The Biggest Problem for Indirect Realists

Bob Ross

Periodically, Kant’s CPR comes back to haunt me: it is like a world-class quality car—but there’s one screw slightly loose. There’s one part of the whole transcendental idealism which poses a threat to the entire enterprise and of which I would like to explore with this forum: the paradoxical and necessary elimination of knowledge of the things-in-themselves via particular knowledge of thing-in-themselves.

Kant begins with the presupposition that our experience is representational and proceeds to correctly conclude that knowledge of the things-in-themselves is thusly impossible. However, anyone who questions the legitimacy of this presupposition readily realizes that its justification rests purely a posteriori—on the empirical evidence of our representative faculties as presented to us in our conscious experience (or of another); and, as such, presupposes, from the onset, that one can trust their experience enough to know that (1) they exist (2) with representative faculties (3) in a transcendent reality which (4) has other things in it and of which (5) one’s representative faculties are representing. This incoheres with the original point. E.g., if I can trust my conscious experience enough to conclude that I exist in a world with other objects, then I thereby trust it to know at least some things about the things-in-themselves (namely, that I and other objects exist in reality). Likewise, e.g., if I remove the a priori means and modes of intuiting and cognizing objects, then I left with no reason to believe that I exist with other objects in reality; because the evidence I had for it was empirical, and the object of my body and other bodies (or objects) are perfectly unintelligible when stripped away from the a priori means by which I was able to cognize them to begin with. However, e.g., me taking on the endeavor to remove the a prior means of cognizing myself with other objects (and of which does result in unintelligibility of my own existence) presupposes that I exist in the first place, and so can be said to be secured transcendentally as a necessary precondition for the possibility of my representational experience....and we go round-and-round all day!

The question then becomes: if we can trust our experience to tell us that we exist with other things in a reality, then why can we not trust that very same experience, which is tainted by our a priori means of cognizing reality, to tell us about other things in reality?

The truly perplexing paradox arises when one accepts empirically, through trusting one’s conscious experience, those minimum 5 claims about the things-in-themselves; because, then, they are committed to the idea that they cannot know anything about the things-in-themselves (for all we can know about the world is filtered through the lens of our a priori means of cognizing it). There then appears a stalemate, catch-22, between the resulted claim and the claim required to get that result.

How do we reconcile these problems as indirect realists that accept that our conscious experience is representational? If we do trust our conscious experience to tell us about the things-in-themselves to some extent (as a necessity and way out), then how do we determine the limits of what we can know about the things-in-themselves? If we don’t trust our conscious experience to tell us about the things-in-themselves to some extent, then what grounds do we have to accept Kant’s presupposition (that our experience is representational)?

Special shoutout to @Mww, which is our friendly neighborhood transcendental idealist that will have much to say on this topic (:

wonderer1

How do we reconcile these problems as indirect realists that accept that our conscious experience is representational? — Bob Ross

Drop the black and white thinking in the sentence below...

Kant begins with the presupposition that our experience is representational and proceeds to correctly conclude that knowledge of the things-in-themselves is thusly impossible. — Bob Ross

..and recognize that we can have some degree of incomplete knowledge of things-in-themselves?

180 Proof

↪wonderer1

:up:

tim wood

Without claiming to be right (and never having finished ... Practical Reason), I understand his Critique of Pure Reason to be about knowledge itself, what we can and cannot know, and how. And for me most of the argument might be contained in a back-and-forth about a tree in your back yard. For example, if asked if there's a tree in your backyard, you might answer that there is. Being asked how you know, you might say that you can see it. Ask what exactly that means and you're off the races. And people who are quite sure that they see a tree are called "naive."

Bob Ross

↪wonderer1

↪180 Proof

By claiming we have conditional knowledge of the things-in-themselves, you are denying that representational experience cannot afford us knowledge of the things-in-themselves (which I noted Kant had rightly pointed out in the CPR). So we would, then, have to discuss what reasons we have for thinking that the a priori modes by which we cognize objects can afford knowledge of a thing as it is in-itself. I will start the discussion with two "arguments".

Firstly, the phenomena are a result of the cognition of sensations and not things-in-themselves; and those sensations are limited by our sensibility. Our sensibility is incapable of migrating the properties of the things-in-themselves over to the understanding because they are limited to how they are pre-structured to sense (such as the two forms of sensibility: space and time). For you claim to hold, you would have to explain how it can be that our sensibility can migrate the properties of things-in-themselves to our understanding.

