What about matter creating the spiritual — Gregory

Why should I think "spirtual" refers to something that exists?

"The truth can never be told so as to be understood and not be believed"
William Blake

I think stephen pinker nailed in when he said we have a "language instinct"

Understand how an infant is predisposed to grammar and you are speaking of phenomenology-

That is, a reality that is imposed a priori by descriptions and assimilations of relations

The kantian idea of a priori concepts that are irreducible to another category

We do not come into the world blank slates,

Names in themselves are arbitrary, the ability to name is not

A linguist, don't remember his/her name, discerned the possibility of more than 30 kinds of intelligible grammars where as only.5 were utilised globally

Say, you see a shape you've never seen before, you can say with accuracy it is formless, when you see it twice it is recognisable

The shape of the island of Ireland appears as something specific the second time you encounter it

A child's capability to name things is a priori, the form of trees are derived from experience but one's first impression precedes the concept

Saying nominalism is concerned with names only is not a paradox but a refutation,

Maybe when you think of spiritual you aren't really having spiritual content in your mind. When it is experienced one recognizes that it's different from matter's psychology. Spiritual vs psychological. I assume the spiritual is where I will go when I die, since annihilation doesn't make sense from experience and doesn't really refer to anything, unless to hell. I hope to stay out of hell and loss of consciousness into eternity, so I have great interest in spiritual things. Sorry but i dont think i can demonstrate these things to you

When I think of "spritual" I relate it to my childhood Christian faith. I was told to interpret various feelings a certain way, and I bought into it. So I think I have some grasp of what you're saying, but I know longer accept that paradigm.

I was raised traditional Catholic. I don't believe in Christianity anymore. Anyway, as a materialist what do you think of Einstein's religious beliefs? He said he believed in Spinoza's God and admired Buddhism (annihilation vs anatman?).

My understanding is that Einstein believed in a non-personal, non-anthropogenic "law giver", and denied there existing a life after death. I suspect he felt this way because he could think of no other way to account for laws of nature. Metaphysics has advanced beyond that, so that doesn't sound as reasonable now as it might have back then.

There have been occasions on which I though that it was possible such a god existed, although it is didn't seem likely because it depends on the rather unparsimonious assumption that such a being just happens to exist. Even if it did exist, it would have no relevance in anyone's life - so it would be irrelevant.

I assume my car has an individual identity. Suppose my neighbor has a identical make and model, and we gradually start swapping parts. Eventually, the car in my driveway has none of its original parts and all of my neighbors parts. Is it now the neighbor's car? If so, how many parts had to be replaced to constitute the transformation? — Relativist

When you speak of the identity of a part, then you are not talking about the identity of the whole, and vise versa. So, I think you have produced an example which shows that these two are incompatible. If "my car" is the object referred to, then the supposed individual parts cannot have a distinct identity, because the part's identity is subsumed as it is "a part" of the whole.

This can be understood as a matter of what is our subject here, the part or the whole. If the car (the whole) is the subject, then the part is a property of that subject. When the part is removed, that property is negated from that subject, and the subject maintains its status as the subject, without that property. So it's just a matter of affirming and negating properties It really does not matter which properties come and go.

On the other hand, if the part is the subject, then being in X relation with other parts, or wholes, are properties of that part. Then the part can be moved around accordingly, and whatever relations it is in, will define its position as "a part".

The important thing to notice is that whether a thing is a "part of" something else, is never an essential property, neither to the identity of the thing said to be "a part" (giving it an identity as a thing denies its status as a part), or the identity of the whole. Therefore "part" is a name we assign when the thing is in a specific type of relation, the relation is what is essential to the determination of "part", and if we give that thing which is said to be "a part" an identity as an independent thing, we deny that this relation is essential to the thing's identity, so we can no longer speak of it as "a part".

Leibniz's law:
if, for every property F, object x has F if and only if object y has F, then x is identical to y.

This means identity implies identical in every way. — Relativist

Lebniz' law is not the same as the law of identity. The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. To make your statement representative of the law of identity, we would have to say that object named x is the same object as the object named y. The point to consider is that then "x" and "y" are symbols which both refer to the same object, and it is not the case that "x" and "y" refer to two different objects which are "identical". The latter is what is impossible by the law of identity, that two distinct objects could be "identical".

Any other definition of identity depends on an arbitary set of necessary and sufficient properties that persist over time - or the assumption that identity is some metaphysical thing that could take on any form (your identity could exist as a cat, a stone, a quark, or a gust of wind.) — Relativist

By the law of identity a thing's identity is itself. This means your identity is not a symbol, idea (such as stone, cat, etc.), or anything else which a human being might assign to you (even your name). Your identity is you, yourself.

Under strict identity, the car in my driveway today is causally connected to the car that was there yesterday so I can claim it as my car from day to day. — Relativist

I believe that "causally connected" is an unwarranted assumption here, which only complicates things. We can simply say that there is temporal continuity between the thing in your driveway yesterday, and the thing in your driveway today, which would allow us to represent it as a subject for predications, and "causation" is left as a distinct and unnecessary conception.

