:halo:

I don't know how much science Nagel knows, but do you really mean to say that any perspective is not scientifically well-informed is not worth having? That's a very big assumption. — Ludwig V

I'm not saying that at all, I'm just pointing out that Nagel's perspective is not a scientifically well informed perspective, and that @Wayfarer tries to use Nagel's perspective to besmirch the perspective of people unlike Nagel.

It's very common for religious aplologists to engage in such propagandizing, and I'm done with biting my tongue when Wayfarer is doing it.

Back in The Day, 60 Minutes ended each show with “Point/Counterpoint”, parodied on SNL most hilariously between Jane and Dan.
(jesuuuuuus, that as funny. Sad commentary, perhaps: 1975…the last time I remember laughing that hard (sigh))

All that follows is dry, humorless point/counterpoint, a pseudo-Socratic dialectic, if you will, with all due respect:

We know there are competing contradictory notions of "rational" at work here in this thread. They do not all rest upon the same ground. — creativesoul

All notions of ‘rational’ at work here, including those that contradict each other, do rest on the same ground, which is human intelligence. The concept “rationality” is itself a human construct predicated on its intellectual capacities, from which follows any instance of it relates to no other intelligence than the one that conceived it as such.

The quality of any behavior, which is to say whether such behavior is rational, which reduces to whether the quality of the thought/belief from which the behavior follows is rational, can only be judged by that intelligence that deems itself in possession of it. Just as we cannot know the beauty of a thing without the apprehension of beauty itself to which that thing relates. Just as we cannot deem an observed act as moral without our own sense of what morality is.

Which gets us to coherency, insofar as given that rationality is apprehended in humans by humans regardless of behavior, the notion follows that rationality should be apprehendable in other animals by humans regardless of behavior, which is under any condition whatsoever impossible, hence the notion is incoherent.

This is no reflection on language-less thought/belief as such, which is, again, only apprehendable from a human point of view. It is not a valid judgement that lesser animals are language-less, nor is it a valid judgement that lesser animals engage in thought/belief. Regarding the former, any series of vocalizations by any species so capable of them, in conjunction with another of like kind, can be a language for them, and, thought/belief being an entirely internal cognitive machination by definition, precludes any external access to it, which is sufficient to refuse its affirmation by an external arbiter.

But it is non-contradictory that humans do engage in language-less thought/belief, given the possibility of thought/belief by means of mere imagery. And from that follows that it is also non-contradictory to maintain that, in humans, thought/belief in general and rational thought/belief in particular, is antecedent to and proper ground for, the inception and development of language in them as a species.

Even granting human language-less thought/belief, is not sufficient reason to grant lesser animals thought/belief because they happen to be language-less in lacking all forms of serial vocalizations. And without sufficient reason to grant to these quite lesser animals thought/belief, it is then immediately contradictory to grant them rationality, which is merely a relative quality of thought itself.

Which leaves us with those lesser animals considered as possessing a rudimentary form of language, judged by human standards, as to whether that form of language is a development of a commensurate form of rational thought/belief. Nature is, of course, rife with occasions which instill in us the notion those occasions are exemplifications of rational thought by those intelligences the internal cognitive machinations of which are inaccessible to us.

Now, given the irrefutable truth that all of which is not a possible experience for us, is impossible knowledge for us….by what right can we say we know of rational thought/belief in those animals the cognitive machinations of which are inaccessible?

Odd, innit? We find ourselves using our intelligence to judge other intelligences, but in the very judging of them we have no choice but to treat them other than how they may actually be. Which is the same as being completely wrong, which in turn, and indeed to be rational about it, makes explicit we are best served to not engage in those judgements at all.

….be sure to tune in next week….

"Jane, you ignorant slut!"

Is there any chance Nagel's perspective is as scientifically well informed as that of anyone here?

Graphic and physical. It's what feral human children do to survive in the wild. — Vera Mont

That would not cover rational thinking would it?

As noted, I think this distinction is resisted in contemporary culture because it's politically incorrect. There's an aversion to the Christian doctrine of mankind's sovereignty over nature as it is associated with religion and old-fashioned cultural attitudes. It's today's 'popular wisdom'. — Wayfarer

The only political component I can see is the enacting of laws against cruelty to animals. The same factions are working to reduce cruelty to other humans. If that goes against Christian dogma - oh, well, it's had its 2000-year reign (sometimes of paternalism, sometimes of terror.)