Secondly, any given phenomena stripped of the a prior means of intuiting and cognizing it is left perfectly unintelligible (viz., remove all spatial, temporal, mathematical, logical, etc. properties from the phenomena and you have nothing left to conceptually work with other than a giant '?'); so whatever the thing-in-itself is will be exactly what is unintelligible: it is the 'thing' stripped of the a priori means of cognizing it.

wonderer1

Firstly, the phenomena are a result of the cognition of sensations and not things-in-themselves; and those sensations are limited by our sensibility. — Bob Ross

I'd suggest seeking scientific understanding of what the sensations are a result of. It seems you might need some understanding of the role the things themselves play in your experience of sensations.

What are the details of the light that reflected off the thing and into your eye?

Do you see consideration of such matters off limits for this discussion. If so, might it be that you are trying to understand things in overly simplistic terms?

Secondly, any given phenomena stripped of the a prior means of intuiting and cognizing it is left perfectly unintelligible... — Bob Ross

Translating into wondererese yields, "If the functioning of a person's brain is disabled, the person won't have intelligible thoughts." My response to my interpretation is, "Right. And???"

I'm afraid you would need to elaborate for me to understand what you see as a problem.

Wayfarer

Kant begins with the presupposition that our experience is representational and proceeds to correctly conclude that knowledge of the things-in-themselves is thusly impossible. However, anyone who questions the legitimacy of this presupposition readily realizes that its justification rests purely a posteriori—on the empirical evidence of our representative faculties as presented to us in our conscious experience (or of another); and, as such, presupposes, from the onset, that one can trust their experience enough to know that (1) they exist (2) with representative faculties (3) in a transcendent reality which (4) has other things in it and of which (5) one’s representative faculties are representing. — Bob Ross

I'm no expert, but I think I have enough understanding to pinpoint a problem with this analysis. I think you're misinterpreting the significance of the 'ding an sich' - you're representing it as something real yet innaccesible, and then expressing a kind of frustration that we're left with only 'the representation' as a kind of inferior copy of The Real Thing. You want to 'peek behind the curtain', so to speak. But to make this comparison, you have to put yourself outside both the appearance and the thing in itself, as if they could be compared.

Consider this account of the matter:

Kant's introduced the concept of the “thing in itself” to refer to reality as it is independent of our experience of it and unstructured by our cognitive constitution. The concept was harshly criticized in his own time and has been lambasted by generations of critics since. A standard objection to the notion is that Kant has no business positing it given his insistence that we can only know what lies within the limits of possible experience. But a more sympathetic reading is to see the concept of the “thing in itself” as a sort of placeholder in Kant's system; it both marks the limits of what we can know and expresses a sense of mystery that cannot be dissolved, the sense of mystery that underlies our unanswerable questions. — Emrys Westacott

any given phenomena stripped of the a priori means of intuiting and cognizing it is left perfectly unintelligible (viz., remove all spatial, temporal, mathematical, logical, etc. properties from the phenomena and you have nothing left to conceptually work with other than a giant '?'); so whatever the thing-in-itself is will be exactly what is unintelligible: it is the 'thing' stripped of the a priori means of cognizing it. — Bob Ross

You could just as well say, were we unconscious, then we'd know nothing. The 'apriori means of intuiting' just are the activities of the conscious mind/brain by which it assimilates and interprets information about the world. All well and good - but then you try to work out what there could be in the absence of that - which we can't know, as a matter of principle. And sometimes knowing you don't know something is what needs to be understood.

Anyone who supposes that if all the perceiving subjects were removed from the world then the objects, as we have any conception of them, could continue in existence all by themselves has radically failed to understand what objects are. Kant did see this, but only intermittently ‚ in the gaps, as it were, between assuming the existence of the noumenon 'out there' as the invisible sustainer of the object. He expressed it once in a passage which, because so blindingly clear and yet so isolated, sticks out disconcertingly from his work:

'If I take away the thinking subject, the whole material world must vanish, as this world is nothing but the phenomenal appearance in the sensibility of our own subject, and is a species of this subject's representations.'

(An) objection would run: 'Everyone knows that the earth, and a fortiori the universe, existed for a long time before there were any living beings, and therefore any perceiving subjects. But according to what Kant has just been quoted as saying, that is impossible.'

