Has anyone determined what the average number of retrievals a caregiver is willing to perform before the object is thrown out the window? — BC

My informal observation: up to six times without showing exasperation, after which they don't give it back. All babies seem to do it; I think they consider this a game.

One shouldn't waste scarce helium on experiments that have already been done — BC

...or on celebrations or political hoopla... especially knowing how much harm they o the environment.

I hope that's tongue-in-cheek. — Vera Mont

Oh, no! Totally serious. (Ouch! bites tongue)

Whether mimicry and imitation are rational or not depends on why it is being done, surely? If it is being done to avoid predators, for example, why is it not rational?
When a parrot mimics speech, there is no doubt that it is the parrot that is doing the mimicking. Quite why I don't know, but it seems most reasonable to suppose that the parrot has some purpose in doing that, because it clearly finds the behaviour rewarding in some way. — Ludwig V

Okay, thank you for expanding on your comment because I had wanted to come back to this thread to make a critical observation that the point of rational thinking seems to have been lost in this discussion. I said in my first post here that the goal of rational thinking or reasoning is to arrive at a valid/sound conclusion. Animals do not use rational thinking, but instinctive behavior.

You said, "purpose", "rewarding" and "reasonable to suppose". All these are fine -- nothing wrong with this behavior, but it is not rational thinking. Because we can talk to each other and be articulate and coherent with each other (like right now here on the forum) -- but do you suppose that you have talked to a dog and determined that he spoke to you about why he is doing what he's doing? Did the parrot articulate to you his reasoning for mimicking? It looks reasonable to you, but you did not arrive at this 'reasonableness' by discussing it with the parrot.

Do we have a member here in the forum that is dog or a parrot? Then let us invite that parrot on this thread and let him lay out his reasons for mimicking.

So, for you, the only valid criterion for reason is the use of human language? Pretty narrow definition.

I had wanted to come back to this thread to make a critical observation that the point of rational thinking seems to have been lost in this discussion. I said in my first post here that the goal of rational thinking or reasoning is to arrive at a valid/sound conclusion. Animals do not use rational thinking, but instinctive behavior. — L'éléphant

I agree. I think there’s a difference between behaviours that can be accounted for in terms of stimulus and response, and behaviours that can be attributed to rational inference. The former, for instance, covers an enormous range of behaviours that animals and even plants exhibit. Venus fly traps, for instance, close around their prey, and numerous other plants will open flowers in sunlight and close them when it sets. Animal behaviours from insect life up to mammals routinely exhibit complex behaviours in response to stimuli. But the question is, do such behaviours qualify as rational? Human observers can obviously perceive the causal relationship between stimulus and response, but I don't think that implies conscious rational calculation ('If I do this, then that will happen') on the part of the animal (or plant).

It might be worth recalling the distinctions Aristotle makes between different organic forms. Plants, according to Aristotle, possess only the nutritive soul, responsible for growth, nutrition, and reproduction. Animals, in addition to the nutritive soul, have the sensitive soul, granting them the abilities of sensation, movement, and desire. Humans uniquely possess all these functions but also have the rational soul, which allows for inference, reflection, and the capacity for abstract thought. This rational capacity sets humans apart, as it involves deliberation and the ability to grasp universals, which Aristotle sees as the hallmark of true rationality. (Bear in mind 'soul' is used to translate the Greek term psuchē which refers broadly to the principle of life or the life force in living beings rather than the modern notion of an "immaterial soul." I've been reading a little of contemporary systems science and biology, and while it is true that Aristotle's schema has been updated somewhat in those disciplines, elements of his biology are still recognised. Terrence Deacon, in his Incomplete Nature, adapts Aristotelian concepts like teleology (goal-directedness) in describing emergent processes in nature, and Alice Juarrero, in her work on causality and complex systems, sees continuity with Aristotle’s notion of formal and final causes.)

Thanks for the Wittgenstein quotation. I had forgotten it.

The upper midwest of the US doesn't harbor many red squirrels, so I'm not familiar with their behavior. Grey squirrels are everywhere around here. They usually are grey with a white belly, but they sometimes are black or white (not a seasonal change). — BC

Your greys are a bit different from ours. I've never heard of black or white ones. It wouldn't be surprising if the two groups diverged over time. I wish I could post a picture of a red for you - their ear tufts are incredible.

I've read about the terrorism directed at your red squirrels by the Yankee grey squirrels. Social scientists and psychoanalysts have not been able to determine what, exactly, is the source of this inter-squirrel hostility. — BC

You mean that the cognitive dissonance created by the similarity combined with the difference in colour is not sufficient? They should read some social history.

It's not hard to let them eat out of your hand; even to sit on your knee and eat the offered peanuts. I've established such a relationship several times since I was a kid. I'm more fastidious as an old guy, and would just as soon NOT have even cute rodents sitting on me. — BC

I hate to say this, but most people in the UK regard grey squirrels as vermin along with rats and mice. But that's because the red squirrels are much cuter and the greys are immigrants and consequently are thought to have no right to exist.

