I don't think that is how habits work at all, but even if we imagine that it is, not realizing an option was available to you (generally) isn't a restriction on your freedom either. You are setting too high a bar for freedom.

But that is exactly the case with Dan's perspective. Dan thinks laws, and the threat of punishment are restrictions. But these do not prevent one from carrying out those acts. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you're somewhat glossing over the difference. The thread of enforcement creates a materially different scenario. You can - literally - have your freedom removed, rather than be unable to access it (for lack of a better way to delineate). I'm not saying this is the best take, but I think there's a difference here.

impossible for a person to chose because they are not present to the person's mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

These don't follow, to me, so back to my original objection. Though, this goes someway to clarifying:

What do you mean by "not really" in this sentence? — Metaphysician Undercover

Just because it didn't occur to you in the moment doesn't mean you aren't capable of having made that choice. Something as simple as having encountered a slightly different shade of green prior to making the decision might have put you in mind of the 'other' option/s.
I think if you were to make your point as one about things you don't know then it could be run, but in it's current form its basically saying "it's in the shadows, so it can't be real" as regards these other options' availability.

Some things chosen are impossible to achieve in actions due to physical restrictions — Metaphysician Undercover

While I think this, and the surrounding notes are great points and well-put, I don't think it affects the difference being noted here.

This is a very real and absolute restriction, you simply cannot dig up information which has been forgotten. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, you very much can. There are entire therapies dedicated to this mechanism. Memories are very, very rarely actually lost. This is why I made the point earlier that, sure, if you didn't know the thing you couldn't drag it up even with the aid of environmental triggers.

This is also a very direct response to your last quote to Dan there. He is 100% correct.

Therefore mentioning a further option brings that option into the realm of possibility, but existing habits still restrict one from choosing it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps this is the case for you.

I don't think that is how habits work at all, but even if we imagine that it is, not realizing an option was available to you (generally) isn't a restriction on your freedom either. You are setting too high a bar for freedom. — Dan

Why do you say that not knowing a specific option doesn't restrict your freedom to choose it? I don't understand what you think freedom is. Do you think freedom is the capacity to do the impossible? That's what it seems like, if you think that a person can choose an option which is not present to the individual's mind.

I think you're somewhat glossing over the difference. The thread of enforcement creates a materially different scenario. You can - literally - have your freedom removed, rather than be unable to access it (for lack of a better way to delineate). I'm not saying this is the best take, but I think there's a difference here. — AmadeusD

You're not getting anywhere. The threat to -literally- remove one's freedom does not remove the person's freedom. You are jumping from the possibility of loosing one's freedom, to the conclusion that this is an actual restriction on one's freedom. A threat is just that, a threat. It is not an actual restriction to one's freedom, just a threat to it, that is plain and simple. The possibility (threat) of me being locked up in jail if I steal Dan's car, in no way limits my freedom to choose to steal Dan's car. I have a very difficult time believing that neither you nor Dan can understand this. I think that both of you are simply denying the facts because the facts are inconsistent with what you believe.

Just because it didn't occur to you in the moment doesn't mean you aren't capable of having made that choice. — AmadeusD

Yes it does mean exactly that. If you truly believe what you say here, explain to me how you think that a person is capable of choosing an option which does not come to the person's mind. If the option did not occur to the person at the moment when the person is making the choice, then the person was not capable of making that choice.

This is actually the issue which Dan and I started with. I said that making a choice restricts your freedom, because you are constrained by that choice made, while not choosing, deliberation and contemplation, provides you with greater freedom. At the moment when the choice is made, a person is constrained, and restricted, by that choice, and being only capable of choosing the options present to mind at that time. But it is only the act of choosing which forces those restrictions. If the person does not choose, one is allowed to find other options at a later time. If the person chooses, and something comes up later, it's too late to alter the choice already made.

You ought to see that it is logically impossible for a person to be capable of making a choice which does not come to one's mind. "Choice" requires something that is chosen, and the one choosing can only choose from the options present. Therefore it is impossible that a person is capable of choosing an option which does not come to the one's mind.

Something as simple as having encountered a slightly different shade of green prior to making the decision might have put you in mind of the 'other' option/s. — AmadeusD

Sure, if something different had happened, then the options might have been different. But we can only take into consideration what actually did happen. Counterfactuals are irrelevant because they refer to what did not happen. And, it is impossible to change what has already happened. Therefore counterfactuals deal with what is impossible, and are therefore irrelevant when considering these possibilities.

The different shade of green did not happen. The other option did not come to the person's mind. It was impossible for the person to choose that other option, when the choice was made, because that option was not present to the person's mind. The person's freedom to choose that option was therefore restricted.

I think if you were to make your point as one about things you don't know then it could be run, but in it's current form its basically saying "it's in the shadows, so it can't be real" as regards these other options' availability. — AmadeusD

I don't understand what you\re trying to say. The other options are not "in the shadows", they are simply not present to the person's mind at the point in time when the decision is made. Since they are not present to the person's mind it is impossible that the person can choose them. It's very simple and straight forward. I really cannot believe that you guys have such a hard time to understand something so obvious.

Yes, you very much can. There are entire therapies dedicated to this mechanism. Memories are very, very rarely actually lost. This is why I made the point earlier that, sure, if you didn't know the thing you couldn't drag it up even with the aid of environmental triggers. — AmadeusD

It doesn't even matter if it is possible to drag up the memory or not. What matters is whether the person actually does drag up those particular memories. If the memories are not pulled up, then the person cannot use the information (which may be deep in the mind somewhere anyway) in the decision making process. Not pulling up the information restricts one's freedom of choice by leaving options concealed. It is impossible for the person to choose an option not revealed. This is why habit is so important as a restriction to one's freedom. A lazy habit inclines one not to pull up all the relevant information which is stored in the brain, and this restricts the person's freedom to choose other options.

It's very clear, that lazy thinking habits restrict one's freedom of choice. I find it very difficult to believe that intelligent people like you and Dan actually dispute what is so obvious. Do you not agree that prejudices, biases, and ideologies in general are real restrictions on one's freedom of choice? What about religious faith? Is this not a restriction to one's freedom in your mind? Where would you draw the line? Prejudice, ideology, and religious convictions do not restrict one's freedom, yet respect for the law does restrict one's freedom? How so, by threat? As explained above, threats don't actually restrict one's freedom of choice. I think you and Dan need to reconsider.

No, ideologies, biases, and prejudices do not restrict someone's freedom (generally). Religious faith may do so more often as there is often a threat of eternal damnation or something similar involved. Freedom is restricted by threats because the choice is coerced rather than free. If I point a gun at you and tell you to give me your wallet, your choice to do so isn't free, it is coerced. I have restricted your freedom to choose what to do with your wallet by forcing you to choose between giving it up and being shot. That is how coercion restricts choices, and the same thing is going on with laws.

For a clear example of how not knowing about an option does not restrict one's choices, let's consider how I might get to work tomorrow. Let's imagine that I am considering driving or walking, but I don't know that a bus route has opened up near my house and goes right by my work. My lack of knowledge about the bus route here doesn't make my choice less free. My freedom isn't restricted by the fact that I could have done things that I didn't know about or just didn't consider. I am still able to apply my rationality to the choice in question and make it freely. That there were other options I didn't consider is not a problem.

No, ideologies, biases, and prejudices do not restrict someone's freedom (generally). Religious faith may do so more often as there is often a threat of eternal damnation or something similar involved. Freedom is restricted by threats because the choice is coerced rather than free. If I point a gun at you and tell you to give me your wallet, your choice to do so isn't free, it is coerced. I have restricted your freedom to choose what to do with your wallet by forcing you to choose between giving it up and being shot. That is how coercion restricts choices, and the same thing is going on with laws. — Dan

OK, so your principle is that freedom of choice is restricted by threats, because a threat is an act of coercion. It appears to me, like restricting one's freedom is something which one person does to another person. And a good example of this is through threat. I have a couple questions.

First, are there specific types of threats which qualify as restricting one's freedom, and other types which do not? For example, if I threaten to not be your friend if you do not share your desert with me, is that a restriction of your freedom? To put it simply, does every instance of "I will punish you if you do not..." constitute a restriction of freedom? Further, does the threat to withhold a reward, or deny a pleasure, constitute a restriction to one's freedom? Suppose for example, a man's wife says "no sex unless you...", does this constitute a restriction to the man's freedom of choice? If it isn't the case that every threat is a restriction to one's freedom, how would you draw the line between ones that are, and ones that aren't?

The next question concerns the possible situation where the person doesn't care about the threat, so that the threat has no effect. Suppose the person puts a gun to someone's head and demands the wallet, and the person says "fuck you" and keeps walking. Is the threat still a restriction to the person's freedom of choice? It doesn't appear like it restricts the person's freedom of choice whatsoever. But this produces a problem. The very same threat might restrict a person's freedom in some cases, and not restrict the person's freedom in others. This becomes more evident in the other examples I gave above, where the punishment threatened is milder. Depending on how the severity of the threat is perceived, some people will respond to the threat, others will not care about it. Then the very same act may or may not restrict the person's freedom

It appears to me, like threats restrict freedom sometimes, but do not restrict freedom other times. Is that a fair conclusion? Depending on how the threatened person responds, freedom may or may not be restricted by a threat. If this is the case, then the restriction of freedom is really an attribute of the response to the threat, not an attribute of the threat itself. This is what I have been arguing, it is the thinking of the threatened person, which follows from the threat, rather than the threat itself, which actually restricts the person's freedom. This is very evident from the fact that some threats "work" while others do not.