You need to distinguish between parts as understood philosophically and parts of an object seen as geometry. In the latter an object has infinite parts. In the former, well it is debatable. That is why Aristotle failed to refute Zeno. Zeno made a mathematical point with philosophical implications,and Aristotle responded simply with his philosophy

George Berkeley, author of The Analyst, was one philosopher who thought Zeno's paradoxes proved idealism, as Zeno intended. Likewise William of Ockham contended against the argument for mere [potential infinity] that the parts either exist or they don't. Matter can't exist as something completely potential. Divide the object and ask "what's there"; repeat process. Together or separate, the same quanity is there. Finally, Bertrand Russell said that calculus could be done without infinitesimals. However, it is still assumed in mathematics that infinitesimals make logical sense, which is why they are used in calculus courses and in nonstandard analysis

Ooh this feels very much in the discussions of the Speculative Realists like Graham Harmon’s Object-Oriented Ontology:

Object-oriented ontology holds that objects are independent not only of other objects but also from the qualities they animate at any specific spatiotemporal location. Accordingly, objects cannot be exhausted by their relations with humans or other objects in theory or practice, meaning that the reality of objects is always ready-to-hand.[10] The retention by an object of reality in excess of any relation is known as withdrawal.[25] And since all objects are, in their fullness, partially withdrawn from one another, every relation is said to be an act of translation, meaning that no object can perfectly translate another object into its own nomenclature; Harman has referred to this as the "problem with paraphrase". — https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Object-oriented_ontology

I forgot to reply to this post.

If you asked everyone to classify a set of objects into chairs and not chairs, there would be disagreements precisely for this reason. "chair" has no single definition and so refering to it is not referring to a universal. — Ourora Aureis

Yes, that is a valid and good point. That is specially clear with redness. There is disagreement, often even within a single person, about what objects really instantiate 'redness'.

I remember reading a reply to that some time ago, but I can't remember it. Since I don't wanna put words in the mouths of some philosophers, I will say what I think the platonist would reply:

If we look at a wolf, and because of blurry sight or just ignorance of species, we identify it instead as a coyote, it does not mean that the wolf does not belong to its species. Likewise, a misidentification of the instantiation of a universal for another does not mean that the particular is not of its universal, but instead we misattribute its reality due to a mistake of our mind. That is the platonist position, the universal exists and it instanties itself in objects regardless if we are there to see it correctly or incorrectly or not. Not only that, but the object is imperfect in respect to its universal and, depending on how imperfect, it might hinder our capacity of identifying it as such. It is the nominalist that will make away with categories if an intelligent mind, expressing itself in language, decides so.

If a definition has no particular reason to apply to a word, then by definition its arbitrary — Ourora Aureis

Did you mean to say something else? Definitions typically are inbuilt in words or otherwise at least give them meaning, they don't apply to them. Definitions may apply to things, like the definition of 'white' or 'slim fit' applies to my pants. But 'colour above infrared' doesn't apply to 'red', one is the other.

If you mean instead that a definition/concept has no reason to apply to a thing, well, that is another argument, so you can let me know. But that is somewhat the counterargument that I gave to Chesterton, defending Wells, in my second post on this thread.

Also, be careful not to make a circular argument for universals — Ourora Aureis

I don't think I am :razz:

Jacques Derrida introduced the concept of deconstruction, which is an interesting idea opposing these ideas if your interested and havent heard about it. — Ourora Aureis

Check out this article, I read it some years ago and enjoyed it. If you do read it, let me know what you think https://thedangerousmaybe.medium.com/the-deconstruction-of-identity-derrida-and-the-first-law-of-logic-3a6246c42eb

Can I make up new Chinese words even though I don't speak Chinese? — Count Timothy von Icarus

People who don't speak Greek make up "Greek words" all the time :razz:

When you speak of the identity of a part, then you are not talking about the identity of the whole, and vise versa. So, I think you have produced an example which shows that these two are incompatible. If "my car" is the object referred to, then the supposed individual parts cannot have a distinct identity, because the part's identity is subsumed as it is "a part" of the whole. — Metaphysician Undercover

I partially disagree: the parts of the car are still things, and can be a subject of discussion. I can refer to "my car's engine/steering wheel/tires" etc. I think your issues are a tangent, because states of affairs do not have a mereological composition: a part can be a constituent in multiple states of affairs.

I was only trying to show that "enduring indentity" is a problematic concept - because it depends on essentialism: the notion that there is something that is both necessary and sufficient to an individual identity. I probably clouded the matter by referring to "my car"; the real question is whether it can be considered the "same car" (an enduring identity).

This can be understood as a matter of what is our subject here, the part or the whole. If the car (the whole) is the subject, then the part is a property of that subject. When the part is removed, that property is negated from that subject, and the subject maintains its status as the subject, without that property. So it's just a matter of affirming and negating properties It really does not matter which properties come and go. — Metaphysician Undercover

My point is that it's arbitrary, and not of much ontological signficance- it's more of a semantic convention. Consider this snapshot from one day to the next:

Day 1: I purchase a car and park it in my driveway (=Car1)
Day 2: I replace a tire on that car (=Car2)

Car1 is not strictly identical to Car2, but there is a temporal/causal link between Car1 and Car2: Car1 is a material cause of Car2.

Focus instead on humans: you are not strictly identical to the person you were yesterday: the sets of elementary particles that comprise the respective bodies are somewhat different, and you now have one more day of memories. Get more extreme: compare today-you to infant-you on the day you were born. There is no identifiable set of necessary & sufficient conditions that today-you shares with infant-you - so what would be your ontological basis for claiming you're the same person as infant-you? This is the problem with endurantism: it requires essentialism, the notion that there is some core of you that endures throughout your existence. If you're a theist, you might consider this your "soul", a substance that is assumed to never change -but good luck on proving such a thing exists.

The important thing to notice is that whether a thing is a "part of" something else, is never an essential property, — Metaphysician Undercover

Two problems with this:
1) In Armstrong's ontology, a "thing" (AKA an existent AKA a state of affairs) is not a property. Instead, we might define a complex state of affairs as a set of things connected through relations of some sort. (an "atomic" state of affairs is not composed of other states of affairs - it's just a thin particular+intrinsic properties+relations). So a car consists of parts that are connected to the other parts to form a functional whole. (I'll defer explaining the technicality of how a thing's identify perdures over time).
2) you're referring to something being "essential", while seemingly ignoring the fact that nothing can be identified as essential (both necessary and sufficient).

