I know Apustimelogist already answered, but I want to add the following link to flesh out the very literal sense in which synchronization occurs — wonderer1
“Interactions are not simply bits of information to be processed by individual cognizers, but rather, interaction processes move the participants in their sense-making activities, and these include affect. Participatory sense-making reaches directly into the precarious network of self-maintaining processes that constitute a subject's identity. Thus, our encounters with others may not only modulate our very self-maintenance, but to some extent even enable and constrain it. This means that the constitution of our subjectivity can be strongly dependent on the history of social encounters. Thus, self-constitution and self-affection happen with and through others while-importantly and basically-at the same time always retaining an aspect of closure.
This sharing in inter-affectivity comes through participating in a process that is not simply the summation of individual activities, but a jointly created and literally embodied pattern that affects each of our affections. (Hanne De Jaegher)
Does physics ground mathematics?
— Ludwig V
Do the smallest scales of existence ground our use of math?
Absolutely. — Apustimelogist
Can you explain in what sense you do mean "mechanistic"?
— Ludwig V
I just mean mechanistic in the sense of one event causing the next event and the next event in a way that is divide of any kind of extra meaning. Like knocking down dominos where one falls causes the next and the next and the next in a mindless ways. But I am not assuming any limits on complexity or non-linearity or recurrence or anything like that — Apustimelogist
Actually, the most complex scale of existence grounds our use of math. Mathematics is a conceptual invention. — Joshs
The billiard ball model of causality — Joshs
I suggest that such non-linear reciprocal affecting between cause and effect is more fundamental than the mechanistic billiard ball or domino form of description we might try to foist onto neural processes as their ‘real’ basis. — Joshs
The fact that you may need higher levels of explanation to make a dynamic system intelligible doesn't negate the fact that ot may be at the most fundamental level just a consequence of simple billiard ball causality. It could not be any other wa since such explanations you talk about are by their very nature not fundamental — Apustimelogist
I suggest that such non-linear reciprocal affecting between cause and effect is more fundamental than the mechanistic billiard ball or domino form of description we might try to foist onto neural processes as their ‘real’ basis.
— Joshs
This doesn't make any sense since all of the complex behaviors neurons do are emergent from very simple ones at smalled scales - described by morr fundamental laws of physics - such as ions crossing a membrane barrier — Apustimelogist
I’m arguing that the full implications of the non-linearity of complex systems in living beings makes it impossible to derive them from physical models as they are currently understood. — Joshs
“relations are not secondarily derived from independently existing “relata,” but rather the mutual ontological dependence of “relata”—the relation—is the ontological primitive. The notion of intra-actions constitutes a reworking of the traditional notion of causality.” — Joshs
I’m arguing that the full implications of the non-linearity of complex systems in living beings makes it impossible to derive them from physical models as they are currently understood. — Joshs
about non-linear systems. — wonderer1
This doesn't make any sense since all of the complex behaviors neurons do are emergent from very simple ones at smalled scales - described by morr fundamental laws of physics - such as ions crossing a membrane barrier. — Apustimelogist
This neatly inverts things. An informational mechanics is precisely what biology and neurology impose on the physical world. Not the other way around. — apokrisis
This ignores the fact that organisms are organised by codes and so exist in a semiotic modelling relation with the world. — apokrisis
But the world itself is not a machinery of linear cause and effect — apokrisis
For all practical purposes, we may regard a wave function as collapsed as some probe with a switch mounted on its end has been heard to flip state. Holism can be considered localised. Another bit of thermodynamic history has now definitely been added to universe's equation of state. — apokrisis
If neurology relied on ions crossing membranes as its deep explanation, then it would be getting us nowhere — apokrisis
Well this just ignores the context about which of two things is more fundamental — Apustimelogist
Again, just because it may not be your preferred level of explanation, does not preclude it from being more fundamental or at least perform a role of grounding the other more preferred explanation so that preferred explanation itself would in principle be explained by and depend on this more small scale perspective. — Apustimelogist
But you said all the complex behaviours of neurons emerge from lower level physics which is quite wrong. They emerge from the information processing which entropically entrains the physical world in a way that brains and nervous systems can be a thing. — apokrisis
I don’t favour computer analogies but what do you think causes the state of a logic gate to flip. Is it the information being processed or the fluctuating voltage of the circuits? — apokrisis
The physics of neurons is shaped by the top-down needs of Bayesian modelling. Bayesian modelling isn’t a bottom-up emergent product of fluctuating chemical potentials. — apokrisis
You rephrased the question. Surely, applying math to the smallest scales of existence implies that physics and math exist independently. So I'll take that as your answer. Which I agree with.Does physics ground mathematics?
— Ludwig V
Do the smallest scales of existence ground our use of math?
Absolutely. — Apustimelogist
Would a Popperian ontic triadism be better? I doubt it. I suppose it is time to come out. I do have a view of this. I see your claim as the classic philosophical mistake of thinking that a grammatical device, which is purely rhetorical, has some philosophical significance. "Brains do plus tasks" is synecdoche for "People do plus tasks". You may not know what synecdoche is (I had to look it up to be sure).I am not going to be able to make you understand what I am saying without you giving up this kind of dualism. — Apustimelogist
Synecdoche refers to a figure of speech in which the word for a part of something is used to refer to the thing itself (as "hired hand" for “worker”), or, less commonly, the word for a thing itself is used to refer to part of that thing (as when society denotes "high society"). In metonymy, a word that is associated with something is used to refer to that thing (as when "crown" is used to mean "king" or "queen").
