You are resolving tensions in what you want, not in what you can or could do. So you still have the choices, you just don't want it anymore... so I would say no it doesn't limit your choices, it just give you a more clear idea of what you really want so you don't get pulled in all direction getting nowhere ultimately. — ChatteringMonkey

It seems to me that part of resolving tensions in what you want is resolving what you can or could do.

With the idea of a strong will to eat chocolate there may be conflict between the conscious and subconscious aspects of will. A person may enjoy chocolate but realise a need to not do so, especially for health reasons. This may create a complex dynamic and subconscious aspects, such as comfort, may be a stumbling block.

The other part of this may be where an intention or aspects of will fit in within the larger system of one's motivation and gratification. If one is trying to make change in one area of life a certain amount of stability in various other aspects may be important. That is because to deal with too much conflict and change at once may be too difficult. — Jack Cummins

You speak as if everyone has split personality disorder where multiple personalities, or wills (subconscious and conscious) battle to control the decision-making process. There is one will that has many options at any given moment. I enjoy chocolate but I also like to be healthy. I have a decision to make. It doesn't necessarily have to be a black and white issue. I can eat chocolate in moderation thereby achieving both eating chocolate and being healthy. Notice how I was able to explain it using just one will - I.

Can we change our own thoughts and behavior? — Jack Cummins

It seems quite obvious that we can. You just need to look at the many people that have been able to break their dependence on drugs, change their lifestyle to be healthier, manage their anger, etc. You can change your behavior. You just need to want it more than eating chocolate or taking drugs. You have one will that is faced with multiple options, not multiple wills fighting over one option.

I find it shocking that in discussions of free will no one is willing to actually describe the decision-making process - what it is like for them to make a decision from the moment they are faced with some set of circumstances, how they become aware of the options available to them and how they filter out all options to arrive at one choice.

It is an odd thought that all the movements of particles/energy in our brains could cause feelings of doubt about the resolution as they all resolve into the only brain state into which they could possibly resolve. — Patterner

Are you questioning how doubt could arise due to neurobiological processes or how they could be resolved? We don't know how neurobiological processes could cause all sorts of brain states, such as thoughts, feelings, etc. So the answer to the first question is that we don't know. The answer to the second question is, that although we know that doubts are caused by neurobiological processes in the brain, the brain cannot possibly resolve doubts since the brain is a deterministic entity. Therefore, I think that doubts are resolved by the mind which has the ability to freely decide.

Doubts may be experienced so often by an individual. I certainly feel in a maze, or even a fog of confusion of possibilities on a frequent basis. That is often because it is difficult to see the larger picture, especially of the unknown future. What I like about Watson and Skinner's picture of rats iand mouses n mazes isn't the actual deterministic picture of behaviorism but the metaphor of the creatures within the maze.

Behaviorism certainly paints a picture of determinism. However, the later development of cognitive behavioral approaches may alter this. That is cognition plays a part in making sense of it all, including the mazes, even if there are not any easy solutions. — Jack Cummins

I don't think that doubts can be resolved by a deterministic entity such as the brain since doubts are not deterministic states. Hence, I think doubts are resolved by the mind that has the ability to freely decide.

You speak as if everyone has split personality disorder where multiple personalities, or wills (subconscious and conscious) battle to control the decision-making process. There is one will that has many options at any given moment. I enjoy chocolate but I also like to be healthy. I have a decision to make. It doesn't necessarily have to be a black and white issue. I can eat chocolate in moderation thereby achieving both eating chocolate and being healthy. Notice how I was able to explain it using just one will - I. — Harry Hindu

One thing with many aspects, or many things that combine and "fight" to result in one outcome at a particular time seem philosophically the same to me. I'm not sure how one would differentiate between to two empirically?

So it seems like maybe this is just quibling over how we would want to name and frame the same underlying thing.

