I think that a distinction can be made between 'intrinsic' and 'relational' properties. — boundless

So like gauge invariance vs Poincaré invariance? Constrain spacetime to a manifold of points and it still has degrees of freedom in that the points may spin rather than sit still. They may be vector and chiral rather than scalar. Quantum spin arises as an intrinsic property and the rest of particle physics follows.

What relativity doesn’t forbid becomes what QFT exploits.

On the other hand, yes, I agree if this is taken to mean that any reference frame can be used to discover/find some truth that is valid for all other reference frames. — boundless

Yeah, that bit. The principles of physics are to be formulated so that the frame of reference being used does not change those principles. Any frame will do. This was intended to head off the common notion that science seeks a "view from nowhere" - perhaps the view you described and disagreed with as "independent from any reference frame". Rather, science seeks a view from anywhere. A point worth making in a philosophy forum.

That seems to be making 'an ontological claim'. Or wait - is it an 'epistemological claim?' — Wayfarer

It depends on the interpretation of this type of things. In epistemic interpretations like, say, QBism or some form of Copenaghen-ish interpretations, such an experiment results in an update of the knowledge of the agent/observer, not in the 'coming to be' of some kind of reality.
At best, it is an 'ontological claim' in the sense that 'the world' that the agent 'observed' is not 'the world in itself', but the 'world observed'.

These kind of theories do not make ontological commitments, i.e. do not attempt in describing 'how the world is in itself' (from a 'view form nowhere', if you like).

Unfortunately, concepts like 'participatory realism' IMO kind of muddy the waters. They seem to imply that 'the observer changes reality'. This in QBism, as I understand it, actually means 'the observer gets a new experience'. Other similar interpretations say that 'the observer knowledge its updated' and so on.

I guess that 'participatory realism' was developed in other to defend QBism and similar views from the charge of solipsism. But I do not really see the point of that. It only complicates the issue.

that article was specifically about John Wheeler with additional commentary by Andrei Linde. Wheeler is the one known for the participatory universe idea. You can see how he gets that from the ‘delayed choice’ experimental results, particularly his thought-experiment where the experimental apparatus comprises light arriving from distant qasars.

Christian Fuchs who developed QBism was one of Wheeler’s (many) students but I think Wheeler had passed on by the time he started publishing. I listened to a long interview with him recently, I find his account of the interpretation of the physics quite understandable.

At issue is what counts as a measurement. You presume it must involve a conscious being, because you want consciousness to be a substance within the universe. Others have different ideas. Again, mere speculation. Shut up and calculate.

So like gauge invariance vs Poincaré invariance? Constrain spacetime to a manifold of points and it still has degrees of freedom in that the points may spin rather than sit still. They may be vector and chiral rather than scalar. Quantum spin arises as an intrinsic property and the rest of particle physics follows. — apokrisis

Well, maybe 'symmetries' are the only intrinsic properties that can be discovered by physics.

But even quantum spin after all is a quantity that describes how an object responds to an interaction. So I am not sure that it can be said that it is an intrinsic property of a particle (I admit that this does not 'conclusively' shows that it isn't lol...).

(IIRC there was a paper by philosopher Michel Bitbol that discussed this kind of things. If I find it I'll link or quote the relevant parts)

Yeah, that bit. The principles of physics are to be formulated so that the frame of reference being used does not change those principles. Any frame will do. This was intended to head off the common notion that science seeks a "view from nowhere" - perhaps the view you described and disagreed with as "independent from any reference frame". Rather, science seeks a view from anywhere. A pont worth making in a philosophy forum. — Banno

Completely in agreement with this :100:

You presume it must involve a conscious being, — Banno

As did Schrödinger. But it’s metaphysically embarrassing, isn’t it, because it implies the observer, who is not in scope for the objective sciences. (If you bother to read the OP I wrote on idealism, you will notice I reject any notion of ‘consciousness as substance’ right at the beginning.)

IIRC there was a paper by philosopher Michel Bitbol that discussed this kind of thing — boundless

Bitbol one of the great discoveries I’ve made reading this forum. He’s written a book on Schrodinger’s philosophy of physics, which is a bit difficult without advanced physics, but many of his other papers are well worth reading, such as It is Never Known but it is the Knower. (By the way, during your absence I wrote an OP on idealism which you can find here.)

Again, there is the bit where you give and the bit where you take back. You want consciousness to be the special thing that collapse wave functions, but you don't want it to be different to the other stuff of the universe.

Hence:

it implies the observer, who is not in scope for the objective sciences — Wayfarer

and

I reject any notion of ‘consciousness as substance — Wayfarer

But how can you have it both ways? You both physicalism and dualism.

*

You want consciousness to be the special thing that collapse wave functions, but you don't want it to be different to the other stuff of the universe. — Banno

Thank you for that question. It is only taken about five years of argument to get to this point. I will carefully compose a response in due course.