For a clear example of how not knowing about an option does not restrict one's choices, let's consider how I might get to work tomorrow. Let's imagine that I am considering driving or walking, but I don't know that a bus route has opened up near my house and goes right by my work. My lack of knowledge about the bus route here doesn't make my choice less free. My freedom isn't restricted by the fact that I could have done things that I didn't know about or just didn't consider. I am still able to apply my rationality to the choice in question and make it freely. That there were other options I didn't consider is not a problem. — Dan

Obviously, your freedom of choice is restricted in this example. The freedom to choose the bus as your mode of transport was denied from you. That is a restriction to your freedom of choice. Another person who knew about the bus could choose the bus, and therefore that person's freedom has less restrictions than yours.

I think that we need to recognize that in no situation is a person's freedom of choice absolute, it is always restricted to some degree. We always say that a person's choice "is free", but it is also always implied that there are restrictions to a person's capacity to choose. So a person is always capable of making one's choice "freely", but there is also always restrictions to that freedom. Whether or not you knew about the bus does not affect the fact that you made your choice freely, but it does affect the degree of restrictions to your freedom. Not knowing about the bus made your freedom of choice more restricted than someone who knew about the bus, regardless of the fact that you both chose freely. Knowledge affects the restrictions to the freedom, not the freedom itself.

Only threats that threaten to restrict/violate your freedom would be morally relevant. So "I will shoot you" clearly would, but "I won't be your friend anymore" wouldn't be, because someone else being your friend is their choice to make, not yours.

In the case of putting the gun to the person's head, it does restrict their freedom if they think you are actually going to kill them. If the person doesn't believe that, then they haven't really been coerced. That would be a good example of how a threat might restrict someone's freedom or not. That is no more a problem than a bullet not restricting someone's freedom if it missed them. If they believe that you will kill them and don't care, then they have been coerced and their freedom restricted, but they just don't care about the freedom you are threatening.

In the case of the bus, no. My freedom is my ability to understand and make my own choices, which I have here. None of my choices are taken from me, I just don't have all the information I might wish for. I don't need to agree that someone's choices are always restricted because I am setting a much lower bar for being free than you are.

s. Do you think freedom is the capacity to do the impossible? That's what it seems like — Metaphysician Undercover

It will become clear why I think two things here:

1. This is unanswerable, as between the two of us (my answer is "no" prima facie, though); and
2. You are not adequately understanding much of what im saying, or overblowing it to caricature.

The possibility (threat) of me being locked up in jail if I steal Dan's car, in no way limits my freedom to choose to steal Dan's car. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. Yes it does. The only other option is to say that one is prisoner of their own moral outlook. Which would be weird, to say the least.

Yes it does mean exactly that. — Metaphysician Undercover

Im unsure we're using these words in the same way, if this is your response.
"could have done otherwise" is the metric generally used, and the fact that you know something means it could have come to mind. There's not much more to that, in terms of what we're talking about.
Otherwise, we are never free to choose anything, at any time. We are restricted by our current conscious access to whatever is in our minds and this changes drastically from moment-to-moment depending on environmental triggers (or lack of, i suppose). If you have a different metric you're using, please outline it. You seem to be using post-hoc "Well, it happened in way X therefore way Y wasn't possible" which is clearly wrong. If it's not that, i'll need some help.

then the person was not capable of making that choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

PLainly wrong, pending a better explanation of your fundamental position.

making a choice — Metaphysician Undercover

This one is true, but is not what I'm talking about. Once a choice is made, you're not free to choose otherwise due to the law of identity (though, that gets muddled when we're talking about intangibles, but you get the point i'm sure).

it's too late to alter the choice already made. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, as above. Perhaps this is the issue. You're conflating post-choice with pre-choice. I doubt Dan intends (and I dont) to suggest one can retroactively change one's decision. You could override it, but you can't undo it. Obviously.

You ought to see that it is logically impossible for a person to be capable of making a choice which does not come to one's mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, not at all. You're just, for whatever reason, assuming that the example is one in which nothing brings the option to the subject's mind. I have been explicit that this isn't what I'm describing. I've given examples of what, and how that could be, also. I wont repeat here as it looks, weirdly, like you've actually addressed that. We'll see how that goes..

Therefore it is impossible that a person is capable of choosing an option which does not come to the one's mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. It would be impossible to make a choice which was not consciously accessible at the time, say after a concussion. It is possible that anything could bring something not currently in ones waking consciousness. Again, your bar is way the hell too high.

But we can only take into consideration what actually did happen. — Metaphysician Undercover

Bingo. The bolded response above is exactly what's happening. This explains a lot about our disagreement, and everything you've said is reasonable in light of that. However, that's not what i'm talking about and very clearly so.

It was impossible for the person to choose that other option, when the choice was made, because that option was not present to the person's mind. The person's freedom to choose that option was therefore restricted. — Metaphysician Undercover

This only makes even basic structural sense in a post-hoc description. And it's still essentially wrong, because you're referring to circumstances that could have been otherwise, in a pre-choice world. Clearly.

The other options are not "in the shadows", they are simply not present to the person's mind at the point in time when the decision is made. — Metaphysician Undercover

They are. No idea what you're getting at here. Seems like desperate flailing to get through the conflation of the two scenarios, unfortunately, being cross-discussed. In the pre-choice world they are options that anything could bring to mind. This makes it possible prior to the choice being made. A gust of bloody wind could've done it.

It doesn't even matter if it is possible to drag up the memory or not. What matters is whether the person actually does drag up those particular memories. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, your entire objection seems to be about whether it's possible or not. So, this seems like an admission that your point isn't holding water? If it's possible that another option could occur to the person, then their freedom wasn't stymied. Again, you're retrospectively applying the rigidity of time and its unidirectionality to a clearly in-the-air proposition which at the time was indeterminate. It is only determinate from the post-hoc perspective.

restricts one's freedom of choice by leaving options concealed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Now we're coming to terms a bit better - so those options are, in fact, 'in the shadows' which you denied earlier in this response. With that on the table, we clearly see the implication differently. That these options are available, but not present, doesn't stymie freedom of choice to me. It seems to, for you. That's fine, but I don't think you're making good arguments for it basically.

Do you not agree that prejudices, biases, and ideologies in general are real restrictions on one's freedom of choice? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. They are obstacles, I'd say, but not restrictions. Having no legs is a restriction on your choice of mobility. Being white restricts your choice of skincare product (or, can). Being a female restricts *insert a laundry list, no pun intended*. Being a dick doesn't (trying to catch your examples, not trying to assume what you mean). But, i see we disagree here. Fine. I don't htink you've made good, or even coherent arguments for it.

I think that both of you are simply denying the facts because the facts are inconsistent with what you believe. — Metaphysician Undercover

I literally scoffed. Take that as you will. These aren't facts. Not meaning to be rude - but there are no facts being discussed.

Only threats that threaten to restrict/violate your freedom would be morally relevant. So "I will shoot you" clearly would, but "I won't be your friend anymore" wouldn't be, because someone else being your friend is their choice to make, not yours. — Dan

Let me see if I follow you. A threat against one's freedom to act constitutes a restriction to one's freedom of choice, but a threat concerning anything else does not. Does this mean that a threat to take one's property, or threats against other rights which a person has, which do not involve one's "freedom", do not qualify as coercion? Sorry Dan, but your restricted definitions are getting too convoluted and difficult for me to understand.

Yes. Yes it does. The only other option is to say that one is prisoner of their own moral outlook. Which would be weird, to say the least. — AmadeusD

Why do you say this is weird? I think it's not only reality, but obvious. Are you familiar with the concept of original sin? We are all prisoners of our moral outlook, that kind of goes without saying.

Im unsure we're using these words in the same way, if this is your response.
"could have done otherwise" is the metric generally used, and the fact that you know something means it could have come to mind. There's not much more to that, in terms of what we're talking about. — AmadeusD

We must adhere to the facts though. The fact is that the other option did not come to mind. This implies that the reason why the person 'could not make the appropriate choice' is because the person did not put enough effort into the decision making. It does not absolve the person from responsibility, it simply provides an explanation as to why the person made a bad choice. The person has lazy decision making habits which restrict one's freedom of choice.

Otherwise, we are never free to choose anything, at any time. We are restricted by our current conscious access to whatever is in our minds and this changes drastically from moment-to-moment depending on environmental triggers (or lack of, i suppose). If you have a different metric you're using, please outline it. — AmadeusD

We are always free to choose, we are just not free to choose our restrictions. You seem to believe that a person is free to choose the restrictions which one's own body serves up, as if one could choose one's own body, or one's parents or that kind of thing. There are restrictions to our decision making capacity, which our physical bodies force upon us, which we cannot overcome no matter how much effort we make. So in the process of decision making there is two extremes, the rash, quick decision (which I called the lazy decision above), and also the overly extended, lengthy effort of trying to consider every possible relevant piece of information, when this is impossible for a person's mind to do anyway.

You seem to be using post-hoc "Well, it happened in way X therefore way Y wasn't possible" which is clearly wrong. If it's not that, i'll need some help. — AmadeusD

No, that's not what I'm saying at all. So I'll repeat. When the person makes a choice, there are specific options present to that person's mind. And; it is impossible for the person to choose an option which is not present to one's mind at the time of choosing. To state it very clearly, in the terms of your example, I am saying that it was not possible for the person to choose Y, if Y was not present to the person's mind as an option at the time when the choice was made.

