I don't! I think I made that clear. What I have pointed out is the difference between what we hold to be true and what is true - between belief and truth.

That there is a world that may be different to our beliefs is shown, not said. It's not an "inference". It's demonstrated by the cup coming out of the dishwasher clean, and all manor of other interactions, with medium sized smallgoods and whatever else you might find. It's what enables you to say the car keys are in your pocket even when you can't see or feel them. And even when you are not thinking about them.

That there is a world that may be different to our beliefs is shown, not said. It's not an "inference". It's demonstrated by the cup coming out of the dishwasher clean, and all manor of other interactions, with medium sized smallgoods and whatever else you might find. — Banno

That was the very point of the passage from Berkeley's dialogues that I provided, in which this exact objection is made to Philonous/Berkeley. Hylas says 'if all you admit is the reality of ideas, then how come your ideas can be wrong, like when a stick in the water appears to be bent?' It's the same objection you're offering here, that our beliefs can be different to what we discover about the world. But notice that Philoonous qua idealist does have an answer to that, along the lines of coherentism.

Besides, this is something much deeper than a matter of belief. The cognitive process of world-construction is subconscious or subliminal. I'm talking about our whole 'meaning-world', the entirety of our sense of self-and-world. That is created by the mind but not the conscious ego or self. It goes much deeper than that, it is a process which informs all living things.

I think what you're instinctively defending is naive realism (no pejorative intended). You are shocked by the questioning of the reality of the sensable world. Damn it, can't he just see that my cups are in the cupboard even with the door closed?!? That they don't dissappear when I can't see them?!? I'm not saying that, but that is how you're reading it.

Please excuse my butting in. — Banno

Cheers but there is nothing to excuse, it's an open forum.

It's the same objection you're offering here, that our beliefs can be different to what we discover about the world. But notice that Philoonous qua idealist does have an answer to that, along the lines of coherentism. — Wayfarer

It has nothing to do with coherentism. The reality that we can be mistaken about. according to Berkeley, is the human mind-independent reality of what Goid has in mind, as opposed to the materialist reality of mind-independent existents.

You have been challenged to explain how it is that we all perceive the same things, if you reject both the idea of mind-independent existents and Berkeley's human mind-independent ideas in the mind of God. It seems you just don't want to admit you can find no alternative.

You have been challenged to explain how it is that we all perceive the same things, — Janus

I don't deny the reality of objects. Heck, I myself have coffee cups, and some of them are in the dishwasher even as I write this. I'm not arguing for solipsism. My claim is that (1) reality has an ineluctably subjective pole, and (2) that no world can be imagined real in which this is not the case (3) that this subjective pole or ground is never itself amongst the objects considered by naturalism, and (4) that the emphasis on objectivity as the sole criteria for what is real is deeply mistaken on those grounds.

Indeed, it remains a mystery how our beliefs might be coherent unless there is something - a coherent world - to keep them so.

I think what you're instinctively defending is naive realism (no pejorative intended). You are shocked by the questioning of the reality of the sensable world. Damn it, can't he just see that my cups are in the cupboard even with the door closed?!? That they don't dissappear when I can't see them?!? — Wayfarer

Cobblers. I'm showing how language works, rather than defending naive realism.


1) reality has an ineluctably subjective pole.
Our understanding of the world has an ineluctably "subjective" pole. Scare quote because subjective is a loaded term. The world just is as it is, regardless of what you think of it - as is demonstrated by error, novelty and there being other folk.

(2) that no world can be imagined in which this is not the case.
To imagine is to invoke this "subjective" pole; so this looks to be tautologous.

(3) that this subjective pole or ground is never itself amongst the objects considered by naturalism
Psychology does just that.

(4) that the emphasis on objectivity as the sole criteria for what is real is deeply mistaken on those grounds.
"Objective" is just as loaded.

(2) that no world can be imagined in which this is not the case.
To imagine is to invoke this "subjective" pole; so this looks to be tautologous. — Banno

You'll notice I struck out 'imagined' and replaced it with 'real'.

I'm showing how language works, rather than defending naive realism. — Banno

Of course you're defending naive realism. That is made particularly obvious by your homely choices of kitchen utensils to stand in for 'the object'.

The world just is as it is, regardless of what you think of it — Banno

It's a given, right?

(1) reality has an ineluctably subjective pole — Wayfarer

Reality as experienced and interpreted by us has a subjective pole, so no disagreement there.

(2) that no world can be imagined in which this is not the case — Wayfarer

We can imagine that the world without us has no subjective pole, in fact it seems to be the most plausible conclusion. We cannot imagine "what the world is like" without perceivers, because the idea of 'what it is like' is meaningless outside the context of perception and judgement. On the other hand, we can imagine that it is differentiated, that is that it is not amorphous, and the idea that it is differentiated has more explanatory power than the idea that it is amorphous, because if it were amorphous there would be no explanation for how we come to perceive difference.