Lebniz' law is not the same as the law of identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am referring to the conjunction of:
(the identity of indiscernibles) & (the indiscernibility of identicals).

Some refer to this conjunction as "Leibniz law" (see this). But whether or not it's a correct label is moot. The point is that strict identity entails an identical set of properties. We likely agree that personal identity is not the same thing as strict identity, but Armstrong's ontology makes sense of the distinction, without essentialism.

I believe that "causally connected" is an unwarranted assumption here, which only complicates things. We can simply say that there is temporal continuity between the thing in your driveway yesterday, and the thing in your driveway today, which would allow us to represent it as a subject for predications, and "causation" is left as a distinct and unnecessary conception. — Metaphysician Undercover

The temporal continuity of the car depends on each version of the car being a material cause of the next version. That is warranted. Compare the completed process of gradually swapping car parts to simply swapping complete cars on day 1. The latter provides no basis for claiming the car I now possess is the same car as before.

Your quote on Graham Harmon’s is very interesting. It sounds like a philosophical answer to Zeno's paradoxes instead of the mathematical one. In fact, it might question the mathematical explanation since the object is no longer pure geometry. Hegel thought, because of the paradoxes, objects were instanstiated contradictions and this was a huge part of his philosophy in that everything resolved into other things as if forming a complete puzzle. This is a bit much, as if objects were finite and infinite in the same respect. They may seem to be by logic, but intuition sees them was they are

You need to distinguish between parts as understood philosophically and parts of an object seen as geometry. In the latter an object has infinite parts. In the former, well it is debatable. That is why Aristotle failed to refute Zeno. Zeno made a mathematical point with philosophical implications,and Aristotle responded simply with his philosophy — Gregory

I don't see the relevance, we were talking about identity, which refers to things, not geometrical conceptions.

Ooh this feels very much in the discussions of the Speculative Realists like Graham Harmon’s Object-Oriented Ontology: — schopenhauer1

I think that's a similar point. Properties are what we attribute, what we say about things. But in logic the object is represented as a subject, and we predicate. The predication is made of the subject, not the object, and there remains a separation between the subject with its predications, and any possible object which is represented in this way. This separation, makes the object completely separate from anything we say about it, even spatial-temporal location, it's reality is a possibility. This is what allows for the reality of mistake.

I partially disagree: the parts of the car are still things, and can be a subject of discussion. I can refer to "my car's engine/steering wheel/tires" etc. — Relativist

These are predications though, your car is the subject, and you are saying that it has these things, as properties. At any time, such predications may be true or false. Therefore at sometime your car may not have any tires, then afterwards it might have tires which are different from the tires before. The swap in parts makes no difference to the identity of the car.

I was only trying to show that "enduring indentity" is a problematic concept - one that depends on essentialism: the notion that there is something that is both necessary and sufficient to an individual identity. — Relativist

The point though is that there is nothing necessary and sufficient, because identity is the thing itself.

I probably clouded the matter by referring to "my car"; the real question is whether it can be considered the "same car" (an enduring identity). — Relativist

When you say "same car", you are designating a type of thing, "car", and that causes a problem because we might think that there are necessary and sufficient conditions for being "a car". I think the important point of the law of identity is that it makes identity distinct from anything we say about a thing, making it the thing itself.

My point is that it's arbitrary, and not of much ontological signficance- it's more of a semantic convention, that is justifiable under this ontology. Consider this snapshot from one day to the next:

Day 1: I purchase a car and park it in my driveway (=Car1)
Day 2: I replace a tire on that car (=Car2)

Car1 is not strictly identical to Car2, but there is a temporal/causal link between Car1 and Car2: Car1 is a material cause of Car2. — Relativist

You are using "identical" in a different way. This is not the law of identity. It allows that the thing which you refer to as Car 1, and Car2, are the very same thing, a changing thing with different properties at different times. You have just taken different time frames, saying that the thing does not have the same properties at one time as it does at another, so you want to designate them as two distinct things. It's a different way of looking at things, a different ontology.

There is no identifiable set of necessary & sufficient conditions that you share with infant-you - so what would your basis be for claiming you're the same person as infant-you? This is the problem with endurantism: it requires essentialism, the notion that there is some core of you that endures throughout your existence. If you're a theist, you might consider this your "soul", a substance that is assumed to never change -but good luck on proving such a thing exists. — Relativist

I think your association of the law of identity with "essentialism", and "the notion that there is some "core of you" that endures throughout your existence" is mistaken. What is simply assumed is temporal continuity. This means that form one moment of time to the next, there is some continuity in what we observe, a certain persistence of things. So changes are not random, they are consistent with what we've observed already. That's what allows for prediction. That is the temporal continuity which we assume the reality of, because we've observed it. This allows us to say that a thing has an identity. The assumed "identity" is not supposed to be some essential conditions, nor is it assume to be "some core" of the person, it is simply the temporal continuity of the thing, which we observe as time passes.

2) you're referring to something being "essential", while seemingly ignoring the fact that nothing can be identified as essential (both necessary and sufficient). — Relativist

No, I said it is "never an essential property", not that it is essential. You seem to have misunderstood.

I am referring to the conjunction of:
(the identity of indiscernibles) & (the indiscernibility of identicals). Some refer to this conjunction as "Leibniz law" (see this). But whether or not it's a correct label is moot. The point is that strict identity entails an identical set of properties. — Relativist

Your idea of "strict identity" is completely different from mine. I am trying to adhere to the law of identity, you have a different set of principles which you are calling "strict identity".

