. Are you familiar with that book, or the concept of Holism? — Gnomon

No, I never heard of Jan Smuts and I am not familar with his work. But I am familiar with the concept of holism, though. Not sure if Spinoza's philosophy can be said to be 'holistic'. After all, the modes are not the Substance's parts (the Substance is IMO partless in his philosophy...if it had parts, after all, it would be ontologically dependent from them).

In my previous post, I asked you "I'm not a Spinoza expert, but regarding unbounded space-time, he seemed to assume that the material world, and his Nature God, was Eternal & Infinite*1. So how would he deal with modern Cosmology, which says that the universe had a sudden & inexplicable beginning of Space-Time-Matter-Energy? Where or when was boundless Natura Naturans before the Bang?" Do you have an opinion about Spinoza's opinion on that vexing modern question? — Gnomon

Lol, sorry for my short attention span :sweat: I missed your question

Anyway, IMO Spinoza's philosophy is unaffected by the beginning of our universe. In fact, maybe Spinoza would said that our 'universe' is merely a mode and therefore it can have a beginning.

But that sounds too close to traditional god-concepts for some of us. :smile: — Gnomon

Some interpreters seem to think that Spinoza was a modern 'scientific pantheism' who identified 'God' with our physical world. I am not saying that they cannot be defended somehow, but IMO they are implausible because Spinoza did not see himself as an 'innovator' and used in a different ways the concepts of 'classical philosophy' (derived mainly from Plato and Arisotle). Also, Spinoza's substance had infinite attributes. Only one of them was extension (the analogue of our 'phyicality' at this time) and another attribute of the Substance was actually mind. Also, he endorsed the view of psychophyical parallelism*, so mind could not be generated by matter (in his terms 'extension') in any way.

So, yeah, while not a Personal God like the one present in classical Theism, Spinoza's God was quite incompatible with a merely 'physical wholeness'.

PS___ For all practical purposes, I am in a space-time box. But, for philosophical purposes, I try to think outside the box. — Gnomon

Yeah, I think that the same goes for me

Some interpreters seem to think that Spinoza was a modern 'scientific pantheism' who identified 'God' with our physical world. I am not saying that they cannot be defended somehow, but IMO they are implausible because Spinoza did not see himself as an 'innovator' and used in a different ways the concepts of 'classical philosophy' (derived mainly from Plato and Arisotle). — boundless

Obviously, Spinoza's identification of God with Nature, sounds like both Pantheism and Immanentism. But, I interpret his deus sive natura as more like Plato's Logos : an essential principle, not a material thing ; an amorphous Ideal, not a space-time Object. That essence could be interpreted as the immaterial Whole of which all material things are parts ; or the unbounded Aristotelian Potential of which all physical objects are Actualizations.

As a creative causal Essence, though, this Logos or Potential might not create intentionally*1, but more like accidental Evolution. However, even Darwinian evolution has created material things (us) with philosophical minds. Moreover, as a scientific concept, Evolution is guided by "natural laws" and powered by physical Energy. Which may be merely two of God's "infinite attributes", but are of prime importance to creatures who seek to understand how & why this creative process works. Those directional Laws & Causes --- understandable to humans only metaphorically*2 --- are necessarily limitations on Infinity and Eternity. :smile:


*1. In fact, Spinoza's God is an entirely impersonal power, and this means that he cannot respond to human beings' requests, needs and demands. Such a God neither rewards nor punishes – and this insight rids religious belief of fear and moralism. Second, God does not act according to reasons or purposes.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2011/feb/21/spinoza-ethics-god-human-traits

*2. Natural Forces & Laws are not material things, but general principles. Metaphorically, like a quantum particle that exists only as undefined non-local statistical Potential until "collapsed" into finite local reality by an intentional probing observation. We humans only know those non-things by inference from their effects, not by direct knowledge of their essence or substance.

I'm not a Spinoza expert, but ... — Gnomon

No doubt. :sweat:

... regarding unbounded space-time, he seemed to assume that the material world, and his Nature God, was Eternal & Infinite

Wtf :confused:
.

So how would he deal with modern Cosmology, which says that the universe had a sudden & inexplicable beginning of Space-Time-Matter-Energy?

