If someone had rational thinking on why he went to a shop, then he should be able to explain the reason why when asked the reason why. — Corvus

That's the great mistake that Socrates made. Articulating one's reasons is a different skill not the same as having them. Even if you can't define courage, you can use the word correctly. You may not know whyhow the fuel makes the car go, but it doesn't mean you are irrational when driving the car.

Just because a hawk has hunted his meals, or dog has opened door to go out for whatever don't mean they have rational thinking. They are just instinctual survival and habitual response by the animals. — Corvus

So when we act appropriately on our survival instincts and open doors when appropriate, are we acting rationally or not?

If you trace back to the origin of rational thinking, then it would be the ancient Greeks. — Corvus

If that's how you choose to define it, that's fair enough. But it seems a bit odd to characterize the people who built the pyramids as irrational, don't you think? (They were indeed irrational in some ways, but not when they built the pyramids.)

Driving and fueling cars and opening the doors which most people do without having second thought about doing so based on habits and routines, and rationalising i.e. analysing, criticising, reflecting and questioning about them logically, critically and reflectively are different category of things.

The former is just doing and living, the latter rationalising and philosophising.

You are mixed up between driving and fueling cars and opening the doors which most people do without having second thought about doing so based on habits and routines, and rationalising i.e. analysing, criticising, reflecting and questioning about them logically, critically and reflectively. — Corvus

OK. I can make some sense of that. To be rational is to rationalise.

1. So do you think that the people who built the pyramids were rational or not? (They built them before the ancient Greeks started philosophizing.)

2. About the process of learning or acquiring a habit or routine. I grant you that putting on one's lucky trainers when going out to compete is not (normally) rational. But when the habit or routine is capable of rational justification - driving or fuelling one's car would be examples - is learning or practising those activities rational or not?

I agree rational thinking requires language and then questioning out one thinks and that animals do not do this and can not do so without language. However, there is evidence that bonobos can learn language and judge right from wrong. Why not, we are on the same branch of the tree. But it is curious in nature that bonobos do not develop language independent of human intervention. However, if a bonobo does learn language at least one of them has taught the offspring language. I am wondering if they would continue to pass on language and if so, would they develop better language skills in following generations? (evolution working)

More important, should we assume all humans are rational thinkers or must they learn the higher order thinking skills to be rational? Is believing and defending a myth, rational thinking?

1. So do you think that the people who built the pyramids were rational or not? (They built them before the ancient Greeks started philosophizing.)

2. About the process of learning or acquiring a habit or routine. I grant you that putting on one's lucky trainers when going out to compete is not (normally) rational. But when the habit or routine is capable of rational justification - driving or fuelling one's car would be examples - is learning or practising those activities rational or not? — Ludwig V

I love that first question because it stretches our thinking!

That second one is hard to answer. Is it rational to believe something that is not true?

You didn't mention it in your account of how different humans are from animals. Mind you, I don't mention what you emphasize in my accounts of how similar they are. Perhaps it comes down to "glass half full/empty" - a difference in perspective rather than a disagreement about the facts. Then we need to tease out why that difference in emphasis is so important. — Ludwig V

I suspect we agree on facts. We've all heard the numbers of the percentages of DNA we share with various species. It is truly amazing that the differences between us are accounted for by such a small difference in DNA!!

What interests me is the things that small difference in DNA gives us. We think in ways nothing else (in the universe, as far as we know) can, and do things nothing else does. The proof of which is all around us, covering the planet, and includes both the content and method of our communication.

My point is there couldn't be such a thing. As I've said before, just because we can say the words, doesn't mean we can conceive of them. Like a square circle.
— Patterner
That's exactly why I can't do anything with your thought-experiments. — Ludwig V

Understandable. I don't think PZs are possible. I think any bit of information processing brings a little bit of consciousness. I was just trying to say what I think epiphenomenalism would need like. But, as far as consciousness goes, I don't think epiphenomenalism applies.

That second one is hard to answer. Is it rational to believe something that is not true? — Athena

Is believing and defending a myth, rational thinking? — Athena

The answer to the general question is that it is rational to believe anything that you have good evidence for. Sometimes good evidence is misleading, but that doesn't affect the answer. Sometimes we believe things without good, or even any, evidence. That is irrational. Believing a myth is a bit different. Short story, myths (and religious beliefs in general) have a status a bit like axioms, and in that sense are pre-rational. But one could, nevertheless defend them on rational grounds.

I think any bit of information processing brings a little bit of consciousness. — Patterner

H'm. I think that's a bit extreme, but comprehensible.