You look at the situation and you determine Y was possible. I agree, Y was possible. Further, you might judge and say that the person ought to have chosen Y, and I might agree, yes, the person ought to have chosen Y. Further, we might agree that the reason why the person did not choose why is because Y, as an option was not present to that person's mind, if we agree that Y would have been the obvious choice for the person. So, our only point of disagreement seems to be that I say it was impossible for the person to have chosen Y at that time, because Y was not present in the person's mind, as an option, at the time when the decision was made. You seem to think that it is possible for a person to choose an option not present in the person's mind at the time of making the choice. I think that this is impossible.

You're conflating post-choice with pre-choice. I doubt Dan intends (and I dont) to suggest one can retroactively change one's decision. You could override it, but you can't undo it. Obviously. — AmadeusD

You seem to be agreeing with me, that choice occurs at a point in time. Now, do you understand that weighing options occurs pre-choice? Then a choice is made. Do you see, that when the choice is made, the chooser cannot then proceed to weigh options not brought up, as if the choice wasn't yet made? At this point in time, the point when the choice is made, it is impossible for the chooser to consider options not brought up, because the time of considering options is pre-choice. Therefore it is impossible for the chooser, at the time of making the choice, to consider any options not already present in the mind.

Once a choice is made, you're not free to choose otherwise due to the law of identity — AmadeusD

Yes, so this is the key point. A choice is made at a point in time. After the choice is made one cannot choose otherwise (except by changing ones mind, reversing the choice). So, at the point in time when the choice is made, if the person has not brought all the relevant information into the decision making process, then the decision making capacity of the person is impaired, restricted, by that failure to bring up the relevant information.

You can argue all you want, that the person could have brought more information to bear on the problem, and therefore could have made an unimpaired, or unrestricted choice, but the simple fact is that in the example, the person did not, and therefore when the person acted to choose, the person's choice was restricted by that habit or laziness, or whatever it was which caused the person to not bring forth the pertinent information.

You're just, for whatever reason, assuming that the example is one in which nothing brings the option to the subject's mind. I have been explicit that this isn't what I'm describing. — AmadeusD

It's my principle, my description, and that is exactly what I am describing, a case when nothing brings the other option to the person's mind. You and I look at the person, and say the person should have seen option Y, but the fact is that the person did not. Now, we have to separate the act of choosing, as a point in time, from the act of bringing forth and analyzing the information, which goes on for a period of time. In that period of time when the person is analyzing the information, for some reason option Y did not come to mind. Then, at a point in time, the person chooses, and I am claiming that the person's freedom of choice is restricted by the fact that option Y did not come to mind. The person's freedom to choose from all the possibilities is restricted by not having all the possibilities present. Therefore the person's freedom to choose is restricted The reason why option Y did not come to mind is irrelevant. .What is relevant is that at that point in time, when the person makes the choice, the person's freedom to choose from all the possibilities is restricted, therefore the person's freedom of choice is restricted, because that option is not there, in the person's mind.

No. It would be impossible to make a choice which was not consciously accessible at the time, say after a concussion. It is possible that anything could bring something not currently in ones waking consciousness. Again, your bar is way the hell too high. — AmadeusD

You are not distinguishing between the process of bringing options to mind, and the point in time when the decision is made. You recognize that when the decision is made, it cannot be otherwise, by the law of identity. You also recognize that "it would be impossible to make a choice which was not consciously accessible at the time". Now, you need to also recognize that the possibility of something bringing up a thought "not currently" accessible, is an irrelevant possibility, because it would be post hoc to the choice being made. At the point in time when the decision is made, only currently accessible information is relevant. So it does not matter that something could potentially bring up some other information. At the point in time when the choice is made, all the bringing things up in the mind is in the past. Because this is all in the past at that time, it is impossible that something else could enter into the decision making process. It's in the past, therefore it is impossible for it to be otherwise.

No. They are obstacles, I'd say, but not restrictions. Having no legs is a restriction on your choice of mobility. — AmadeusD

You are not recognizing the difference between freedom to choose and freedom to act. Having no legs is not a restriction on your freedom of choice, it is a restriction on your freedom to act. Without legs you can still choose to stand up and walk, you just cannot actually do it. People often choose to do things which are physically impossible. And, it is very important to distinguish between freedom to choose and freedom to act because threats appear to restrict one's freedom to act, but they do not restrict one's freedom to choose.

These aren't facts. Not meaning to be rude - but there are no facts being discussed. — AmadeusD

We are very clearly discussing facts, the facts about the temporal order of the process of making a choice. It is a fact that a person cannot choose an option not present to one's mind. And, it is also a fact that at the time when the person makes a choice, other options not considered are irrelevant to the choice which is made. What is a matter of opinion is whether this constitutes a restriction on one's freedom of choice. Once we get the facts sorted out we might be able to reasonably discuss the matter of opinion.

I would say that threats that don't involve threatening to restricting one's freedom in a morally relevant way are not coercing a person in a morally relevant way. Threatening someone's property does involve threatening to violate/restrict someone's freedom in a morally relevant way, specifically their freedom over their property, so that would be coercive in a morally relevant way.

I don't think this is convoluted in the least. I think I have been fairly clear from the beginning that what is morally relevant is a person's ability to understand and make those choices that belong to them. If you keep that in mind in reading my responses, I think it will be clear what I mean.

I would say that threats that don't involve threatening to restricting one's freedom in a morally relevant way are not coercing a person in a morally relevant way. Threatening someone's property does involve threatening to violate/restrict someone's freedom in a morally relevant way, specifically their freedom over their property, so that would be coercive in a morally relevant way. — Dan

I have a problem with this approach. We are attempting to define "freedom" for the purpose of setting moral principles. If we proceed by reference to what is "morally relevant" then we produce a vicious circle. We define "freedom" by what is presupposed as "morally relevant", and this produces moral principles based on those presuppositions. To put it bluntly, this is the fallacy known as "begging the question". You are basing what constitutes a restriction to one's freedom on your preconceived ideas as to what is "morally relevant", consequently the moral principles derived from your conclusions will simply be a reflection of your preconceived ideas of what is "morally relevant".

Instead, I have proposed that we analyze the nature of "freedom", and proceed from there toward determining moral principles which would respect a person's freedom. This would utilize an understanding of "freedom", with a true definition of the word, based in an analysis of the human condition, rather than a definition based in one's preconceived ideas about what is and isn't morally relevant.

So, I proposed that we start with a distinction between the freedom of choice and the freedom to act, as I think that understanding the difference between these two could assist us in understanding the nature of freedom. However, you seem to have no interest in understanding the nature of freedom, only a desire to define "freedom" relative to some preconceived notions of morality. That sort of discussion, where the person demonstrates oneself to be completely unwilling to free oneself from the constraints of one's own preconceived ideas does not interest me.

I don't think this is convoluted in the least. I think I have been fairly clear from the beginning that what is morally relevant is a person's ability to understand and make those choices that belong to them. If you keep that in mind in reading my responses, I think it will be clear what I mean. — Dan

As I said already, in my opinion, restricting "morally relevant" to the "choices that belong" to the person, simply excludes the true essence of "moral value". "Moral value" is a principle of judgement aimed at judging choices which we make concerning what belongs to others, how we treat others, including respect for their goods and chattels. We cannot restrict "morally relevant" to choices which concern 'one's own' body, mind, and property, without losing track of what morality truly is.

Furthermore, as soon as I mentioned that this would require principles to determine what is truly "one's own", this started a seemingly infinite regress of principles required for a person to accurately determine what is "one's own". You started with body, mind, and property, but then you had to make exceptions to include freedom and rights which refer to a person's position relative to the public world, rather than what is "one's own". As soon as you included freedom you produced the vicious circle by defining "freedom" with "morally relevant", in an effort to bring it into the category of "one's own", having already defined "morally relevant" in reference to "one's own".

Simply put, you are trapped within your own ideas of what is morally relevant, refusing to accept, and denying the relevance of the ideas of others, because "morally relevant" for you implies that the ideas must be your own ideas to be morally relevant. As soon as you accept that the ideas of others might be morally relevant, and open your mind to them, freeing yourself from the restrictions of your self imposed solipsism, we might make some progress.

I am not defining freedom by reference to what is morally relevant. I am defining what is morally relevant by reference to freedom. I'm not begging the question, you have just misunderstood what I said.

As to things being morally relevant, you have gone down completely the wrong track here. Just like the utilitarian isn't concerned only with the happiness of the person in question, I am not suggesting that only "your own" freedom is morally relevant to your decision making. I am saying that everyone's freedom over that which belongs to them is morally relevant. So the moral status of an action depends on the extent to which it protects persons' freedom to make their own choices and/or the extent to which is restricts/violates persons' freedom to make their own choices.

I didn't have to make any such exceptions regarding the "public world," and I'm not sure when you think I did so.

Is it the term "morally relevant" that is causing confusion? I'm happy to use different language, but I'm not sure how I can be clearer in what I mean here.

I am not defining freedom by reference to what is morally relevant. I am defining what is morally relevant by reference to freedom. I'm not begging the question, you have just misunderstood what I said. — Dan

You've referred to "morally relevant" in relation to freedom of choice, a number of times. Here are some examples.

I mean, the type of freedom is quite a limited one already. It isn't the freedom to do anything that is to be protected, it is the freedom to make choices over what belongs to the person in question. If you want to steal my car and prevent you doing that, that hasn't violated your freedom in a morally relevant way (depending on how I do the preventing) because stealing my car was not your choice to make. — Dan

Here, you appear to be limiting the meaning of "freedom", to a "type of freedom" which you believe to be relevant, which you call "morally relevant". In this example, you claim that your act of violence which prevents me from doing what I have freely chosen to do, does not violate my freedom. You make this claim by saying that I am not free to make such choices over your property See, you are restricting the meaning of "freedom" to circumstances which you believe are "morally relevant", in order to say that you can physically prevent me from carrying out an act, without violating my freedom. That is clearly a highly restricted sense of "freedom". A person is free to choose what is morally good, but not free to choose what is morally bad. So "free" and "not free" are defined by reference to what is morally good and bad.

