I'll defer to your knowledge of Aristotle, but that still doesn't make it so - that abstractions have actual, independent existence. It's unnecessary to an ontology.

I'm not a relativist in any traditional sense.

To me the question is whether what we exprience as "matter" is purely material and nothing else. Aristotle doesn't believe forms are purely abstractions but reside inside, or maybe for properly "around" matter, as well as existing within the mind. These union of form with form in the mind is the spiritual experience of perception for him, a position rejected by latter materialists from his school, such as Strato of Lampsacus I believe. For me this is allowing idealism enter where she doesn't belong. The eyes see as material with the brain (despite what Berkeley said about optics)

As with relatavism, it's a hard thing to think about. Thinking is hard. Relativism leads to absolute idealism, or vice versa. Keeping matter merely parrelell to any idealism is how i strike the balance

To me the question is whether what we exprience as "matter" is purely material and nothing else. Aristotle doesn't believe forms are purely abstractions but reside inside, or maybe for properly "around" matter, as well as existing within the mind. — Gregory

My view is mostly consistent with (physicalist) David Armstrong's metaphysics: everything that exists (an existent) is a "state of affairs" which is a particular with its properties. Properties do not exist independently; they exist only imminantly - instantiated in a state of affairs.

The same property can be held by multiple existents, therefore a property is a universal. Example: -1 electric charge is a property held by every electron (as well as other objects), so it is a universal. Universals are anything that can be multiply instantiated, which includes sets of properties (consider the complete set of properties that an electron has; so "electron" is also a universal).

We mentally identify properties through "the way of abstraction": conceptions are formed by considering the common features of several objects or ideas and ignoring the irrelevant features that distinguish those objects. Obviously, the abstract concept of a -1 electric charge is not the charge itself.

This makes the most sense to me because it parsimoniously accounts for everything that exists, while rejecting nominalism. It even provides a framework for laws of nature.

What the framework doesn't do is to treat abstractions as having some direct relation to the objects to which they apply. There is only the indirect relation of the way of abstraction.

Do you still believe you see the world as it is? Hegel says properties are universals as well, while the object is an "indifferent immediate" (extended matter). He had a strange relationship with Aristotle even as he considered him the greatest philosopher. In between Cartesian extension and the Absolute Idea were his thoughts on Aristotle, and they are hard to decipher, especially in the Logics. What exactly does it mean to say a property is universal? It is held in common with many "matters" but are they independent of each other as the matters are and as within the matters? What are we adding to our conceptual scheme by speaking of universals that modern materialism is missing?

Going off on a tangent, Hegel's philosophy was akin to Schelling's (who accused Hegel of stealing his ideas) while Fichte was more in line with Schopenhauer. The Absolute Idea and the Will are to aspects of God, and two aspects of us (in my belief). Instead of one Incarnation, there has been billions of them, and these beings can do good AND evil because really they are just biological matter. The separation between the universe and God is definite, yet they are One in union.

Do you still believe you see the world as it is? — Gregory

I believe we perceive a reflection of the actual world, one that is functionally accurate - i.e. it enables us to successfully interact with the world - which is mandatory for survival. I believe ontological theories (like the one I referenced) are theories about the way the world actually is - foundational aspects, at least.

Still, all our knowledge and theories are grounded in our human perspectives (this is actually the "relativism" I based my screen name on). I also don't think this is actually a problem, or at least not a problem worth worrying about.

What are we adding to our conceptual scheme by speaking of universals that modern materialism is missing? — Gregory

I think nominalists and Humeans are missing something. Properties are ways things are, and there do seem to be multiple objects that have commonnalities in the way they are. IMO, Humean regularity theory doesn't have a satisfactory account of laws of nature. Armstrong (a modern materialist) improves upon these.

Example: a 90 degree angle is instantiated in objects that have this angle. "90 degree angle" doesn't exist independently in some "platonic heaven" — Relativist

I don't think this is correct. What is instantiated is what we sense as particular things, and that something has a 90 degree angle is a judgement we make. So "90 degree angle" is not an instantiation of the particular, it is a judgement which is made by human beings, produced through measurement.