And ultimately I think my kind of framing is closer to how I experience it. I really do sometimes seem to be torn between two minds. One simple example is, I want to stay fit as a longer term goal, but then I also like eating food that isn't the best for reaching that longer term goal. Is that one will with two aspects, or two wills that battle with eachother? Does it really matter how we frame it ultimately?

It seems to me that part of resolving tensions in what you want is resolving what you can or could do. — Harry Hindu

I don't know, I don't get it I think, the tension is in what you want... and then you maybe refrain from doing certain things to resolve the tension in what you want.

Maybe an example can help. Let's say I want two things that compete with eachother. I want to be healthy, and I also want to smoke (because I'm addicted). The one (smoking) has an adverse effect on the the other. To resolve the tension in favour of health, I should try to reduce my addiction, my wanting of nicotine, otherwise I will keep having to deal with these two conflicting wants. The way to do that is to try and refrain from smoking. The first couple of weeks after I quit, I'm probably still addicted to nicotine, I still want sigarettes. But then this addiction gradually wanes the longer you stop with it, until you don't want it anymore. At that point, it's not that you have to limit yourself, you just don't want it anymore.

One thing with many aspects, or many things that combine and "fight" to result in one outcome at a particular time seem philosophically the same to me. I'm not sure how one would differentiate between to two empirically?

So it seems like maybe this is just quibling over how we would want to name and frame the same underlying thing.

And ultimately I think my kind of framing is closer to how I experience it. I really do sometimes seem to be torn between two minds. One simple example is, I want to stay fit as a longer term goal, but then I also like eating food that isn't the best for reaching that longer term goal. Is that one will with two aspects, or two wills that battle with eachother? Does it really matter how we frame it ultimately? — ChatteringMonkey

This works if you equate one mind to one goal. It seems to me that I have one mind with many goals and many options to achieve each. If you did have two minds then how do you distinguish yourself from someone with split personality disorder?

In your example, you have two goals, not two minds. One is to experience the feeling of eating sugary/salty food and the other is to be healthy. From this point you weigh your options mostly based on one thing - what will make you the happiest? You eliminate one or the other based on this ultimate goal. For some, continuing to eat sugary/salty food is what makes them happy. Maybe they decided that they are going to eventually die one day healthy or not, so why not enjoy the ride before you drop dead? For others being healthy is what makes them happy. I can certainly vouch for seeing your weight drop each day and sleeping better, etc. can be more immediate results that can keep you on the track of eating healthy. Seeing your weight drop makes you happy and keeps you going.

So the question is are you trying to keep multiple selves happy, or just one? I seems to me that the person that wanted to eat a lot of chocolate is the same person that wants to be healthy. I can change my mind and changing my mind does not change who I am. I am a decision-making entity who simply wants to be happy and I have many ways of achieving this.

You act as if a mind or a self is a thing. A brain is a physical thing, a mind is merely a kind of metaphor for what the brain does. Strictly speaking we do no 'have' a mind, we have thoughts following eachother. That's why I don't think any of this matters a lot, 'en matière'... one mind/two minds, a mind is just a kind container concept to point at the amalgam of thoughts the brain produces. One forest, two forests, a bunch of trees together, to some extend its arbitrary where you want to draw the lines for the concepts you are using.

I prefer to be carefull not to reïfy things, because usually that muddles more than it clarifies... So I'm happy leaving it at "I have conflicting thoughts and drives" without any talk of minds, selfs or wills.

Pardon me if this is a little bit missing the point of this post, but are we not just able to say,
Yes, in that our actions have an effect on our thoughts and behaviors (ignoring the free will problem).
Because how else would you describe changing your thoughts and behaviors in a universe that allows perfect free will? Are we not as free as it gets?
Even if our thoughts, behaviors and choices are decided by a set of factors we don't always have complete control over, I believe free will is simply our senses of reason or want being a factor and influencing the importance of other factors at play.

This seems to me as free as you could be without being omnipotent, being able to choose based on these factors, as opposed to being forced to pick a choice.