The urban grey squirrel readily exploits human behavior. The smart squirrels on the University of Minnesota campus follow people carrying paper bags. If you stop, because you happen to like squirrels, they'll go so far as to climb up your pant leg to access the presumed food in your bag. This is somewhat disconcerting. — BC

There was a lot of fuss in sea-side tourist resorts a few years ago. People couldn't resist feeding the sea-gulls (herring-gulls) with sandwiches and potato chips. Then the sea-gulls took to swooping down and grabbing them from their hands as they were munching them. I haven't heard any complaints recently. People must have learnt not to "open-carry" goodies along the sea front.

I said in my first post here that the goal of rational thinking or reasoning is to arrive at a valid/sound conclusion. Animals do not use rational thinking, but instinctive behavior. — L'éléphant

I think we're talking past each other. The short explanation is that we have different ideas about the goal of rational thinking. Let me put it this way. Arriving at a valid/sound conclusion may sometimes be the point of the exercise (as it usually is in philosophical discussion, for example). But very often the point of a valid/sound conclusion is that it is a better basis for successful action.

In particular, it enables the organism to adapt behaviour to circumstances, whereas purely instinctive behaviour, which cannot, by definition, adapt, is likely to be less successful and even counter-productive. However, very often, what animals (and people) do is a combination of instinct and rationality. Birds have an instinct to build nests, and do so in different ways according to species. But, inevitably, they have to pursue that goal in negotiation with their environment. Hunger is "hard-wired", but how we satisfy hunger is extremely flexible in response to the environment that we find ourselves in.

When we observe human behaviour, we do not hesitate to interpret (read) their behaviour as rational even when we have no access to their given reasons. If you like, we reconstruct their reasons, in order to make sense of their behaviour. To be sure, we make certain assumptions, which may be falsified and reconstructions based on them can be contested either at the level of the assumptions themselves or at the level of the specific reasons attributed.

What's more, action without discursive reasons is found in human behaviour. Perhaps the most dramatic example, for philosophers, is the ability of people to use words correctly without being able to give a definition; they are often even more bewildered if they are asked to explain the rules of grammar (linguistic sense). It seems inescapable that articulating one's reasons is itself an example of an activity that is executed without discursive reasons.

You said, "purpose", "rewarding" and "reasonable to suppose". All these are fine -- nothing wrong with this behavior, but it is not rational thinking. .... Did the parrot articulate to you his reasoning for mimicking? It looks reasonable to you, but you did not arrive at this 'reasonableness' by discussing it with the parrot. — L'éléphant

So when we see animals adapting their behaviour to circumstances, we are inclined to read their behaviour as rational even though we have no access to any verbal account. It seems to me to be a reasonable extension of our practice in relation to other human beings. What's more, it works.

Personally, I have difficulty in applying this process to insects and fish and I often feel that people anthropomorphize too far. A dog might sympathize at my distress when I can't find my glasses, but I don't think that s/he necessarily understand what my glasses are. But I have no doubt that lobsters are frightened when they get caught, so this is not binary issue.

Do we have a member here in the forum that is dog or a parrot? Then let us invite that parrot on this thread and let him lay out his reasons for mimicking. — L'éléphant

It's tempting to think that the discursive account by agents of their reasons is the gold standard. It is true that it will often give us details that we cannot read off from the behaviour or the context. But, the rational reconstruction is often so persuasive that when the verbal account of reasons conflicts with our rational reconstruction, we are often (but not always) inclined to give preference to the rational reconstruction.
So if animals could tell us what "their" reasons were, we would not necessarily believe them.

Human observers can obviously perceive the causal relationship between stimulus and response, but I don't think that implies conscious rational calculation ('If I do this, then that will happen') on the part of the animal (or plant). — Wayfarer

Have you followed any of the tests that scientists have devised to differentiate between stimulus-response and rational problem-solving? Here is an example. We've come quite a long way since Aristotle.
(Plant?? you know they don't have brains, right?)

It might be worth recalling the distinctions Aristotle makes between different organic forms. — Wayfarer

It certainly is.
Though I sometimes wonder why he left insects and fish out of his hierarchy.

This rational capacity sets humans apart, as it involves deliberation and the ability to grasp universals, which Aristotle sees as the hallmark of true rationality. — Wayfarer

There's that sneaky little "true" rationality. Which means that whether Aristotle did or did not recognize other forms of rationality, you do. For some reason, you don't think that other forms are "really" rational. You cite Aristotle as identifying the critical marks as deliberation and a grasp of universals.