No, the principle I'm claiming is that my car, being my property, is something that belongs to me and not something that you get to make choices over, morally speaking. As I mentioned in the primer, the kind of freedom being protected here is specifically over those choices that belong to you. Whether or not to steal my car is not a choice that belongs to you, because it is [my car. — Dan

Here again, you refer to a "kind of freedom" which is being protected, the freedom to make choices about things which belong to oneself. So, as I pointed out, in order to determine which free choices qualify as those which need to be protected, we first need some moral principles to determine property ownership. Therefore you are producing a very special definition of "freedom", a special type of freedom, and this is the only kind of freedom which qualifies as "freedom" to you, in relation to your proposed principle that freedom ought to be protected. That other forms of free choice do not qualify is evident from the fact that you proceed to argue that a person does not have the freedom to make choices about someone else's property. In reality, you want to protect the freedom to make good choices, but not the freedom to make bad choice, so you argue that making a bad choice is not a free choice, (in a morally relevant way), so that you can claim to be protecting freedom of choice.

These bad choices, the choices to do things with others' property (steal for example), you claim are not "morally relevant", but this is blatantly false. Clearly the choice to steal someone else's property is a choice which is morally relevant, as morally bad, and it is a choice which one freely makes.

No, I am saying that only the freedom to make certain kinds of choices is morally valuable. Specifically, the choices over that which belongs to the person, their mind, their body, and their property. — Dan

Now you continue with that blatant falsity expressed above. Clearly, the kinds of free choices which are morally relevant extend far beyond choice concerning what belongs to the person making the choice. As I explained, a very large portion of morally relevant choices actually concern other people's property, such as when I decide whether or not to steal your car, in the example. Clearly, this is a morally relevant choice, which I freely make, concerning someone else's property. Restricting the meaning of "freedom", such that I am not "free" to choose to steal your car, because you assert that this choice is not "morally relevant" is complete nonsense. You have totally distorted the meaning of "morally relevant", to support your unjustified opinion that this sort of "freedom" ought not be protected, therefore it ought not be classed as a choice which can "freely" be made. Obviously, that is nonsense.

I would say that threats that don't involve threatening to restricting one's freedom in a morally relevant way are not coercing a person in a morally relevant way. Threatening someone's property does involve threatening to violate/restrict someone's freedom in a morally relevant way, specifically their freedom over their property, so that would be coercive in a morally relevant way. — Dan

Here, we find the crux of the problem. Any threat to restrict one's freedom is morally relevant. However, you have totally distorted the meaning of "morally relevant", to say that restricting one's freedom to do a morally bad act is not morally relevant, so that this form of restricting one's freedom is not a morally relevant restriction of freedom. This allows you to hang on to your principle that freedom (in the morally relevant sense) ought to be protected. In reality though, the very nature of "freedom", what it means to be free, implies that one may freely choose to do what is morally bad just as much as what is good. And choosing to do bad is just as morally relevant as choosing to do good. But you do not want to protect that sort of "freedom", true freedom, you only want to protect "freedom" by some twisted distorted definition which suits your morality.

I am not limiting the meaning of "freedom". I am saying that only a certain type of freedom is being used as the measure of value, specifically the freedom of persons over their own choices. Only this limited kind of freedom is what ought to be protected, rather than freedom of all kinds.

I didn't say that commiting an act of violence to prevent you stealing my car wouldn't violate/restrict your freedom. When I said "stop you from doing so" I wasn't implying that I was going to physically attack you. Commiting violence in such a circumstance would restrict/violate your freedom, though of course it may be justifiable to do so as long as it prevents greater violations of freedom.

I am not arguing that a bad choice is not a free choice. You seem to be taking "this is the kind of freedom we should protect" to mean "this is the only true kind of freedom" and those do not mean the same thing.

Again, I think you may have misunderstood what I am claiming is morally relevant. The choice to steal from someone is morally relevant in the sense that it is a choice to do something morally bad but the freedom to make that choice is not morally relevant in the sense that it does not have moral weight that we need to consider when making decisions. We don't need to weigh your choice to steal my car against my choice to not have my car stolen, because one choice is the sort that should be protected morally and the other isn't.

Again, I am not defining "freedom" generally as only the kind I refer to here, but I am using "freedom" within the context of freedom consequentialism as a shorthand for "The ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices". That is the thing that I am claiming is morally valuable, and I will sometimes say the freedom to make one's own choices to make that clear. I am using the word "freedom" because it seems like the most applicable of the available options, but if you have a better suggestion, I'd happily use that instead.

I am saying that only a certain type of freedom is being used as the measure of value, specifically the freedom of persons over their own choices. Only this limited kind of freedom is what ought to be protected, rather than freedom of all kinds. — Dan

Ok, so this is what I am saying is problematic. To protect the freedom for a certain type of choice, while excluding the freedom for other types of choices as having no value, is really a matter of restricting one's freedom rather than protecting it. Those other types are denied value so as to deny the possibility of choosing them. So what you are proposing is that freedom ought to be restricted rather than protected.

I didn't say that commiting an act of violence to prevent you stealing my car wouldn't violate/restrict your freedom. When I said "stop you from doing so" I wasn't implying that I was going to physically attack you. Commiting violence in such a circumstance would restrict/violate your freedom, though of course it may be justifiable to do so as long as it prevents greater violations of freedom. — Dan

Well, how else would you stop me from stealing, with a threat? And of course the threat would not constitute a restriction to my freedom of choice, because that choice does not belong to me (not one that I am free to make under your proposal because it has no value).

Here's a question. Why the inconsistency in your principles, between one's freedom of choice, and one's freedom to act? If you physically prevent me from stealing your car, with the use of violence, you accept that this is a restriction of my freedom. Therefore I am fundamentally free to act in that way. However, when we discuss my choice to steal your car, you say that I am not free to make that choice, because that choice does not belong to me. Therefore I am fundamentally not free to make that choice.

Do you apprehend the inconsistency I am talking about? In the case of making choices, I am not free to make certain choices (let's say bad choices), so persuading (by threatening for example) me to change my mind does not violate my freedom, because that sort of freedom has no value in this context. However, when it comes to acting out choices, using violence to prevent one's actions is a violation of one's freedom, even if the act has no value (is a bad act) in this context.

To physically prevent me from stealing your car, with the use of violence, requires that you restrict my freedom to act. You do not apply your principle that I am fundamentally not free to make that act, because it has no moral value. But to persuade me not to steal your car, does not restrict my freedom of choice, because you apply the principle that this is a choice which I am not free to make in the first place because it has no value.

It appears to me, like your principle is a reversal of what is really the case, if we made a real description. What is really the case, is that I am completely free to make the choice to steal your car, and nothing (neither persuasion nor threat) can actually prevent me from making that choice. But I am not free to carry out that act, because I may be prevented with physical violence. Furthermore, the prevention with violence is not a restriction on my freedom because principles of law dictate that I am not free to act in this way, so the prevention is justified therefore not a restriction of my freedom. However, there are no principles of law which dictate that within my mind I am not free to decide to steal your car. So long as I do not end up acting in that way, nothing will restrict that freedom.

Therefore you really have things reversed. People are fundamentally not free to make certain actions, because they will be prevented with violence, and this violence is not a restriction to their freedom. And these free actions of authority over one's own body and property are the type of freedom which serves as a measure of value. Other actions (bad acts), we are not free to make because of physical prevention, and such prevention is not a restriction to our freedom because it is justified, and so these acts cannot be admitted into the freedom value scale. In the case of choices however, we are inherently free to choose anything because and nothing justifies a restriction to the freedom of choice, therefore all choices must be allowed some value. We can use means of persuasion and even threats, but these do not qualify as a restriction on one's freedom of choice. And freedom of choice is fundamentally unrestricted.

We don't need to weigh your choice to steal my car against my choice to not have my car stolen, because one choice is the sort that should be protected morally and the other isn't. — Dan

This is precisely the example of why your principle is a vicious circle. The good choice ought to be protected. Which is the good choice? The one which "belongs" to the person to make. How do we know which choice "belongs"? It is the morally good choice.

In reality, we need to question which choice "should be protected morally". And this means that we need to weigh one against the other. You seem to assume that we can just take for granted which one ought to be protected. But this locks us in the vicious circle produced by 'what has been taken for granted', in the moral context. And as you demonstrate, we are not free to make decisions outside of this moral enclosure because they are designated as void of moral value. In other words we get entrapped within our own preconceived moral principles, what we take for granted morally, and deny ourselves the freedom to make any moral choices outside those preconceived boundaries by designating them as having no moral value.

Again, I am not defining "freedom" generally as only the kind I refer to here, but I am using "freedom" within the context of freedom consequentialism as a shorthand for "The ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices". That is the thing that I am claiming is morally valuable, and I will sometimes say the freedom to make one's own choices to make that clear. I am using the word "freedom" because it seems like the most applicable of the available options, but if you have a better suggestion, I'd happily use that instead. — Dan

It appears like what you are actually doing is giving priority to moral consequentialism over "The ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices". You take one type of choice, which has been designated by some preconceived moral principles (taken for granted) as "the sort that should be protected morally", and you propose that the ability to make this sort of choice ought to be protected. But this is not at all a matter of protecting "The ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices", it is a matter of protecting their ability to make a certain type of choice. In fact, what you are proposing is that the freedom of rational agents to make their own choices ought to be restricted in a way such that only those which are consistent with the preconceived moral principles ought to be protected.