Schopenhauer's defence of Kant on this score was twofold. First, the objector has not understood to the very bottom the Kantian demonstration that time is one of the forms of our sensibility. The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room. The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper.

This, incidentally, illustrates a difficulty in the way of understanding which transcendental idealism has permanently to contend with: the assumptions of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect' enter unawares into the way in which the statements of transcendental idealism are understood, so that these statements appear faulty in ways in which, properly understood, they are not.

Such realistic assumptions so pervade our normal use of concepts that the claims of transcendental idealism disclose their own non-absurdity only after difficult consideration, whereas criticisms of them at first appear cogent which on examination are seen to rest on confusion. We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them.

This, of course, is one of the explanations for the almost unfathomably deep counterintuitiveness of transcendental idealism, and also for the general notion of 'depth' with which people associate Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. Something akin to it is the reason for much of the prolonged, self-disciplined meditation involved in a number of Eastern religious practices.

Schopenhauer's second refutation of the objection under consideration is as follows. Since all imaginable characteristics of objects depend on the modes in which they are apprehended by perceiving subjects, then without at least tacitly assumed presuppositions relating to the latter no sense can be given to terms purporting to denote the former‚ in short, it is impossible to talk about material objects at all, and therefore even so much as to assert their existence, without the use of words the conditions of whose intelligibility derive from the experience of perceiving subjects. Again, then... transcendental realism cannot be stated. It is 'the philosophy of the subject who forgets to take account of himself. But 'just as there can be no object without a subject, so there can be no subject without an object, in other words, no knower without something different from this that is known . . . A consciousness that was through and through pure intelligence would be impossible . . . For consciousness consists in knowing, but knowing requires a knower and a known. Therefore self-consciousness could not exist if there were not in it a known opposed to the knower and different therefrom.'... Consciousness is intrinsically intensional ‚ it is always consciousness q/"something: it always has an object. — Schopenhauer's Philosophy, Bryan Magee, Pp105-106)

Janus

How do we reconcile these problems as indirect realists that accept that our conscious experience is representational? If we do trust our conscious experience to tell us about the things-in-themselves to some extent (as a necessity and way out), then how do we determine the limits of what we can know about the things-in-themselves? — Bob Ross

I don't see any puzzle. It comes down to what is meant by saying we don't know things in themselves. Insofar as they are thought as what gives rise to our experience of a world of things, then of course we can say we do know them. But it can also obviously be said that we only know them as they appear to us.

Mww

Thanks for the nod, Bob. Hopefully whatever I contribute helps in some way.

…..proceeds to correctly conclude that knowledge of the things-in-themselves is thusly impossible. — Bob Ross

If he correctly concludes, how can a paradox arise? Isn’t a paradox only possible if he wasn’t correct with his conclusion, given the initial conditions? Is it that a paradox is being manufactured from a misunderstanding?

Thing-in-themselves are never considered by those faculties providing empirical knowledge: “…. the thing in itself, is not known by means of these representations, nor ever can be, but respecting which, in experience, no inquiry is ever made….”.

Things-in-themselves are only ever considered by the faculty of reason: “….. objects when they are considered by means of reason as things in themselves, that is, without reference to the constitution of our sensibility…..”.

Really shouldn’t be that taxing to grasp the notion knowledge….regardless of the adjective describing it…..of thing-in-themselves is impossible, insofar as representation is necessary for all knowledge of anything, and things-in-themselves are only considered by reason, which is not part of the constitution of our sensibility which provides representations.

T Clark

the paradoxical and necessary elimination of knowledge of the things-in-themselves via particular knowledge of thing-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

I don't think it's truly paradoxical at all. As with most "paradoxes," it's a matter of language, attitude, perspective, not fact.

Kant begins with the presupposition that our experience is representational and proceeds to correctly conclude that knowledge of the things-in-themselves is thusly impossible. However, anyone who questions the legitimacy of this presupposition readily realizes that its justification rests purely a posteriori—on the empirical evidence of our representative faculties as presented to us in our conscious experience (or of another); and, as such, presupposes, from the onset, that one can trust their experience — Bob Ross

Here's the heart of the problem. There is no true "justification" for Kant's presuppositions because they can not be established empirically. This is not a criticism, because it's true of indirect realism, direct realism, and all other philosophical isms. For example:

one can trust their experience enough to know that (1) they exist (2) with representative faculties (3) in a transcendent reality which (4) has other things in it and of which (5) one’s representative faculties are representing. — Bob Ross

I can trust my conscious experience enough to conclude that I exist in a world with other objects, then I thereby trust it to know at least some things about the things-in-themselves (namely, that I and other objects exist in reality). — Bob Ross

I exist with other objects in reality — Bob Ross

None of these things can be established empirically. There are many, many problems like this in philosophy - there always have been and always will be - until we give up and recognize these kinds of statements are not true - they are assumptions, presumptions. We need them in order to proceed in the world, but they are human inventions, not properties inherent in the world.