But, as far as consciousness goes, I don't think epiphenomenalism applies. — Patterner

It does depend what you mean by the causal explanation "doing all the work". That's a complicated issue. What is the work that the explanation needs to do?

No. For a number of reasons. — Ludwig V

D’accord.

Good enough reasons.

First and foremost, and from which all relevant distinctions evolve, the presence in continental, the absence in analytic philosophy, of theoretical system metaphysics.

Probably isn’t a single all-consuming response, but I read this one somewhere, seemed to cover more bases. — Mww

AFAIK since Nietzsche Husserl and Heidegger the continentals have (purportedly at least) eschewed metaphysics or at least reduced it to be a subset of phenomenology.

But I thought that Husserl specifically developed phenomenology to be something quite distinct from science - unless you define science as anything that attempts to achieve objectivity.

Which prompts me to complain that this entire discussion is scientistic and ignores the possibility that disciplines that do not aim to emulate science may be (I think are) essential to understanding consciousness. History, Literary and Cultural Studies, Sociology, some branches of Psychology etc. - not to mention Marxism and Psychoanalysis which might well have something to offer. But, of course, it all depends how you define "science". — Ludwig V

It does depend on how you define science. I think Husserl considered phenomenology to be a science, and I see no reason not to think of psychology, anthropology, sociology and history as sciences.

Yes, I guess it is. Perhaps that simple-mindedness is a fault. One can't, for example, describe an unborn baby as a foetus and pretend not to know what kind of context that sets up. — Ludwig V

I would count simplemindedness as a fault wherever a more nuanced understanding is available.

Well, I certainly agree that it is a good thing to recognize the difference between a picture and a description and being there. Whether "limitations" is appropriate for that is another question. — Ludwig V

You introduced the photograph analogy. I think a photograph does capture aspects of the reality just as our thinking can. Thinking may be more or less apt. I can see your point if you mean to say that we needn't worry about whether or not what we say is absolutely adequate to the reality, but should rather concern ourselves with the relevance, validity and soundness of what we say within the ambit of common human experience.

Heidegger wrote extensively on metaphysics. Husserl’s method was ‘transcendental phenomenology’.

Getting back to rational thinking: animals and humans. The upshot of what I’m arguing is that the ability to discern and understand reason is one of the distinguishing characteristics of h.sapiens . In Western culture up until recently, that distinction was universally accepted. It has been called into question by interpretations of biological evolution which place humans on a continuum with other species. Neodarwinian materialism insists that human nature has a strictly biological explanation which can be accounted for solely in terms of molecular genetics; we ourselves can be ‘explained by science’. But such arguments are self-refuting, in that while appealing to reason, they hold that reason is simply an organ of biological adaptation. An argument is simply another of the sounds that this particular organism makes. And that’s the only point I wished to make in this thread.

AFAIK since Nietzsche Husserl and Heidegger the continentals have (purportedly at least) eschewed metaphysics or at least reduced it to be a subset of phenomenology. — Janus

That is my understanding.

It does depend on how you define science. I think Husserl considered phenomenology to be a science, and I see no reason not to think of psychology, anthropology, sociology and history as sciences. — Janus

Well, the Husserl's crucial idea was the epoche or "bracketing" of external reality to exclude it from consideration. The "first-person" or subjective "lived world" was the subject-matter. The methods of the sciences as understood in his day were not applicable. But he did think of phenomenology as a systematic study and methodology. So in that sense, it was a science but it wouldn't have been called that at the time.

I can see your point if you mean to say that we needn't worry about whether or not what we say is absolutely adequate to the reality, but should rather concern ourselves with the relevance, validity and soundness of what we say within the ambit of common human experience. — Janus

That's about right. I would add that no clear meaning can be attributed to reality beyond our access and the the ambit of common human experience - amplified by techniques discovered or at least valdiated by science - is all there is.

I was just trying to say that theoretical systems metaphysics is a pretty good way to distinguish one from the other, their respective commonalities notwithstanding.

Well, the Husserl's crucial idea was the epoche or "bracketing" of external reality to exclude it from consideration. The "first-person" or subjective "lived world" was the subject-matter. The methods of the sciences as understood in his day were not applicable. But he did think of phenomenology as a systematic study and methodology. So in that sense, it was a science but it wouldn't have been called that at the time. — Ludwig V

As far as I remember Husserl considered phenomenology to be the science of consciousness, of human experience. I see the epoché, the bracketing of the question of the existence of an external world as being the kind of reverse mirror image of the bracketing of concern about first person experience in the other sciences. I could be mistaken about that of course.