What I am proposing is that a certain type of freedom should be protected. Not, for example, the freedom to assault others. That sort of freedom should not be protected.

You have misunderstood. It is not the fact that my violent act prevents you from stealing my car that is worth considering, it is the other freedoms of yours I have violated in doing so (such as your freedom over your body).

No, the way we know what choices belong to a person are determining what things belong to them. Self-ownership is easy enough to establish, and if property can be owned, then we own that too. It is not a matter of referring to the "good choice" at all.

It is true that I am claiming that a certain type of choice should be protected, specifically those choices that belong to the person or persons in question. I have discussed the reasons for this in the primer I provided and more deeply in the material referenced within.

You have misunderstood. — Dan

No, I don't think I have misunderstood. You state explicitly what I have already acknowledged, there is only a specific type of freedom which you believe should be protected, the freedom to act in a way which is acceptable by your moral principles. To me, this is not "freedom" at all. In reality, freedom of choice allows one to make choices with complete disregard for any preconceived principles, moral or otherwise. So if one wants to protect freedom then this is what needs to be protected. Your proposal to protect a certain type of freedom, and disallow that there is any moral value to the other types of freedom, as not morally relevant and therefore valueless, is nothing but a proposal for a veiled restriction to freedom.

It is true that I am claiming that a certain type of choice should be protected, specifically those choices that belong to the person or persons in question. I have discussed the reasons for this in the primer I provided and more deeply in the material referenced within. — Dan

OK, so do you see that preferring one type of choice to be "protected", over the other types, is not an instance of protecting freedom, but the very opposite?

It is an instance of protecting a specific type of freedom, the freedom to make your own choices. I agree that I am not promoting the protection of the freedom to take other people's choices from them, to physically attack them, to steal from them, etc. It is true that I am not promoting the protection of freedom to do those things.

This is why my first post on this thread stated:

Therefore the "freedom" perspective and the "consequentialist" perspective of moral virtue are inherently incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

The fact that you want the right to choose which of my choices ought to be protected indicates that you are interested in restricting my freedom rather than protecting it.

I mean, that's true if by "freedom" you mean the freedom to do anything at all. I am not interested in protecting that. I am interested in protecting free, rational, agents ability to understand and make their own choices. "Freedom" seems an appropriate word for this, but if you don't think so, feel free to suggest another.

The problem is that a free rational agent may completely understand, and make a choice which you think ought not be protected because of your moral preconceptions. The situation would be such that you do not understand the agent's free rational choice, as "a rational choice", due to those preconceptions. In this case you would not be interested in protecting that agent's "freedom". In the interest of claiming that you actually want to protect the agent's "freedom", you moved toward portraying such an act as not free (in the sense of morally relevant freedom).

I believe "freedom" is not an appropriate word here. What you want to protect is better known as "moral restraint". You are interested in protecting free rational agents' ability to understand and make choices which are consistent with specific moral principles. In other words, you would encourage people to think in a way (develop good thinking habits) which inclines them to freely choose good behaviour through what is known as "moral restraint".

Notice my earlier argument that habits constrain one's freedom. But habits can be classed as good or bad, and in this case you are interested in cultivating good habits. I believe that we ought not portray this as "protecting freedom", as this is really a deceptive slogan, because what we are really doing is curtailing freedom in a good way.

If you are with me so far, then we might take a step further to look at freedom itself, as something outside of, transcending, moral principles. That freedom truly transcends moral principles is evident from the fact that we can freely make choices with complete disrespect for any codes of ethics. However, because you are inclined to understand freedom as something which needs to be curtailed by moral restraint, I don't think you really want to consider freedom itself as something which ought to be protected. Notice, if we properly allow that freedom transcends moral principles, we cannot truthfully say that it ought or ought not be protected. Would you agree?

Again, I haven't said that such an action would be not free or not rational.

What I am suggesting ought to be protected is not moral restraint, and you have again moved from "we don't need to protect people's choice to take others' choices away from them" to "we should only protect the choice to do what is right". These are not the same.

What I am protecting is not the developing of good habits or the curtailing of freedom in a "good way". It is the protection of a specific type of freedom.

Also no, that wouldn't show that freedom "transcends moral principles".

Did you read the primer that I included in the initial post?

Why do you say this is weird? I think it's not only reality, but obvious. Are you familiar with the concept of original sin? We are all prisoners of our moral outlook, that kind of goes without saying. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hey mate.
Just want to note whether or not you're using religious reasoning to support your positions here? This seems a bti of a curve ball otherwise.
In the substantive, if we're all prisoners of our moral outlook, that's the end of that. We get no free choices. Nice (Y).

The fact is that the other option did not come to mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a retrospective fact, and I've been extremely clear to the point of feeling a bit silly that this isn't what's on the table right now. The position that the past (having happened) could, now, have been otherwise, is utterly preposterous. Luckily, that's not what's being discussed here.

This implies that the reason — Metaphysician Undercover

....

It doesn't imply that. It implies there was a reason which was not that the person lacked that knowledge (or ability to act, I suppose, it's just as apt here).

The person has lazy decision making habits which restrict one's freedom of choice — Metaphysician Undercover

I cannot make sense of this, I'm sorry.

There are restrictions to our decision making capacity, which our physical bodies force upon us — Metaphysician Undercover

This is clearly incoherent. Our bodies prevent us from acting in whatever ways (well, most ways lol so the point is not lost). Unless you want to get specific about neurological disorders, this doesn't hold water for me.

when this is impossible for a person's mind to do anyway. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, a perfect decision is not available. I can accept that and change nought else in my position. And, I do ftr. I don't see how this relates to various options being in the person's, call it, lexicon, at the time a decision was made. Not being in their conscious mind is just not enough for me to dismiss those options come choice-time.

To state it very clearly, in the terms of your example, I am saying that it was not possible for the person to choose Y, if Y was not present to the person's mind as an option at the time when the choice was made. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hmm, I understood this to be what you were saying already, for whatever that is worth. I am not seeing an "impossibility' though. It seems to me you're putting the choice ahead of a set of possible choices thereby ipso facto making them unavailable because the choice is already made. But...
I also note this is specific to certain types of choices, but it doesn't change our disagreement - just want to be clear a lot of choices are better-made the second time around, despite every option being, in some sense, available the first time. Most courts acknowledge this. The concept of "adducing fresh evidence" in it's various forms relies on that information being plainly unavailable and not just "not before the court". It may be that the issue comes down to not being able to know one from the other, scientifically. The fact that you didn't think of it simply isn't something that makes it impossible. It makes it unlikely, at best.

Perhaps even restrictively unlikely - and here you're going to get some definite truck and likely, if worded well, some concession from me. The problem is that, what is restricting it? If the idea is that one's mind restricts one's mind I think there's more work to be done... but I certainly see a way to my backing down if this is zoomed in on.

So, our only point of disagreement seems to be that I say it was impossible for the person to have chosen Y at that time, because Y was not present in the person's mind, as an option, at the time when the decision was made. You seem to think that it is possible for a person to choose an option not present in the person's mind at the time of making the choice. I think that this is impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

(there are comments on the preceding, but they're not that interesting so I deleted them)
*conscious mind. And therefore, I have no issue with just standing on the disagreement. If you see that as enough-of-a barrier to the choice to relegate X option to 'impossible' so be it. I don't. Otherwise, I think that's probably a relatively good overview.

Then a choice is made. Do you see, that when the choice is made, the chooser cannot then proceed to weigh options not brought up, as if the choice wasn't yet made? — Metaphysician Undercover

You're still conflating the two points in time, but trying to use preciseness to make it coherent. I'm sorry, but your position as-stated in this paragraph seems to boil down to "every single choice is of one option" which isn't even an argument to do with what we're discussing. What I would say here to bring it a little more into focus is that, one version of your position is:

One cannot choose an option which is not in-mind at the moment the choice is made. — metaphysician undercover

(my comment: surely true).

(an aside - one can retroactively weigh options - you just can't reverse a decision made.. immaterial here, but crucial at other points of the discussion)
As you'll note, that's entirely agreeable. I haven't thus far understood this to be your argument, or what we're disagreeing about. What I've disagreed with is that one not having an option consciously in mind while weighing options makes that option impossible to be made. It doesn't. All of our language, reviewing the exchange, indicates this version of the problem. The choice to be made, not a choice already made. I have, again, tried to be excruciatingly clear about this.

If all you're saying is that once a person has settled on (to make this easy...) 2 out of 10 options to deliberate about, then they are now precluded from choosing the other 8. This is for several reasons, but none of those reason are because it is impossible.

So, it's possible I'm agreeing with you and feel as if some time was wasted talking about two separate issues imprecisely. But i've had fun. Having just skimmed the remaining in your post, forgive some glib replies - they run the same risks as the above.

if the person has not brought all the relevant information into the decision making process, then the decision making capacity of the person is impaired, restricted, by that failure to bring up the relevant information. — Metaphysician Undercover

This statement is clearly true, but its much softer than the bar you set earlier. Potentially making some serious sense here now..

the person did not, — Metaphysician Undercover

re-tro-ac-tive.

The person's freedom to choose from all the possibilities is restricted by not having all the possibilities present. — Metaphysician Undercover

Restricted, certainly. I am also restricted by cling-film, but it isn't a real obstacle to my movements.