He recognizes at least two forms of deliberative rationality - practical and theoretical. The former directed to action and the latter to contemplation which he thought was infinitely superior to merely practical reason because it is what the gods to and so we are more god-like when we contemplate. If I remember correctly, one of the distinctions between practical and theoretical is that practical is concerned with universals. By that criterion, practical reason is also not "true" rationality. One can understand his reason, but I'm not at all sure that we can accept it.
EDIT Ouch! That should have been "one of the distinctions between practical and theoretical is that practical is NOT concerned with universals". Sorry. Red face!

Alice Juarrero, in her work on causality and complex systems, sees continuity with Aristotle’s notion of formal and final causes. — Wayfarer

Yes. These have more application to living things. He was apply to apply them to the whole universe because he thought that the entire universe was directed to achieving The Good - the supreme good of everything.

I never claimed otherwise. And, in fact, the remark was not directed specifically at you - except inasmuch as you have been defending the human exclusivity position - but was an observation regarding a whole system of faulty/disingenuous human reasoning for the purpose of arriving at a desired conclusion.
Propaganda and advertising work in this same way: argument directed at a desired outcome. The purveyors of mis- and disinformation use a rational process to determine what kinds of falsehood their audience is most likely to believe and construct the most persuasive arguments to make their conclusions sound reasonable. Often, this involves altering the meaning of words and twisting familiar concepts, and may include denial of the audience's practical experience. — Vera Mont

Wow, what a depressing view of reality. I just got back from a trip to hell and I am so happy to be here.
All my ideas may be wrong, but at the moment I don't give a damn because I am going to enjoy my happiness. Today I am not in charge of the world. It is my day to enjoy my home and my life. Maybe to tomorrow I will get more serious and back to feeling responsible for the world.

The bright side is I have almost finished the book about humans, animals, and math and look forward to to discussing what I have learned. We can talk about what is so and society be reason and being happy.

I think there’s a difference between behaviours that can be accounted for in terms of stimulus and response, and behaviours that can be attributed to rational inference. — Wayfarer

"Stimulus and response" can cover a multitude of sins, including rational responses to events as they happen, but I get what you're after. Where I differ from you is that I think that actions can be rational responses even if they are not the result of (conscious) inference. This doesn't actually depend on a single argument, but it seems best to propose one here and develop others as needed. So, forgive me for quoting myself below. Put it down to laziness.

What's more, action without discursive reasons is found in human behaviour. Perhaps the most dramatic example, for philosophers, is the ability of people to use words correctly without being able to give a definition; they are often even more bewildered if they are asked to explain the rules of grammar (linguistic sense). It seems inescapable that articulating one's reasons is itself an example of an activity that is executed without discursive reasons. — Ludwig V

Human observers can obviously perceive the causal relationship between stimulus and response, but I don't think that implies conscious rational calculation ('If I do this, then that will happen') on the part of the animal (or plant). — Wayfarer

When a human, or a dog, smells food, it is an automatic reflex (i.e. not the result of conscious control"). It is by way of a preparation for chewing and digesting food - a product of evolution. Before Pavlov's dogs were fed, a bell was rung. Before long, the dogs started salivating as the bell rang, before the food arrived. In the jargon, they associated the bell with food. Was the response rational or merely causal? In my book, both. I'm not dogmatic about that, but rocks don't change their behaviour like that.

When a dog gets hungry and sometimes just when the smells get tempting, it is will known that they will position themselves where they will be noticed and sit very quietly, but very attentive. This behaviour is called "begging". It is a behaviour that is voluntary, not a reflex. It seems perfectly clear that the dog thinks that if s/he does that, food will happen. It is also perfectly clear that the dog did not say to itself or anyone else "If I do this, that will happen". If you don't call it rational thinking, what do you call it?

I don't think that plants think or believe or feel emotions or have desires. But we do say that they do things. So that's another whole mystery that needs untangling.

When a dog gets hungry and sometimes just when the smells get tempting, it is will known that they will position themselves where they will be noticed and sit very quietly, but very attentive. — Ludwig V

And when it's time to eat and she can't smell anything edible, she goes out to the kitchen, picks up her food dish and brings it back to place in my lap, then sits directly opposite me and stares into my face. (Granted, this was an exceptionally bright German Shepherd.)

It seems perfectly clear that the dog thinks that if s/he does that, food will happen. — Ludwig V

Especially if the guilt-inducing soulful gaze alternates with running to the pantry where the dog-food is kept and nudging the bag.

A not-so-clever Pyrennese who liked to roam would ask her border collie confederate to help her escape. The collie would stand on her hind legs and push on the far frame (not where it opens) with both paws of the big sliding patio door. She didn't have the weight to push it all the way open, but she'd slide it over just enough for the big dog to wedge her nose in and force it open. Then they would pad softly across the patio, around the corner of the house, duck behind the car and make their way down the drive. (I stopped them there, having watched the whole procedure. I was on guard, because they'd already gone AWOL twice.)