:roll:

Sub specie aeternitatis "the universe" is only an (unbounded, though finite) mode, not substance itself, that "modern cosmology" (provisionally) explains sub specie durationis. Read Spinoza's Ethics, Part One: "Of God" (iirc only 31pp in E. Curley transl. paperback).

Where or when was boundless Natura Naturans before the Bang?

:monkey: Sub species aeternitatis, "where or when was" and "before" do not pertain to natura naturans (only to natura naturata (e.g. finite modes) sub speccie durationis).

Your jabberwocky, Gnomon, merely amounts to asking 'How did Spinoza get somewhere north of the north pole?' because, as usual, you opine about subjects you've barely skimmed and thereby wantonly misinterpret. We're all "amateur philosophers" here (no experts needed) but that's – your usual prefatory cop-out – not license to routinely spout your uninformed opinions free of some critical blowback from those of us who are not, unlike you, too intellectually lazy to have informed ourselves (beyond mere pedantry) on various topics like Spinozism, materialism / physicalism, modern cosmology, etc.

:up: :up: Thanks.

The Jojo Siwa of TPF.

P.S. I have a hunch that you might find interesting the Thermal interpretation by Arnold Neumaier. It is an 'ontologically interpretable' interpretation which apparently solves the measurement problem and other issues of other 'realist' interpretations — boundless

Forgot to say that Neumaier indeed argues the same position I take, down to the biosemiotic point about measurement being a matter of imposing metastable mechanical switches on larger patterns of thermal decoherence.

We impose a logic of yes/no on a reality that is always larger or vaguer than that classical binary state. And this is where the epistemic confusion arises. Why the idealists and realists believe they have some real argument going.

the string of adjectives 'permanent...eternal...' is the same as that used by the 'eternalists' views criticized in the Buddhist scriptures — boundless

(By way of footnote - the question of what is eternal and/or persists in Buddhism is a very interesting one, against the background assumption of the impermanence (anicca) of all dharmas (moments of existence). The way I understand it is that 'eternalism' is very much the view that *I* will persist forever, and so it is criticized by the Buddha as basically a self-oriented attitude. That was in the context of a culture which accepted the reality of continued re-birth - the critique was of those who believed that the goal of the path was to be forever re-born in favourable states of being, distinct from the complete cessation (nibbana) of re-birth. However, as you point out, I don't think any of that ought to be taken to imply that nibbana itself is something transient. 'Ignorance has no beginning but it has an end. Nirvāṇa has a beginning but it has no end' ~ traditional aphorism.)

I don’t think the world is fair or just. I think we humans make up those ideas and apply them to nature. To say everything happens for a reason is kind of true, but not for some big plan or something. Things just happen and it’s mostly luck. That’s my view anyways

I don’t think the world is fair or just. I think we humans make up those ideas and apply them to nature. To say everything happens for a reason is kind of true, but not for some big plan or something. Things just happen and it’s mostly luck. That’s my view anyways

I agree, the descriptors fair, just and lucky are all subjective, post hoc labels to help humans make "sense" of individual events by making them appear to be part of a universal "plan".

, Do either of you think that we can make the world fairer? Do you think we ought?

Obviously, Spinoza's identification of God with Nature, sounds like both Pantheism and Immanentism. But, I interpret his deus sive natura as more like Plato's Logos : an essential principle, not a material thing ; an amorphous Ideal, not a space-time Object. That essence could be interpreted as the immaterial Whole of which all material things are parts ; or the unbounded Aristotelian Potential of which all physical objects are Actualizations. — Gnomon

The modes are not parts of the substance! If they were, the Substance would not be an absolute. As @180 Proof correctly said 'our physical universe' itself is merely a mode of the substance. Modes are just 'aspects' of the natura naturata which from our 'point of view' seem discrete objects or 'parts'.
Regarding the 'actualization'... maybe the whole 'natura naturata' can be thought to be an actualization of 'natura naturans'. There is absolutely nothing outside God in his metaphysics. So IMO saying that God is a 'Potential' misses this.