The truly perplexing paradox arises when one accepts empirically, through trusting one’s conscious experience, those minimum 5 claims about the things-in-themselves — Bob Ross

Again, there is no paradox because the claims are neither true nor false. We act as if they are true, but there is no way to establish that.

T Clark

any given phenomena stripped of the a prior means of intuiting and cognizing it is left perfectly unintelligible (viz., remove all spatial, temporal, mathematical, logical, etc. properties from the phenomena and you have nothing left to conceptually work with other than a giant '?'); so whatever the thing-in-itself is will be exactly what is unintelligible: it is the 'thing' stripped of the a priori means of cognizing it. — Bob Ross

As I see it, this is a good way of looking at it, but it is not paradoxical.

T Clark

I'd suggest seeking scientific understanding of what the sensations are a result of. It seems you might need some understanding of the role the things themselves play in your experience of sensations.

What are the details of the light that reflected off the thing and into your eye?

Do you see consideration of such matters off limits for this discussion. If so, might it be that you are trying to understand things in overly simplistic terms? — wonderer1

As I've noted in my responses to @Bob Ross's posts, the specific cognitive mechanisms of perception are not relevant in addressing his concerns.

T Clark

↪Wayfarer

I like the quotes from Westacott and MacGee you've provided, especially this:

Anyone who supposes that if all the perceiving subjects were removed from the world then the objects, as we have any conception of them, could continue in existence all by themselves has radically failed to understand what objects are. — Schopenhauer's Philosophy, Bryan Magee, Pp105-106)

Wayfarer

↪T Clark

:up: Glad it resonates for you. Hence my frequent mention of Mind and the Cosmic Order, Charles Pinter, which backs this up with solid empirical data.

jkop

If we don’t trust our conscious experience to tell us about the things-in-themselves to some extent, then what grounds do we have to accept Kant’s presupposition (that our experience is representational)? — Bob Ross

Examples of illusions, dreams, hallucinations etc. tend to make some thinkers conclude that the object of experience is not the external object but a figment of the perceptual apparatus, conceptual scheme, language, culture etc.

But if the object that we see is only our own phenomenal object, then how can we explain its relation to the external object?

We can't, and idealists know this, but "solve" the problem by rejecting the external. However, Kant's transcendental idealism maintains the external object by distinguishing between its empirical sense and transcendental sense.

In its empirical sense it's an object of experience, but in its transcendental sense it's an abstraction, an object without properties, hence imperceivable.

But it seems to make explanations of perceptual experience ambiguous, e.g. when we see the empirical object, do we see the object or our own phenomenal representation of... what? It also seems to make skepticism true, e.g. do we see the object, a representation, or an hallucination?.

Wayfarer

We can't, and idealists know this, but "solve" the problem by rejecting the external. However, Kant's transcendental idealism maintains the external object by distinguishing between its empirical sense and transcendental sense. — jkop

After the First Edition of the CPR was published, many critics said that Kant was no different to Berkeley, which greatly annoyed him. Accordingly in the second edition he included the 'refutation of idealism', a summary of which can be found here. The salient point was that he wanted to differentiate himself from Berkeley by showing we must be aware of an external reality, in order to maintain (or index) or own sense of the temporal succession of experiences.

I think, again, a problematical perspective is introduced here:

if the object that we see is only our own phenomenal object, then how can we explain its relation to the external object? — jkop

The question is posed as if it is possible to compare the appearance and the object, implying that they are separable. I think that relies on an implicit 'world-picture' of the self and world - but that itself is a product of the brain/mind! We can't 'get outside' phenomena in that way. (There's something distinctly Zen about all this, in my view.)