The temporal continuity of the car depends on each version of the car being a material cause of the next version. That is warranted. Compare the completed process of gradually swapping car parts to simply swapping complete cars on day 1. The latter provides no basis for claiming the car I now possess is the same car as before. — Relativist

As I said, changing parts does not change the thing's identity, that's a matter of properties coming and going, what we express by having one subject with different predications at different times. Clearly two distinct things in the same place at different times, does not provide the temporal continuity required that it be one subject.

I don't see the relevance, we were talking about identity, which refers to things, not geometrical conceptions. — Metaphysician Undercover

You talk in completely different language than I do. Example:

But in logic the object is represented as a subject, and we predicate. The predication is made of the subject, not the object, and there remains a separation between the subject with its predications, and any possible object which is represented in this way. This separation, makes the object completely separate from anything we say about it, even spatial-temporal location, it's reality is a possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

Huh? A subject in the philosophy I read is a conscious observer. You are saying that the subject is the object observed, and then use those words in the same way. I can't make sense of this. Are you saying the predication is made "of" the subject or "by" the subject?

Therefore at sometime your car may not have any tires, then afterwards it might have tires which are different from the tires before. The swap in parts makes no difference to the identity of the car. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whether it's an ancient ship or a modern car, the argument still holds that we don't know when exactly minimally a the object ceases to be an object.

The point though is that there is nothing necessary and sufficient, because identity is the thing itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

Huh? He was saying necessary and sufficient refers to what makes a thing a thing in itself.

I think the important point of the law of identity is that it makes identity distinct from anything we say about a thing, making it the thing itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

So the object can never be completely known? It IS very strange that I can look at a pair a shoes and know the relation there and exactly what they are and yet there on other states of consciousness I could see them in which would be a wholly different experience of their ontology

You have just taken different time frames, saying that the thing does not have the same properties at one time as it does at another, so you want to designate them as two distinct things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where has anyone on this thread said time itself causes things to change?

That is the temporal continuity which we assume the reality of, because we've observed it. This allows us to say that a thing has an identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

So now time is what gives identity?

I think your association of the law of identity with "essentialism", and "the notion that there is some "core of you" that endures throughout your existence" is mistaken. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's just the language he was using. He uses "essential" to mean "identity". How is any of this an answer to the ship of Theseus?

I'll be honest: I have never understood a single post of yours on this forum. I never know what the heck you are even talking about :(

*edit* I overlooked this portion of your post, since I didn't think it wasn't addressed to me. But it does seem relevant:

Properties are what we attribute, what we say about things. But in logic the object is represented as a subject, and we predicate. The predication is made of the subject, not the object, and there remains a separation between the subject with its predications, and any possible object which is represented in this way. This separation, makes the object completely separate from anything we say about it, even spatial-temporal location, it's reality is a possibility. This is what allows for the reality of mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

In Armstrong's metaphysics, properties actually exist - they are not *just* what we attribute to things (and we often attribute characteristics to things that aren't actually properties). You seem focused on semantics, whereas Armstrong is focused on ontology. So I wonder if you're just treating individual identity as some semantical convention. That seems a defensible position, but it's not ontology - and it is ontology that Armstrong is dealing with.

Below is my original response (with a couple of *edit* comments added in italics):

I partially disagree: the parts of the car are still things, and can be a subject of discussion. I can refer to "my car's engine/steering wheel/tires" etc. — Relativist

These are predications though, your car is the subject, and you are saying that it has these things, as properties. At any time, such predications may be true or false. Therefore at sometime your car may not have any tires, then afterwards it might have tires which are different from the tires before. The swap in parts makes no difference to the identity of the car. — Metaphysician Undercover

(*edit* - the above reinforces my thought that you're dealing with semantic convention)

Again, I have not said the car has "things" as "properties". Rather, at a point in time, the car has a specific set of components. A swap in parts absolutely implies the resulting vehicle is not strictly identical to the car before the swap. I hope that is clear.

You claim that it makes no difference to the car's identity if some parts are replaced, but you haven't explained how that car's identity endures despite a change of parts. When the part-swapping process is completed, what has become of each original car's identity?

While I'm interested in hearing your view of how identity endures over time, don't lose sight of the fact that I'm describing David Armstrong's ontology. In Armstrong's terms, true identity is a strict identity. Below, I'll describe his concept of a personal identity perduring over time.

The point though is that there is nothing necessary and sufficient, because identity is the thing itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

This statement doesn't account for identity over time. What makes the car (or you) the same identity from one day to the next, or from one decade to the next? If you aren't accounting for it through essentialism, then how DO you account for it?

When you say "same car", you are designating a type of thing, "car", and that causes a problem because we might think that there are necessary and sufficient conditions for being "a car". I think the important point of the law of identity is that it makes identity distinct from anything we say about a thing, making it the thing itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

Considering "types of things" actually strikes close to Armstrong's account of identity over time, so I'll describe it now.

Remember that every thing that exists (i.e. a particular) is a State of Affairs (SOA), and every SOA has 3 types of constituents: a (thin) particular*, (intrinsic) properties, and relations to other SOAs (AKA extrinsic properties). Properties, relations, and "thin particulars"* do not exist independently; they exist only as constituents in a state of affairs. Strict identity means the exact same set of constituents.
-------------------
*Thin particular: Armstrong denies that SOAs (AKA existents; AKA particulars) are nothing more than bundles of properties. There is also particularity to which properties attach in a SOA. When we abstractly consider the constituents of an SOA, we therefore need to include "particular" as one of these constituents (the particular considered without the attached properties & relations). To distinguish the SOA's constituent particular from an SOA (also called a particular), he labels the constituent as a "thin" particular.
-----------------
Armstrong next defines a "State of Affairs Type (SOAT) - SOAs that have one of more properties/relations in common are the same SOAT. Electron is a SOAT. A specific electron located at some exact location is an SOA. Every SOAT is a universal: it can be instantiated multiple times. An SOAT can be a single property, or a set of properties+relations. As in the case of an electron, all electrons have the same exact properties (excluding location) - but they are different particulars (with distinct "thin particulars").