Through it, we become different kinds of beings, namely, human beings, and we're not just another class of primate. — Wayfarer

Nobody's tried to take that away from you. So why insist on taking away from those "lesser" beings a faculty they possess in common with us? Does crossing a threshold require you to sever all ties?
Many people have declined to do that; have retained their links to the natural world and other species and are the healthier for it.

What is needed is engagement of a particular kind, so that one can grasp that animals in many ways will engage with us in many (but not all) of the same ways that we engage with other people. — Ludwig V

There is the undeniable and ever present imbalance of power to take into consideration.

Now, given the irrefutable truth that all of which is not a possible experience for us, is impossible knowledge for us….by what right can we say we know of rational thought/belief in those animals the cognitive machinations of which are inaccessible? — Mww

By the same right that allows us to discuss distant suns and galaxies to which we have no direct access, and the way we learn the relationships of atoms in molecules or the events of geological time: though observation, theory, prediction and experimentation. What makes animals easier to understand than chemicals and mountains is that we are more closely related to animals and thus better able to recognize behaviours that are similar to ours and extrapolate that the motivation and thought process that prompts the same behaviour may also be similar.

That would not cover rational thinking would it? — Athena

Well, they did survive, so they must have made some rational decisions along the way. We can't see the process, only the result.

It's very common for religious aplologists to engage in such propagandizing, and I'm done with biting my tongue when Wayfarer is doing it. — wonderer1

Thank you for telling me. But I think I'll make up my own mind, if you don't mind.

Is there any chance Nagel's perspective is as scientifically well informed as that of anyone here? — Patterner

If Nagel is not scientifically well informed, he is as well informed as me. In other respects also, I would very much like to be able to adopt Nagel's perspective. He's a much better philosopher than me. Yet I still disagree with many of his opinions, especially with regard to bats.

Some people say they think in images. (Planning how to pack a suitcase, for example). I don't, but how could I contradict them?
Sometimes, when we are improvising, we are thinking by doing.
Then there's all the thinking that goes on that we are not aware of. This is more controversial, philosophically speaking. My favourite example is our echo-location. Phenomenologically, we just know where a sound is. But the scientists tell us that we work out where sounds are by the difference in the sound between one ear and the other - it arrives later on the side furthest from the source.
This is sometimes called "tacit knowledge". There's a lot of it about, but philosophy regards it as secondary to conscious thinking. Short story. It's a bit of a mystery.
And Vera Mont is quite right to cite feral human children. When found, they are often completely without language, yet can clearly respond appropriately to what's going on. (They also, I understand, find it very difficult to learn language at all.) But that only demonstrates that it is possible to think unconsciously and without language. So it is important for this thread. — Ludwig V

I had to look up tacit knowledge and found this..

Examples of tacit knowledge include knowledge of how to manage an angry customer or the know-how required to complete a complex task. This type of knowledge is often not easily captured in words, and therefore not easily transferred from one person to another. https://helpjuice.com/blog/tacit-knowledge#:~:text=Tacit%20knowledge%20refers%20to%20the,Tribal%20knowledge

I knew a man who was mechanical and took a class in physics and failed, yet he could resolve a mechanical/physics problem that no one else in the class could figure out. I would say that is an example of tacit knowledge. It is not understanding theory which is a verbal explanation of how something works. Verbal knowledge is something the man has trouble learning but he has knowledge that is not verbal.

When speaking of rational thinking- human and animal, I think we should mull over what is a thought. You said a thought can be an image rather than words and I spoke with a woman who designs things for people who request designs such as a machine that makes concrete barriers for a fancy garden. She said she sees the required parts of such a machine. She came to her job by her unique skill, not education.

Now if we agree rational thinking requires words, the two people I mentioned are not thinking with words and that might be akin to how animals think. With sonar, a bat can do amazing things and that is not a verbal task. Animals in general do amazing thing without words and could label all this tacit knowledge?