It's my principle, my description, — Metaphysician Undercover

While I think this is a bit of a lazy way to approach the disagreement, this entire paragraph relies on 'restriction'. Not 'impossibility'. I'm fine with that.. No disagreements. Impossibility just isn't int he discussion.

You are not distinguishing between the process of bringing options to mind, and the point in time when the decision is made. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is actually exactly what I did because it seemed clear to me you were having a pointless discussion about not being able to reverse time. I made it painfully clear, which i've also noted in this response several times, that you are conflating the post-choice issue with the pre-choice issue. No one, in any circumstance, can re-do something they did in the past (1:1, that is). And I acknowledged this pretty clearly, even in some of the quotes you've used. Confusing my man...

It's in the past, therefore it is impossible for it to be otherwise. — Metaphysician Undercover

Bingo bango bongo. Im unsure why you got through several hundred words from each of us before noting this clear distinction between what you're claiming and what actually is..

And, it is very important to distinguish between freedom to choose and freedom to act — Metaphysician Undercover

I did so, quite clearly and have needed to remind you of it a couple of times.

Once we get the facts sorted out we might be able to reasonably discuss the matter of opinion. — Metaphysician Undercover

This explains a lot of your responses..

What I am suggesting ought to be protected is not moral restraint, and you have again moved from "we don't need to protect people's choice to take others' choices away from them" to "we should only protect the choice to do what is right". These are not the same. — Dan

You explicitly said you are only interested in "protecting a specific type of freedom" , and this type of freedom is qualified by moral principles. Do you agree that this is a moral principle which you use to determine the type of freedom which you are interested in protecting? That is the reason why I conclude that what you are interested in protecting is really moral restraint rather than freedom. You want to protect a certain type of free choice, but not another, and the distinction is based on a moral principle. so I conclude that what you are promoting is moral restraint, not freedom.

This is a retrospective fact, and I've been extremely clear to the point of feeling a bit silly that this isn't what's on the table right now. — AmadeusD

As I said, I'm the one who set the table. It appears like you want to replace it with your own setting

It seems to me you're putting the choice ahead of a set of possible choices thereby ipso facto making them unavailable because the choice is already made. — AmadeusD

Correct, the choice has been made. That's what I've always been talking about, having made a choice. We are looking backward in time from the point when the choice has been made. By definition, at the point in time when the choice is made, the choice has been made. Notice the past tense, "the choice is made". I was not ever talking about the time prior to making the choice, when options are being considered, that is your changing of the setting of the table, I was always talking about the time when the choice is made.

The fact that you didn't think of it simply isn't something that makes it impossible. It makes it unlikely, at best. — AmadeusD

Do you, or do you not agree, that at the point in time time when the choice is made, it is impossible for you to have made a choice which you did not think of? If you do not agree then there is nothing for us to discuss. If you do agree, then quit making statements like this, which makes it appear like you do not agree. Very clearly, the fact that the person did not think of the option at the time when the decision was made, makes it impossible that the person could have chosen that option at that time.

If the idea is that one's mind restricts one's mind I think there's more work to be done. — AmadeusD

Roughly speaking, I think that this is the case. One's mind is a system which acts to restrict one's actions. And, as i said earlier, by restricting one's actions a being increases one's freedom. This is commonly known as will power. In general, the mind serves to prevent us from proceeding on reflex, impulse and habit, and this "will power" allows us greater freedom.

What I've disagreed with is that one not having an option consciously in mind while weighing options makes that option impossible to be made. — AmadeusD

See, this is how you are changing the setting of the table. I was not talking about the time spent "weighing options", I was very explicitly talking about the point in time when the decision is made.

Let me review the point I made. I said that every choice which is made, restricts one's freedom. I said that not choosing allows one to deliberate and contemplate. Notice that "weighing options" is consistent with deliberating and contemplating, and this is enabled by not having made the choice. Having made the choice puts an end to weighing the options. By putting an end to the weighing of options, making the choice is an act which restricts ones freedom

The process of "weighing options" is clearly not what I argued is what restricts one's freedom. What restricts freedom is the act of judgement, which is the choice itself, the decision.

All of our language, reviewing the exchange, indicates this version of the problem. The choice to be made, not a choice already made. I have, again, tried to be excruciatingly clear about this. — AmadeusD

Perhaps you misunderstood what you engaged with when you engaged me. But if you look at my discussion with Dan, you'll see that I was very clearly saying that every choice made is a restriction to one's freedom. And, I said that not choosing enables deliberation and contemplation, what you now portray as "weighing options", and this enhances freedom, as not passing judgement.

If all you're saying is that once a person has settled on (to make this easy...) 2 out of 10 options to deliberate about, then they are now precluded from choosing the other 8. This is for several reasons, but none of those reason are because it is impossible. — AmadeusD

You have reversed the causal order here. I am not saying that when you make a choice it is because other choices are impossible, I am saying that when the choice is made this causes other choices to be impossible. What I am saying is that the choice makes it impossible to choose otherwise, because the choice is an act which occurs in time, and when it is made it cannot be undone. If we ever get to the point of agreement on this, we could look further at the possibility of reconsidering.

You need to consider the context of the statement. The argument was that when you make a choice, (and this means when the decision is made) this is an act which restricts your freedom. It restricts your freedom because you exclude the other possibilities, by having chosen what you chose.

So, it's possible I'm agreeing with you and feel as if some time was wasted talking about two separate issues imprecisely. But i've had fun. Having just skimmed the remaining in your post, forgive some glib replies - they run the same risks as the above. — AmadeusD

Yes, I think we actually agree on the first part, but now to the significant part. Do you agree that each time you make a choice, you are actually restricting your own freedom? This is what deciding, making a choice is, restricting your freedom to choose otherwise. It is a self-imposed restriction, and adhering to the decision prevents you from reconsidering or choosing otherwise.

Further, as I described above, I think the mind actually works as a system which is constantly imposing restrictions. By restricting choices it increases freedom, and by making choices it restricts freedom.

Impossibility just isn't int he discussion. — AmadeusD

"Impossibility" is the key principle, it is the centerpiece of the discussion. It is a very significant feature of our temporal existence. As time passes it is impossible to alter what has already occurred. This is the basis for the reality of "impossibility" in this context. When a decision is made actions are carried out accordingly, and this creates impossibility where prior to this was possibility. Without this "impossibility", making a choice would not restrict one's freedom.

Bingo bango bongo. Im unsure why you got through several hundred words from each of us before noting this clear distinction between what you're claiming and what actually is.. — AmadeusD

it seems you misapprehended the setting of the table, thinking it to be something other than it was.

As I said, I'm the one who set the table. It appears like you want to replace it with your own setting — Metaphysician Undercover

If this is your feeling, that also explains a lot and I apologise if that's the vibe that's coming through. As noted elsewhere in my response, I have reviewed the entire exchange to avoid this being the case - so, either you've been a bit off in your wordings or I've been a bit lazy in my readings - either way, I think further down my response it will be clearer what's going on, and where we've converged...

I was not ever talking about the time prior to making the choice — Metaphysician Undercover

As noted elsewhere, this is a bizarre revelation to me, given what's been being discussed and how it's been worded, but it sorts some stuff out and I have no issue with how you're approaching this.

I was always talking about the time when the choice is made. — Metaphysician Undercover

I may leave off similar responses, so as to just clear a crystal clear response to this version of the position: This is uninteresting and there is no argument. If the choice has already been made, there's no discussion to be had. I think, in this sense, it's basically "I agree, but why did you bring this up then?" haha.

Do you, or do you not agree, that at the point in time time when the choice is made, it is impossible for you to have made a choice which you did not think of? — Metaphysician Undercover

This question conflates the two possibilities of what we're talking about. Asking it indicates you want me to answer to my version of what we're talking about, but the rest of the context indicates you want me to respond to yours which would result in a bit of a 'gotcha'. Given I was not indicating what you were, with some trepidation I will answer to both:
Obviously, yes. The choice has already been made. Any shred of time prior to the act of 'choice', i disagree. Anything can get in between the two. So, hopefully this answers both 'versions' relatively succinctly and clears up what I was apprehending vs what you were wanting to hear.

Very clearly, the fact that the person did not think of the option at the time when the decision was made, makes it impossible that the person could have chosen that option at that time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hmm, I don't think that even on your version this the case (but I note this is different to the question at the top of this para, which i've answered directly). The thing which makes it impossible in the above is having already made a decision. Any amount of time prior to Choice Point A (lmao, i love doing that) then impossibility isn't in the picture. Unlikelihood is. Once the choice is made (which, I now take is what you're wanting me to address) there isn't a discussion. It is definitionally impossible. It wouldn't matter if the options were in mind at the time. They weren't chosen. End of. There's no philosophy there.
So, in short - I agree, but that's just uninteresting and there are not valid objections - It's like the "water is wet" argument (well, no - water makes things wet, but im sure you get me) - it's a non-issue. If we can get clear of the current crossed wires, I would (without a shred of incredulity) like to know what's being seen as an interesting discussion there :)

Perhaps you misunderstood what you engaged with when you engaged me. — Metaphysician Undercover

It certainly seems I did, regardless of my view on your wordings. Apologies for any tension as a result.

I am saying that when the choice is made this causes other choices to be impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is what I illustrated, to my mind - so, your answer is clear regardless :)

the choice makes it impossible to choose otherwise, because the choice is an act which occurs in time, and when it is made it cannot be undone. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we agree.