That's about right. I would add that no clear meaning can be attributed to reality beyond our access and the the ambit of common human experience - amplified by techniques discovered or at least valdiated by science - is all there is. — Ludwig V

I agree with that. But I do think that our capacity to imagine possibilities beyond the ambit of common experience is an important phenomenological fact about the human.

I was just trying to say that theoretical systems metaphysics is a pretty good way to distinguish one from the other, their respective commonalities notwithstanding. — Mww

Yes, I think there's some truth in that.

So in that sense, it was a science but it wouldn't have been called that at the time. — Ludwig V

German has an expression, Geisteswissenschaften, which literally means 'sciences of the spirit', covering subjects other than what English calls 'natural science', including philosophy. There is no equivalent term in English.

I would add that no clear meaning can be attributed to reality beyond our access and the the ambit of common human experience - amplified by techniques discovered or at least valdiated by science - is all there is. — Ludwig V

That would be 'positivism', wouldn't it? And what precisely constitutes 'common' in that sentence? Where do you draw the line between what would be accepted as 'common' and what would not? But then, the kinds of observations produced by the LHC would not be 'common', nor would the interpretive skills required to analyse them, even if they are designated 'scientific'.

Speaking of Heidegger

If we look around at beings in general—from particles to planets, ants to apes—it is human beings alone who are able to encounter the question of what it means to be... — SEP, Heidegger

I was just trying to say that theoretical systems metaphysics is a pretty good way to distinguish one from the other, their respective commonalities notwithstanding. — Mww

Yes. I just like details - but not so many I get confused. .

As far as I remember Husserl considered phenomenology to be the science of consciousness, of human experience. I see the epoché, the bracketing of the question of the existence of an external world as being the kind of reverse mirror image of the bracketing of concern about first person experience in the other sciences. — Janus

That makes sense, and I didn't mean to imply that it couldn't be called a science at all. But the epoche does set on one side the "hard" sciences, doesn't it? That's why phenomenology has to have a method of its own.

But I do think that our capacity to imagine possibilities beyond the ambit of common experience is an important phenomenological fact about the human. — Janus

Yes. You may be thinking of fantasy stories. But those rely on hand-waving - magic or future technology - to keep plausibility going.

German has an expression, Geisteswissenschaften, which literally means 'sciences of the spirit', covering subjects other than what English calls 'natural science', including philosophy. There is no equivalent term in English. — Wayfarer

So it does and so there isn't. I guess English culture is just not comfortable with them.

That would be 'positivism', wouldn't it? And what precisely constitutes 'common' in that sentence? Where do you draw the line between what would be accepted as 'common' and what would not? But then, the kinds of observations produced by the LHC would not be 'common', nor would the interpretive skills required to analyse them, even if they are designated 'scientific'. — Wayfarer

Perhaps I didn't express myself well.
My attitude to this is that truth conditions are not the whole of the meaning of anything. But they are a part of the meaning of everything that is "truth-apt".
But I was thinking that if something cannot affect us in any way, then it makes no difference to us. So it is irrelevant.
I was also thinking that absolute reality, "beyond" all the contextual frameworks that we use to define what's real and what's not is not just an unachievable goal, but meaningless. The framework that defines meaning is, ex hypothesi, missing.
Also, I did refer to the "amplification" of our senses "by techniques discovered or at least validated by science".

:up:

I agree rational thinking requires language and then questioning out one thinks and that animals do not do this and can not do so without language. — Athena

:up:

However, there is evidence that bonobos can learn language and judge right from wrong. Why not, we are on the same branch of the tree. But it is curious in nature that bonobos do not develop language independent of human intervention. However, if a bonobo does learn language at least one of them has taught the offspring language. I am wondering if they would continue to pass on language and if so, would they develop better language skills in following generations? (evolution working) — Athena

I am not familiar with bonobos and their languages at all, but I guess it is nowhere near in the complexity and diversity of human languages.

More important, should we assume all humans are rational thinkers or must they learn the higher order thinking skills to be rational? Is believing and defending a myth, rational thinking? — Athena

Not all humans are equal, and rational even if they appear to be. Only some are.

Is believing and defending a myth, rational thinking? — Athena

No, they are not rational at all. They are more in the arena of emotional states.

OK. I can make some sense of that. To be rational is to rationalise. — Ludwig V

:up:

1. So do you think that the people who built the pyramids were rational or not? (They built them before the ancient Greeks started philosophizing.) — Ludwig V

They were physically rational, but not philosophically rational. There is no record or evidence of their rational explanations on how and why they had built them.