When arguing bonobo can learn language I wanted to say something that I didn't have the words for. Your thoughts helped me find the right words...

We used to think that a new embryo's epigenome was completely erased and rebuilt from scratch. But this isn't completely true. Some epigenetic tags remain in place as genetic information passes from generation to generation, a process called epigenetic inheritance.

Epigenetic inheritance is an unconventional finding. It goes against the idea that inheritance happens only through the DNA code that passes from parent to offspring. It means that a parent's experiences, in the form of epigenetic tags, can be passed down to future generations. https://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/epigenetics/inheritance/

I believe bonobos have the potential for learning language but it is dormant because they lack the epigenome and inherited use of language that humans have. However, if they were taught communication as infants and were in an environment that encouraged communicating, their children would have epigenome and inherited language skills and they could eventually evolve into using language.

Well, they did survive, so they must have made some rational decisions along the way. We can't see the process, only the result. — Vera Mont

Surviving does not require the ability to think. You would not want to say alligators think, would you? They do not have a cortex and it is the cortex that makes us thinking animals. Alligators have reptilian brains, and so do we. I have been with severely brain-damaged people and they may be able to make some survival choices but their inability to think means very poor decision making.

Insects and animals do amazing things as a matter of instinct and want to add epigensome to this, which I define in my post just before this one. Our emotions can cancel out our ability to think, resulting in us reacting perfectly to an emergency or perhaps doing something we seriously regret. Just because we are capable of rational thinking, that does not mean that is what we are doing 24/7. Our brains are like chattering monkeys constantly running from one thought to another, but this is not rational thinking.

I think we need to understand the importance of language and learned logic skills for rational thinking. Not all thinking is rational thinking.

All notions of ‘rational’ at work here, including those that contradict each other, do rest on the same ground, which is human intelligence. The concept “rationality” is itself a human construct predicated on its intellectual capacities, from which follows any instance of it relates to no other intelligence than the one that conceived it as such. — Mww

"All notions of ‘physical’ at work here, including those that contradict each other, do rest on the same ground, which is human intelligence. The concept “physical” is itself a human construct predicated on its intellectual capacities, from which follows any instance of it relates to no other intelligence than the one that conceived it as such."
The notions we apply to the world are like a lens, through which we understand the world. There may be distortions due to our particular perspective. But that does not mean that everything we understand is false. After all, we cannot change our perspective, so we might as well make the most of what we've got.

Which gets us to coherency, insofar as given that rationality is apprehended in humans by humans regardless of behavior, — Mww

What do you mean? We can call out irrational behaviour as such. We do it all the time.

thought/belief being an entirely internal cognitive machination by definition, precludes any external access to it, which is sufficient to refuse its affirmation by an external arbiter. — Mww

That applies to both humans and animals and means that no judgement, positive or negative, is justified. But it is clear that we do make such assessments, from which it follows that thought/belief is not an entirely internal cognitive machination.

Even granting human language-less thought/belief, is not sufficient reason to grant lesser animals thought/belief because they happen to be language-less in lacking all forms of serial vocalizations. — Mww

Granting human language-less thought/belief is sufficient reason to grant animals thought/belief unless a sufficient reason for withholding language-less thought/belief from them is provided.

Which leaves us with those lesser animals considered as possessing a rudimentary form of language, judged by human standards, as to whether that form of language is a development of a commensurate form of rational thought/belief. — Mww

That would be one possibility, but it is not the argument that I would put.

Nature is, of course, rife with occasions which instill in us the notion those occasions are exemplifications of rational thought by those intelligences the internal cognitive machinations of which are inaccessible to us. — Mww

Two conclusions follow. First that animals are capable of rational action. Second, the internal cognitive machinations are accessible to us, so they are not purely internal.

I knew a man who was mechanical and took a class in physics and failed, yet he could resolve a mechanical/physics problem that no one else in the class could figure out. I would say that is an example of tacit knowledge. It is not understanding theory which is a verbal explanation of how something works. Verbal knowledge is something the man has trouble learning but he has knowledge that is not verbal. — Athena

I would say that is an example of what tacit knowledge is all about. It means that the ability to verbalize one's reasoning is distinct from the ability to reason - the two are not the same process. Which does not mean that the ability to verbalize one's reasons does not enable more complex thinking.