I do not doubt their credentials. I am merely saying that an ontological reading of certain ideas can be misleading. Of course it also depends on how 'ontology' is defined.

Yes, for instance QBism does require that 'observers' can 'experience', i.e. are conscious. But this does not imply that consciousness 'affects' the 'external reality' when a measurement, observation or anything like that is made.

If 'consciousness causes collapse' is taken as meaning that 'an experiment updates the knowledge/degree of beliefs' of a conscious agent, I do not see anything 'weird'. On the other hand, if it is taken as implying that an observation of a conscious agent changes the 'fabric of reality' or that 'consciousness causes a drastic change in external reality' and so on, then yes it becomes a problem IMO.

Thanks for the link, btw, I'll read it. Anyway, I do think that your own idealism is actually a form of epistemic idealism, rather than ontological (based on what I read in the past). Ontological idealism treats consciousness as the sole substance.

That’s pretty right - I do hold to a form of epistemic idealism. But I also claim that what we can claim is real is inextricably connected to what we can know, which I think is a consequence of my training in Buddhist philosophy.

As far as QBism is concerned, it says that each individual has a separate observation, and to that extent, it undermines the claim that they’re all observing the same thing. In other words, it calls objectivity into question - which is too high a price for its critics.

... to head off the common notion that science seeks a "view from nowhere" ... Rather, science seeks a view from anywhere. A point worth making in a philosophy forum — Banno

:up:

It is one thing to say that things unperceived are not the same as we perceive them to be and altogether another to claim that when unperceived they don't exist. — Janus

:up: :up:

↪Wayfarer Again, there is the bit where you give and the bit where you take back. You want consciousness to be the special thing that collapse wave functions, but you don't want it to be different to the other stuff of the universe. — Banno

Actually QBism is a form of 'consciousness causes collapse' interpretation as I understand it. But given that in such an interpretation the wave-function is merely a tool that allows one to calculate probabilities to have some kind of experiences, I do not see how it can be problematic or how can it give a 'special' role to consciousness. It certainly does not mean that when a conscious agent makes an observation something in the 'fabric of the universe', so to speak, changes. The only thing that happens is an update of knowledge (in QBism this is expressed as an upddate of a probability, which in turn is interpreted as a quantification of a degree of belief).

I do not think that QBism or similar views are in contrast with your own view.

On the other hand, Rovelli's RQM holds that all physical objects can be considered as 'observers'. To be fair, I prefer QBism or similar views because, after all, what a 'physical object is' is extremely vague. Is a table a physical object? Are its legs physical objects? Does each atom of a table have its 'perspective'? Do all its atoms and the whole table have their own perspective? How they are related?
My problem with such a view is its vagueness.

↪boundless That’s pretty right - I do hold to a form of epistemic idealism. But I also claim that what we can claim is real is inextricably connected to what we can know, which I think is a consequence of my training in Buddhist philosophy. — Wayfarer

Ok :up: Note, however, that if one thinks that the delayed choice experiment shows that a measurement can change the past (rather than our knowledge of it), then one enters in some serious difficulties. That's why I don't like the expression 'partecipatory realism' even if respected physicists use it.

I do not think that QBism or similar views are in contrast with your own view. — boundless

Cheers.



What's odd is that this is a thread about justice and fairness, yet it contains page after page of speculative quantum physics.

If we needed QBism to fathom justice, presumably the courts would be teaming with physics grads.

So I'm left with the impression that something is seriously astray here.

Linde says it changes our perception of what appears to be ‘the past’.

↪boundless Linde says it changes our perception of what appears to be ‘the past’. — Wayfarer

I think that it is a good way to put it :up: That's would be an 'epistemic' claim, consistent with epistemic interpretations. So, I don't think that is a controversial statement.

What's odd is that this is a thread about justice and fairness, yet it contains page after page of speculative quantum physics. — Banno

Lol, yeah, I see your point. Is it possible to 'split' the thread?

Hence:
it implies the observer, who is not in scope for the objective sciences
— Wayfarer
and
I reject any notion of ‘consciousness as substance
— Wayfarer

But how can you have it both ways? You both physicalism and dualism. — Banno

As I said at the beginning of mind-created world, my argument is perspectival. So long as you’re trying to treat consciousness, or mind, or observation, as one among the other objects in the world, then you’re adopting a faulty perspective. The mind/observer/subject is not an object in the world, one factor among others, to be considered alongside gravity or radiation. It is that which discloses such things as gravity and raditation and sub-atomic particles, amidst innumerable other things. It is the subject to whom all this occurs or appears. The ‘unknown knower’.