Furthermore, it's in no way 'our own phenomenal object' (suggesting solipsism) because our minds all rely on the same a priori categories. We all share the same categories, kinds of objects, species, etc.

jkop

The question is posed as if it is possible to compare the appearance and the object, implying that they are separable. I think that relies on an implicit 'world-picture' of the self and world - but that itself is a product of the brain/mind! We can't 'get outside' phenomena in that way. — Wayfarer

I agree we can't get outside phenomena. The question follows from concluding (from illusions etc) that we see external objects by way of seeing something else first (e.g. sense-data, mental representation etc). That's indirect realism. It creates an insurmountable gap between what we see and what it supposedly represents.

Idealism and naive realism are two ways of closing that gap, but Kant rejects both. His ontology consists of categories, not objects. Objects are conformed by the categories. It sure seems to assume that there are two objects, or two versions of one object: one we see, and another we don't see.

Mww

Firstly, the phenomena are a result of the cognition of sensations….. — Bob Ross

The source of phenomena does not cognize…..

“… it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion)…”

…..which demonstrates that receptivity and cognition are separate faculties, hence the functions of them must be commensurably separate, even while necessarily working together for a given end.

Phenomena result from “…. The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical intuition. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon. (…) It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us à posteriori; the form must lie ready à priori for them in the mind, and consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation….”.

But the matter and form of which a phenomenon is constituted still does not result in one….

“…. we find existing in the mind à priori, the pure form of sensuous intuitions in general, in which all the manifold content of the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations….”

…..and it is then the case the synthesis of matter and form is required in order to result in a phenomenon: “…. synthesis is that by which alone the elements of our cognitions are collected and united into a certain content, consequently it is the first thing on which we must fix our attention, if we wish to investigate the origin of our knowledge….”.

The “phenomenal world” is only intuition itself, and, the “certain relations” are between the “undetermined object” and space and time. “Arranged and viewed” is merely a euphemism for cognized, which is clearly post hoc relative to the synthesis of the matter of sensation to the pure form in the mind a priori.

“Elements of our cognitions” are that which constitutes them, but are not them. Phenomena then, are one of two elements of our cognition, the other being conception, there being possibly a manifold of each for any given cognition.

—————

Secondly, any given phenomena stripped of the a prior means of intuiting and cognizing it is left perfectly unintelligible…. — Bob Ross

Any given phenomena presupposes the a priori means of intuition, otherwise none would be given. Stripping such a priori means makes phenomena impossible, insofar as all that could remain is its matter given from mere sensation, making the intelligibility of them irrelevant.

In simplistic common sense, as well as a dualistic epistemological metaphysic, such as CPR promotes, the knowledge of what an object is, is impossible by its sensation alone**. THAT there is an appearance of something is determinable from its sensation, but that an object appears, from which we know only the mode of its reception, re: which sensual device is affected, does nothing to facilitate the object’s relation is to our understanding, or, which is the same thing, how it is to be, first, cognized, and consequently, known, by us.
(**An argument prevails still, that experience grants knowledge of things from their sensation alone, but this negates the systemic functionality of human intelligence, which is necessary to relate to which experience a repetitive sensation refers. Enter…..consciousness, the highest transcendental object belonging to humans alone, as a derivable product of pure reason. For whatever THAT’S worth.)

Philosophim

If we do trust our conscious experience to tell us about the things-in-themselves to some extent (as a necessity and way out), then how do we determine the limits of what we can know about the things-in-themselves? — Bob Ross

Nice post Bob. This is essentially the question, "What is knowledge?" I wouldn't call it a paradox per say, just incomplete. If you recall from my knowledge theory, reality is the undercurrent to anything we define and believe. We have evidence that there are things in themselves, because we have identities and beliefs that are often contradicted by something outside of our control. If I see a rotten apple and think, "That looks good, I'll eat that and won't get sick", the reality of food poisoning will invalidate your representation soon after you consume it.

Reality is, "The thing in itself". The limits of our representations of things in themselves is based on what is contradicted, and what can stand concurrently. Even then, we don't know if we're even interpreting what to do with the contradiction correctly. For example, it could be that a rotten apple is actually an infestation of undetectable aliens. However, its impossible to claim something like that from the representations we have. So we call it, "Rotten" or "A food state of decay that will make a person sick if they eat it." No matter how we represent the rotten apple, eating it will make us sick, and any other representation that it will not is contradicted by "reality".

So in sum, we are limited to knowing there are things in themselves by contradictions to our representations by experience. That's it.