What is instantiated is what we sense as particular things, and that something has a 90 degree angle is a judgement we make. So "90 degree angle" is not an instantiation of the particular, it is a judgement which is made by human beings, produced through measurement — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you saying the relation of 90 degrees, that we measure, does not describe an objective fact? Of course, we define "degree" and "90", but the relation we identify as such is not mere opinion - it describes an ontological relation (setting aside the inherent error of making measurements). Do you disagree?

Are you saying the relation of 90 degrees, that we measure, does not describe an objective fact? Of course, we define "degree" and "90", but the relation we identify as such is not mere opinion - it describes an ontological relation (setting aside the inherent error of making measurements). — Relativist

You can divide a circle into four equal angles, but the convention, that each of these angles is 90 degrees is completely arbitrary. The circle could have had 400 degrees, then the right angle would be 100. Or, we could say that there is an infinite number of degrees within the circle, and within the right angle as well. The issue is with the nature of "a degree". It's not something within the object, but designated by the subject, in a completely arbitrary way (other than that there is a conventional standard). This excludes the possibility of "the four equal angles of a circle are 90 degrees" being an objective fact.

When you say existence is a state of affairs, do you mean an "event" as in Process and Reality (Whitehead)"? I struggle to process "process philosophy" and "interdependance" as emphasized by buddhism. This plant here has no relation to my cup. They are clearly not dependant on each other. But maybe in a cosmic sense

These conventions are semantics, and do not erase the fact that there is a ontic relation. An object with the relation labled 90 degrees is logically and ontologically different from an object that we label 45 degrees (under the same set of conventions) - and they are different irrespective of how we choose to abstractly divide a circle.

When you say existence is a state of affairs, do you mean an "event" as in Process and Reality — Gregory

No. I'm referring to David Amstrong's use of the term. "State of affairs" is the term he uses to refer to any ontic object. If X exists, then X is a state of affairs.

He uses this clumsy term in order to stress that everything that exists has 3 types of constituents, and the constituents never exist in the world independently of a state of affairs.

The 3 types of constituents are: (thin) particular*, (intrinsic) properties, and relations (=extrinsic properties). They constitute a state of affairs.

* A state of affairs can also be referred to as a particular. This is a "thick" particular. "Thin" particular is just an abstraction of a thick particular (=state of affairs) minus the properties and relations. He does this because he denies that existents (states of affairs) are simply bundles of properties.

My familiarity with the word "ontic" is completely from Heidegger. I always assumed he meant -that which we perceive with our senses, the substance we perceive. This is contrasted with "ontological" which includes all about the object we do and do not perceive.

Hegel also denies that objects are purely bundles of properties. The core of the object is "universal" for him in that he would equate a "thick particular" with "quality". Quality comes before quantity for him, the reverse of what most people believe. Quality is the bridge, as the universal in an object, through the Notion (logos), to the Spirit's Idea. Quality is more ontologically interior to the object then quanity (reminds me of the wizard of oz for some reason) and reveals the mystic semblance of nature

These conventions are semantics, and do not erase the fact that there is a ontic relation. An object with the relation labled 90 degrees is logically and ontologically different from an object that we label 45 degrees (under the same set of conventions) - and they are different irrespective of how we choose to abstractly divide a circle. — Relativist

Do you mean that we perceive these as different, our perceptions of such objects are different? I mean science tells us that what we perceive as an object is really a bunch of molecules, which are a bunch of atoms, which are some other particles. So we perceive an edge, a boundary of some sort to those bunches of moving particles, and we measure the edge to be curving (angling?) at the specific degrees. That these angles of degrees are an accurate description of what is really the object, is highly doubtful, so we're best off to just recognize that these are descriptions of what we perceive.

Do you mean that we perceive these as different, our perceptions of such objects are different? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm discussing an ontological theory: they are truly different, irrespective of what we perceive.