My favourite example of tacit knowledge is Socrates/Plato's insistence that if one cannot define, e.g., courage, piety in words, one does not know what courage/piety may be. But it is clear that that is not the case. In fact, when we speak, we are following a set of complex set of rules that we cannot verbalize. This is a dramatic illustration of how important tacit knowledge can be.

BTW If you post image-thinking as an alternative, that is fair enough. But there is not reason to suppose that it explains tacit knowledge, because if one can sensible manipulate the images such that the product is what you imagined, then you are following rules that you cannot articulate. Image-thinking is an alternative (better, in some circumstances) to verbal thinking.

Animals in general do amazing thing without words and could label all this tacit knowledge? — Athena

Yes, I think so.

I'm glad following up tacit thinking was so productive for you. I think it is an important phenomenon. It is a shame that philosophers have seen fit to ignore it.

You would not want to say alligators think, would you? — Athena

Their thinking is on a fairly rudimentary level. They do have a cerebellum, as do lizards and turtles, so the 'reptilian brain' is not quite as you depict it. The alligator's lifestyle doesn't pose many intellectual challenges. They're also stronger and more in their element than a human child alone in a forest.

I have been with severely brain-damaged people and they may be able to make some survival choices but their inability to think means very poor decision making. — Athena

And so, other people take care of them, even in adulthood. That feral kid doesn't survive with the use of its mighty jaws or its social support system; it only has its little hands and big brain to provide itself with food and shelter while avoiding predators.

Now if we agree rational thinking requires words, — Athena

Which we still do not,

I think we need to understand the importance of language and learned logic skills for rational thinking. Not all thinking is rational thinking. — Athena

Oh, we can be quite irrational in language, too. Just listen to a speech by.... never mind.
Humans have an enormous brain, only a small part of which is required to run the vital physical systems and another small part for reflex actions and survival instincts. The rest is available for learning, memory, language, culture, skill acquisition, storytelling, convictions, wealth accumulation, altruism, invention, emotional complexity, deceit, social bonding, philosophy, ambition, superstition, delusion and madness. As well as reasoning and assessment.

“…Dan, you pompous ass!!!….

A gentle reminder, n’est ce pas?, not to take what we do here all that seriously?

Indeed! :grin:

All notions of ‘physical’ at work here, including those that contradict each other, do rest on the same ground, which is human intelligence. — Ludwig V

I disagree. All notions of physical, all of that which is conditioned by natural relations, do rest on the same ground, but such ground is Nature. Nature cannot contradict itself, but human intelligence certain has that capacity.

Is it really worth the trouble, to admit other possible worlds and such, in which, e.g, our logical principles, and by extension our mathematical principles, are false, or, even the totality of this Nature inaccessible to us in which there may be natural contradiction, and we are forced to start over? How would we even do that, if all we thought we knew is destroyed, but the internal mechanisms by which we know anything at all, remains the same?

The notions we apply to the world are like a lens, through which we understand the world. — Ludwig V

Agreed. But this presupposes world, and world as not that which contains the lens through which it is understood. There is us, and there is not-us, which justifies the distinction in grounds upon which they rest.
—————-

Which gets us to coherency, insofar as given that rationality is apprehended in humans by humans regardless of behavior,
— Mww

What do you mean? We can call out irrational behaviour as such. We do it all the time. — Ludwig V

This conflates the effect with the cause of it. Rational/irrational behavior is a complementary pair in exhibition of rationality. Humans know what rationality is, without the necessity of an example of it, and irrationality being merely its negation.

It is absurd to say humans don’t apprehend rationality, in that rationality is the general human rule and irrationality is the exception to the rule.
—————

thought/belief being an entirely internal cognitive machination by definition, precludes any external access to it, which is sufficient to refuse its affirmation by an external arbiter.
— Mww

That applies to both humans and animals and means that no judgement, positive or negative, is justified. — Ludwig V

It can’t mean that, without self-contradiction. But that’s irrelevant, in juxtaposition to your response intermingling internal with external, yet my comment maintains their separation. In correcting the inconsistency, it is true my judgement of your thought/belief, being the aforementioned external arbiter, is unjustified, in that I have no warrant whatsoever for it. It is only your behavior consequential to your thought/belief that is sufficient warrant, such behavior being external to yourself hence for me a mere perception, understood, as you say, through a lens that is me.