When a dog really wants something, whether it's your pizza or your flip-flops, he makes a plan and carries it out step by step. That's nothing like salivating on cue. And they're very good (wolf lrgacy) at co-ordinating team work. Watch some You Tube videos.
When a crow wants a piece of cheese, he goes looking for a tool to get the tool that will poke the cheese out of the cage. Or figures out which flaps to lift in what order to tilt the plastic chute and make the cheese roll out.

Wow, what a depressing view of reality. — Athena

Sorry; didn't mean to depress you. I thought you already knew.

↪Athena
I guess you'll have better things to do that hang around here!

I want to add that I do not at all deny that animals (including humans) do have purely mechanical responses. Examples in humans are the reflex breath as you come back to the top of the water, which is clearly evolved and rational, as contrasted with the jerk of your lower leg as your old-fashioned doctor tap just below your knee, which (so far as I know) has no evolutionary purpose. You may know that if you scratch a dog at just the right place, their back leg comes up as if to scratch themselves; they can also do the same thing when they want to scratch themselves; that response can be mechanical and irrational and can be voluntary and rational.

Often, this involves altering the meaning of words and twisting familiar concepts, and may include denial of the audience's practical experience.
— Vera Mont
You're not wrong. But, along with all the similarities, there must be differences. The same applies to chimps and horses and whales. So there is a legitimate enquiry to be had here, surely? — Ludwig V

If it is not language it is not rational. If we do not agree on the definitions of words, we are doing no better the competing groups of chimps screeching at each other. Without agreement on the definition of our words, we doing no better than pissing on a tree to mark our territory, or a fire alarm. Certain sounds like a chimp screech, a police siren, or a fire alarm are universal sounds of danger because the screech is in all these things and also bird calls. In some cases an animal will make different sounds for different threats and this close to language but not exactly language.

I am eager to get into animals and math, because I wrongly thought the ability to do math means a form of rationalizing. After reading "The Math Instinct- Why You're a Mathematical Genius(along with lobsters, birds, cats, and dogs)" Now I understand the math animals are doing is like our knee jerk or a dog moving its leg when the right is touched. It is not the problem-solving humans do until we get to hire order animals that are making choices, such as a chimp taking the dish with 7 pieces of candy and not the one with only 6 pieces. Many lions means leave the territory but only one lion can be challenged. A snake jumping in the right direction at the right time to catch prey is using math, but this is like a knee-jerk. What bats can do with sonar hearing is amazing and better than anything we have invented, or birds flying 20 thousand miles from a summer home to their winter home. These animals are doing trigonometry and geometry but it is instinct, not learned math, and most certainly not working with 1+2=3. Those numbers are like language and animals do not have language. It is more like an intuitive reaction than rationalizing, how the chimp can count, can of like making a scratch for each piece of candy and remember how many times a scratch was made.

We need to agree on what "rational" means and what "language" means. What is the definition of these words?

If we do not agree on the definitions of words, we are doing no better the competing groups of chimps screeching at each other. — Athena

Their vocalizations may sound harsh to you, but are meaningful to another chimp. We might as well be communicating, you in ASL and I in Japanese. Or just yelling at each other, as people often do.

We need to agree on what "rational" means and what "language" means. What is the definition of these words? — Athena

Rational thinking is a process. It refers to the ability to think with reason. It encompasses the ability to draw sensible conclusions from facts, logic and data.
In simple words, if your thoughts are based on facts and not emotions, it is called rational thinking.
Rational thinking focuses on resolving problems and achieving goals.

[Language is] “a communication system composed of arbitrary elements which possess an agreed-upon significance within a community. These elements are connected in rule-governed ways” (Edwards, 2009: 53) https://www.languageeducatorsassemble.com/5-definitions-of-language/

One of 12 quotes. If they can't agree, how could we?

If it is not language it is not rational. — Athena

And if it is not human, it's not language.
Therefore, only humans are capable of reason.
There: all wrapped up with a triumphal bow on top.

There was a lot of fuss in sea-side tourist resorts a few years ago. People couldn't resist feeding the sea-gulls (herring-gulls) with sandwiches and potato chips. Then the sea-gulls took to swooping down and grabbing them from their hands as they were munching them. I haven't heard any complaints recently. People must have learnt not to "open-carry" goodies along the sea front. — Ludwig V

I would post a link to a New York Times piece on gulls from a few weeks ago, but I'm pretty sure you would find it secured behind their pay-wall. Gulls are pretty smart, and they are good observers. They like to eat food that other animals are eating: "If she's eating it, it must be good. I'll just have some of that!" That goes for a gull's approach to what humans--and other gulls--are eating. Gulls show up when the food shows up.

They are good parents; both males and females care for the young. So, a plus there -- they don't hatch and then abandon their chicks. (Elsewhere I read that pigeons are good parents too, so their children are neither seen nor heard. On the other hand, I don't know what, besides popcorn and the like, urban pigeons would have to feed their little chickies.)