Identity over time is a loose identity (as opposed to the strict identity I've been discussing): it is a SOAT; it is a universal. An individual identity has "temporal parts": the actual SOA at each point of time. Each of these SOAs is temporally/causally connected to each other (directly or indirectly).

As I said, changing parts does not change the thing's identity, that's a matter of properties coming and going, what we express by having one subject with different predications at different times. Clearly two distinct things in the same place at different times, does not provide the temporal continuity required that it be one subject. — Metaphysician Undercover

You've indicated that personal identity is not identified by a set of necessary and sufficient properties. OK, then what does identify a specific personal identity, if it's not some subset of its properties that it holds throughout its existence? Are you, perhaps, referring to haecceity - treating identity as a primitive? *edit* or are you just treating individual identity as a semantic convention?

The paradox of perception in the context of this discussion is perplexing. Mathematics obviously would seem to apply to matter. Take your childhood bicycle: you can take off a handle, then divide that into two with a buzzsaw. So you have the bicycle and two parts. How many parts total? 3. Can't you divide one of the halves too? Now you have 4 pieces. As long as there is something there that is spatial the process, to the logical mind, would descend to infinity, and putting the bicycle back would fill up WITH infinity, into... a finite bike. I know mathematics has a lot to say about this, but as a description of something spatial it is very curious. The principle of infinity seems suspended within the concept of "the finite". It's like they are two sides of each other. The number 1 can be divided to infinity, but it's much more odd when doing this with spatial objects (because space has size). So we say "real spatial objects have much more to them then mathematical relationships to themselves. These other aspects make the mathematical sides appear distorted". This sounds to me like we're on acid and are seeing a round triangle. That can actually happen! But in the real world, when the mind and intuition is clear, we can see with perfect clarity, when observing a car or bicycle, what it is. We can "know it". Yet when the mind is elsewhere, we don't seem to feel we grasp the whole thing. There seems to be more to it that we can't get to, and this increases the sense of mystery, which in turn is the foundation of a latter focus of the intuition which, then, sees the object as it is

Just a barrage of thoughts...

The principle of infinity seems suspended within the concept of "the finite". It's like they are two sides of each other. The number 1 can be divided to infinity, but it's much more odd when doing this with spatial objects (because space has size). So we say "real spatial objects have much more to them then mathematical relationships to themselves. These other aspects make the mathematical sides appear distorted". — Gregory

I think we need to be careful when applying mathematics to reality. It may be less of a problem when applying reality to mathematics -because there are obvious mathematical relations between objects.

Xenos paradox is an example of a problem created by treating the mathematics of infinity as something that is instantiated in the actual world. Consider that there' a practical limit below which we can't divide accurately enough to actually conduct the scenario in the real world, but there may actually even be a real-world limit on the division, when we get down to the Planck length. The question should be asked: How does the mathematics map into the real world process? If that can't be described coherently, that's a clue that there is no such mapping. Mathematics is not ontology, albeit that there seem to be some mathematical relations among the actual objects of the world.

If what you say is true then I would have to conclude that matter is not pure extension (Cartesian) and so adopt some other philosophical stance

Let's put it this way:if matter is pure extension, then it leads to certain paradoxes. If that's right, then it's a reason to at least consider alternatives.

Today I finished The Theory of Mind as Pure Act by Giovanni Gentile ("design and setting by Alpha Editions" 2020). It's an incredible book. The spiritual side of me says i created my consciousness but I also know my brain and spine cause conscious throughout my body. I wonder what materialist explanations there are for consciousness being material and for consciousness seeing reality objectively. I see they are talking about this on my other thread. Anyway, i recommend the book

Huh? A subject in the philosophy I read is a conscious observer. You are saying that the subject is the object observed, and then use those words in the same way. I can't make sense of this. Are you saying the predication is made "of" the subject or "by" the subject? — Gregory

Are you familiar with "predication"?

predication, in logic, the attributing of characteristics to a subject to produce a meaningful statement combining verbal and nominal elements. Thus, a characteristic such as “warm” (conventionally symbolized by a capital letter W) may be predicated of some singular subject, for example, a dish—symbolized by a small letter d, often called the “argument.” The resulting statement is “This dish is warm”; i.e., Wd. Using ∼ to symbolize “not,” the denial ∼Wd can also be predicated.

https://www.britannica.com/topic/predication

He was saying necessary and sufficient refers to what makes a thing a thing in itself. — Gregory

The point I made though, is that it doesn't. By the law of identity a thing is unique, and what makes a thing unique, i.e. the thing that it is instead of something else of the same type, is the accidentals. "Necessary and sufficient" are what is used as the criteria to judge that a thing is of a specific type.