And don’t neglect context here. The dialectical dichotomy refers to humans as opposed to lesser animals, which does not abide in human as opposed to human, which is what you’ve done. Now it is the case that for me to refuse affirmation of your thought/belief, its inaccessibility to me notwithstanding, perfectly exemplifies my invalid judgement.
(sidebar on a technicality: all judgements are justified, else they wouldn’t be judgements. Conclusions to which judgements arrive may be unjustified, iff subsequent judgements with different premises falsify them.)
—————-

Granting human language-less thought/belief is sufficient reason to grant animals thought/belief unless a sufficient reason for withholding language-less thought/belief from them is provided. — Ludwig V

I am not withholding language-less thought belief; to do so is to contradict myself, insofar as I affirm my own. I am withholding affirmation of thought/belief, specifically rational thought/belief, in language-less intelligences. Provision of sufficient reason for withholding such affirmation reduces to the fact they cannot inform me of it on the one hand, and I have no possibility of affirming that which is inaccessible to me on the other.
————-

Two conclusions follow. — Ludwig V

This is tantamount to claiming that cloud which looks like a flying horse, is a flying horse. Extreme example, but holding in principle. That which instills a notion in us cannot be used as proof for the validity of the notion, re: sunrise/sunset. The notion that deities exist cannot itself prove they do.

Anyway….feel free to rebut as you will.

Now, given the irrefutable truth that all of which is not a possible experience for us, is impossible knowledge for us….by what right can we say we know of rational thought/belief in those animals the cognitive machinations of which are inaccessible?
— Mww

By the same right that allows us to discuss distant suns and galaxies to which we have no direct access, and the way we learn the relationships of atoms in molecules or the events of geological time: though observation, theory, prediction and experimentation. — Vera Mont

If something is inaccessible to us, we cannot know of it. Which is not to say we cannot infer, from an experience, its cause. But I’m not interested in possibilities logical inference affords, when I want the certainty implied by an answer to an empirical question, especially when I already have the certainty afforded me from my own rational thought.

I believe bonobos have the potential for learning language but it is dormant because they lack the epigenome and inherited use of language that humans have. — Athena

It's genetics, not simply epigenetics. And don’t overlook the fact that not only are their brains not equipped for language, but neither are their vocal tracts, for which the h.sapiens anatomy is uniquely suited.

My suggestion is that there is a tendency to see animals as inherently other than us, human beings, mainly on the ground that they are in what one might call the state of nature, before humans came and developed societies. It's a way of thinking that was prominent in 18th century philosophy, but the roots of it in our way of life are deeper than that. The difference is that they are now openly contested. — Ludwig V

Well, you said that neither Christianity nor Darwinism are a philosophy, but Christianity absorbed a great deal of Greek philosophy, which resulted in the unique synthesis of Christian Platonism.

In traditional theology and metaphysics, the natural was largely conceived as the evil, and the spiritual or supernatural as the good. In popular Darwinism, the good is the well-adapted, and the value of that to which the organism adapts itself is unquestioned or is measured only in terms of further adaptation. However, being well adapted to one’s surroundings is tantamount to being capable of coping successfully with them, of mastering the forces that beset one. Thus the theoretical denial of the spirit’s antagonism to nature–even as implied in the doctrine of interrelation between the various forms of organic life, including man–frequently amounts in practice to subscribing to the principle of man’s continuous and thoroughgoing domination of nature. Regarding reason as a natural organ does not divest it of the trend to domination or invest it with greater potentialities for reconciliation. On the contrary, the abdication of the spirit in popular Darwinism entails the rejection of any elements of the mind that transcend the function of adaptation and consequently are not instruments of self-preservation. Reason disavows its own primacy and professes to be a mere servant of natural selection. On the surface, this new empirical reason seems more humble toward nature than the reason of the metaphysical tradition. Actually, however, it is arrogant, practical mind riding roughshod over the ‘useless spiritual,’ and dismissing any view of nature in which the latter is taken to be more than a stimulus to human activity. The effects of this view are not confined to modern philosophy. — The Eclipse of Reason, Max Horkheimer

I don't know how much science Nagel knows, but do you really mean to say that any perspective is not scientifically well-informed is not worth having? — Ludwig V

Those who push scientism seem never to understand what it is or that this is what they're doing. I think the reason is, that the distinction between a philosophical and a scientific question is itself a philosophical distinction, therefore unintelligible in scientific terms.