The science writer recommends watching the gulls closely for individual differences; in a sea of gulls dive bombing your hot dog, that might be difficult, but give it a try.

New Zealand Kea

Yes, I’ve read about Caledonian crows.

Crows and parrots seem to have hit the intelligence jackpot much more often than other birds, but birds--any bird, pick a bird--are capable animals meeting many of the challenges they face.

A science fiction writer said, in a story about animals--I forget the title and author, "In the jungle, everybody is thinking!" Even brainless plants have the means to warn other plants of threats, and are able to mount targeted defenses (within a fairly narrow repertoire).

It is the nature of this world that no organism gets a free ride. There are ALWAYS dangerous threats and tempting opportunities to be navigated.

Another glittering generality: Human civilization, as it has evolved to the present, has become incompatible with the most optimal balance of resources of the natural world. What should we do about it? Were we able (which we are not) we ought to be far-sighted about the long-term consequences of our industrially powered production--everything from our own numbers, to the automobile and airplane or laundry detergents and cheap meat.

When a human, or a dog, smells food, it is an automatic reflex (i.e. not the result of conscious control"). It is by way of a preparation for chewing and digesting food - a product of evolution. — Ludwig V

I was wanting to get at the meaning of reason, in particular, which is fundamental to the OP. I've read about the Caledonian crow studies and other studies indicating rudimentary reasoning ability in some animals and birds, but I don't see the relevance in terms of the philosophical question at issue, as to what differentiates the rational ability of h.sapiens, 'the rational animal', from other species.

The reason I mentioned Aristotle's philosophy of biology is not because I idolize the ancients, but because the distinction between vegetative, sensory and rational forms of life remains basically sound. In addition, in Aristotle's philosophy, the particular prerogrative of the rational intellect ('nous' - a word which lives on in vernacular English) is to grasp universal ideas and concepts. Unlike other animals, we can see meaning in an abstract and comprehensive way. And I think the case can be made that this ability - the ability to grasp ideas and concepts - is foundational to language, and so a key differentiator between h.sapiens and other species. I fully understand acceptance of universals and Platonic forms is generally considered, well, ancient history by most, but in my view, these are barely understood in today's culture.

There's an essay I often cite by neo-Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain on this point, in which he also addresses the point you raise about canine behaviour.

For the empiricist there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in the real as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real).

Thanks to the association of particular images and recollections, a dog reacts in a similar manner to the similar particular impressions his eyes or his nose receive from this thing we call a piece of sugar or this thing we call an intruder; he does not know what is 'sugar' or what is 'intruder'. He plays and lives in his affective and motor functions, or rather he is put into motion by the similarities which exist between things of the same kind; but he does not see the similarity, the common features as such. What is lacking is the flash of intelligibility; he has no ear for the intelligible meaning. He has not the idea or the concept of the thing he knows, that is, from which he receives sensory impressions; his knowledge remains immersed in the subjectivity of his own feelings -- only in man, with the universal idea, does knowledge achieve objectivity. And the dog's field of knowledge is strictly limited: only the universal idea sets free -- in h.sapiens -- a potential infinity of knowledge.

Such are the basic facts which empiricism ignores, and in the disregard of which it undertakes to philosophize. ...In the Empiricist view, intelligence does not see in its ideative function -- there are not, drawn from the senses, through the activity of the intellect itself, supra-singular or supra-sensual, universal intelligible natures seen by the intellect in and through the concepts it engenders by illuminating images. Intelligence does not see in its function of judgment -- there are not intuitively grasped, universal intelligible principles (say, the principle of identity, or the principle of causality) in which the necessary connection between two concepts is immediately seen by the intellect. Intelligence does not see in its reasoning function -- there is in the reasoning no transfer of light or intuition, no essentially supra-sensual logical operation which causes the intellect to see the truth of the conclusion by virtue of what is seen in the premises. Everything boils down, in the operations, or rather in the passive mechanisms of intelligence, to a blind concatenation, sorting and refinement of the images, associated representations, habit-produced expectations which are at play in sense-knowledge, under the guidance of affective or practical values and interests. — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism

You might notice a resemblance between this description and eliminative philosophy of mind, which is not co-incidental.

@Leontiskos

Even brainless plants have the means to warn other plants of threats, and are able to mount targeted defenses (within a fairly narrow repertoire). — BC

That extensive mycelial network! Pretty amazing, actually.

Human civilization, as it has evolved to the present, has become incompatible with the most optimal balance of resources of the natural world. What should we do about it? Were we able (which we are not) we ought to be far-sighted about the long-term consequences of our industrially powered production--everything from our own numbers, to the automobile and airplane or laundry detergents and cheap meat. — BC

At some point - about 7000 years ago, but there were interim steps that took much longer - humankind turned against nature and began to treat it as Other/the enemy. We lost a good deal of our own nature and have been paying for it ever since in mental illness, discontent, strife and a sense of loss. It's a big hole that we keep trying to fill with religion, technology, spectacles, self-aggrandizement, overconsumption and lots and lots of wars.
There are people - a growing number of people - who take their own path to simplicity and balance. Global economy, global culture are too big to be changed, but individuals are capable of change.