(3) that this subjective pole or ground is never itself amongst the objects considered by naturalism — Wayfarer

Yes. obviously not because it is a concept not a concrete thing.

that the emphasis on objectivity as the sole criteria for what is real is deeply mistaken on those grounds. — Wayfarer

Objectivity is not a criterion, but a mode, of existence.

The world just is as it is, regardless of what you think of it
— Banno

It's a given, right? — Wayfarer

What is the alternative? That the world just is what it isn't? I have to say, Wayfarer, that I am yet, after all the exchanges we have had over the last twelve or however many years, to gain any clear idea of what it is you are actually arguing for.

It's a given, right? — Wayfarer

No. I'm a bit surprised you think this of what has been said. The world is what is the case.

On the other hand, we can imagine that it is differentiated, that is that it is not amorphous, and the idea that it is differentiated has more explanatory power than the idea that it is amorphous, because if it were amorphous there would be no explanation for how we come to perceive difference. — Janus

I agree with the general point that you are making, but it also has the difficulty that a perceptible world - a perception-enabling world - must come as the dialectical package of cohesion and its incoherences, or differentiations and integrations, its continuities and its discreteness, and so on.

So to see the local thing of some difference, we must also see how it is a difference that makes a difference. And now we get into how we see the globalism or holism that could make a mark meaningful. We seem to see directly the material event - the bruteness of the stone we kick or cup we smash - but not so directly the global organising purpose or finality involved.

It is thus correct to complain about physicalism or even logic that doesn’t make the effort to wrap up both sides of the equation when it comes to the reality that exists in a fashion that does make it rationally perceptible.

That version of physics or logic is idealism promoting in itself. Not deflationary in the fashion it might wish.

The world is what is the case. — Banno

For whom? And what was their purpose?

Always just half the story. Lumpen realism delivered from an egocentrically fixed view.

I think you are saying that we perceive the differences that have meaning for us, differences that make a difference for us, and that that meaning is the global background or context against which particulars can stand out. I agree with that, but I also think there are many differences we just don't perceive at all but that nonetheless make a difference to how and what we perceive.

The world is what is the case.
— Banno

For whom? And what was their purpose?

Always just half the story. — apokrisis

It seems plausible to think that there is much that is the case despite there being no one around to notice it, care about it, or comment on it, or even able to be consciously aware of it. I don't see that equating with "lumpen realism" if by that term you mean 'naive realism'. I think what we consciously experience always is "just half the story".

but I also think there are many differences we just don't perceive at all but that nonetheless make a difference to how and what we perceive. — Janus

Erm. What are these and how would we know?

The world is what is the case.
— Banno

For whom? — apokrisis

Well, not for the folk for whom the world is what is not the case.

Notice the difference between the world being what is the case, and the idealist view that the world is what we believe, know, intuit, hope, doubt to be the case.

It's important.

So, you were underwhelmed by this revelation of Causal Information as the key to universal progressive & creative Evolution from almost nothing to everything? — Gnomon

I would be less underwhelmed if you had a substantive counter to my claim that nothing novel is being said. The definition I quoted before is virtually tautology. What you have been saying about it looks like exaggeration to me.

No. I'm a bit surprised you think this of what has been said. The world is what is the case. — Banno

Well, you said:

The world just is as it is, regardless of what you think of it — Banno

Isn't that just another way of saying that its reality is a given? What else could it possibly mean?

Notice the difference between the world being what is the case, and the idealist view that the world is what we believe, know, intuit, hope, doubt to be the case. — Banno

But I've already addressed that very point:

this is something much deeper than a matter of belief. The cognitive process of world-construction is subconscious or subliminal. I'm talking about our whole 'meaning-world', the entirety of our sense of self-and-world. That is created by the mind but not the conscious ego or self. — Wayfarer

According to the classical tradition of philosophy, we do not see 'what is really the case'. Seeing what is really the case is the hallmark of sagacity, and it's generally considered very rare. We are too self-centred and our cognition is distorted by innummerable biases (encapsulated under the heading 'avidya' in Indian philosophy). The purpose of philosophy is to dispel the darkness of ignorance, to overcome our unconsciously self-centred view of the world. Science actually got it's start from this very same intuition.

We seem to see directly the material event - the bruteness of the stone we kick or cup we smash - but not so directly the global organising purpose or finality involved. — apokrisis

:100:

Isn't that just another way of saying that its reality is a given? — Wayfarer

No.

this is something much deeper than a matter of belief. The cognitive process of world-construction is subconscious or subliminal. I'm talking about our whole 'meaning-world', the entirety of our sense of self-and-world. That is created by the mind but not the conscious ego or self. — Wayfarer

Sure, "The cognitive process of world-construction is subconscious or subliminal. I'm talking about our whole 'meaning-world', the entirety of our sense of self-and-world. That is created by the mind but not the conscious ego or self" using the stuff around us.

Yawn.

Make yourself a coffee. I know you have plenty of cups, even if I can’t see ‘em.

Well, not for the folk for whom the world is what is not the case. — Banno

So it is for the folk. But only if they are just like you?