And while many say this allows and even proves determinism in the subject universe, I would say that determinism only really makes sense as a concept if the future is realized by anything before it becomes the present. If the idea of the future is not literally real (which is another matter of debate), then determinism doesn't make any sense. You could say that determinism deal with the past, but this is only because you have hindsight. From that point in the past, the outcome you are talking about cannot have been determined if the future doesn't exist (either as a prediction of some entity or if you subscribe to the block universe theory, or others).

If the future is literally real, then yes, this is determinism.

I figure Spinoza made short work of this. We deliberate between choices as means to achieve our ends. Whatever is making it possible for this to happen is not a copy of our nature.

If the agency we experience gives us no conception of what is happening, presuming a 'determinism' is not an argument against the reality of deliberation. — Paine

Yes, and I find the roots of this in Aristotle as well. Whereabouts in Spinoza could this be found?

The rejection of the idea that the Creator is a copy of us or vice versa permeates the Ethics to a degree that is difficult to narrow down to a single proposition. In terms of what is a free choice in the language of this OP, this conversation touches upon some of what Spinoza said directly about it.

The alternative is saying something is a choice, then saying it was the only possible outcome
— Patterner
That's one other alternative. Some people would say there is no choice, that it's illusiory, and want to avoid that word. But even those who do not take that position can say that the word choice refers to when we mull over two or more actions and have the subjective experience that it could have gone either way or any of the ways, when in fact it was always going to be the way it went. So, the word 'choice' is built on subjective experience. — Bylaw

I haven't heard of any guess as to why evolution would select for the illusion of choice, or any subjective experience, that makes sense. If the physical processes of determinism can only happen the one way they do in every instance, bringing about the only possible outcome every moment of our lives, regardless of our feeling that we are truly able to go in different directions, what is the value of the feeling? What is the value of of any subjective experience at all? Why do these physical processes not take place "in the dark"?

He's not, there, writing about free will. — Bylaw

No, he is not. he is talking about something that would seem to be less complex then free will. If there is no physicalist explanation for the simple thing, I don't see how there can be a physicalist explanation for the more complicated thing that It makes possible.

Notice that you hinge the truth of free will on the fact that someone says something. — Bylaw

I don't. I thought free will was obvious long before I ever heard of him. I only point out that there is no hint of a physicalist explanation for it, according to one of the experts in physics. If what seems obvious is wrong - which is certainly not impossible - I would like to hear the evidence. I am not aware of any. Physicalism seems to be saying that, since the physical is all we can detect and study, it must be the answer. I think that, since we are aware of something that we cannot detect or study with the tools of physicalism, there is something else in play.

There are scientists who disagree with him. — Bylaw

I would love to see this! Not being sarcastic. Please tell me where I can find a scientist explaining how the "mindless, thoughtless, emotionless particles come together and yield inner sensations of color or sound, of elation or wonder, of confusion or surprise." How "mass, electric charge, and a handful of other similar features (nuclear charges, which are more exotic versions of electric charge), [which] seem completely disconnected from anything remotely like subjective experience" nevertheless give rise to subjective experiences.

So, mental properties can cause matter to do things and there is no causation in the other direction? — Bylaw

It is certainly a two-way connection. And that's only logical. Why would the physical lead to the mental, but things not go in the other direction?

And why is there free will in the non-physical? What don't processes in that substance cause the next processes/phenomena to happen? Is there no causation in the non-physical, yet it can cause things to happen in the physical? — Bylaw

The way I'm using it, free will means free from the one-and-only possibility offered every moment by physicalist determinism. Freedom from the rules that billiard balls must follow, which allow nothing that deviates in the slightest from exactly X.

This doesn't mean the physical doesn't play a huge role in the mental. It is both the vehicle and the companion of the mental. It is what the mental experiences. Without the physical, there would be nothing for the mental to experience. There would be no mental at all.