You seem focused on semantics, whereas Armstrong is focused on ontology. So I wonder if you're just treating individual identity as some semantical convention. That seems a defensible position, but it's not ontology - and it is ontology that Armstrong is dealing with. — Relativist

It is ontology, it's called "nominalism", the ontology that holds that only particular things exist. Armstrong obviously has a different ontology, but if he believes that properties have independent existence, not being simply what we say about things, then I do not think his ontology is nominalism

Again, I have not said the car has "things" as "properties". Rather, at a point in time, the car has a specific set of components. A swap in parts absolutely implies the resulting vehicle is not strictly identical to the car before the swap. I hope that is clear. — Relativist

But to say "the car has x. y. z components is to attribute those named properties to the named subject "the car". This is predication. And, as I said already, a thing changes as time passes, without loosing its identity. So we can predicate this set of components at one time, and another set of components at another time, and it is still the very same car.

The issue here is that you are using "identical" in a way which is not consistent with "identity" in the law of identity. You say "identical" means having all the same properties, but identity in the law of identity means being the same thing. This makes the properties which a thing is said to have, completely irrelevant, because a thing is the same as itself regardless of its properties. This is how a thing can be constantly changing, yet maintain its identity, because it is always the same as itself no matter what changes it undergoes.

You claim that it makes no difference to the car's identity if some parts are replaced, but you haven't explained how that car's identity endures despite a change of parts. — Relativist

How a thing remains the thing which it is through all sorts of changes as time passes, is unknown, as a mystery of the universe. Asking to have this explained is like asking how there are laws of physics. Some would answer that God made the universe this way, it's God's Will that this is the case, but that doesn't provide a very good answer.

The principal alternative ontology. which you seem to be promoting, holds that every time a thing changes, it cannot still be the same thing because it is no longer 'identical" to the way it was before. From this perspective, each object must be created anew at each moment of passing time, to account for all the minute changes as time passes. Since it is impossible that an object maintains its identity as the same object, as time passes (by your principle of "identical"), because aspects are always changing, then we have to conclude that everything in the universe is newly created at each moment of passing time. This is a fine ontology, but then we have to account for the reality of similarity from one moment to the next. If things are created anew every moment, why do they remain so similar. And again this is often answered with reference to God. Something must create the new universe at each moment of passing time, and ensure that there is intelligible consistency from one moment to the next, and this is claimed to be God.

This statement doesn't account for identity over time. What makes the car (or you) the same identity from one day to the next, or from one decade to the next? If you aren't accounting for it through essentialism, then how DO you account for it? — Relativist

As stated above, it's simply unknown. No one understands temporal continuity, and there is often an appeal to God. But this does not provide a good answer so it's better just to say that it's unknown.

Remember that every thing that exists (i.e. a particular) is a State of Affairs (SOA), and every SOA has 3 types of constituents: a (thin) particular*, (intrinsic) properties, and relations to other SOAs (AKA extrinsic properties). Properties, relations, and "thin particulars"* do not exist independently; they exist only as constituents in a state of affairs. Strict identity means the exact same set of constituents. — Relativist

You say first, that every particular is an SOA. But then you say that an SOA consists of 3 type of things, and a particular is one of the three. So which is the true particular, the SOA, or the part of the SOA. Or do you have two very distinct types of particulars, one being an SOA, and one being a part of an SOA?

*Thin particular: Armstrong denies that SOAs (AKA existents; AKA particulars) are nothing more than bundles of properties. There is also particularity to which properties attach in a SOA. When we abstractly consider the constituents of an SOA, we therefore need to include "particular" as one of these constituents (the particular considered without the attached properties & relations). To distinguish the SOA's constituent particular from an SOA (also called a particular), he labels the constituent as a "thin" particular. — Relativist

This does not resolve the issue of which is the true particular, it simply creates an infinite regress. Each particular is composed of "thin" particulars, but those particulars, to fulfill what it means to be "a particular" under Armstrong's description, must also be composed of "thinner" particulars, and so on ad infinitum. This is the problem which the ancient Greek materialists known as the atomists were addressing when they posited a fundamental, base particle (the atom). I see no difference here. A rock is an SOA and its thin particulars are molecules. A molecule is an SOA and its thin particulars are atoms. Etc.. To avoid infinite regress, a base particular needs to be posited. But this assumption has all sorts of problems which Aristotle exposed, they cannot have any form, being indivisible, and without form they cannot have identity, making them all unintelligible.

Armstrong next defines a "State of Affairs Type (SOAT) - SOAs that have one of more properties/relations in common are the same SOAT. Electron is a SOAT. A specific electron located at some exact location is an SOA. Every SOAT is a universal: it can be instantiated multiple times. An SOAT can be a single property, or a set of properties+relations. As in the case of an electron, all electrons have the same exact properties (excluding location) - but they are different particulars (with distinct "thin particulars"). — Relativist

The problem though, is that when you get to the base particulars (particles), which are necessary to assume to avoid infinite regress, identity is completely lost. One cannot be distinguished from another, and they are moving as time passes, so location is of not help. At this point, "strict identity" turns into no identity, and the entire ontology falls apart by proposing a fundamentally unintelligible universe.

Identity over time is a loose identity (as opposed to the strict identity I've been discussing): it is a SOAT; it is a universal. An individual identity has "temporal parts": the actual SOA at each point of time. Each of these SOAs is temporally/causally connected to each other (directly or indirectly). — Relativist

This is exactly opposite of what is actually the case. Identity over time grants identity to the particular, "a thing is the same as itself. The SOA is a universal, a type. Because the base particular cannot have any thin particulars, to avoid infinite regress, the whole structure is undermined and all SOAs are fundamentally universals, because spatial temporal positioning loses its validity.

OK, then what does identify a specific personal identity, if it's not some subset of its properties that it holds throughout its existence? — Relativist

As stated above, this is an unknown. It's why metaphysicians, and philosophers in general, still have work to do

Are you, perhaps, referring to haecceity - treating identity as a primitive? *edit* or are you just treating individual identity as a semantic convention? — Relativist

What's the difference? "Semantic convention" and "primitive" are the same, aren't they?