.

When a dog really wants something, whether it's your pizza or your flip-flops, he makes a plan and carries it out step by step. That's nothing like salivating on cue. And they're very good (wolf legacy) at co-ordinating team work. Watch some You Tube videos. — Vera Mont

I'm sorry. There is in; deed a wide spectrum. I wanted to undermine the idea that actions are either rational (plan, execute, enjoy liberty/food/ whatever) or mindless cause/effect. Salivation is not even a voluntary action - it is controlled by an "autonomic" system. Yet making rational connections is possible even at that level.

At some point - about 7000 years ago, but there were interim steps that took much longer - humankind turned against nature and began to treat it as Other/the enemy. — Vera Mont

I don't know. There's so little to go on. But I think you are over-simplifying. Our attitude towards nature is ambivalent, in the sense that there are negative and positive attitudes which play into our interpretation of nature. "We" don't have a single, consistent view of it.

There are people - a growing number of people - who take their own path to simplicity and balance. Global economy, global culture are too big to be changed, but individuals are capable of change. — Vera Mont

Surely there is some room for thinking that when more and more individuals start to change, sometimes the movement gathers weight and pace and ends up changing things at the macro scale?

Unlike other animals, we can see meaning in an abstract and comprehensive way. And I think the case can be made that this ability - the ability to grasp ideas and concepts - is foundational to language, and so a key differentiator between h.sapiens and other species. — Wayfarer

Well, you are making a case, so obviously it is possible to do so. I notice that you seem to accept that this is not the only, and not the only relevant, differentiator. A good deal of clarification of what you mean by "abstract and comprehensive" and "ideas and concepts" is needed, and you have the difficulty that philosophy doesn't have a consensus view about what those terms mean.
The other difficulty you face is the empirical evidence that animals do have communication systems that are, at least, language-like, so you need to show what the "essential" relevant differentiation is between animal languages/communication systems and human languages/communication systems.

I was wanting to get at the meaning of reason, in particular, which is fundamental to the OP. — Wayfarer

I'm not at all sure that there is single, coherent, meaning of reason.

I've read about the Caledonian crow studies and other studies indicating rudimentary reasoning ability in some animals and birds, but I don't see the relevance in terms of the philosophical question at issue, as to what differentiates the rational ability of h.sapiens, 'the rational animal', from other species. — Wayfarer

So the idea that human reason might be a development (hyper-development, perhaps) of abilities that animals have is not entirely implausible to you. Where we may disagree is that you seem to presuppose a cliff-edge distinction between humans and animals. However, if evolution is correct, even in outline, humans have evolved from animals, so the expectation must be that human reason is a development of animal reason. So to understand human reason, we have to understand animal reason. Of course, it is possible that you don't accept the evolutionary approach to these questions.

Thanks to the association of particular images and recollections, a dog reacts in a similar manner to the similar particular impressions his eyes or his nose receive from this thing we call a piece of sugar or this thing we call an intruder; he does not know what is 'sugar' or what is 'intruder'. He plays and lives in his affective and motor functions, or rather he is put into motion by the similarities which exist between things of the same kind; but he does not see the similarity, the common features as such. What is lacking is the flash of intelligibility; he has no ear for the intelligible meaning. He has not the idea or the concept of the thing he knows, that is, from which he receives sensory impressions; his knowledge remains immersed in the subjectivity of his own feelings -- only in man, with the universal idea, does knowledge achieve objectivity. And the dog's field of knowledge is strictly limited: only the universal idea sets free -- in h.sapiens -- a potential infinity of knowledge. — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism

Each differentiation of human from animal arrives out of the blue. I need to understand what each of them amounts to. It looks as if he is not writing from me, but for people who already accept the philosophical ideas that are at stake. There may be much that the dog does not know about sugar and intruders. But there are some things that they do know. What he means by "he does not see the similarlity, the common features as such". "The flash of intelligibility" and "no ear for the intelligible meaning" are particularly obscure, and my understanding of "(universal) idea", "concept", "objectivity" is clearly very different from his.

Intelligence does not see in its function of judgment -- there are not intuitively grasped, universal intelligible principles (say, the principle of identity, or the principle of causality) in which the necessary connection between two concepts is immediately seen by the intellect. — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism

When someone attacks a doctrine but doesn't bother to ensure that his version of the doctrine coincides with his opponent's understanding of his own doctrine, I'm a bit inclined to suspect that a straw man may be all that is at stake. But it may be that his writing is not directed at his opponents, but to his supporters.

Intelligence does not see in its reasoning function -- there is in the reasoning no transfer of light or intuition, no essentially supra-sensual logical operation which causes the intellect to see the truth of the conclusion by virtue of what is seen in the premises. — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism

Is he a platonist of some kind? What does "cause" mean here?