What do you think the physical is? It seems you think the physical is particles only. Is that true? — Bylaw

I don't know why you think I think the physical is particles only. No, I don't think that. Sure, there are certainly a lot of particles. Aside from all the matter everywhere, my understanding is that energy, such as light and electricity, is streams of particles, photons and electrons respectively.

I don't think the physical properties of particles, - mass, charge, spin, etc. - are particles. In fact, it is not known what such things are. Brian Greene again:

I don’t know what mass is. I don’t know what electric charge is. What I do know is that mass produces and responds to a gravitational force, and electric charge produces and responds to an electromagnetic force. So while I can’t tell you what these features of particles are, I can tell you what these features do. — Brian Greene

They aren't particles, and we don't know what they are. Still, they are physical properties.

I don't think liquidity and solidity are particles. But I think they are physical. Physical characteristics. Macro physical characteristics, as opposed to the micro physical characteristics like mass and charge.

I don't think movement, flight, or life are particles. But I think they are physical. Physical processes.

I don't think gravity is particles. But I think it is physical. I don't know how else to classify the shape of space-time. (I've often heard they are looking for the fundamental particle of gravity, which they would call a graviton. I don't have any idea why they are looking for such a thing if gravity is caused by the warping of space-time.)

[are you Swedish?] — Bylaw

Another very interesting question. :grin: No. American. Mainly Irish, English, German, and Dutch ancestry.

In any case, so these physical causes are leading to your decision, it seems. — Bylaw

These physical causes are why I'm thinking about Bach at all. They aren't why I decide whether or not to listen to his music, or which pieces I listen to. I'm not programmed like a robot that receives sensory input, and has no choice but to do a specific thing. The robot walks at times; sits at times; makes noises at times; etc. But when it perceives sensory input X, it can do nothing but act in the one specific way it is programmed to act. It has no option, despite the many things it is physically capable of doing. I have options.

But what is making you decide: desire, interest, curiosity, preference? ARe you by any chance thinking that determinism means only causes external to the person lead to what the person does/chooses? That's not most people's idea of determinism. — Bylaw

No, I'm not thinking determinism means only external causes. Many things within us are involved, from memories, to the feel of our own heartbeat, the physiological reactions we get when seeing someone we consider attractive, to upset stomaches...

So, changes in the physical lead to choice? — Bylaw

They may lead to a fork in the road. They don't dictate which way I turn.

And what do you think motivates you to choose between two desserts that you've never tried? What is the motivation? Is your choice in that situation motivated or random? — Bylaw

I am sure I sometimes choose randomly. I'm always getting grief for taking so long to order food. I debate endlessly. I'm told it's called Analysis Paralysis. LoL. I usually ask the waitress which one comes with the most food. That seems like a good way to break a tie.

Sometimes one dessert is much more to my liking than the others. Lots of icing, or cream, or syrup. So I choose that. But choosing based on my preferences is not the same thing as there being no possibility that I could have chosen against them.

You seem to be arguing here that it has nothing to do with memory, so it is free. But what motivates the choice? — Bylaw

I don't know why you think I'm arguing that. I'm not. But my memories don't determine that there is one-and-only-one option I am able to pick from among the possibilities.

Is it random? Is it motivated by desires and goals you have? why are these causes not determined causes in a causal chain? The physical vs. mental to me is a non-issue here. Determinism is the idea that each effect is caused by what went before and in turn is a cause. Doesn't matter if these are mental causes or physical causes or some others. — Bylaw

I'm saying the way physics forces all the particles in the head to move around is not determining the choices I make.

Something leads to your decision/choice. If you chose because of your desires, for example, well these were causes by prior mental states and external causes also. If the choice is not caused by what went before and not caused by you and what you are, it seems a pyrrhic 'freedom' and random. — Bylaw

Not being capable of making a choice at any instant of our lives other than one determined by the laws of physics doesn't seem to be 'freedom' at all.

This poses the problem that humans have lack of capability to change, at the level of thoughts and neurochemistry.

...

