You know I'm not going to be goaded into that mess.

:wink:

Is learning how to open a gate or door by observation alone possible by a creature completely incapable of thinking?

The dog does not recognize the sound of it's human's car. — creativesoul

Sure he does. Even the dumbest dog knows the sounds and smells of its people and their stuff.

The dog, after being reminded of past events - by virtue of being amidst much the same spatiotemporal events - begins to form, have, and/or hold expectation that the human will be there. In doing so the dog begins getting anticipatory excitement in a happy sort of way due to the lifelong loving connection the dog and human have. — creativesoul

You're using more words to describe: dog expects human's arrival. 'Spatiotemporal' - yes, he knows where and when. I can't characterize that as even one of the multitude of alternate explanations.

I'm not saying that the dog's behavior is not rational. I would say that it most certainly is. — creativesoul

Yes. So, then...?

It is only after becoming aware of the fact that we can be wrong about stuff, that we can become hopeful - in the face of that uncertainty. — creativesoul

That's a pretty big bold statement about a wide-ranging emotion! What has our own fallibility to do with hope? It's not as if we had, before discovering our own fallibility, been convinced of being in control of the universe.

Compared/contrast that with autonomous anticipation and/or expectation without such metacognitive reservation. — creativesoul

You mean humans never rationally expect something that usually happens to go on happening on schedule? When a human goes to work on Monday morning, he doesn't merely hope, but quite reasonably and confidently expects his workplace to stand where it has always stood and function as it has always functioned. If it's lifted up by an alien police force and transported to the moon, he discovers his own fallibilty. If he and the workplace survive the incident, thereafter, he only hopes to find it in the usual place.
If the dog's human is taken to hospital during the day and doesn't return home for a week, the dog's reasonable expectation is reduced to hope.

This mistakenly presupposes that you are somehow privy to my fear(s)? — creativesoul

Nah, just citing a vague general human-centric fear. It was huge in the sciences for a century. the word 'looms' triggered it.

It is rational. The irony, once again. You're quoting my argument for how and/or why it is rational. — creativesoul

I'm still trying to figure out what it is you're arguing. Sometimes I seem to misunderstand it.

"No reason, really. It's just a Monday, ya know?" — creativesoul

What people say is not always candid, insightful or comprehensive. I know of no effects without a cause. It sounds as if they 1. are not aware of or 2. do not wish to investigate or 3. assume you already know the sequence of experiences that have contributed to this particular response to an anticipated and repeated situation.

Knowing what time a particular person is expected to arrive is to pick that time out from the rest. The dog does not do that. The dog knows when the human is about to arrive, and it is perfectly rational in doing so... but it does not know what time the human is expected to arrive. — creativesoul

I just don't follow the distinction here. Are there discreet points in the continuity of time that we have to identify and choose among? What increments, and how aware do we do have to be of choosing one? Or do we experience the passage of time as fluid, and of which we are sometimes keenly aware and sometimes lose track? I don't see how a dog should have to 'pick out' an item of time from among a group of similar items, as if it were a toy in a pile of toys. To me, minutes all look and pretty much alike; I could not tell them apart except by the events that take place during their passage.

But then, as you say, I don't understand your arguments. Logically, then, I should stop responding to them. I don't know how to disengage without seeming rude.

Knowing what time a particular person is expected to arrive is to pick that time out from the rest. The dog does not do that. The dog knows when the human is about to arrive, and it is perfectly rational in doing so... but it does not know what time the human is expected to arrive.
— creativesoul
I just don't follow the distinction here — Vera Mont

Read the next bits.

I don't know how to disengage without seeming rude. — Vera Mont

I wouldn't take it as rude. Asking for clarity may help you to understand, should you want to.

No, you said he was a crank. That is not a word I put in your mouth. — Wayfarer

So, an academically-qualified professor of philosophy, but Christian, therefore a crank, right? — Wayfarer

You asked a loaded question, insinuating that what is in bold is my thinking.

Anyway, the EAAN is a crank argument because it ignores many issues that were previously brought up in this thread.

Can you cite evidence from any version of the EAAN that considers evolution occurring within a social species? Can you recognize that failure to think through the implications of evolution occurring within a social species results in the failure of the EAAN to make the case it claims to?

Suppose evolution alone only resulted in something like a feral human child that you might barely call rational, but if the individual members of that species were raised in a culture with other members of the same species the result was members of that species going to the moon.

Where does Plantinga show any evidence of having considered the role of cuture?

and therefore of course he’s accessible to me; I got a tv. — Mww

So have I. All the world is accessible to me, including the observed and recorded behaviour of animals in the wild. And that's all you can know of Putin, too.