Bob Ross

↪wonderer1

I'd suggest seeking scientific understanding of what the sensations are a result of

I don’t think you are fully understanding the OP’s proposed paradox yet, but I think we can get there.

Scientific understanding is a posteriori (i.e., it is purely empirical [besides the underlying philosophical presuppositions of it]); and so if we accept that scientific knowledge can tell us that we have representational experience (viz., that indirect realism is true) and about how we represent objects which impact the senses, then we are immediately and necessarily conceding that we can trust our representational experience to know about some things about the world as it is in-itself (namely, what was noted before). The paradox arises because when we accept it, because then we must also perform a transcendental investigation of it (which is philosophical, as opposed to scientific) and that investigation produces the conclusion that we cannot know things-in-themselves. Even on a scientific note, the science supports we cannot know the things-in-themselves with respect to the first reason I gave: if you accept that we have scientific knowledge that we have sensibility and that our brains cognize objects based off of the sensations therefrom, then you should also accept that the sensations cannot possibly a priori migrate properly the properties of the things-in-themselves (since they are preconditioned by the prestructured way by which the sensibility senses); and so the objects of our experience (i.e., phenomena) are really representations of sensations and not things-in-themselves.

The paradox arises because we had to trust that scientific (or more generally empirical) knowledge that we have sensibility and representative faculties to begin with (which is also mediated fundamentally by our a priori knowledge)—so we are trusting that our experience can give us knowledge of the things-in-themselves to some extent even though we thereafter must conclude we have no knowledge of the things-in-themselves.

Do you see what I mean?

Translating into wondererese yields, "If the functioning of a person's brain is disabled, the person won't have intelligible thoughts." My response to my interpretation is, "Right. And???"

If I were to take a jab at translating into “wondererese” I would say: “We accept we have a brain and that it represents objects which are outside of it and this brain is incapable of knowing the things-in-themselves because it represents sensations according to how it is [and its neurological receptors are] pre-structured, but this acceptance of all the previously mentioned required us to trust our experience, which is produced by that very brain, to know that we had a brain in reality as it is in-itself in the first place—thereby contradicting where we began”.

I am not merely pointing out that if our brains didn’t function properly, that they would function properly; which is all I understood your translation to say.

Bob Ross

↪Wayfarer

I appreciate your response and quotations, but I don't think it addressed the OP whatsoever. I am not noting in the OP the implications of only knowing the "images of reality" but, rather, a paradox that arises for anyone who accepts that they have a brain and it represents objects which exist outside of it according to a priori modes and means. They must trust their experience to believe that indirect realism is true (in the sense of the commonly accepted version of it) which necessarily trusts their a priori modes of cognizing reality to give information about things-in-themselves, and then the theory necessitates (from this indirect realism) that we cannot now the things-in-themselves at all.

Both claims seem perfectly cogent to me and seem necessitated by accepting indirect realism in the sense of having a brain that represents reality; and so I am wondering if anyone has a solution or any useful comments on how indirect realism (or some sort of idealism) could salvage itself.

Bob Ross

↪Janus

If you can only know them as they appear to us then you cannot know them as they are in-themselves, but you have to claim certain things about things-in-themselves to begin with: namely, the five claims I noted in the OP. See the paradox?

Bob Ross

↪Janus

E.g., If you can trust the appearances of your experience to tell you that you exist with a brain which cognizes objects that are outside of it (and that this is true in reality as it is in-itself: not appearance); then this contradicts the notion that you cannot know the things-in-themselves and that you can only know appearances. Either you know you exist only facially or you know it as a matter of fact about reality in-itself.

Bob Ross

↪Mww

Thanks for the nod, Bob. Hopefully whatever I contribute helps in some way.

:wink:

If he correctly concludes, how can a paradox arise? Isn’t a paradox only possible if he wasn’t correct with his conclusion, given the initial conditions?

The paradox was outlined in the OP, and arises out of Kant correctly concluding (from the stipulations) that we have no knowledge of the things-in-themselves.

Is it that a paradox is being manufactured from a misunderstanding?

You tell me!

The “phenomenal world” is only intuition itself, and, the “certain relations” are between the “undetermined object” and space and time. “Arranged and viewed” is merely a euphemism for cognized, which is clearly post hoc relative to the synthesis of the matter of sensation to the pure form in the mind a priori.