I am interested in research and also the nature of personal change and self mastery? Do you think that self-mastery is possible? — Jack Cummins

Hi Jack, I think that your op, and the title, show an inadequate approach to the issue. The questions you ask imply a separation between what we call "self", and what we call "thoughts", so that you ask "can we change our thoughts", and "do you think that self-mastery is possible". The latter even suggests a separation between "self", and something further which masters the self. Notice that "mastery" implies a master and something which is mastered, and the two are distinct.

So I believe questions like this are somewhat mistakenly expressed, and are therefore ill-fated to being forever discussed without being resolved. The problem is with what is assumed as implied, by the question, a separation between the thing directing and the thing being directed. The implied separation is not a true representation, so the question is doomed by the implicit falsity. The common example I've seen is "have you quit beating your wife?". Notice that the assumption implied by the question can make the question impossible to answer.

Instead, I suggest that you approach the issue with the attitude that thoughts are an inseparable part of one's self. Thoughts are not separable from the self, in a way that would allow the self to control the thoughts, rather the thoughts are an integral part of the self. And, we can look at the self, itself, as a changing being. From this perspective we can ask to what degree does the self, as the changing being, have control over its own changes. Then we ask about "self-control". Notice that "self-control" implies one unified being, rather than "self-mastery" which implies a master/slave separation.

Proceeding in this way, we see that thinking, and thoughts, are a means of self-control. Therefore we do not have to ask the ill-fated question, "does the self control the thoughts", we can accept as an observed fact, that the self has some degree of control, over itself, through the use of thoughts. Then we can proceed to investigate the nature of this self-control, and what it consists of.

Yes, by definition, the first choice was a free choice. If it's not free, it's not a choice
— Patterner

So you don't have to have chosen your motivations or your will, in order for a choice that your will chooses to be your choice. In other words, the whole "self-authorship" requirement some people have for free will, is not in fact a requirement you have for free will - someone can make a free choice with no self authorship at all.

Your first choice can be a choice, despite being the product of countless things you didn't choose, and 0 things you did choose - like you had no choice but to make that choice, right?

And please recall, the quote that opened this conversation between you and I was T Clark saying "if we don't determine our will, we don't have free will."

If your first choice is free, despite being based on a will you had no choice in creating or designing, then you're disagreeing with that quote from Mr Clark. You're saying we can make free choices even if we haven't determined one single iota of our will. — flannel jesus

I'm not sure I understanding all of this. I don't know if my response is relevant.

I would say 'motivations' and 'preferences' are different things. My preferences seem to be largely built in. As I've touched on, I am a lunatic for Bach, but don't care too much for Mozart. I didn't choose this arrangement, and it has stood since there first time I heard Bach. My preference for Baroque over Classical came first. That began the moment I heard the Prelude to Henry Purcell's Dido and Aeneas. Then I heard Bach, the pinnacle of Baroque.

I don't think these preferences are motivations. I'm sometimes motivated to choose in agreement with my preferences, and I listen to something I'm very familiar with and love. I'm sometimes motivated to choose against my preferences, and I listen to something new. Are those opposing motivations also built-in preferences?

I believe I am free from the physics-driven interacting constituents of my brain, and am not listening to the one I'm listening to because there was no possibility that I could listen to anything else.

Adding
And I think this also address your question,
Regret seems a funny thing. When I was only several years old, my mother took me to the store for sneakers. I had narrowed my choices down to a pair of blue and a pair of gold. I struggled over the decision for a while, and finally went with the gold.

I regretted my decision within minutes. Possibly before I even got to the car. I wasn't traumatized, but I remember it clearly enough. I'd have taken them back and exchanged them, if I'd know at the time that that was allowed. But I didn't know that at the time, so I resigned myself to the fact that I'd be wearing sneakers I regretted having chosen, until it was time to get another pair.

I don't see how this makes sense from the standpoint of physical determinism. All of my brain's structures and particles are exactly where they are because of all the chains and webs of events that came before, all determined by the laws of physics. And when it came to this decision, it worked out the only way it possibly could, considering the state of all things and the laws of physics. I chose because all things were weighed, and gold was what came out on top.