Yes, I understand that. So the language that you use to describe the brain process excludes the possibility of describing a plus task. So in what sense can it explain or cause a plus task?I just mean mechanistic in the sense of one event causing the next event and the next event in a way that is divide of any kind of extra meaning. — Apustimelogist
Thanks very much. Very thoughtful of you. I did know about this, but I saw the reports so long ago that I have completely forgotten where. I noticed that in this report, there is no suggestion that A's brain is in love with or trusts B's brain. I'm completely relaxed about the idea that brain mirroring is among the symptomatic criteria for love and trust, along with heavy sighs, big smiles, dilated pupils, raised heart rate, the release of oxytocin and, on occasion, mild insanity. Yes, I realize I'm channelling Wittgenstein here.I know Apustimelogist already answered, but I want to add the following link to flesh out the very literal sense in which synchronization occurs: — wonderer1
However, the synchronization that is involved here (mirroring) is not obviously the same as the one that @Apustimelogist is concerned with. But I don't know what the active inference/free energy principle is, so I could be wrong.The kind of synchronication between internal and external states as described by active inference / free energy principle. — Apustimelogist
I liked this distinction. I'm happy to admit that as a philosopher, I'm usually a complicator. But I don't deny that simplification has its uses and it would be hard to do without it. We need both, each in their place. It takes all sorts...As an engineer I'm a complicator. I have to consider a multitude of details, about the ways physical things interact, in order to do my job well. — wonderer1
I think you are saying that the a physical process can (under the right conditions) be interpreted as an information processing process, and conversely. If so, that's very nearly what I was getting at. Thank you.But you said all the complex behaviours of neurons emerge from lower level physics which is quite wrong. They emerge from the information processing which entropically entrains the physical world in a way that brains and nervous systems can be a thing. — apokrisis
That's all very helpful. I do think it is high time that philosophers took seriously modern developments in the sciences and abandoned the concept of causality that developed in the context of 17th century science, with its Aristotelian heritage. (Not that the classical concept of causality was ever completely satisfactory; I'm sure you are aware that the concept of gravity was an exception.)Complex dynamical systems exhibit nonlinear effects and a type of causality called causal spread, which is different from efficient causality. The interactions and connectivity required for complex systems to self-organize are best understood through context-sensitive constraints
I suggest that such non-linear reciprocal affecting between cause and effect is more fundamental than the mechanistic billiard ball or domino form of description we might try to foist onto neural processes as their ‘real’ basis. — Joshs
It isn't just the complexity. The relation between minds and brains is cross-categorial, which means there can be no relation, which is absurd. There are other situations when we ache to understand different categories in relation to each other, but lack the conceptual resources to do so. I doubt that philosophers will find the way in this case; practical science seems already to be making progress, mainly by simply ignoring the problem.It is not the non-linearity that is particularly problematic when trying to grasp minds/brains. It is the complexity, and lack of anything remotely approaching a detailed account of that complexity. — wonderer1
For my money, it depends what you mean by "cause". The system can be described as a physical process or as a information process. Both categories apply, so both the information and the voltage cause the gate to flip. If a physical bug is interfering with the process, you will apply the physical description and deal with the problem. If a software glitch is the problem, you'll apply the information description and deal with the problem.I don’t favour computer analogies but what do you think causes the state of a logic gate to flip. Is it the information being processed or the fluctuating voltage of the circuits? — apokrisis
This made be realize why I'm so uncomfortable with the idea of "emergent" properties. It still locates the physical as original or fundamental. But, in the case of the logic gate, the gate emerged from the information process. I don't deny that it can work the other way round, of course.A logic gate flipping is a physical process with emergent properties which allow us to treat it as if logic determines the results, by imposing additional constraints by only sampling the output of the logic gate on clock edges. — wonderer1
I think you are saying that the a physical process can (under the right conditions) be interpreted as an information processing process, and conversely. — Ludwig V
You rephrased the question. Surely, applying math to the smallest scales of existence implies that physics and math exist independently. — Ludwig V
Would a Popperian ontic triadism be better? I doubt it. I suppose it is time to come out. I do have a view of this. I see your claim as the classic philosophical mistake of thinking that a grammatical device, which is purely rhetorical, has some philosophical significance. "Brains do plus tasks" is synecdoche for "People do plus tasks". You may not know what synecdoche is (I had to look it up to be sure). — Ludwig V
Yes, I understand that. So the language that you use to describe the brain process excludes the possibility of describing a plus task. So in what sense can it explain or cause a plus task? — Ludwig V
However, the synchronization that is involved here (mirroring) is not obviously the same as the one that Apustimelogist is concerned with. But I don't know what the active inference/free energy principle is, so I could be wrong. — Ludwig V
But you said all the complex behaviours of neurons emerge from lower level physics which is quite wrong. They emerge from the information processing which entropically entrains the physical world in a way that brains and nervous systems can be a thing. — apokrisis
I don’t favour computer analogies but what do you think causes the state of a logic gate to flip. Is it the information being processed or the fluctuating voltage of the circuits? — apokrisis
The physics of neurons is shaped by the top-down needs of Bayesian modelling. Bayesian modelling isn’t a bottom-up emergent product of fluctuating chemical potentials. — apokrisis
A neuron is characterized as a physical object made up of particles that behave according to the laws of physics. All neuronal behaviors follow from this and we put information processing on top of it. Not the other way round. — Apustimelogist
You can always in principle describe whatever a brain is doing in terms of more fundamental physics. — Apustimelogist
It's the pretence that is irksome. Reworking Hegel is fine, if one is honest about it. — Banno
Be honest about it. My biosemiotic position arises within a community of reason that was Aristotelean and then became Peircean. So the reworking of Hegel would have been done by Peirce.
But you seem quite ignorant of all these metaphysical distinctions. Time to womble off in the direction of your lunch. Don't pretend you have any training in either biophysics or functional neuroscience. — apokrisis
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