It restricts your freedom because you exclude the other possibilities, by having chosen what you chose. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a different issue, again. I'm not implying you've conflated, just that this is separate. My response here is essentially "Not until you act, but once the act takes place, that choice is made "in time" with no recourse". The freedom to re-choose, or change one's mind prior to acting is clearly available in essentially any situation where we're not considering some form of mind-reading. Again, this is only go to apply to certain types of decision, but this is at least a separate issue to the one we've come to terms on (as I see it).

Do you agree that each time you make a choice, you are actually restricting your own freedom? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. I don't think it's possible to choose otherwise (it seems you also?) therefore freedom isn't relevant. "Could have done otherwise" seems to be required for freedom in these types of contexts (choice, ethics etc..). Again. perhaps I'm missing something but this seems clearly a state-of-affairs about the direction of time and not a philosophical point about freedom or choice. Every single moment hat passes precludes us from altering the prior moment/s ad infinitum. Self-evident and uninteresting.

It restricts your freedom because you exclude the other possibilities, by having chosen what you chose. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see what you're doing here, and I think there's a interesting meta-discussion to be had, but i refrain so we're not muddying water again (and perhaps, getting off-topic). It would result in a fair few exchanges, I think.

By restricting choices it increases freedom, and by making choices it restricts freedom. — Metaphysician Undercover

You'll need to go a lot further before this formulation makes too much sense to me, and given i've clearly gotten some crucial aspects of your posts wrong I will refrain from forming any view on it right now other than that it seems bit of an aesthetic claim, rather than a neurological or philosophical one.

adhering to the decision prevents you from reconsidering or choosing otherwise — Metaphysician Undercover

B= (for me) "acting on the decision". Maybe there's a disagreement we can starting working on here after all! :D

When a decision is made actions are carried out accordingly — Metaphysician Undercover

Those are two distinct events, as far as I'm concerned (goes to the above, i guess!) which somewhat materially changes the implications made out in your comments.

and this creates impossibility where prior to this was possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

Definitely agree that once an act (pursuant to a decision) has been carried out or initiated, you cannot then "re-choose" what to be inspired by (in the strict sense) as regard the act you just did. You can merely over-ride by further action, whatever result the previous decision caused by way of your actions in pursuit of it. But, i see them as distinct events so there's a twinge of disagreeing with the overall view, despite probably assenting to most discreet elements.

it seems you misapprehended the setting of the table, thinking it to be something other than it was. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, regardless of my views on your wording (or noticing what wire were crossed, lol) this seems quite clear to me now and I apologise for whatever level of tension or irritation came from that.

I agree that it is moral reasoning that is being used to determine what kind of freedom we should protect and what we shouldn't, though I'm not sure that is quite what you mean when you say "moral principles". Even if it were, it still wouldn't follow that what I'm suggesting we protect is moral restraint.

Also can I take it from you not answering that you didn't read the initial primer? Because that would really help to clear a lot of this up.

To be clear on what the subject of discussion is, this is what I said to Dan:

As I said, not choosing, rather than choosing, provides the most freedom, because every choice made restricts one's freedom with respect to that choice already made. And, since the measure of value is freedom, as you say, then the highest value is to not choose, because this provides the most freedom. And, not choosing is what enables deliberation and contemplation. This is consistent with Aristotelian virtue, which places contemplation as the highest activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't understand this difference, between protecting and promoting freedom. Bad habits are morally relevant, and habits guide our decisions when we do not take the time to deliberate. To protect one's freedom of choice requires that the person resists the formation of habits in one's thinking. To be inclined this way, i.e. to resist habitual thinking, requires that freedom be promoted, because choosing not to choose is an intentional skill requiring will power to develop, and the desire for freedom is the required intention. This is where consequentialism really fails us. It does not properly provide for the value of will power. — Metaphysician Undercover

When you engaged me I had said:

I explained why the person's choice is restricted by habit. The habit prevents the person from properly considering other options. This is a very real and very strong restriction to one's freedom to choose. The most significant restriction to one's freedom of choice is a failure to consider all the possibilities. The person is free to choose any option, but literally cannot choose an option which doesn't come to mind. The best option may not come to mind, due to the person\s preexisting habits of thinking, so the person's freedom to choose that option is restricted accordingly.

And, back to the point we started with, making a choice restricts one's freedom in much the same way. The choice is made, and the person proceeds accordingly. Proceeding with the choice firmly decided restricts one's freedom to choose otherwise. — Metaphysician Undercover

Notice the last paragraph.

You replied to me with:

This isn't a restriction. I'm with Dan on this. A restriction would mean you are unable to do the thing. In this case, you're just misguided. Any instance where a further option is suggested to you leaves you open to considering it. Your personal habits only prevent you from bringing options up within yourself - and even then, not really. Habits are flimsy, mentally speaking, versus the ability to take on new information. — AmadeusD

It seems like a lack of context produced a misunderstanding of what I was talking about.

What I am claiming is that in the case of acting by habit, the choice is made, the person proceeds accordingly, and it is not possible for the person to consider other options because the actions which follow from the habitual choice have already been initiated, by that act of making the choice.

To avoid further misunderstanding, here's a concrete example. When I'm sitting in my house, and I hear my dog barking at the door, my habit is to immediately get up and let the dog in. So, as soon as I hear the dog barking, I respond with the decision to let the dog in, and I proceed accordingly. This is my habit.

Now here's the issue. When I act according to my habit I do not consider other options. It's true as you say, that at the time when I hear the dog bark, I could consider other options. But this, considering other options, is not what I am talking about, I am talking about acting by habit, in which case other options are not considered. Furthermore, I am saying that when the person does act by habit, it is impossible for the person to consider other options because this actually contradicts what is meant by "acting by habit". So, if when I hear the dog barking, instead of automatically getting up to let it in (acting by habit), I consider possibilities, "is that my dog?", "does the dog want to come in?", "should I get up, or ask someone else to let it in?", etc., then I am not acting by habit, I am deliberating.

Here's a couple more examples to help elucidate what I am talking about.

Consider the use of logic and mathematics as habits of decision making. Whenever we apply mathematics we exclude other possibilities through a learned habit of thinking. So for example, if I'm having some people over for a dinner party, and I want to determine how many people to prepare for, I might think four couples are coming, so four times two is eight. At this point I decide that eight is the tally and I proceed accordingly. Notice that by applying that habitual way of thinking, I accept the conclusion and I exclude all other possibilities. I know that there are other possible ways to determine the number, I could go through each name individually for example, but I do not do this, I name the couples and multiply by two. That way of thinking is a habit for me, and if I started thinking about other ways to figure out the total number, i would not be acting by habit, but deciding from options.

Here's an example which is more relevant to the moral principles which Dan is talking about. When I leave the grocery store, my habit is to look for my car in the parking lot, get into it and drive home. I never once consider the possibility of taking another car from the lot, because my habit is to look for my own. I do not think about my key only allowing me to use my car, so this is irrelevant to my decision making, that decision to find my car and drive it, is completely habitual. If I started consering other possibilities, like taking someone else's car, I might be dissuaded from that by the fact that my key wouldn't work, but I would only consider these other factors if I wasn't following the habit of looking for my car to drive home in.

The point is that when you act by habit you do not consider other options, that's what acting by habit is. If you consider other options before choosing, then the choice is not an habitual one. This is not to say that the person could not have overpowered the habit, and considered other options, it is to say that the person did not do this. And, as we've discussed, the fact that the person did not consider other options at the point in time when the choice was made, implies that it was impossible for the person to choose any other options at that point in time.

If the choice has already been made, there's no discussion to be had. I think, in this sense, it's basically "I agree, but why did you bring this up then?" — AmadeusD

So, the reason I brought this up is described in my earlier posts to Dan, as reproduced above. I was arguing that making a choice restricts one's freedom to choose.

Obviously, yes. The choice has already been made. Any shred of time prior to the act of 'choice', i disagree. Anything can get in between the two. So, hopefully this answers both 'versions' relatively succinctly and clears up what I was apprehending vs what you were wanting to hear. — AmadeusD

Now, relate this to habit, and freedom. When the habit kicks in there is no time prior to the act of choice, during which the person deliberates. The person finds oneself in a specific type of situation, the habit kicks in, and the person acts accordingly. If the person prevents the habit from kicking in, and creates a "shred of time prior to the act of 'choice'", for the sake of deliberating, then we cannot say that the person's act is habitual, it is deliberate. So in these situations which I am talking about, the habitual decisions, this idea of a shred of time prior to the choice, is irrelevant. It's very similar to a reflex. You ask me "what's 2+2?", and I say "4". There's no deliberation on my part. Through some sort of reflex I apply the process I know will produce the answer. Then I state the answer.

This is a different issue, again. I'm not implying you've conflated, just that this is separate. My response here is essentially "Not until you act, but once the act takes place, that choice is made "in time" with no recourse". The freedom to re-choose, or change one's mind prior to acting is clearly available in essentially any situation where we're not considering some form of mind-reading. Again, this is only go to apply to certain types of decision, but this is at least a separate issue to the one we've come to terms on (as I see it). — AmadeusD

I believe that we need to consider even the thinking process itself as a type of acting. In this way we can understand ways of thinking as habits, and we can see how habits restrict our freedom of choice. Take the example of applying a mathematical solution to a problem. When the problem is presented, the person will apply mathematics as applicable, and this is a habit. The person goes straight to the habitual way of solving the problem without considering any other ways.

It's true as you say, that after solving the problem in the habitual way, the person can still re-choose to do it in another way, and in grade school this was called checking your answer. However, in practise we most often don't bother to do this checking, we tend to just work out the answer in the customary way, then continue on. Because the habit is generally quite reliable, we often do not doubt it.