Then those same laws of physics continued acting upon my brain's constituents, and determined that I should have chosen otherwise, and that I should have a useless feeling of regret.

Comes right down to it, the actual preference of blue over gold that my choice opposed wasn't even important. Color preferences? Of sneakers? What is the value of the physical arrangements of my brain's constituents giving me a preference of blue over gold, or Bach over Mozart, that evolution chose for it? This isn't about survival, like preferring the taste of apples over dirt. Nor is it about choosing a mate, like a woman preferring a man who looks like he can provide food, or a man preferring a woman who looks like she can bear children. The physical arrangements of my brain's constituents could discriminate important things, like the color of something beneficial over the color of something deadly, without my having any feeling about it at all. So why have the feeling? Especially when there are instances where physics determines a decision that physics them feels to be wrong?

[And, as always, the HPoC. How does the physical arrangements of my brain's constituents even give me the subjective experience of feeling these preferences the way I do? No, not the same issue. But I think they are closely related.]

I'm not sure I understanding all of this. I don't know if my response is relevant. — Patterner

I think it's very relevant. I think it's apparent why, but I can explain in more detail if you like.

I'm good. Just wasn't sure if you were getting at something different.

I don't think these preferences are motivations. I'm sometimes motivated to choose in agreement with my preferences, and I listen to something I'm very familiar with and love. I'm sometimes motivated to choose against my preferences, and I listen to something new. Are those opposing motivations also built-in preferences? — Patterner

And there is a reason you would go against your (usual) preferences. Your mood is different. You have a preference for trying new things. Whatever the reason, it is a motivation, based on your preferences. It could be at a meta-level: for example you prefer to explore occasionally.

Either the choice is made based on who you are in that moment or it has nothing to do with you at all. Then it's random. Still trying to see what this freedom is. This uncaused choosing.

I believe I am free from the physics-driven interacting constituents of my brain, and am not listening to the one I'm listening to because there was no possibility that I could listen to anything else. — Patterner

'and i am trying to get you to focus on what would lead you to choose one thing over another. If it has nothing to do with you, what would that supposed freedom be worth and how is it not mere randomness. If it has something to do with you - matches your desires, preferences motivations, than it is caused by your state.

The fact that you choose things that you haven't had a preference for earlier, does not mean that typ eof choice is not a preference of yours. There are all sorts of motivations for trying something new or different, certainly once, then possibly more.

I can see the weaknesses you mention in my line of argument. I guess that I am coming from the angle of seeing determinism as fatalistic.

Also, a few months ago, I read John Gray's ' The Soul of the Marionette: A Short Enquiry into Human Freedom' (2015), which connects the concept of freedom and free will. It goes as far as questioning to what extent do human beings wish to be free. Gray suggests,
'Many people today hold to a a Gnostic view of things without fully realising the fact. Believing that human beings can be understood in the terms of scientific materialism, they reject any idea of free will. But they cannot give up hope of being masters of their destiny. So they have come to believe that science will somehow enable the human mind to escape the limitations that shape its condition.'

Gray argues that the illusion of lack of freedom and free will enables people to be 'like fairground puppets', escaping the 'burden of choice'. In that respect, determinism is an ideology.

Rigid thinking, along the lines that if I do not have absolute control, I have no freedom at all, is mistaken.

To the contrary, operating a brain is like riding a bike, one learns to both steer and balance by the same manipulation of the handlebars. The inherent instability of thought - its propensity to veer off in unexpected directions is the very feature that allows control by awareness. Mathematical rigidity must be laboriously imposed by much practice and training along with constant vigilance and a blackboard and chalk.
As the old witch spells have it, one cannot not think about a black cat to order, but panic not, you will stop thinking about it soon enough.

You speak of 'multiple personality disorder', which is a rare diagnosis. It is the extreme end of splits in personality and will, but it is likely that many people do experience degrees of splits, which may trigger some underlying mental health problems and imbalances.