To know of a thing, is not the same as to know the thing. Do you see that if you’d asked if I knew Putin, I’d have given a different answer? — Mww

Indeed. I was answering:

If something is inaccessible to us, we cannot know of it. — Mww

We can know of, and quite a lot about, many things that we can't access directly.

If another’s capabilities or subjective experiences were sufficiently accessible to me, they wouldn’t be merely implied. They would be, or could possibly be, demonstrably given. — Mww

But you don't accept experimental demonstrations as true. And so cannot be certain of anything.

Read the next bits. — creativesoul

yes:

The dog knows when the human is about to arrive, and it is perfectly rational in doing so... but it does not know what time the human is expected to arrive. — creativesoul

When but not what time. Because he doesn't know the names humans have artificially given the hours and minutes of the day. Okay.

From the jacket cover of that title:

This intriguing line of argument raises issues of importance to epistemologists and to philosophers of mind, of religion, and of science. — Wayfarer

I agree the argument raises such issues, but that is a different matter than whether it merits being taken seriously as an argument against naturalism.

Knowing what time a particular person is expected to arrive is to pick that time out from the rest. The dog does not do that. The dog knows when the human is about to arrive, and it is perfectly rational in doing so... but it does not know what time the human is expected to arrive.

The expectation belongs to the dog. Dogs are not capable of thinking about their own thought and belief. — creativesoul

Knowing what time the human is expected is knowledge about one's own expectations. Dogs do not have that.

What's in question is whether or not dogs can look forward to Thursdays despite having no knowledge whatsoever that any given day of their life is a Thursday. — creativesoul

The same applies to the five o'clock train.

an argument against naturalism. — wonderer1

God made no such thing...

:razz:

I wanted to mention something prior to retiring for the night.

When I said "language less" I meant without naming and descriptive practices. There is no clear lines to be drawn between language less creatures and our pets, for they are not language less. Not at all, actually. There's good reason domestication changes animals drastically, aside from the shrinking of the gene pool which is the function of the aim of breeding for specific traits.

There's overlap between language less animals and us. Our pets.

This overlap matters here, in these sorts of discussions, for not all dogs and cats and birds have drawn correlations between our language use and other things. Some have. Pets are socialized by us with us. It matters. Language has helped, as best I can tell, in helping to provide better means for pets to become rational to a greater extent than their cousins.

You asked a loaded question, insinuating that what is in bold is my thinking. — wonderer1

But you did say that Thomas Nagel, atheist though he might profess to be, should be categorised along with 'that crank' Alvin Plantinga, and The Discovery Institute, which is an Intelligent Design organisation. The implication is that you think Nagel and Plantinga's arguments against evolutionary theory are based on religious ideology and science denial, that you lump them all together as being a form of creationism or intelligent design. In actual fact, all three are very different. Thomas Nagel never appeals to intelligent design or belief in God - he says he lacks any 'sense of the divine'.

Can you cite evidence from any version of the EAAN that considers evolution occurring within a social species? Can you recognize that failure to think through the implications of evolution occurring within a social species results in the failure of the EAAN to make the case it claims to?

Suppose evolution alone only resulted in something like a feral human child that you might barely call rational, but if the individual members of that species were raised in a culture with other members of the same species the result was members of that species going to the moon.

Where does Plantinga show any evidence of having considered the role of cuture? — wonderer1

None of that is relevant, though. His argument is epistemological, about the nature of knowledge. It is of the kind described as 'transcendental arguments'. Transcendental arguments seek to demonstrate the necessary preconditions for the possibility of some experience, knowledge, or exercise of reason. They typically follow this form: if a belief is plausible, then certain conditions must be met for it to be coherent and intelligible.

Plantinga argues that if both naturalism and evolution are true, then the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable is low. If our cognitive faculties are unreliable, then we have a defeater for any belief produced by those faculties, including the belief in naturalism and evolution. This creates a self-defeating situation for the naturalist.

The basis on which he says that, is that naturalism typically holds that all events, including mental events like beliefs, are the result of natural (e.g. neurological) causes that can be studied and explained by the principles of natural science (such as neurology). This form of causation is often referred to as efficient causation, where one event (the cause) brings about another event (the effect) in accordance with physical or natural laws. In this view, mental states, including beliefs, are fully determined by physical processes in the brain, which are themselves the result of evolutionary pressures and biological mechanisms. Those who hold that the mind is identical with or a product of the brain or neural processes are obliged to hold this view. It is made explicit in the arguments of those such as Daniel Dennett.