No. I don't think it's possible to choose otherwise (it seems you also?) therefore freedom isn't relevant. "Could have done otherwise" seems to be required for freedom in these types of contexts (choice, ethics etc..). Again. perhaps I'm missing something but this seems clearly a state-of-affairs about the direction of time and not a philosophical point about freedom or choice. Every single moment hat passes precludes us from altering the prior moment/s ad infinitum. Self-evident and uninteresting. — AmadeusD

It is a freedom related issue. At the time when the person is making the choice, the person has freedom to consider more options. At the time when the choice is made, the person does not have that freedom. Therefore we can conclude that the act of judgement is an act which limits one's freedom. Furthermore, "making the choice", (and this is when the person has freedom), exists as a duration of time, but the habit limits that amount of time to the very minimum. So the habitual choice, as a type of choice is a type which restricts freedom even more.

Those are two distinct events, as far as I'm concerned (goes to the above, i guess!) which somewhat materially changes the implications made out in your comments. — AmadeusD

The point is that when the decision is made we stop actively considering options. Making a decision always has consequences, of some sort.

I agree that it is moral reasoning that is being used to determine what kind of freedom we should protect and what we shouldn't, though I'm not sure that is quite what you mean when you say "moral principles". Even if it were, it still wouldn't follow that what I'm suggesting we protect is moral restraint. — Dan

To put it bluntly, I do not agree that you can properly call what you are claiming to protect, "a type of freedom". Really what you want to protect is a type of choice, choices which belong to a person. To ensure that the person's choice is within the criteria of that type, requires that the choice be constrained. Within those constraints the person's freedom is protected. This is not protecting a type of freedom, it is protecting freedom as long as the free agent respects certain boundaries. And this is what I call moral restraint.

Also can I take it from you not answering that you didn't read the initial primer? Because that would really help to clear a lot of this up. — Dan

I read some, but I didn't get too the end.

It seems like a lack of context produced a misunderstanding of what I was talking about. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's a bit of both. Your wording clearly leaves me open to give the response I did, but subsequently I definitely veered away from what you were getting at. The distinctions between action and choice are pretty directly on point there, so my last response should be pretty apt.

that act of making the choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not at all the case, and I can't see how you don't see your conflation - The Choice and The Act are clearly different things, and inserting the speculative, and indefinite 'habit' aspect again, reduces likelihood only. Nothing beyond having already carried out the act prevents you from making what would, in the moment, be considered 'other' choices.
Habits aren't in-stone, repetitive neural connections that cannot be altered. A gust of wind could do it, to go back to my original line of thought. Only hte act precludes anything from possibility here. That's clear cut. I'm unsure how you're getting to the choice (i.e internal delineation between options) or habit (a vague, not-well-defined series of neurological actions that usually follow each other to an end) could be doing the same job. They aren't metaphysical obstacles so possibility shouldn't be being spoken about there imo.

When I act — Metaphysician Undercover

You can delete the rest of this sentence, and your mode of description works perfectly. Why you acted isn't relevant to possibility (i am likely to have to back down from whether I consider threats a curtailing of freedom here). In your description of the case the "habit" is doing precisely zero for possibility. It is making it less likely you would consider other options - nothing to do with whether you could. Again, these aren't facts about anything, other than that time proceeds unidirectionally and we cannot change an act that already occurred.

because this actually contradicts what is meant by "acting by habit". — Metaphysician Undercover

Then you're simply using a phrase which has your conclusion baked-in. Not philosophy. This is just pointing out that once someone acts, you can't change the act. This remains in the position of being entirely self-evident, and uninteresting. It isn't a discussion.
However, it seems you're trying to imply that from the post-choice position of "It was habit that caused me to act in X way" this somehow retroactively places the now-extant impossibility of considering other options at the time of decision/choice. It doesn't, though. So, again, you're 100% correct in what you're literally saying but It seems you're trying to get much more out of it than is actually there. Time moves in one direction. Big whoop.

making a choice restricts one's freedom to choose — Metaphysician Undercover

This is incoherent to me. Making a choice doesn't restrict one's freedom to choose in any sense other than that time moves in one direction. Freedom isn't in play. You already chose. There's no 'restriction'. It's plainly not open to you to make that same decision again. Restricting is both inadequate and inapt. The general fact that time moves in one direction restricts your choices to one's that operate in the same direction. But this isn't at all what you've tried to say.
I'm truly not understanding what lifting you think these ideas are doing?

When the habit kicks in there is no time prior to the act of choice — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, there is. The rest of this sentence is an empirical speculation that is required to support your claim but I think is plainly wrong. You are, again, speaking from the post-action world to the pre-action world to try to impugn the obvious freedom to break out of one's habit prior to acting.

cannot say that the person's act is habitual, it is deliberate. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct, and this, I think, ironically, is what most of the rest of your comments are not sufficiently parsing out from one another. If your position is simply that if (Habit)->(Act) actually occurs then, retrospectively, that person was restricted in their choices. But that is wrong, and incoherent. What actually occurred doesn't inform what could have been.

this idea of a shred of time prior to the choice, is irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's because you have necessarily removed the important part of the process from your claim's supporting struts. Whcih is fine, if the point you're making literally boils down to "Time moves in one direction" but it feels, at least, as if you're trying to wring more from it.

You ask me "what's 2+2?", and I say "4". There's no deliberation on my part. Through some sort of reflex I apply the process I know will produce the answer. Then I state the answer. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is one possible sequence of events and is not at all bounded logically or even empirically. This is retroactive claim couched in present-tense words.

Because the habit is generally quite reliable, we often do not doubt it. — Metaphysician Undercover

This seems to wipe away from debris. These are, then, heuristic claims and not at all claims about the possibility of deliberation. That's fine, and insofaras (that goes) I agree.

We often do doubt it. This is how most specialised areas of thought develop. Habits are as you describe them, but they don't get close to preventing anything from happening in the metaphysical sense. Habits are loosely held sequences of thought in response to common stimulus. Not pre-recordings.

It is a freedom related issue. At the time when the person is making the choice, the person has freedom to consider more options. At the time when the choice is made, the person does not have that freedom. — Metaphysician Undercover

The choice is no longer extant to be made. It is in the past. There is no consideration of Freedom. You would not say that my not having gills restricts my freedom to breathe underwater. I am simply unable to do so. Freedom isn't relevant. The present case is the same, as far as I see it.

herefore we can conclude that the act of judgement is an act which limits one's freedom. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly the opposite - it is one's freedom to choose made manifest (unless we're back at "time passing restricts freedom" type of inanity).

exists as a duration of time, but the habit limits that amount of time to the very minimum — Metaphysician Undercover

This is certainly true, and acknowledged. I wouldn't say 'very minimum' though, I think you're speculating far too much in some of these claims. But, overall, vibe is on point imo.

I mean, I would also be happy to say that I am protecting freedom to make certain types of choices, if that would be more agreeable to you linguistically.

Our disagreement appears to two twofold. First, we disagree as to the causal efficacy of habit. Second, we disagree as to the metaphysical significance of the passing of time. Each of these disagreements has an affect on how we individually understand freedom and its restrictions.

Concerning the first subject of disagreement, I cannot tell you exactly what a habit is, or how it works, but I've given you examples as to how, when we act through habit, we do not consider other options, and I've explained how it is logically impossible to choose another option if the other option is not present to the mind. Therefore I conclude that it is impossible for one to choose another option when the habit is in force. You, on the other hand, define "habit" as "loosely held sequences of thought in response to common stimulus" or, "a vague, not-well-defined series of neurological actions that usually follow each other to an end". By these terms, "loosely held", and "usually follow each other", you exclude the necessity of the cause/effect relationship which I assume to constitute a habit, and you thereby deny the necessity which I attribute to "habit". I conclude therefore, that this aspect of our disagreement is based in a difference in understanding of what "a habit" is. You deny the necessity of the cause/effect relationship within a habit, which I assert.

The second part of our disagreement is a bit more difficult for me to understand. Clearly the passing of time imposes significant restrictions on our freedom, and we seem to agree on this. However, for some reason I cannot understand, you dismiss the importance of this as "entirely self-evident, and uninteresting", and you refuse to allow it as a point of discussion. In metaphysics, the self-evident is of the utmost importance, because it is used to form the base, the foundation of ontology, and from this we construct an understanding of reality. Therefore we cannot dismiss the self-evident fact that the passing of time imposes significant restrictions on our freedom, as "uninteresting" in a discussion of freedom, just because it is something which as "self-evident". We ought to agree on this self-evident fact, and use it to form the base for a wider understanding between us. It is therefore the most interesting to "us".

What I propose therefore, is that we concentrate on our points of agreement, what we take as self-evident. If we can agree on the way that the passing of time bears on possibility and impossibility, and therefore on our freedom, we can proceed toward applying these agreed upon principles to the nature of "habit", and by this means we might overcome some of our points of disagreement about how habit affects our freedom.

So, after giving it some consideration I will address the points of your post, beginning with the aspects concerning the self-evident fact about the passage of time, From this, I will try to build an understanding of points of agreement between us, and bring this to bear on the larger point of disagreement, the nature of habit. I'll get back to you later.

I mean, I would also be happy to say that I am protecting freedom to make certain types of choices, if that would be more agreeable to you linguistically. — Dan

This does not address the problem. Since you are employing your principles to dictate the "types of choices" which you are protecting, then all you are really doing is proposing a restriction to my freedom of choice.

I don't think that's a problem. I don't think we need to protect your freedom to go and stab people in the throat. In fact, I think we should restrict your ability to do that. That is very much a feature not a bug.