The idea of schizophrenia as being about a split personality were a gross caricaturistic overgeneralisation. Nevertheless, it is likely that divisions in thinking are the source of psychotic breakdown. This was suggested by RD Laing in, 'The Divided Self'. He spoke of contradictions in socialisations which give rise to internal conflicts. His writings were part of the antipsychiatry movement, which is not predominant now, but the idea of 'the divided self' is still a useful metaphor or idea for considering divisions and split in the psyche and will.

Yes, determinism as a perspective is limited by reductionism to brain states, which denies the existential nature of choices in human awareness. The deterministic argument is often choice is a feeling, but that leaves out the specific choices in their own right.

Believing that human beings can be understood in the terms of scientific materialism, they reject any idea of free will. — Jack Cummins

There is inconsistency in the belief that all reality is governed by the laws of physics, and the belief in free will. The fundamental discrepancy in its base, is derived from the way that we interpret Newton's first law of motion. This law indicates that for a body's motion to be altered there is required an external force. If we interpret this law as applicable to all bodies then a belief in determinism is the outcome. On the other hand, if we allow that some special bodies, living bodies, may be moved by an internal force such as "spirit" or "soul", then we provide for ourselves the principle required to believe in free will.

Gray argues that the illusion of lack of freedom and free will enables people to be 'like fairground puppets', escaping the 'burden of choice'. In that respect, determinism is an ideology. — Jack Cummins

This appears to be an oversimplification of a very complex situation. My opinion is that belief in science, and confidence in science's capacity to provide for us a very powerful understanding of the world, is well supported by experience. This produces a complacency in the majority of human beings, in relation to aspects of the world which science does not provide an adequate understanding of, like freewill. The underlying current is, science will figure it out, and this feeds the illusion of lack of freedom (if it is in fact an illusion). So the majority of human beings just go with the flow, allowing the external forces of the world to move them this way and that way, and in many contrary, conflicting, and confusing ways, believing that this is their fate. That creates what the spiritual would call tormented souls. The conflicted soul does not give proper attention to the capacity of will power.

The idea of 'soul' is useful here, not as a disembodied spirit but as a way of describing the inner world. It is the interface of the inner and outer aspects of 'reality', just as emotions are the interface between brain and body. This is a basis of nondualism and the concept of soul is useful for differentiating between brain and the nature of experience. This is also in line with compatabilism, which sees determined and determining aspects of human consciousness.

We are free to act on our will, but not free to choose our will.... We are our will, who would be the "we" apart from our will that wants to change the will. — ChatteringMonkey

Yes, we have an inherent disposition. In many ways, this is akin to having (being) a perspective. How does this not make sense conceptually? And just because we have a disposition, why should this mean we are not free to change our disposition? Your argument is like saying that a sailboat being driven by a northerly wind is not able to change its course.

Let me try to approach this from the angle I was coming from in the things I said most recently, when I added you to my post to FJ. For me, this issue comes down to the HPoC. First, there isn't a physicalist explanation for why there is, as Nagel famously put it, "something it is like" to be me. How is it that the physical processes do not take place "in the dark"? They could. Nerves could feel damage being caused by something very hot being in contact with skin, and action potentials could be initiated so that the hand pulls away. Reflexes work like that, without any involvement from me. The events could be stored in the brain, and the same situation avoided in the future, without my feeling of pain. There's no need for it.

And there's no explanation for it. Koch just paid up on a bet with Chalmers, because he couldn't find an answer. Greene says nothing can be seen as a basis for it. Physicalism has nothing to offer in the way of explanation. Only faith that we will, eventually, find a physicalist answer.