In contrast, logical causation refers to the relationship between propositions where the truth of one proposition logically necessitates the truth of another. For example, if "All humans are mortal" and "Socrates is a human" are true, it logically follows that "Socrates is mortal" must also be true. This form of causation pertains to the realm of reason and logic rather than to observable physical processes. It governs how conclusions follow from premises in a rational argument, and is independent of physical causation.

What I've been arguing in this thread, is that the human faculty of reason differentiates humans from other species, because it enables humans to 'see reason' in that second sense (i.e. grasp logical inference.) That general lineage of argument has a very long pedigree, going right back to Plato and his predecessors.

I will add, there have been many developments in naturalism such that it no longer is susceptible to this argument i.e. Deacon's 'absentials', Vervaeke's 'extended naturalism' among others. But the case can certainly be made against the kind of neo-darwinian materialism that Dennett and Dawkins advocate.

But you did say that Thomas Nagel... — Wayfarer

If you are going to claim that I said something, then please have the intellectual integrity to quote what I actually said, rather than make up stories of what I said to suit the narrative you are trying to gaslight people into believing.

Can you cite evidence from any version of the EAAN that considers evolution occurring within a social species? Can you recognize that failure to think through the implications of evolution occurring within a social species results in the failure of the EAAN to make the case it claims to?

Suppose evolution alone only resulted in something like a feral human child that you might barely call rational, but if the individual members of that species were raised in a culture with other members of the same species the result was members of that species going to the moon.

Where does Plantinga show any evidence of having considered the role of cuture?
— wonderer1

None of that is relevant, though. — Wayfarer

Sure it is relevant, if Plantinga hopes to do more than beat on a staw man account of naturalistic evolution.

Can you help Plantinga out, by explaining why the species under consideration is a social species for which generally communicating truths is of no more adaptive value than generally communicating falsehoods?

If you are going to claim that I said something, then please have the intellectual integrity to quote what I actually said — wonderer1

Sure:

Nagel has fallen in with the cranks at the Discovery Institute, the crank Alvin Plantinga, etc. — wonderer1

Sure it is relevant, if Plantinga hopes to do more than beat on a staw man account of naturalistic evolution. — wonderer1

Your objection doesn’t address the argument.

I might add, whatever occurs within a social species, is a completely separate matter to what evolves according to natural selection. That only operates over much larger time-periods, and refers to the process of speciation. Certainly culture and human capabilities develop, but h.sapiens have not evolved significantly since their early forbears first appeared.

So who’s is the straw man argument?

Dogs do not have that. — creativesoul

I wonder how you know this. Or what difference it makes to rational thinking.

Your objection doesn’t address the argument. — Wayfarer

It addresses this gloss on your part:

Plantinga argues that if both naturalism and evolution are true, then the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable is low. — Wayfarer

If you want to provide a more fleshed out account of this aspect of Plantinga's argument, I'll address that. In the meantime...

As I said, Plantinga doesn't consider the role of communication among members of a social species in making his case. So Plantinga's claim is that:

P(R|N&E) is low
(I.e. the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable given naturalism and evolution is low.)

However, in order for Plantinga to address a scientifically informed position regarding the reliability of our cognitive faculties he needs to address a more complex scenario than he actually does. We can say that to be taken seriously Plantinga needs to address:

P(R|N&E&S)
(The probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable given naturalism and evolution and the evolution occured in a social species.)

However, in order to make that case Plantinga would need to establish that truth conveying communication occurring amongst members of the social species would do nothing to increase the reliability of the cognitive faculties of members of that species, as compared to being a feral member of the species without social interaction.

It's pretty ironic that an educator like Plantinga, needs to ignore the possibility of members of a social species educating each other and passing down culture, in order for his argument to superficially appear to work.

and also, Aristotle's 'De Anima', translated as 'On the Soul'. I love the connection between Anima, Animal, and Animated. — Wayfarer

Aye. Me too very much so. To be fair, Aristotle spoke in Ancient Greek whereas "anima" "animal" and "animated" are Latin based. But the associations are fairly blatant to understand, at least from where I stand.

A controversial thought, but if incorporeal beings of far grander stature - here thinking of polytheistic deities or else angels and archangels - were to be, what else would they be but more universal animas (souls) whose animus (mind) would be that much more evolved than any human's? Hence, if one were to entertain a great chain of being, it would start with the anima of bacteria or thereabouts and progress onward through the anima of humans into animas whose bodies of Logos would consist of non-physical Logos. No stark metaphysical divides anywhere to be found, just differences of degrees that then result in classifications of different kinds. This difference in kind amid an every fluid scale of degrees being in keeping with one nature of Logos being that of ratio-ning one something from the other.