The subject of predication is the object of awareness, so subject and object are the same in that context. The conscious synthetic subject will analyze the object and account for predicates by synthesizing them into a mental picture. Substance and accidents don't refer to anything different anymore than matter and form for the reason that the object is particular (has "thisness"). You said on page 3 that angling was subjective but i think it is objective. You are using a dualism of substance and accidents (or a "quadism?" by using the prior prime matter/form distinction) to say that object of perception is beyond our comprehension. At the right time an object can be known for what it is. Right focus, right concentration are needed for this. Not bare "understanding", but intuitive knowing. Angles are part of the very shape of a thing. Without shape it's not physical anymore

How a thing remains the thing which it is through all sorts of changes as time passes, is unknown, as a mystery of the universe. — Metaphysician Undercover

Armstring's ontology accounts for it.

The principal alternative ontology. which you seem to be promoting, holds that every time a thing changes, it cannot still be the same thing because it is no longer 'identical" to the way it was before. From this perspective, each object must be created anew at each moment of passing time, ...This is a fine ontology, — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps, but it's not the ontology I've been trying to explain.

You say first, that every particular is an SOA. But then you say that an SOA consists of 3 type of things, and a particular is one of the three. So which is the true particular, the SOA, or the part of the SOA — Metaphysician Undercover

I did explain it, right here:

*Thin particular: Armstrong denies that SOAs (AKA existents; AKA particulars) are nothing more than bundles of properties. There is also particularity to which properties attach in a SOA. When we abstractly consider the constituents of an SOA, we therefore need to include "particular" as one of these constituents (the particular considered without the attached properties & relations). To distinguish the SOA's constituent particular from an SOA (also called a particular), he labels the constituent as a "thin" particular. — Relativist

You then responded:

This does not resolve the issue of which is the true particular, it simply creates an infinite regress. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then we haven't succeeded in communicating. I'll try this:
Every SOA is a "true particular" in the sense that we typically use the term. It is something that exists in the world, wholly and
independently (except that it may have relations to other particulars).

A "thin particular" is not a "true particular" - it isn't a thing that can exist wholly and independently. Here's how to conceive of a "thin particular": think about an object. Like all objects, it has intrinsic properties, and relations to other things. Now mentally subtract those properties and relations. What's left is the "thin particular".

(You may believe there's nothing left after you strip off the properties and relations. You'll need to set that aside and accept this as a stipulation of the ontology, at least for now).

The problem though, is that when you get to the base particulars (particles), which are necessary to assume to avoid infinite regress, identity is completely lost. One cannot be distinguished from another, and they are moving as time passes, so location is of not help. At this point, "strict identity" turns into no identity, and the entire ontology falls apart by proposing a fundamentally unintelligible universe. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's a distinction between "strict identity" and an "individual, perduring identity" (IPI, for short; my term, not Armstrong's, but corresponds to his usage). An IPI corresponds to our everday view of identity.

A "base particular" is an "Atomic State of Affairs". It's analogous to an elematary particle in physics. It exists at a specific set of spatio-temporal coordinates with it's specific set of properties and relations. It's strict identity ceases to exist at the next instant of time. But each point of time has a successor, with a slightly different set of coordinates, properties, and relations. Every member of this set of successors shares a single IPI.

I'll leave it there to see if this got across - and to see if you are sufficiently interested to continue. I acknowledge it's complex, and takes some work to try and understand it.

A "thin particular" is not a "true particular" - it isn't a thing that can exist wholly and independently. Here's how to conceive of a "thin particular": think about an object. Like all objects, it has intrinsic properties, and relations to other things. Now mentally subtract those properties and relations. What's left is the "thin particular". — Relativist

This doesn't make sense, because you said an SOA is made of (thin) particulars, their intrinsic properties and their extrinsic properties. Now you say that I have to subtract those properties to understand what a thin particular is. A particular without any intrinsic or extrinsic properties is not a particular at all, nor is it a constituent of an SOA, which is made up of thin particulars which have intrinsic and extrinsic properties. It's not a real thing. So your description makes no sense.

A "base particular" is an "Atomic State of Affairs". It's analogous to an elematary particle in physics. It exists at a specific set of spatio-temporal coordinates with it's specific set of properties and relations. — Relativist

But quantum physics shows that elementary particles do not exist at any specific spatio-temporal coordinates. So if you are proposing a "base particular" which exists at "a specific set of spatio-temporal coordinates", this is not consistent with elementary particles in physics. Furthermore, this runs into the problems which Aristotle brought against the atomist. To begin with, a "base particular" cannot have any intrinsic properties, or else it would not be the "base". This means it cannot have any form, therefore no identity, and it is fundamentally unintelligible.

This doesn't make sense, because you said an SOA is made of (thin) particulars, their intrinsic properties and their extrinsic properties. Now you say that I have to subtract those properties to understand what a thin particular is. A particular without any intrinsic or extrinsic properties is not a particular at all, nor is it a constituent of an SOA, which is made up of thin particulars which have intrinsic and extrinsic properties. It's not a real thing. So your description makes no sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was trying to clear up your confusion about what a "true particular" (your term) is, and how a SOA could both BE a particular, and yet have a (thin) particular as a constituent in a SOA.

You said, "A particular without any intrinsic or extrinsic properties is not a particular at all,..." This is true, and it's because in the real world, particulars necessarily have properties and relations (per this metaphysical theory).

But it's also part of.this theory that a particular (i.e. an SOA) has 3 types of constuents: thin particular, intrinsic properties, and relations (AKA extrinsic properties). None of these constituents exist in the real world independently of the others.