A good deal of clarification of what you mean by "abstract and comprehensive" and "ideas and concepts" is needed, and you have the difficulty that philosophy doesn't have a consensus view about what those terms mean. — Ludwig V

I don't expect much *modern* philosophy will have any consensus about those questions, as they're deep questions, not the kind of minutae that analytic philosophy is preoccupied with. But the fact that you and I can have such a conversation as this, should indicate a key differentiator between us and other creatures, none of which could entertain such ideas, let alone devise the medium by which we're able to discuss them.

However, if evolution is correct, even in outline, humans have evolved from animals, so the expectation must be that human reason is a development of animal reason. So to understand human reason, we have to understand animal reason. Of course, it is possible that you don't accept the evolutionary approach to these questions. — Ludwig V

Of course I accept the facts of evolutionary biology, but its applicability to the problems of philosophy is another matter. For instance, the idea that evolutionary biology alone accounts for or explains the nature of reason or of the intellect is contentious. Evolutionary biology is not, after all, an epistemological theory, but a biological one, intended to explain the origin of species, not the origin of such faculties as reason. In fact I think one of the unintended consequences of Darwinism on culture is to believe that such evolutionary accounts are sufficient, when in fact they're barely applicable. The thread on Donald Hoffman is about a cognitive psychologist who argues that if our sensory faculties are explicable in terms of evolutionary fitness, we have no reason to believe they provide us with the truth. Of course that's a contentious argument, but I mention it to provide an indication of the scope of these issues.

Certainly there is a biological continuity between h.sapiens and other species, that is indisputable from the fossil record. But the ability to reason, speak, and to invent science, indicates a kind of ontological discontinuity from other animals in my view. Through the faculty of reason, we cross a kind of evolutionary threshold, which opens horizons that are imperceptible to animals.

Is he (Jacques Maritain) a platonist of some kind? — Ludwig V

He says he writes as an Aristotelian. I haven't read a great deal of him, but he was a major 20th century Catholic philosopher, but on the intellectual left, so to speak (as distinct from many more conservative Catholic philosophers.) But that passage I quoted, concerning the ability of reason to grasp universals, is really, in my opinion, part of the real mainstream of Western philosophy, which I do think is Platonist on the whole. Incidentally the essay from which the quote was taken can be found here.

At some point - about 7000 years ago, but there were interim steps that took much longer - humankind turned against nature and began to treat it as Other/the enemy. We lost a good deal of our own nature and have been paying for it ever since in mental illness, discontent, strife and a sense of loss. — Vera Mont

I think you’re on the right track but needless to say it’s a vast topic.

But the fact that you and I can have such a conversation as this, should indicate a key differentiator between us and other creatures, none of which could entertain such ideas, let alone devise the medium by which we're able to discuss them. — Wayfarer

There might be a single difference that explains all the difference. But there might not.
There might be a key difference. But there might not.
The difference(s) might be a difference in degree, not in kind.
There is also the issue of what, exactly, reason is. If you define it as the ability to plan and execute a project, we have what seems to me to be an open and shut case.

A not-so-clever Pyrennese who liked to roam would ask her border collie confederate to help her escape. — Vera Mont

Sure, it's not rocket science. But that doesn't mean it is not rational.

Evolutionary biology is not, after all, an epistemological theory, but a biological one, intended to explain the origin of species, not the origin of such faculties as reason. — Wayfarer

Quite so. But the origin of species necessarily includes the origin of faculties. The evolution of the eye is also the history of the development of the faculty of sight, &c. For example, the development of the faculty of reason is part of the development of homo sapiens. So far as I know there is no doubt that faculty depends on the brain, at least in homo sapiens. There is story of the evolution of the human brain from the early precursors to our day compare the story of the evolution of the eye.

Donald Hoffman is .. a cognitive psychologist who argues that if our sensory faculties are explicable in terms of evolutionary fitness, we have no reason to believe they provide us with the truth. — Wayfarer

That's odd. One would expect evolution to favour a creature with sensory apparatus that provides them with true, rather than false, information. Still, I can't take responsibility for what cognitive psychologists might choose to say. (Perhaps he has an idiosyncratic view of what truth is?)

But that passage I quoted, concerning the ability of reason to grasp universals, is really, in my opinion, part of the real mainstream of Western philosophy, which I do think is Platonist on the whole. Incidentally the essay from which the quote was taken can be found here. — Wayfarer

Platonism is certainly an important part of the tradition of Western philosophy. But that is not a reason for believing that it is true. The traditional canon of Western philosophy is as much an opportunity for criticism as anything else. You seem to suggest that there is an unreal mainstream of Western philosophy. What does that consist of?