Regarding his 'immantenism' and the supposed identification between God and the physical universe (as some like to interpret him), he said in a letter to his friend Henry Oldenburg in 1675:

My opinion concerning God differs widely from that which is ordinarily defended by modern Christians. For I hold that God is of all things the cause immanent, as the phrase is, not transient. I say that all things are in God and move in God, thus agreeing with Paul, and, perhaps, with all the ancient philosophers, though the phraseology may be different ; I will even venture to affirm that I agree with all the ancient Hebrews, in so far as one may judge from their traditions, though these are in many ways corrupted. The supposition of some, that I endeavour to prove in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus the unity of God and Nature (meaning by the latter a certain mass or corporeal matter), is wholly erroneous.

(italics mine)

Note two things here: first he seemed to agree with - or at least seemed to be very close to - the scholastic Christian tradition that God is the sustainer of all creatures (God always sustains their beings and the creatures exist by participation) and this amounts of being the 'immanent cause' and second he explicitly rejects a materialist/physicalist interpretation of his views. Of course, he was no traditional theist but he accepted many elements of the 'traditional' Christian metaphysics.

:monkey: Sub species aeternitatis, "where or when was" and "before" do not pertain to natura naturans (only to natura naturata (e.g. finite modes) sub speccie durationis). — 180 Proof

To elaborate on this, IMO 'sub specie aeternitatis' was also the correct way of seeing natura naturata, which transcends time. In this perspective one must see all the past, present and future, all times and all phenomena as aspects of an 'undivided unity' which has an ontological priority over them.
As a hopefully not too misleading analogy, natura naturata is like, say, the book 'the Lord of the Rings'. Each 'event' in the book is a 'mode' and the plot is the temporal relation between them. So, the plot itself is an aspect of the book and the 'story as a whole' transcends its plot, so to speak.

Forgot to say that Neumaier indeed argues the same position I take, down to the biosemiotic point about measurement being a matter of imposing metastable mechanical switches on larger patterns of thermal decoherence. — apokrisis

Ok, I see thanks!

(By way of footnote - the question of what is eternal and/or persists in Buddhism is a very interesting one, against the background assumption of the impermanence (anicca) of all dharmas (moments of existence). The way I understand it is that 'eternalism' is very much the view that *I* will persist forever, and so it is criticized by the Buddha as basically a self-oriented attitude. — Wayfarer

I agree here!

That was in the context of a culture which accepted the reality of continued re-birth - the critique was of those who believed that the goal of the path was to be forever re-born in favourable states of being, distinct from the complete cessation (nibbana) of re-birth. — Wayfarer

I think that 'eternalism'* means any kind of view that posits the existence of an eternal substantial self (so a view that posits that the 'cessation of rebirth' implies a sort of 'static' eternal bliss enjoed by such a self would be considered eternalism).

However, as you point out, I don't think any of that ought to be taken to imply that nibbana itself is something transient. 'Ignorance has no beginning but it has an end. Nirvāṇa has a beginning but it has no end' ~ traditional aphorism.) — Wayfarer

Regarding this aphorism:

In this work, in Chapter XVI on the Faculties and Truths, in the section dealing with the
third noble truth, we find a lengthy disquisition on Nibbāna. It is striking that the polemic
part of it is exclusively directed against what we have called the “nihilistic-negative
extreme” in the interpretation of Nibbāna.
..
As to the positive-metaphysical view, the Venerable Buddhaghosa perhaps thought it
sufficiently covered by the numerous passages in the Visuddhimagga dealing with the
rejection of the eternity-view and of a transcendental self.
...
The adversary then proposes that Nibbāna consists solely in
the destruction of all defilements, quoting in support of his contention the sutta passage:
“That, friend, which is the destruction of greed, hate and delusion that is Nibbāna” (SN
38:1). Buddhaghosa rejects this view too, pointing out that it leads to certain undesirable
consequences: it would make Nibbāna temporal, since the destruction of the defilements is
an event that occurs in time; and it makes Nibbāna conditioned, since the actual destruction
of the defilements occurs through conditions. He points out that Nibbāna is called the
destruction of greed, hate and delusion in a metaphorical sense: because the unconditioned
reality, Nibbāna, is the basis or support for the complete destruction of those defilements.
Venerable Buddhaghosa next deals with the negative terminology the Buddha uses to
describe Nibbāna. He explains that such terminology is used because of Nibbāna’s extreme
subtlety. The opponent argues that since Nibbāna is attained by following the path, it cannot
be uncreated. Buddhaghosa answers that Nibbāna is only reached by the path, but not
produced by it; thus it is uncreated, without beginning, and free from aging and death.