2. About the process of learning or acquiring a habit or routine. I grant you that putting on one's lucky trainers when going out to compete is not (normally) rational. But when the habit or routine is capable of rational justification - driving or fuelling one's car would be examples - is learning or practising those activities rational or not? — Ludwig V

You could ask them why they put on the lucky trainers, and if it is rational to do so, and also ask for the justification for doing so. If they can expound about it in rational manner, then they are rational. If not, they were just superstitious.

Doing something, practicing or training some skills are not rational. Only when they can elaborate on them critically, reflectively and logically, they could be regarded as rational.

I agree rational thinking requires language and then questioning out one thinks and that animals do not do this and can not do so without language. — Athena

This is false. Chimps can cooperate and problem solve, as can chickens. The latter may be mere 'programming' but I would not say we can state one way or another what we mean by 'language' to begin with.

I can certainly think without words. The guy from Mexico managed to cross a border and work in the US before coming to understand what language was. Do not confuse language with culture. Our understand of language maps onto the lived-world rather than the other way around.

I can certainly think without words. The guy from Mexico managed to cross a border and work in the US before coming to understand what language was. Do not confuse language with culture. Our understand of language maps onto the lived-world rather than the other way around. — I like sushi

Do not confuse language and words with the rational explications and justifications expressed in language.

I think any bit of information processing brings a little bit of consciousness.
— Patterner
H'm. I think that's a bit extreme — Ludwig V

I've been accused of worse than that! :grin:

….I just like details…. — Ludwig V

Thing about details, upon being convinced of some set of them, it’s awful hard to put them aside. First thing that comes to mind, for that discipline considered as a science, what principles determine its methods and what laws govern its objects? For without those, how can it be a science at all?
—————

I see the epoché, the bracketing of the question of the existence of an external world as being the kind of reverse mirror image of the bracketing of concern about first person experience — Janus

Epoché; the bracketing. A method for removing the necessity for the human cognitive system to operate in a specific way for every occassion. In other words, a method for disassociating the subject that knows, from that which it knows about.

That being said, what opinion might you hold regarding this IEP entry:

“….It is important to keep in mind that Husserl’s phenomenology did not arise out of the questioning of an assumption in the same way that much of the history of thought has progressed; rather, it was developed, as so many discoveries are, pursuant to a particular experience, namely, the experience of the world and self that one has if one determinedly seeks to experience the “I”; and, Hume notwithstanding, such an experience is possible….”

It needs no mention of course, that my position must be that experiencing the “I” is impossible, if only the “I” is that which experiences. And why I have so much trouble finding favor with post-Kantian transcendental movements, insofar as those movements make necessary different kinds of “I”’s, or different forms of a single “I”, which makes epoché bracketing predicating one such movement, even possible.

Details. Devils. And how one meets and greets, and gets lost in, the other.

So you are saying that people with no language do not act rationally? That seems like a stretch.

No, they are not rational at all. They are more in the arena of emotional states. — Corvus

In one way, you are not wrong. I think "emotional state" is not the whole story. But I want to ask whether, given that you believe in a myth, working out what it is rational for you to do in the light of that myth is not an exercise in rationality. For example, we know, from textual evidence, that the ancient Egyptians built their pyramids because it was in their interest to do so and that makes sense to us. Why would we not say that given that they believed their myths, they were rational to build the pyramids?

They were physically rational, but not philosophically rational. There is no record or evidence of their rational explanations on how and why they had built them. — Corvus

We know the why, but not the how - thought we have some ideas from the finished product. They also had quite reasonable arithmetic, though they limited themselves to severely practical applications. From textual evidence. Irrational, but capable of arithmetic?

I've been accused of worse than that! :grin: — Patterner

I think it's the sorites problem. One bit of information processed doesn't mean anything. Many bits of information processed is more persuasive. But it's more than just processing information. It's reacting to it in complex ways, and, it's not just responding to information, but initiating action based on information as well.

So you are saying that people with no language do not act rationally? That seems like a stretch. — I like sushi

Well, if you told me, you like sushi, or you ate 10 boxes of sushi, then I wouldn't take that comment as rational. But if you said, you like sushi, because of the health effects it can bring, or some other reasons why you like sushi from biological, social or cultural backgrounds, then I might take that explanation rational.

Having ability of using language or knowing meanings of some words doesn't make one rational, nor does ability or preference eating sushi.

Why would we not say that given that they believed their myths, they were rational to build the pyramids? — Ludwig V

Knowing something is not also being rational. One can know many things in the world, but still can be irrational, or be common as muck, have nothing to do with rational being. Reason and being rational can be basis of knowing, but reason and being rational is not knowing itself.

Okay, I see you are using 'rational' in a very particular way so I won't waste my time in a pointless back and forth.

Have fun :)