“Elements of our cognitions” are that which constitutes them, but are not them. Phenomena then, are one of two elements of our cognition, the other being conception, there being possibly a manifold of each for any given cognition.

All these were fair points. I was thinking of “phenomena” as the result of our cognition to keep things simple. Techincally, yes, phenomena are the intuitions which are, thereafter, cognized.

THAT there is an appearance of something is determinable from its sensation, but that an object appears, from which we know only the mode of its reception, re: which sensual device is affected, does nothing to facilitate the object’s relation is to our understanding, or, which is the same thing, how it is to be, first, cognized, and consequently, known, by us.

Shouldn’t it be “intuited”, since the, according to you, “phenomena” are the result of a priori intuition and not cognition?

Any given phenomena presupposes the a priori means of intuition, otherwise none would be given.

By “phenomena”, I was referring to the end result of intuition and cognition: we were just talking about two different things. What term would you use for such an end result which includes the two elements you described (namely phenomena and a priori knowledge)? Viz., what’s the object which we experience called then?

Sadly, I don’t think you addressed the paradox from the OP: what were your thoughts on it?

wonderer1

The paradox arises because we had to trust that scientific (or more generally empirical) knowledge that we have sensibility and representative faculties to begin with (which is also mediated fundamentally by our a priori knowledge)—so we are trusting that our experience can give us knowledge of the things-in-themselves to some extent even though we thereafter must conclude we have no knowledge of the things-in-themselves.

Do you see what I mean? — Bob Ross

I'd say I have "some degree of incomplete knowledge" of what you mean. :wink:

I think you are using a definition of "knowledge" that I would find unreasonably rigid, and as a result you see a paradox where there is none, but I'm not wanting to go into that in depth, and others here are likely better equipped than I to discuss that with you, so I'm going to bow out of the discussion. At least for a time.

Bob Ross

↪T Clark

None of these things can be established empirically.

As you noted, this isn’t a critique of the OP. All philosophical positions are like this: so I am failing to see how you are resolving the paradox or denying its existence. All you noted is that we cannot provide a strict empirical proof for any philosophical position.

Again, there is no paradox because the claims are neither true nor false.

You don’t believe that philosophical statements are propositional? E.g., you don’t believe that “two objects cannot be in the same place and time” is propositional?

Bob Ross

↪jkop

With all due respect, you didn't even attempt to address the OP at all.

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

Nice to see you again, Philosophim!

So in sum, we are limited to knowing there are things in themselves by contradictions to our representations by experience. That's it.

I see. Am I understanding you correctly to be denying the claim in the OP that we cannot know anything about things-in-themselves if we only have representational experience?

If so, then here’s the two “arguments” I gave @wonderer1 and @180 Proof:

Firstly, the phenomena are a result of the cognition of sensations and not things-in-themselves; and those sensations are limited by our sensibility. Our sensibility is incapable of migrating the properties of the things-in-themselves over to the understanding because they are limited to how they are pre-structured to sense (such as the two forms of sensibility: space and time). For you claim to hold, you would have to explain how it can be that our sensibility can migrate the properties of things-in-themselves to our understanding.

Secondly, any given phenomena stripped of the a prior means of intuiting and cognizing it is left perfectly unintelligible (viz., remove all spatial, temporal, mathematical, logical, etc. properties from the phenomena and you have nothing left to conceptually work with other than a giant '?'); so whatever the thing-in-itself is will be exactly what is unintelligible: it is the 'thing' stripped of the a priori means of cognizing it.

Philosophim

Firstly, the phenomena are a result of the cognition of sensations and not things-in-themselves; and those sensations are limited by our sensibility — Bob Ross

Correct. A 'thing in itself' is a logical limit. If we observe some 'thing', there has to be something to observe. But if we are observing it, we realize we are observing it by interpreting things like light, sound, touch, and nerve firings. Logically, we cannot see the thing as it is 'in itself' because we are always observing it through another medium, and then creating one or many identities or discrete experiences out off it.

Even though I'm seeing a red ball in front of me, I'm really seeing the light and interpreting it. The light is bouncing off the ball, so something is there. But I can't understand what its like to see a ball without light bouncing off of it. I can't understand the feel of the ball without my nerves firing a sensation of touch in my brain. If I remove all of my senses, there is no way I can 'observe' the ball. And I cannot myself 'be' the ball.