(edit: I forgot to link the source of the quote: 'Nibbana and Anatta' by Nyanaponika Thera, found e.g. here: https://www.bps.lk/olib/wh/wh011_Nyanaponika_Anatta-and-nibbana--Egolessness-and-Deliverance.html)

After all, if one accepts that 'Whatever is subject to arising is all subject to cessation' (sutta reference), if Nibbana had a beginning it would mean that it also has an end.

If you like, I'll send you some other quotes via PM (to avoid to derail the thread even more, unless someone else is also interested).

*and annihilationism is the view of the destuction of an impermanent self.

In this case, I would favour Nāgārjuna over Buddhaghosa, but this is not the forum for Buddhist doctrinal disputes. But, long and short is, realising Nirvāṇa is also realising what has always already been true, nothing comes into being except for a transformation of the understanding. ‘Saṃsāra is Nirvāṇa grasped, Nirvāṇa is Saṃsāra released.’

↪boundless In this case, I would favour Nāgārjuna over Buddhaghosa, but this is not the forum for Buddhist doctrinal disputes. But, long and short is, realising Nirvāṇa is also realising what has always already been true, nothing comes into being except for a transformation of the understanding. ‘Saṃsāra is Nirvāṇa grasped, Nirvāṇa is Saṃsāra released.’ — Wayfarer

Ok!

Anyway, IMO Spinoza's philosophy is unaffected by the beginning of our universe. In fact, maybe Spinoza would said that our 'universe' is merely a mode and therefore it can have a beginning. — boundless

I agree that Spinoza's notion of "Eternity" is not to be interpreted in a space-time sense. But modern interpreters might conclude that a transcendent or supramundane God (beyond space-time) could only be known/imagined via speculation or Faith : like the infinite-eternal Multiverse hypothesis. :smile:

What does Spinoza mean by eternity?
For as I have noted, Spinoza there defines eternity as existence conceived “to follow necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal thing” (E1d8), and he adds the explication that eternal existence “cannot be explained by duration or time, even if the duration is conceived to be without beginning or end.”
https://academic.oup.com/book/2287/chapter-abstract/142414886?redirectedFrom=fulltext

The modes are not parts of the substance! If they were, the Substance would not be an absolute. As 180 Proof correctly said 'our physical universe' itself is merely a mode of the substance. Modes are just 'aspects' of the natura naturata which from our 'point of view' seem discrete objects or 'parts'.
Regarding the 'actualization'... maybe the whole 'natura naturata' can be thought to be an actualization of 'natura naturans'. There is absolutely nothing outside God in his metaphysics. So IMO saying that God is a 'Potential' misses this. — boundless

As I mentioned before, I'm not an erudite Spinoza scholar --- unlike , who haughtily agreed with my deplorable ignorance. But, since my amateur philosophical perspective is similar in some ways to Spinoza's, I'm still trying to learn where his 17th century model and my 21st century worldview differ.

Regarding my use of the term "Potential", it's a generalization & abstraction of the concept of causal Power ; not necessarily a god. Yet, if Spinoza's all-encompassing "God" has creative power*1 , then it is also the boundless Pool-of-Potential from which all space-time material things and immaterial statistical Modes are manifested. That doesn't mean the Eternal Substance is diminished in any way by the distinction between temporary & local Modes (attributes) and eternal & infinite Essence. The particular Modes are contained within the holistic Substance, not separate things. Hence, my notion of Creative Holism. Which is generally compatible with Bergson's Creative Evolution*2. If Spinoza's Nature is neither creative nor intentional, I don't understand why he would call it a "god".

But, is Evolution creative? I suppose that depends on your definition of "creativity". Some say it's only an aimless Algorithm ; but cosmic history certainly seems to reveal the emergence of features like Life & Mind that are not explainable by a simple explosion & expansion of space-time. Evolution from simple to complex goes against Entropy, and seems more like a purposeful program. Whether Natura is intentional or not is also debatable, and a topic for a different thread. But, according to the link below*3, Spinoza's Deus is more like a blind erratic force of Nature than a traditional creative God. Which may be why likes that literally absurd lawless worldview. But my worldview attempts to explain the apparent --- dare I say "obvious"? --- creativity of nature in philosophical terms that go back to Plato. So, it seems that my Panendeistic Nature God*4 explains the progressive "arrow of time", while Spinoza's might better define the orderless background of Chaos from which Plato's orderly Cosmos, including Life & Mind, emerges. Am I missing something here?