That these angles of degrees are an accurate description of what is really the object, is highly doubtful, so we're best off to just recognize that these are descriptions of what we perceive. — Metaphysician Undercover

This was intended only as an example of an ontic property, to illustrate that properties do not exist independently of the objects that have them - in this ontological theory. If you don't happen to believe there actually exist objects with angles, it's irrelevant to the point. If you simply want to contrast this theory with some alternative theory, you first need to understand this one- then you can contrast it.

Would Aristotle agree with you that we may not see reality as it is?

Thanks for this - I haven't read Heidegger. I did find this description of his use of the terms:

The ontic concerns concrete properties and characteristics of an entity, in contrast to the ontological which pertains to the specific way an entity of a certain kind has its characteristics.

I was not using the terms this way. I used "ontic" and "ontological" interchageably to simply identify something as actually existing in the world. The chair I am sitting on actually exists. A concept or perception of a chair (or anything else) does not exist in the world. So I would have said the chair I occupy is ontic or ontological, but my mental concept of the chair is not. Heidegger's distinction doesn't seem to apply to Armstrong's metaphysics, but to avoid confusion, I'll just "existent" or "existing in the world".

I think it would be fair to say that most theology prior to the Reformation and most Catholic and Orthodox theology since is pantheistic. God is present to all things as cause (St. Thomas in the Summa) and all effects as signs of their causes (St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas).

subject and object

Well, except when they get frustrated by the explanatory gap and decide to start arguing that they don't really exist in order to save their system :rofl:

I'm discussing an ontological theory: they are truly different, irrespective of what we perceive. — Relativist

So you're not claiming anything about angles, you are making a statement about differences? I thought you were saying something about the "90 degree angle". My mistake then.

It seems the Eastern Catholics and Orthodox may be more explicit in this than the West, with their insistance on seeing God's energies. If i remember correctly, John Paul II accepted Orthodox saints as part of the Catholic community of saints and Gregory of Palamas was already considered a saint by many Eastern Catholics. Malebranche can be seen as Catholic Spinozism in allowing all human thought to directly utilize, and be, the Divine Ideas (ontologism) and Rosmini's appurtenance of God is the same. Even Protestant Leibniz has his Godly fulgurations, but there have always been those in Christianity who believe philosophy is corrupt. Martin Luther knew scholastcism but latter hated philosophy and considered it a hindrance to salvation. Instead of theology AND philosophy, these thinkers believe only in history and theology. I could never be one of those. Without philosophy, theology offers nothing interesting to my mind

Yes and no. I am saying that there is an ontological relation that is being identified, but not claiming the semantic conventions are relevant.

I'll add that there IS a bit of arbitrariness to what we identify as a "state of affairs" (i.e. an existent) in terms of what we choose to consider. We could rightly say the universe is a single existent, or we could say it consists of the set of all galaxies, or the set of all stars, or the set of all quarks, leptons, etc. But any object(s) we identify is still a state of affairs - something that exists, and it fits the framework (a thin particular+intrinsic properties+relations to other objects).

"Such seems to me, for instance, the after-effect of Schopenhauer on the most modern Germany: by his unintelligent rage against Hegel, he has succeeded in severing the whole of the last generation of Germans from its connection with German culture, which culture, all things considered, has been an elevation and a divining refinement of the historical sense; but precisely at this point Schopenhauer himself was poor irreceptive, and un-German to the extent of ingeniousness" Beyond Good and Evil ch VI para. 204

'll add that there IS a bit of arbitrariness to what we identify as a "state of affairs" (i.e. an existent) in terms of what we choose to consider. — Relativist

Since time is always passing, and there is a lot of energy exchange making for a very rapid rate of change, how does an ontology based in "state of affairs" make any sense?

Identity (i.e. true identity, consistent with Leibniz' law) doesn't endure over time. Rather, we can identify a perduring identity, as a causally connected series of temporal parts.