Sounds accurate.

Well, you said:

The world just is as it is, regardless of what you think of it
— Banno

Isn't that just another way of saying that its reality is a given? What else could it possibly mean? — Wayfarer

This is his problem. If the world reveals itself to the degree it can frustrate our desires, then dialectically this epistemology of truth demands the existence of those desires as the other half of its egocentric equation.

That half of the story is what had gone missing in the way his theory is set out. This is where a lack of rigour appears in the locutions.

Not after two o'clock. That leads to late nights.

More spit.

For whom? — apokrisis

Are you suggesting that there are folk for whom the world is not what is the case?

More spit. — Banno

More dribble.

If the world reveals itself to the degree it can frustrate our desires, then dialectically this epistemology of truth demands the existence of those desires as the other half of its egocentric equation. — apokrisis

'Not my will, but thine, oh Lord' is one way of solving that problem.

Incidentally I did a search on 'biosemiosis and idealism' which predictably returned a number of interesting articles, the top one of which is called The Idealistic Elements of Modern Semiotic Studies. So far it seems quite an approachable read. It starts with this quotation:

“All reality is subjective appearance.
This must constitute the great, fundamental
admission even of biology.”
—Jakob von Uexküll, Theoretical Biology

Which seems congenial to my p-o-v. Much of what I've read so far is on the contribution of Kant to Uexküll vision of the 'umwelt' but I'm still going....

If the world reveals itself to the degree it can frustrate our desires, then dialectically this epistemology of truth demands the existence of those desires as the other half of its egocentric equation. — apokrisis

What?

More dribble. — apokrisis

Then wipe your chin.

It seems you tried to spit and embarrassingly the drool trails down your shirtfront. Is this the school yard retort you hoped for in lieu of actually engaging in the multiple points raised against you?

Why are you always so flustered when the weaknesses of your positions are itemised in public. Do think someone cares?

Do (you) think someone cares? — apokrisis

Well, you keep replying to my posts...

Odd, then, that so much of what you direct at me is spit and name-calling. You could just ignore me, if you think my arguments so poor.

Fairness and justice are things we do, not things we find. This is a core problem with the account you offer.

Along the way the thread went quantum, and you brought up dialectic, and I pointed out a couple of problems with it. Now Way's idealist confusions are in the mix, so a discussion about justice has morphed into ontology.

That "what?" above was quite genuine - I do not understand your purpose in saying

If the world reveals itself to the degree it can frustrate our desires, then dialectically this epistemology of truth demands the existence of those desires as the other half of its egocentric equation. — apokrisis

in response to my simple "

The world just is as it is, regardless of what you think of it — Wayfarer

You are disparaging of "The world is all that is the case", but have offered nothing coherent, no alternative and certainly not a refutation. Instead you offer trivial disparaging comments.

I dunno, Apo. Seems to me you either haven't followed the thread of my discussion or can't address it adequately. That you are a smart fellow, let down by an inability to express yourself clearly and simply.

SO here is my first post:

Only if we make it so. — Banno

And yours:

Eusocial doesn't quite cover it as that applies to a social organism and hive mind at the level of ants and bees.

Humans have their biology – the eusociality of a chimp troop – but then also the further levels of semiosis that result from language and logic. So it is this further level that arguably is first and foremost these days. Well it was language until logic started to take over once science could harness fossil fuels through technology.

So the question of political organisation – what constitutes the fair and just – has ramped up through some actual sweeping transitions. We have evolved from ape troops to agricultural empires to free trade/fossil fuel economic networks.

Good and bad, fair and just, are terms that take some redefining as we move on up this hierarchy of dissipative order. — apokrisis

Have we made progress? I still think I'm right and you are not even answering the question.

You are disparaging of "The world is all that is the case", but have offered nothing coherent, no alternative and certainly not a refutation. — Banno

I said, in declaring this, you are basically starting that the empirical world is a given, the reality of which can't be called into question. I said this is subject to the criticism usually described as the myth of the given. I regard that as a coherent criticism of your common-sense realism.

I know we're talking past one another. From my side, I feel I offer arguments, and they're often ignored. From your side, what I think are arguments seem to be meaningless or pointless. Perhaps our perspectives are in some sense incommensurable.

The "reality" of the world - that some things are the case - cannot be called into question. There are things that are the case. There are true statements.

But this is not the Given. If you think it is you are welcome to set out your account. But I am reluctant to go into detail about Sellars in a thread that is already far, far removed from its main topic. Your invitation features a very large hole, and is declined.

The "reality" of the world - that some things are the case - cannot be called into question. — Banno

Why the scare quotes around reality?

At issue is whether the world is mind-independent or is not. You claimed:

There are three problems - the puzzle of other people, the fact that we are sometimes wrong, and the inevitability of novelty - each of which points to there being meadows and butterflies and other people, despite what you have in mind. I think you know that idealism won't cut it." — Banno

And I think that what you have in mind when you say that, is not what I mean by the term 'idealism', although I quite agree it's not worth another go-around.