Back to the holistic nature of Spinoza's Natura, I tend to think of the Modes, not as parts of a multi-part assembly, but as various expressions of boundless Power/Potential. In that dynamic definition, a changeable mode is like a temporary State*5 of an eternal Substance. By analogy with the hypothetical universal Quantum energy Field, any Particle is merely a local disturbance or manifestation or mode or actualization of the general creative causal power of the continuous energetic system. Is Spinoza's "God" an eternal-infinite-universal energy field from which all Modes emerge? :nerd:


*1.Mode vs Substance :
'That which is in itself,' i.e. that, the reality of which is self-dependent, is what Spinoza calls 'Substance': 'that, which is in something else,' i.e., that whose reality is dependent, is called a 'mode,' or state of substance.
https://academic.oup.com/book/32374/chapter-abstract/268649395?redirectedFrom=fulltext
Note --- Does "God" divide Modes from Substance, or do the modes-we-call-human create such distinctions? If the latter, whence the human ability to create that-which-is-not-given?

*2. Bergson's Creative Evolution :
The theory presented an evolution in which a free emergence of the individual intelligence could be recognized. It was thus wholly distinct from previous deterministic hypotheses that were either mechanistic or teleological and represented evolution as conditioned either by existing forces or by future aims.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/creative-evolution-philosophy

*3. Spinoza's God : accidental or intentional?
This builds on a point he made earlier when he said that if God were to act with a purpose he would be making decisions based on something outside himself, like a person setting up a target and aiming at it. For Spinoza this is absurd; there is nothing outside of God and nothing that God could lack.
https://matthewzgindin.medium.com/spinoza-in-plain-english-pt-10b-god-acts-without-purpose-book-1-appendix-eda9d48cba67
Note --- Is a human's Purpose something outside himself, or an expression of his human nature, and his creative ability? If comprehensive Natura is able to change, the novelty would have to be internal : as a man changes his mind.

*4. God as eternal Potential, Nature as space-time Actual :
Is Space-Time Nature a mode of eternal Potential ; perhaps born about 14 billion years ago, for no apparent reason? "Panendeism" : look it up.

*5. States are not things or objects, but snapshots of continuous processes. Hence, mental or subjective. Only an analytical mind can imagine an ongoing physical process as-if momentarily halted. That talent was codified in the mathematical concepts of Calculus and Differentials, as applied to dynamic systems and non-linear geometric curves. The fundamental idea of calculus is to study change by studying instantaneous bits of change, that only exist in imagination.

I agree that Spinoza's notion of "Eternity" is not to be interpreted in a space-time sense. But modern interpreters might conclude that a transcendent or supramundane God (beyond space-time) could only be known/imagined via speculation or Faith : like the infinite-eternal Multiverse hypothesis. :smile: — Gnomon

Fine, but those 'modern interpreters' have no ground to assume that Spinoza had a world-view like theirs. It is a mere arbitrary assumption. It makes much more sense that Spinoza was actually closer to the classical metaphysical tradition of his time rather than, say, Laplacian materialistic and mechanicistic determinism (Spinoza's determinism was actually probably even stronger but of a completely different kind).
And when one consider the letter I quoted, it would be quite striking that a crypto-materialist would say that he thinks he agree with Saint Paul. Nowhere, as far I can say, he says that he thinks his views are closer to, say, Democritus.

For as I have noted, Spinoza there defines eternity as existence conceived “to follow necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal thing” (E1d8), and he adds the explication that eternal existence “cannot be explained by duration or time, even if the duration is conceived to be without beginning or end.” — Gnomon

Yes! Spinoza's eternity is timelessness, not infinite duration.

But, since my amateur philosophical perspective is similar in some ways to Spinoza's, I'm still trying to learn where his 17th century model and my 21st century worldview differ. — Gnomon

Ok!