If something is inaccessible to us, we cannot know of it. — Mww

Do you know of a man named Vladimir Putin? Is he accessible to you?

But I’m not interested in possibilities logical inference affords, when I want the certainty implied by an answer to an empirical question, especially when I already have the certainty afforded me from my own rational thought. — Mww

Your implied certainty of another's capabilities is based on not being able to access intimate knowledge of that other's subjective experience?
Hnh...

Those behaviors have a multitude of very different and equally accurate explanations for why the dog is behaving that way.
— creativesoul
Of that specific cluster of behaviours at that same time every weekday, but not on weekends or holidays? Show me three of that multitude of accurate explanations. — Vera Mont

The dog believes that the human will be arriving soon. The dog does not recognize the sound of it's human's car. The dog, after being reminded of past events - by virtue of being amidst much the same spatiotemporal events - begins to form, have, and/or hold expectation that the human will be there. In doing so the dog begins getting anticipatory excitement in a happy sort of way due to the lifelong loving connection the dog and human have.

I'm not saying that the dog's behavior is not rational. I would say that it most certainly is.

I'm questioning which things it makes the most sense to say that the dog is experiencing: Which sorts of thoughts and beliefs dogs can form, have, and/or hold.

Being hopeful does not belong in that grouping.

Holding some kinds of expectation does. Anticipation does. All hopefulness is anticipatory. All hopefulness involves expectation, but not all anticipation is hopefulness, and not all expectation is hopefulness. There is a difference, and that difference is key here.

What is hoping that something will happen without knowing that it may not? You see what I'm getting at? Dogs are not aware of their own fallibility. We are. It is only after becoming aware of the fact that we can be wrong about stuff, that we can become hopeful - in the face of that uncertainty. Compared/contrast that with autonomous anticipation and/or expectation without such metacognitive reservation.

Anthropomorphism looms large.
— creativesoul
And terrifying! Why? — Vera Mont

This mistakenly presupposes that you are somehow privy to my fear(s)?

:yikes:


Attributing things that are exclusively human to that which is not is something many do. I myself have been guilty of it. However, it is not at all 'terrifying' in-so-much-as just being completely unacceptable. It is akin to holding false belief. It is a mistake. I try to avoid those.

Similarity and commonality are not diseases; they're a natural result of sharing a planet and a history. — Vera Mont

Of course similarity and commonality are not diseases. The irony. Those are a large part of the foundation of my own worldview/position. Your replies apply to someone who does not agree on that.

It's becoming apparent that there is some misunderstanding at hand.

A candidate not only has to have an intuitive sense of the passage of time, but it also must possess some means of differentiating between timeframes such that they also know that other periods are not that arrival time. They have to think along the lines of different timeframes.
— creativesoul
You're overcomplicating something simple. A biological clock: so much time has elapsed; at this interval, something is supposed to happen. — Vera Mont

Yeah. :brow: No.

What you're claiming is simple is not. The above can be true, and the claim in question... false. I'm not denying the above. What I am denying is not nearly so simple as that.

Changing goalposts is generally frowned upon too.

No. Knowing what time a particular person is expected to arrive is to pick that time out from the rest. The dog does not do that. The dog knows when the human is about to arrive, and it is perfectly rational in doing so... but it does not know what time the human is expected to arrive.

The expectation belongs to the dog. Dogs are not capable of thinking about their own thought and belief.

The arrival of the train meant the arrival of the human, to the dog that is... due to the correlations the dog had drawn, time and time again between all the regularities surrounding the five o'clock train.
— creativesou
And that's not rational, because....? — Vera Mont

It is rational. The irony, once again. You're quoting my argument for how and/or why it is rational.