This, of course, is just one hypothetical to be found among many others - that of an utter non-spirituality included. But I'm here intending to draw attention to the realty that there needs to be no sharp metaphysical divide in being/anima/psyche anywhere from bacteria all the way to deities in order to entertain views such as those professed by many a spiritual reality, both Western and Eastern.

Not sure how this thought will fly hereabouts. For the record, I'm not here endorsing any theology, but I am endorsing an absence of sharp metaphysical divides between all "animated" beings that coexist. And that this can just as easily apply to materialist interpretations of biological evolution as it can the concepts regarding the great chain (or, more aptly, ladder) of being. But, hopefully, I'm just preaching the the choir in saying all this.

What is needed is engagement of a particular kind, so that one can grasp that animals in many ways will engage with us in many (but not all) of the same ways that we engage with other people.

[...]

That's very vague, but I'm trying to gesture at the idea that this is not just a matter for abstract reason. It's about how to live with beings recognizably like us. After all, that's how we come to treat people as people and not "just" animals". — Ludwig V

... else how we come to understand that we ought not treat any other group of people as sub-human animals ... neither granting leeway to those who deem this to be so on "Nature-given" grounds or on "God-given" grounds, for both streams of reasoning leading to this same mentioned conclusion can, when more impartially addressed, only be utter bullshit. Black and Whites, for one example, being equally evolved not just biologically but also in their intellectual abilities - socioeconomic constraints of the current world aside.

All this maybe being a different set of issues for a different thread. But I very much liked your post. Thank you for it.

However, in order to make that case Plantinga would need to establish that truth conveying communication occurring amongst members of the social species would do nothing to increase the reliability of the cognitive faculties of members of that species, as compared to being a feral member of the species without social interaction. — wonderer1

Again, it doesn't address the evolutionary argument against naturalism. He doesn't say that we're incapable of communicating, or that we can't convey information by speaking to one another. For that matter, many creatures other than humans communicate. Bee dances communicate where flowers are. Many birds and of mammals convey warnings or indications of food sources. But then, none of those involve truth claims, as such. They display behaviours which can be understood in terms of stimulus and response. Note that such behaviours are 'reliable' in that bee dances and meerkat alarm calls really do indicate where flowers are or that danger is approaching. The evolutionary argument is rather about judgements of truth.

The argument is that naturalism maintains that mental events such as beliefs are the result of natural (e.g. neurological) causes that can be explained by the principles of natural science (such as neurology) - in other words, instances of efficient causation, where one event (cause) brings about another event (effect) in accordance with physical or natural laws. In this view, mental states, including beliefs, are determined by physical processes in the brain, which are themselves the result of evolutionary pressures and biological mechanisms. Whereas, reasoned inference works by different principles, relying on the relationship between propositions where the truth of one proposition logically necessitates the truth of another. So it's of a different order to physical causation - it transcends it.

That is the thrust of the argument, and so far, I fail to see how your 'social species' response actually addresses it.

Again, it doesn't address the evolutionary argument against naturalism. He doesn't say that we're incapable of communicating, or that we can't convey information by speaking to one another. — Wayfarer

Plantinga doesn't consider the role of communication at all. That is what disqualifies his argument from serious consideration as an argument against naturalism.

The argument is that naturalism maintains that mental events such as beliefs are the result of natural (e.g. neurological) causes that can be explained by the principles of natural science (such as neurology) - in other words, instances of efficient causation, where one event (cause) brings about another event (effect) in accordance with physical or natural laws. In this view, mental states, including beliefs, are determined by physical processes in the brain, which are themselves the result of evolutionary pressures and biological mechanisms. Whereas, reasoned inference works by different principles, relying on the relationship between propositions where the truth of one proposition logically necessitates the truth of another. — Wayfarer

You are conflating other stuff with Plantinga's argument. It would probably be better for you to stick to quoting actual passages written by Plantinga, or start arguing for your own version and we can ignore Plantinga.

Not so. Mine is a perfectly reasonable paraphrasing of Plantinga’s argument. You’ve presented nothing so far that shows you understand it. The reason he doesn’t discuss communication is that it is tangential to his argument.

It occurred to me after you responded, that in that video we have a demonstration of Kahneman's fast and slow thinking occurring in a dog. (And literally fast and literally slow.) — wonderer1

Right, I am only passingly familiar with Kahneman's work, but I think I see the point.

In this view, mental states, including beliefs, are determined by physical processes in the brain, which are themselves the result of evolutionary pressures and biological mechanisms. Whereas, reasoned inference works by different principles, relying on the relationship between propositions where the truth of one proposition logically necessitates the truth of another. — Wayfarer

Why should one explanation preclude the other? Another point is that most of our reasoning is inductive or abductive, where there is no logical necessity in play at all.