But my worldview attempts to explain the apparent --- dare I say "obvious"? --- creativity of nature in philosophical terms that go back to Plato. So, it seems that my Panendeistic Nature God*4 explains the progressive "arrow of time", while Spinoza's might better define the orderless background of Chaos from which Plato's orderly Cosmos, including Life & Mind, emerges. Am I missing something here? — Gnomon

I think that it is an interesting endeavour but I am not sure how Spinoza's philosophy helps here (David Bohm's* is far more interesting for this kind of questions). Spinoza's wasn't interested in such kind of questions as far as I can tell.

*I would suggest to consider the views of David Bohm, especially the one found in his later books. I think that you might like his concept of 'active information', his views on creativity, his views about the implicate and explicate orders etc (I may share some useful links later, via PMs if you prefer).
Or also Schopenhauer. In his main book lays out a 'proto-evolutionary' theory so to speak, according to which the 'struggle for existence' between living organism is seen as an expression of the conflicts of different ways in which the thing-in-itself 'Will' manifests. IMO I think you'll find both thinkers interesting for your philosophical search.

Spinoza's Deus is more like a blind erratic force of Nature than a traditional creative God. — Gnomon

No, Spinoza's claim was that God does not have a 'telos', an aim, because it is already perfect so God doesn't need to 'do' anything (interestingly, most Christians philosophers agree that God is perfect but this doesn't imply that God cannot act). It's also part of the reason why temporal change is ultimately illusory in his views. Your reading is much closer to Schopenhauer's conception of the purposes, blindless 'Will' (but also he criptically says that the 'Will is the thing-in-itself for us', so it is possible that he meant that it is only a 'blind Will' in our distorted perspective...note that Schopenhauer's philosophy deals with the notion of salvation/liberation found in both western and eastern religions and tries to explain them in the context of his philosophical position).

Regarding Bohm's views, IMO you might find this interesting: https://paricenter.com/library-new/david-bohm/active-information-meaning-and-form/ (it is written by one of his students)

For as I have noted, Spinoza there defines eternity as existence conceived “to follow necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal thing” (E1d8), and he adds the explication that eternal existence “cannot be explained by duration or time, even if the duration is conceived to be without beginning or end.” — Gnomon
Yes! Spinoza's eternity is timelessness, not infinite duration. — boundless

Yes, but : us space-time creatures can only imagine essential timelessness, by analogy with the contingent & ever-changing world of matter & energy. So, the Necessary Being is a metaphor, logically defined into existence as the exception to the natural rule of Change & Contingent Existence : here today and gone tommorrow. My own analogy is with 1 & 0 (all or nothing) in computer code. which serve as brackets or bookends (beginning & end), yet are not countable numbers themselves, but conceptual placeholders. The static eternal "brackets" stand in contrast to the fleeting events of sensory reports.

So God is a concept to define temporal existence, not a mundane material creature like ourselves. Hence, Materialists deny such Ideal imaginary existence as literally Unreal, Immaterial, and Irrelevant to flesh & blood creatures. Consequently, the only justification for belief in an invisible nothingness is to serve as a logical Background against which to "see" the figures & forms of reality. Reductive scientists, like Laplace, have no need for such superfluous hypothetical notions. But Holistic philosophers find such concepts necessary for their quest to probe the limits of reality : the General, the Principle, the Whole, of which all real things are mere specks of dust.

Do you think Spinoza would agree with the label : "god of the philosophers", as contrasted with the God of theologians, and the godless-but-fecund Material World of scientists? :chin:

I believe in a God who is Omnipresent, Omniscient, and Just (by Just I mean It delivers Good and Evil in the right proportion). Therefore, I think that life is Just.

Why should we care?

At the least, in a philosophy forum, you might provide some sort of support for your beliefs.

Otherwise, we can point out that life is not fair and just, and therefore by reductio, that there is no Omnipresent, Omniscient, and Just God.

Did you come here to prove God does not exist?

Why should we care? — Banno

I have some arguments which provide support for part of my belief. Another part of my belief is based on my spiritual experiences which we cannot discuss here since here is a philosophy forum.

At the least, in a philosophy forum, you might provide some sort of support for your beliefs. — Banno

Ok, let's start from this list: 1)There was a beginning since infinite regress is not possible, 2) Nothing to something is impossible, and 3) Therefore, there was something in the beginning.

I didn't discuss (1) in this forum but I am open to discussing it. If you agree with (1) we can then move into (2).

