = 3.76×10−4 ), where we find the relationship holds in both directions. This work extends and combines existing techniques to quantify how bots are influencing people in the online conversation around the Russia/Ukraine invasion. It opens up avenues for researchers to understand quantitatively how these malicious campaigns operate, and what makes them impactful. — The interaction of bots and humans in discussion of the Russia-Ukraine war

What's interesting is that pro-Russian human accounts have influence and pro-Ukraine bot accounts have influence.

One could speculate that if there is a massive AI based bot influence campaign to promote Western policy, people with that bias want to hear more of it but then also experience cognitive dissonance when they encounter human criticism of the bot-generated-narrative, then people go back to the bots to maintain their perception.

We could also speculate that if your basic bias is being promoted all over the place by bots (whether you perceive / suspect them as bots or not) you feel no need to create content, whereas if your view is not represented by bots then there's more motivation to get a minority view out there.

Really interesting article, thanks.

I think it's interesting how the influencing mechanisms can be handled by bots, like its not really about being convinced so much as a simple numbers game, like 'how many of my type think X' if the numbers seem big enough, then thinking X becomes the policy.

There was an article about the Russian bots and influencers (which I'll dig out) which looked at who was influenced. By and large, people already in that camp.

I see a lot of beliefs like membership badges, believing X is your proof that you belong to group Y. Since no-one is in charge, everyone is looking to everyone else to see what beliefs are part of the membership criteria at any given time. As each is looking to the other, mistakes get magnified in unpredictable ways, like a massive game of Chinese whispers.

So we end up with some really odd beliefs. Usually these are then 'pruned' by contact with reality.

I think what's happening with social media is that beliefs can spread faster, bots can propagate them (but crucially they do so without error), and reality can be distorted to seem as if beliefs which are unsustainable can be held.

Xi reaches out to Zelensky to offer mediation.