For example "-1 electric charge" exists as a property of electrons (and other objects) but it ONLY exists as "attached to" some such objects as electrons. We can nevertheless conceptualize about the property" -1 electric charge" through our mental powers of abstraction.

Similarly, I described how you could conceptualize about a "thin particular" - analogous to how we can conceptualize about a property: in both cases, we just mentally ignore the other constituents. A thin particular doesn't exist in the world independent of a complete SOA just as a "-1 charge" doesn't exist independently in the real world

The reason Armstrong defines a SOA as including a "thin particular" as a constituent is because the alternative would be to have objects that are nothing more than a bundle of 1 or more properties. This would imply "-1 electric charge" could exist as a real-world entity, unattatched to anything, located in spacetime. (Alternative metaphysical theories treat properties as particulars; Armstrong's does not).

But quantum physics shows that elementary particles do not exist at any specific spatio-temporal coordinates. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think that's true. Can you point me at a source that says this?

The SOA model could be applied to quantum fields, directly. Each field exists at every point in space, so each point could be treated as an SOA.

But it's also part of.this theory that a particular (i.e. an SOA) has 3 types of constuents: thin particular, intrinsic properties, and relations (AKA extrinsic properties). None of these constituents exist in the real world independently of the others. — Relativist

So, how does Armstrong avoid the infinite regress I referred to? A particular (SOA) is made up of thin particulars. A thin particular, having intrinsic properties, is made up of thinner particulars. A thinner particular, having intrinsic properties, is made up of even thinner particular, and so on ad infinitum.

I don't think that's true. Can you point me at a source that says this? — Relativist

I suppose it may be a matter of interpretation, but according to The Copenhagen Interpretation, quantum mechanics is indeterministic, meaning that elementary particles have no determinable location.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copenhagen_interpretation

The SOA model could be applied to quantum fields, directly. Each field exists at every point in space, so each point could be treated as an SOA. — Relativist

A "quantum field" does not represent particulars with intrinsic and extrinsic properties, it represent probabilities of particulars. This is what Aristotle showed as the failure of such an ontology. To avoid the infinite regress there must be posited a base or fundamental particular. However, such a particular cannot be understood as a "particular" (SOA in this case) because it must be indivisible and without intrinsic properties. So it is unintelligible, being designated "a particular" but not fulfilling the criteria of "a particular". Therefore we must look for something other than particulars, or thin particulars, as that which constitutes an SOA.

So, how does Armstrong avoid the infinite regress I referred to? A particular (SOA) is made up of thin particulars. A thin particular, having intrinsic properties, is made up of thinner particulars. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not correct. Thin particulars do not have properties. Rather, a "thin particular" is a constituent of a state of affairs. Everything that exists in the world(as opposed to mental abstractions) is a SOA. Every SOA has 3 constituents (thin particular, a set of intrinsic properties, a set of relations).

Thin particulars are not composed of thinner particulars. Refer back to the mental exercise of conceptualizing the term: ignore the properties and relations and consider what remains. What remains is not further decomposable.

I suppose it may be a matter of interpretation, but according to The Copenhagen Interpretation, quantum mechanics is indeterministic, meaning that elementary particles have no determinable location — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't imply particles don't have a location. That article links to an article on complementarity:
"The complementarity principle holds that certain pairs of complementary properties cannot all be observed or measured simultaneously. For example, position and momentum..."
A position could theoretically be measured to any degree of precision, but this would result in increasingly less certainty about its momentum (and vice versa). Position and location aren't be independent properties. In terms of an SOA, the property would correspond to the wave function that described the relationship between position and momentum.

A "quantum field" does not represent particulars with intrinsic and extrinsic properties, it represent probabilities of particulars. — Metaphysician Undercover

The probabilities are a consequence of a wave function. The wave itself is an entity that actually exists at every point in space:

"a quantum field isn’t only present where you have a source (like a mass or a charge), but rather is omnipresent: everywhere....
...“empty space” as we understand it, with no charges, masses, or other sources of the field in it, isn’t exactly empty, but still has these quantum fields present within it." -- source

So fundamentally, each quantum field is a SOA (a particular). But it's impractical to analyze (say) the quark field as a whole, encompassing all of space.

The purpose of a metaphysical model is not to replace, or guide, physics. Rather, it is a framework that needs to be consistent with physics.

Thin particulars do not have properties. Rather, a "thin particular" is a constituent of a state of affairs. Everything that exists in the world(as opposed to mental abstractions) is a SOA. Every SOA has 3 constituents (thin particular, a set of intrinsic properties, a set of relations). — Relativist

Does a thin particular exist? If so, it is an SOA. And if it is an SOA it must have thinner particulars as constituent parts. That leads to infinite regress. If it is not an SOA, then it is a mental abstraction, along with the sets of intrinsic and extrinsic properties which describe it, making the entire SOA a mental abstraction. Which is the case, the infinite regress, or is the entire world just mental abstractions? See, there's something missing from this ontology.

Thin particulars are not composed of thinner particulars. Refer back to the mental exercise of conceptualizing the term: ignore the properties and relations and consider what remains. What remains is not further decomposable. — Relativist

If it is not further decomposable it is not an SOA, therefore not something which exists in the world, and it's simply a mental abstraction. Then the SOA, being composed of mental abstractions is also a mental abstraction.

The wave itself is an entity that actually exists at every point in space: — Relativist

The wave is not an entity though. By accepted theories, there is no medium (ether), therefore no real wave, just particles without any location, and a mathematical abstraction (wave function) which describes the particles. The supposed "wave" is an SOA without any thin particulars, relations without any substance, because the wave function really describes particles, not waves.