You will recall I quoted the first para of Schop’s WWI a few pages ago:

It then becomes clear and certain to him that what he knows is not a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world which surrounds him is there only as idea, i.e., only in relation to something else, the consciousness, which is himself.” ~ Schopenhauer

To which you responded:

and therefore he has eyes and hands! Why are eyes and hands OK, but not the sun or the earth? — Banno

I thought this response was so comically off the mark that I replied with an emoji. So trying again, and possibly for the last time - the reason ‘the mind’ (observer, subject) is not in scope for science IS NOT that it is a ‘mysterious spooky substance’, but because it’s ‘the subject of experience’. Which is never included in the scientific reckoning, for the obvious reason that it’s not amongst the objects of perception.

Is it possible to 'split' the thread? — boundless

This thread is well beyond that. It’s like the many worlds interpretation where every possible variation happens. :lol:

Is it possible to 'split' the thread? — boundless

No, but you can always start a new thread on the speculative physics. Trouble is, folk here seem adamant that the physics is somehow apposite to fairness, so I think they woudl probably stay here rather than join you. Might be best to go with the flow.

I thought this response was so comically off the mark that I replied with an emoji. — Wayfarer

It was indeed facetious, since the quote had so little to do with the issues at hand. And so we go back to where we were half a thread ago, the challenge before us becoming more endurance than enlightenment.

Ok I see :lol:

It was indeed facetious, since the quote had so little to do with the issues at hand. — Banno

The way you see them, anyway….

So long as you’re trying to treat consciousness, or mind, or observation, as one among the other objects in the world, then you’re adopting a faulty perspective. — Wayfarer

Well, what is one supposed to do with

‘the mind’... (is) ‘the subject of experience’. — Wayfarer

The subject of my present experience is the laptop screen and text...

Language on holidays.

your claim:

You want consciousness to be the special thing — Banno

I have explained the sense in which the mind is not ‘a thing among other things’. It is perfectly clear.

and there you’re referring to the object of your present experience appearing to you as subject (although it shouldn’t have to explained.)

It is that which discloses such things as gravity and raditation and sub-atomic particles, amidst innumerable other things. It is the subject to whom all this occurs or appears. The ‘unknown knower’. — Wayfarer

This "knower" (i.e. perceiver) Bishop Berkeley calls "God" which, not by coincidence I'm sure, is functionally indistinguishable from @Gnomon's "Enformer". An infinite regress-of-the-gaps. :sparkle: :eyes:

[T]he mind is not ‘a thing among other things’ — Wayfarer

Agreed. Mind(ing) is something sufficiently complex brains do – a (meta)activity, not an entity.

You mean experimentally? - https://www.nature.com/articles/nphys3343

As a bone of contention? - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-023-04251-x — apokrisis

I'll read these after you have stood on your head for half an hour. I want a video to prove it.

The subject of my present experience is the laptop screen and text — Banno

Surely that would be the object of your experience? I suppose either would work. Brits abroad.

No. It gathered a good bunch of people to drill into self-organising complexity in the broad sense. But then over-generalised that dynamicist viewat the expense of the further thing which biosemiotics is focused on. Dynamics regulated by information. — apokrisis

I don't follow Santa Fe Institute in general, because my interest is primarily in their work on "dynamics regulated by Information" as you put it. Here's two books by authors & editors, some affiliated with SFI, that approach Complexity and Self-Organization from an Information perspective. :smile:


From Matter to Life: Information and Causality :
Recent advances suggest that the concept of information might hold the key to unravelling the mystery of life's nature and origin.
by Sara Imari Walker, et al (Editor) SFI
https://www.amazon.com/Matter-Life-Information-Causality/dp/1107150531

Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics To Metaphysics :
Many scientists regard mass and energy as the primary currency of nature. In recent years, however, the concept of information has gained importance. Why? In this book, eminent scientists, philosophers and theologians chart various aspects of information, from quantum information to biological and digital information, in order to understand how nature works.
https://www.amazon.com/Information-Nature-Reality-Metaphysics-Classics/dp/1107684536
Note --- It has a chapter specifically about Semiology and Biosemiotics

But if we are here to argue sensibly it seems at least reasonable to be called upon to state a clear position. My complaint about Wayfarer is that he cannot or will not do that. — Janus

Are you demanding a "clear position" expressed in Materialistic terminology? I can't speak for , but I suspect that he "cannot or will not do that", because it would completely miss the meaning of his Immaterialist*1 philosophical Position. Any "sensible" Material aspects of his worldview are covered by Science, not Philosophy. :smile:

*1. Immaterialism :
The term 'immaterialism' was introduced by George Berkeley in the third of his Three Dialogues (1713), to designate his own opinion that there was no such thing as material substance, and that bodies were not to be understood in terms of qualities that inhered in an independent, unthinking substratum, but rather as ...
https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk › Immaterialism
Note --- This may not be how Way would characterize his views. So I show it here only as an example of an alternative worldview to Materialism, which could not be "clearly" & "sensibly" expressed in Materialist language.