For (2) I have a thread you can find it from the list of my threads. The essence of this thread however can be explained in two arguments A (A is my argument) and B (B is from Bob Ross).

A:
P1) Time is needed for change
P2) Nothing to something needs a change in nothing
P3) There is no time in nothing
C1) Therefore, change in nothing is not possible (From P1 and P3)
C2) Therefore, nothing to something is not possible (from P2 and C1)

B:
P1): If an entity is the pure negation of all possible existence, then it cannot be subjected to temporality.
P2): ‘Nothing’ is the pure negation of all possible existence.
C1): Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to temporality.

P3): Change requires temporality.
P4): ‘Nothing’ cannot be subjected to temporality.
C2): Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to change.

P5): ‘Nothing’ becoming ‘something’ requires change.
P6): ‘Nothing’ cannot be subjected to change.
C3): Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to becoming (something).

(3) Follows from (1) and (2).

If we agree on (3) then it means there was something in the beginning. I divide things into two sorts, changeable and changeless. Changeable substances such as material, matter and energy for example. I call changeless substance the mind. It can be shown that the mind has the ability to experience and cause. It can also be shown that change is not possible without the mind. So reality to me, including the beginning, is a mix of changeable substances and changeless substances. Let's see if can agree on what is stated here. We can move further later on.

Otherwise, we can point out that life is not fair and just, and therefore by reductio, that there is no Omnipresent, Omniscient, and Just God.

Did you come here to prove God does not exist? — Banno

No.

So you want to demonstrate that god exists, and that therefore the world must be fair and just.

But the world is not fair and just.

Therefore you are mistaken. There is no god.

If god exists, then the world is fair. The world is not fair. Therefore god does not exist.

Hence your arguments are all of them faulty.

I believe in a God who is Omnipresent, Omniscient, and Just (by Just I mean It delivers Good and Evil in the right proportion). Therefore, I think that life is Just. — MoK

But does not God create humans to have free will? And if so, can choose in such a way to create an unfair and unjust world?

But does not God create humans to have free will? — Richard B

Also, there are unfair things not caused by human action - tsetse fly, child cancer. These are not so easily explained by free will.

That the world must be fair is an act of faith on 's part. Realising it isn't involves denying an omnipotent, omniscient, fair and just god.

MoK might take the argument a step further - as was done by a former prime minister dow nunder - and argue that we needn't, even ought not, worry about famine, climate change or environmental catastrophe, because god ensures the world is fair and just whether we act or not - our actions are not just unnecessary but potentially contrary to the will of the Lord... that we ought not work towards a fair and just world, but instead spend all our spare time happy clapping his praises. :roll:

Yes, this is a common approach in American Christianity. Everything is good because God is good. The end. Interestingly, a recent conversation with a Muslim highlighted a similar perspective. According to them, the world is inherently good and just, and any negatives —like cancer, earthquakes, or famine—are just misinterpretations by humans, not reflections on the goodness of Allah and His creation. This approach is quite effective; dismissing contrary evidence allows the belief to remain intact, much like carefully putting away Grannie's fragile china, which won't get broken if it doesn't interact with the world.

...Grannie's fragile china... — Tom Storm

Yes, it closes itself off form further investigation, safely ensconcing the victim in theological cotton wool.

Just a quick question - concepts like 'fair' and 'just' are human notions grounded in our values. Do you hold that these categories are not intrinsic to nature but are instead relevant only to our interactions with it? Essentially, fairness and justice are about how we engage with the world, not about the world’s inherent nature.

Pretty much.

:up:

No, the subtly denigrating term "moral crusade" --- implying a holy mission? --- characterization of ↪Wayfarer's posts, was yours, not mine. I said he was just doing Philosophy. — Gnomon

You said:

And you accuse ↪Wayfarer of ambiguity? Hasn't philosophy itself, from the beginning, been a moral/ethical crusade? :nerd: — Gnomon

I do see Wayfarer as prosecuting a moral crusade, so yeah, I did introduce the term. It was you that suggested that the whole of philosophy has been a moral crusade and I asked you for examples and to explain why you see the chosen example(s) as constituting a moral crusade.


Also it now, looking back, seems I did not misread you in saying that you suggested that all philosophy is ambiguous:

When was the last time you saw a philosopher present an idea that was not ambiguous to someone? — Gnomon