Jeez!

:worry:

Sometimes. Lots of folk dread Monday, simply because it's Monday.
— creativesoul
No. Because it's the first day of a new work-week. Early rising (possibly with hangover) (possibly lover departing), rigid morning routine, uncomfortable clothing, commute, staff meeting, unpleasant colleague regaling you with their spectacular weekend adventures, bossy department head dumping unwanted task on your desk.... Some people who enjoy their work actually look forward to Mondays; most people don't enjoy their work. Pity!

No?

So now you're going to deny what my coworkers have said when I asked? Sure, some may dread Monday for the reasons listed above. Others just dread Monday because it's a day to be dreaded. That's not all that uncommon. They wake up with negativity teeming, because it's Monday and they're convinced that Monday is the worst day. When asked, some replies have been...

"No reason, really. It's just a Monday, ya know?"

"It's Monday", accompanied by a perplexed look - like I should already know that. :brow: Some people have very strange belief systems.

Arrrgh, feels like a Monday, doesn't it?"

Etc.

There's another relevant issue here. The tactic you're using can be used against the anthropomorphic claims you've made. We can continue to say stuff like, "No. Not because it's the first day of the workweek, but because they do not like work at all."

Whatever.

Many say they dread Mondays because they believe Mondays are the worst days. What you've added and/or said here does not deny that, despite your insistence that you're answering in the negative. Rather, your extrapolation adds further support for why they dread Mondays.

What's in question is whether or not dogs can look forward to Thursdays despite having no knowledge whatsoever that any given day of their life is a Thursday.

To the dog, the train means the human.
— creativesoul
No other train, just the five o'clock local.
But never mind, I have lots of other examples you can explain away.

We could change what we call the train. It would no longer be the five o'clock train is we did so. Would the dog notice? Perhaps it's best put like this: "The five o'clock train" is the way we pick that train out from all others. It is not the way the dog does. The time the train comes makes no difference at all to that dog. What mattered was that train was connected to the human, not what chronological order it was in. Other humans arrive at other times. Their dogs know nothing at all about what time counts as five o'clock or four or two or whatever. The chronological time makes no difference to the dog. What matters is the human connected to the train... regardless of what time it arrives on our clocks.

Yes, dogs have a sense of time. Yes, dogs can develop timely routines. Yes, that consistency can become ritualistic. Ritual shared between species. Bonding. Yes, these can involve the train we call "the five o'clock train".

It's very common for religious aplologists to engage in such propagandizing, and I'm done with biting my tongue when Wayfarer is doing it.
— wonderer1
Thank you for telling me. But I think I'll make up my own mind, if you don't mind. — Ludwig V

I wouldn't have it any other way. It seems as if you've taken something I said as suggesting otherwise, but if so, I don't understand what you interpreted that way.

Is there any chance Nagel's perspective is as scientifically well informed as that of anyone here?
— Patterner
If Nagel is not scientifically well informed, he is as well informed as me. In other respects also, I would very much like to be able to adopt Nagel's perspective. He's a much better philosopher than me. Yet I still disagree with many of his opinions, especially with regard to bats. — Ludwig V

I suppose I should have said "well informed in a way commensurate with the claims he makes". Nagel has fallen in with the cranks at the Discovery Institute, the crank Alvin Plantinga, etc. I don't see any reason to consider Nagel a better philosopher than you. How do you define better?

the crank Alvin Plantinga, — wonderer1

Speaks volumes, don't it.

Alvin Carl Plantinga[a] (born November 15, 1932) is an American analytic philosopher who works primarily in the fields of philosophy of religion, epistemology (particularly on issues involving epistemic justification), and logic.

From 1963 to 1982, Plantinga taught at Calvin University before accepting an appointment as the John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame.[2] He later returned to Calvin University to become the inaugural holder of the Jellema Chair in Philosophy.[3]

A prominent Christian philosopher, Plantinga served as president of the Society of Christian Philosophers from 1983 to 1986. He has delivered the Gifford Lectures twice and was described by Time magazine as "America's leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God".[4] In 2014, Plantinga was the 30th most-cited contemporary author in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.[5] — Wikipedia

So, an academically-qualified professor of philosophy, but Christian, therefore a crank, right?