Jumping in, Parmenides pointed out that nothingness cannot be talked about or indicated. He's right in a way, in an ancient Greek way. Being is the unity of what subsists and for him thoughts are being. The world is becoming, but our thoughts are eternal. Heraclitus was like Nietzsche and Parmenides like the Socrates of Nietzsche's critique. The becoming, the fleeting, had great value for Heraclitus, as we burn like Fire amid the winds of life.

The world is becoming, but our thoughts are eternal. — Gregory

Technically there is very little evidence for this. It is simply a subjective assumption we make due to our appreciation of time (or rather entropy).

The phenomenological positioning of Husserl might shed some light on this topic. What is experienced is experienced. The 'reality' of it is neither here nor there. We experience. From this point we can then pick out certain universals.

Identity (i.e. true identity, consistent with Leibniz' law) doesn't endure over time. Rather, we can identify a perduring identity, as a causally connected series of temporal parts. — Relativist

By Aristotle's law of identity, identity is proper to the thing itself. "A thing is the same as itself". This allows that a thing may be changing as time passes, and yet remain the same thing. This is an important aspect of the law of identity, it allows for the temporal extension of a thing maintaining its identity as the thing which it is, despite incurring changes. Also, Aristotle insists that the identity of a thing is its form. This means that a thing has a changing form. This is shown to be inconsistent with a form being a "state of affairs", by the following argument.

If at the time known as t1, what exists is state A, and at t2 what exists is state B, and the two states are different, then change must have occurred between the two. Now we need to account for what happened between t1 and t2. If we posit state C as a state different from A and B, to account for that change, then there must be a change which occurred between A and C, and also between C and B. Then we would need to posit states D and E to account for the change between A and C and C and B. But now we need to account for the changes between A and D, D and C, C and E, and E and B. As you can see, this leads to an infinite regress, and the use of "states" to represent change is shown to be incapable of fulfilling that purpose.

So, we can talk about a series of different states which are "causally connected", but this does not provide us with a representation of what happens as time passes. Each state is static, so no time can be passing. Between one state and another, when time is passing, there is causation. But what does that mean? The representation you offer is very inadequate because it provides nothing to represent what occurs with the passing of time, which is what is really happening in the world.

Well Einstein himself thought everything was eternal (block universe, B time). Entropy is like the physical equivalent of Will. Maybe philosophy is completely a chemical process and it in no way reaches to some beyond space-time. Perhaps philosophy is purely normative, how evolved creaures should think for their sake. Becoming is the constant process

"With regard to what 'truthfulness' is, perhaps nobody has ever been sufficiently truthful." (Beyond Good and Evil, ch. IV, para. 177)

"A discerning one might easily regard himself at present as the animalization of God." (para. 101)

I am very interested in Husserl

I assume my car has an individual identity. Suppose my neighbor has a identical make and model, and we gradually start swapping parts. Eventually, the car in my driveway has none of its original parts and all of my neighbors parts. Is it now the neighbor's car? If so, how many parts had to be replaced to constitute the transformation?

Leibniz's law:
if, for every property F, object x has F if and only if object y has F, then x is identical to y.

This means identity implies identical in every way. Any other definition of identity depends on an arbitary set of necessary and sufficient properties that persist over time - or the assumption that identity is some metaphysical thing that could take on any form (your identity could exist as a cat, a stone, a quark, or a gust of wind.)

Under strict identity, the car in my driveway today is causally connected to the car that was there yesterday so I can claim it as my car from day to day. There's no metaphysical core that makes it so, it's just the way I choose to identify "my car"

Being is the unity of what subsists and for him thoughts are being. The world is becoming, but our thoughts are eternal. — Gregory

I'm a materialist, and can't accept that a thought (nor abstraction) is truly a part of the furniture of the world. I don't insist everyone agree; I'm just defending the coherence and plausibility of materialism, based on Armstrong's materialist metaphysics.

What about matter creating the spiritual? There is an esoteric word for that but I've forgotten it. Hegel has the world coming from Spirit but even more importantly matter sublates into Spirit through the history