I'm not trying ro derail the conversation. The reason all of that is important to the current discussion is the specific kinds of things "it is like" to be me. Eating preferences is a good example. Beets, cucumbers, and watermelon are three foods I can't stand. I can't emphasize enough how much I can't stand them. But there is no purpose, no function, to my feeling toward them. Most people are perfectly fine with them. Many people have even been incredulous about my feelings toward beets and watermelon, because they are, apparently, among the most loved foods of all. So it's not a problem for the species. I've eaten them all at times, when the rest of the food masks the flavor enough that I can manage it, or when I occasionally try them to see if my tastes have changed. I take extreme pleasures in eating, and consider it a negative to not like every food there is. So I occasionally try, hoping. There is no hint of any kind of allergy to any of them. In short, there is no objective, physical reason for me not to eat them.

I wish I liked beets, in particular. They are more than somewhat appealing in every way but taste. Density, texture, color. It would be very annoying if I was very hungry, and had nothing to eat but this thing I can't stand, despite wanting and trying to like them for decades.

Can there possibly be a reason for the way the molecules of beets interact with my taste buds and brain, such that they ruin nearly every dish I've ever tried that contains them, and I won't eat beyond the first bite?

There's no reason for food preferences at all. Even if we could distinguish poison just from taste, there wouldn't be a reason to not like it. And we don't dislike the taste of things we're allergic to. Often enough, people like the taste of things they're allergic to, and are very sad that they can't eat it. Or, unless it's a risk of death, they eat it anyway, and deal with the rashes, itching, or diarrhea. We could all just eat some bland slop every day. There's no physicalist reason we don't. We don't need restaurants that make certain kinds of food (french, Italian, Mexican, etc.), or certain dishes (Beef Wellington, shrimp scampi, salmon encrusted with pistachios, etc.). But the restaurant industry is huge, because we have feelings about food that have nothing to do with anything physicalism can explain.

I'm not saying i have a non-physicalist explanation, but there sure isn't a physicalist one. I have subjective experience that can't be explained, and that subjective experience gives me strong preferences that have no objective value.

We don't have a problem accepting the existence of dark matter/energy, even though we cannot detect it in any way. But we know it's there, because something is responsible for what we observe. I think something else that we can't detect in any way is responsible for consciousness; something it is like to be me. I think that same something is responsible for free will.

I haven't read any of the discussion - just wanted to note that "Dr" Joe Dispenza (he has a chiropractor degree from something called Life University) is a former New Age cult teacher, an author of self-help books, and a purveyor of quantum healing and other kinds of woo.

I had never heard of Dispenza until I came across the book, 'Evolve Your Brain' in my local library. I have just looked him up on Google and it does appear that he is a controversial figure. Some web entries suggest he wrote pseudoscience. Of course, my outpost is not about the author as such and, hopefully, stands as one which examines the philosophical ideas, especially free will and the brain. Nothing more...

I just can't grok this gobbledygook, mate. Sorry. Reads like trumpian word salad to me. :mask:

:up:

I do think that it matters what credentials Dispenza has and it is unclear, because I do not know what the faculty of Life Sciences in Atlanta is. Nevertheless, those who label his ideas as pseudoscience are only expressing their opinion. It is not as if those on the internet who criticise Dispenza come up with clear evidence based arguments. As for 'woo' and 'gobbledegook', I find that many people dismiss all philosophy as fitting into that category, much to my horror!

The claim of "pseudo-science" is not just someone "expressing their opinion"; the claim can be shown to be true or not true – to wit: if an explanation of phenomena is not testable, even in principle, then it is not a science (i.e. pseudo-science). Whatever else Dispenza's "mind-body" quackery might be, afaik, it is demonstrably not a science. And, imo, speculation based on pseudo-science, Jack, is merely pseudo-philosophy (e.g. esoterica). :sparkle: :eyes:

I have always found what I find as a very disturbing mistake among intellectuals when it comes to talk about free-will and determinism.

Too often they are looked at as Complimentary antonyms by some who argue with others who view them as Relational antonyms. This can then lead to the argument going around in circles with each party accusing the other of contradiction or wordplay. I imagine some would even propose Gradable antonyms (likely those fond of panpsychicism).