Jeez! You guys get a room, will ya?

Hmmm, this isn't the place for it, but there seems to be a remarkable difference between how we treat "meaning". I'm nihilistic, as mentioned heretofore. Where there is no creature capable of drawing correlations between different things, there can be no meaning. When something is meaningful, it is always meaningful to a creature capable of attributing such.

I say that not to argue, compare, or nitpick, but rather to offer you a bit of argumentative ground for the position I'm arguing from/for. Perhaps it will help you to understand where I'm coming from, so to speak.

:smile:

So, an academically-qualified professor of philosophy, but Christian, therefore a crank, right? — Wayfarer

I didn't say anything about Plantinga being a Christian, and I'd like to hope you might want to refrain from putting words in my mouth like that. Do you think that you can?

Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism is a crank argument Do you think academically qualified professors of philosophy are somehow immune to being cranks?

Of course, if you want to argue for the EAAN I'd be happy to point out many ways that it is a crank argument.

Jeez! You guys get a room, will ya? — creativesoul

:razz:

I didn't say anything about Plantinga being a Christian, and I'd like to hope you might want to refrain from putting words in my mouth like that. Do you think that you can? — wonderer1

No, you said he was a crank. That is not a word I put in your mouth. I am pointing out that he's an academically-qualified academic and professor of philosophy with reference to his Wikipedia entry. I've discussed variations of his 'evolutionary argument against naturalism' in the past. You ought to recognise that it was the subject of a number of textbooks with a great deal of commentary by academics on both sides of the argument, including critics such as Daniel Dennett (for example). So, he's not a crank, and it's not a crank's argument.

From the jacket cover of that title:

This intriguing line of argument raises issues of importance to epistemologists and to philosophers of mind, of religion, and of science. In this, the first book to address the ongoing debate, Plantinga presents his influential thesis and responds to critiques by distinguished philosophers from a variety of subfields. Plantinga's argument is aimed at metaphysical naturalism or roughly the view that no supernatural beings exist. Naturalism is typically conjoined with evolution as an explanation of the existence and diversity of life. Plantinga's claim is that one who holds to the truth of both naturalism and evolution is irrational in doing so. More specifically, because the probability that unguided evolution would have produced reliable cognitive faculties is either low or inscrutable, one who holds both naturalism and evolution acquires a "defeater" for every belief he/she holds, including the beliefs associated with naturalism and evolution. Following Plantinga's brief summary of his thesis are eleven original pieces by his critics. The book concludes with a new essay by Plantinga in which he defends and extends his view that metaphysical naturalism is self-defeating.

Do you know of a man named Vladimir Putin? Is he accessible to you? — Vera Mont

Of course I know of a particular man, and therefore of course he’s accessible to me; I got a tv.

To know of a thing, is not the same as to know the thing. Do you see that if you’d asked if I knew Putin, I’d have given a different answer?
——————

Your implied certainty of another's capabilities is based on not being able to access intimate knowledge of that other's subjective experience? — Vera Mont

Correct. If another’s capabilities or subjective experiences were sufficiently accessible to me, they wouldn’t be merely implied. They would be, or could possibly be, demonstrably given.

Is there any experience that isn’t subjective?

But, I emphasize, the description of an action provided by the agent in language may be an important criterion for us, but it is not decisive in all circumstances. — Ludwig V

I would concur.

The agent may be lying or misrepresenting the action for various purposes. — Ludwig V

Sure.

Or the agent may not be recognizing how we might see it - what is just banter to the agent, may be a serious slur to us. — Ludwig V

Yes. Interpretation is a very interesting process. It is entwined with understanding. When someone draws the same correlations between the language use that we do, they interpret correctly, and... understand us.

Which reminds me that I ought check with the readers more often than I do. Always appreciate your 'tone', by the way. Model. Thank you.

It is even possible that the agent may be wrong - deceiving themselves. — Ludwig V

Sure. I'm not fond of 'self-deception' but that's an aside having to do with the inability to tell oneself that they believe something that they do not, or vice versa.

Trauma is another matter altogether. Coping mechanisms and all that.