But, despite my lack of observation, the ball is still there. Light still bounces. If someone throws it at me when I'm not aware, it will hit me and cause me to stumble. So the representation is not merely a dream or will, it is an attempt to grasp and understand. This is why what ever we attempt to represent must be applied or tested to see if what we represent is at the least, not contradicted by the underlying reality.

To sum it up very simply: We observe something. We interpret that observation as a representation of that something. Because we can only know that something through observation and interpretation, we cannot know that something as if it were unobserved and uninterpreted. Thus the placeholder for this logical determination is a 'thing in itself'. And there is nothing more to know about them then that.

Secondly, any given phenomena stripped of the a prior means of intuiting and cognizing it is left perfectly unintelligible (viz., remove all spatial, temporal, mathematical, logical, etc. properties from the phenomena and you have nothing left to conceptually work with other than a giant '?'); so whatever the thing-in-itself is will be exactly what is unintelligible: it is the 'thing' stripped of the a priori means of cognizing it. — Bob Ross

I do not believe in apriori knowledge apart from instinct. What some might call apriori, I call, 'intellectual capacity'. But the idea that we know something without being or analysis has never really logically worked for me. Regardless of your view on it, I do not believe a 'thing in itself' is known apriori, but only after logical analysis and experience.

Mww

Sadly, I don’t think you addressed the paradox from the OP: what were your thoughts on it? — Bob Ross

Bottom line, my thoughts are….either there, 1.) isn’t one, or, 2.) is one albeit of illegitimate origin.
————-

Shouldn’t it be “intuited”, since the, according to you, “phenomena” are the result of a priori intuition and not cognition? — Bob Ross

No. The context for that comment was knowledge. “First cognized” refers to an activity of understanding. Phenomena are the result the synthesis of the matter of sensation with the arrangement of that matter according to an a priori space and time-conditioned form.
————-

By “phenomena”, I was referring to the end result of intuition and cognition: we were just talking about two different things. What term would you use for such an end result which includes the two elements you described (namely phenomena and a priori knowledge)? Viz., what’s the object which we experience called then? — Bob Ross

Hence the potential illegitimacy: we cannot be talking of phenomena in two different ways, or phenomena as two different things, and still say the originator of them is correct in his conclusion, insofar as that very conclusion is predicated on the nature he himself prescribes to them.

The two elements of our cognitions I mentioned were phenomena and conceptions. I have yet to mention a priori knowledge for the simple reason at the juncture of phenomena and conceptions, in and of themselves alone, there isn’t any to mention, in that the faculty of reason which is the source of it, isn’t yet in the explanatory picture.

The end result of the unity of those two elements, phenomena and conception, is thought, itself a third of what the faculty of understanding does. There is no definable end result as such, which includes phenomena and a priori knowledge.

The object we experience is called, is expressively represented by, whatever name understanding thinks for it. In general, on the other hand, objects of experience itself, that of which experience is composed, as the end of a system of knowledge, are the determined empirical representations of what was initially sensed as the “undetermined object of intuition”.
—————

To be fair, you may have a legitimate paradox in mind, but the expression of it herein, the conditions by which you promote its validity, cannot follow from the text in which you say it is to be found.

To be even more fair…..cannot follow from the text as I understand it, and the quotes from which establish the mistakenness of those attributions used as validity. In particular, the notion of stripping away a priori predications, which, if deemed even possible, destroys the entire transcendental philosophy which grounds our system of empirical knowledge in the first place, making any paradox related to it, moot.

Wayfarer

I appreciate your response and quotations, but I don't think it addressed the OP whatsoever. — Bob Ross

All due respect, I think they’re directly relevant, and if you’re not seeing why they’re relevant, it is because of the way you’re framing the problem. As has been noted above, there is no paradox in the work you’re citing. I think you’re sensing it as a paradox because you have an innate conviction that the world is innately real - and yet Kant seems to call this into question. So it’s more a kind of cognitive dissonance. Isn’t that the source of the paradox you’re claiming to describe, in simple terms?

Again, I feel this particular passage is relevant:

We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them.

This, of course, is one of the explanations for the almost unfathomably deep counterintuitiveness of transcendental idealism, and also for the general notion of 'depth' with which people associate Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. Something akin to it is the reason for much of the prolonged, self-disciplined meditation involved in a number of Eastern religious practices. — Schopenhauer's Philosophy, Bryan Magee, Pp105-106)

I think the OP is underwritten by just such ‘realistic assumptions’.

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