But the ability to reason, speak, and to invent science, indicates a kind of ontological discontinuity from other animals in my view. — Wayfarer

You mean something like the emergence of life from the sea to the land? Or of mammals from reptiles? Maybe.
I have to say that the emergence of science has not done much to change the basically animal nature of human beings, so for my money, the discontinuity is not particularly significant. If we do mange to destroy ourselves before we destroy the entire planet as a habitation for life, future species might well consider us to be a faulty evolutionary line that got out of hand, until it self-destructed, much to the benefit of the planet. But then, they may well think that they are the unique peak of their evolutionary line, just as we do....

There's so little to go on. — Ludwig V

About the interim steps? Pastoral peoples were migratory or nomadic and didn't leave many records. Still, we know that they herded livestock - which is a huge step from respect for to control over and ownership of other species. It also reduced all other predators from a threat to be feared to rivals to be hated and exterminated. Settled agriculture did the same to land and vegetation, water and forest.
The Genesis story (which originates in an oral tradition before Judaism) already shows the drive to "subdue and fill the earth" as well as nostalgia for pre-agricultural life.

Every civilization has left records. Their beliefs and lifestyle are generally depicted in representations on walls and in tombs. The architecture itself speaks volumes about how people lived. There is also considerable literature from about 3000BCE onward.
Then, with rapid population growth which required ever more intensive use of land and hostility toward all competing species, also came increasing urbanization and alienation. And the unspeakable practices of the Enlightenment period, and the depredations of European colonial expansion... right up until the late 18th century and the industrial revolution. About the only counter attitude came with the Romantic movement, as a reaction to that assault on the countryside. But that's just art - it has tears but no teeth.

Surely there is some room for thinking that when more and more individuals start to change, sometimes the movement gathers weight and pace and ends up changing things at the macro scale? — Ludwig V

That would apply if a) there were not a much more powerful trend to destroy more of the environment faster and b) we had unlimited time in which to make the change before our environment becomes uninhbitable. Yes, I know that's a pessimistic, depressing view of our reality, but I see no other.

It also reduced all other predators from a threat to be feared to rivals to be hated and exterminated. Settled agriculture did the same to land and vegetation, water and forest. — Vera Mont

We know about their habits. What we don't know is how they thought about them. I can see the point about the predators in the abstract, but that's not the same as knowing what they thought. We are talking about attitudes to nature. There's not going to be an record of that outside language.

The Genesis story (which originates in an oral tradition before Judaism) already shows the drive to "subdue and fill the earth" as well as nostalgia for pre-agricultural life. — Vera Mont

And Genesis is an example and that's much later than 3000 BCE, isn't it?

Yes, I know that's a pessimistic, depressing view of our reality, but I see no other. — Vera Mont

Oh, well, if you are talking specifically about climate change, yes, I'm pessimistic as well. It's already shifted from preventing climate change to mitigating it, and that the target of 1.5 degree rise is already pretty much out of reach. It's all a slippery slope now. God knows when we'll begin to take it really seriously, never mind actually do some effective things. I feel really sorry for upcoming generations and am already embarrassed about what they will think of us when they grow up and take charge.

Sure, it's not rocket science. But that doesn't mean it is not rational. — Ludwig V

It's perfectly rational - and intelligent. They were not interested in rockets, but they sure devised a lot of ways to get what Mako wanted.

We know about their habits. What we don't know is how they thought about them. — Ludwig V

Is it probable that they habitually acted on what they didn't think?

And Genesis is an example and that's much later than 3000 BCE, isn't it? — Ludwig V

No, it probably originates in Sumer. The gods created mankind to work the land and worship them - i.e. obedient servants. The biblical version is more nostalgic: it harks back to a pre-agricultural past and views farming as punishment. The discrepancies were not entirely edited out. The flood figures largely in Sumerian lore (They did have a pictographic alphabet before cuneiform, a good deal of wall art.) The pastoral people that became the Jews and eventually wrote down their oral chronicles, including stories picked up in their herding nomadic years.

Oh, well, if you are talking specifically about climate change, — Ludwig V

That, the rapid eradication of biodiversity, continuing expansion of devastating resource exploitation, the rise of fascism, and the likely collapse of the global economy.

No, it probably originates in Sumer. — Vera Mont

I knew it had roots in earlier myths. I didn't know exactly which myths. So thanks. I've learnt something.

A couple of observations/questions about Genesis.

The opening about God and the Void. I seem to remember reading that the concept of the Void was a priestly concept much later than Sumer, in fact contemporary with when it was actually written. Do you know about that?

I take the point about the nostalgia for the pre-agricultural past. It makes perfect sense of the Garden of Eden. I hadn't thought of that.

It's always seemed very odd to me that the reason God told Adam not to eat the apples because he didn't want them to learn about good and evil and become like the gods (or was it God?). Why would God want us not to know about morality and become god-like. It's weird and very confusing.

Is it probable that they habitually acted on what they didn't think? — Vera Mont

I don't quite understand what you're getting at here.