People doing the wrong thing due to akrasia, or weakness of will, is not a case of their freedom being restricted, but rather them failing to do the right thing, and I think this is what you are describing here when you talk about habits. — Dan
The assertion that we can know causes and effects in one but not the other seems unsupported. — Dan
Also, I fundamentally disagree that not choosing increases ones freedom, so all of this discussion about whether or not we can see the consequences of not choosing and instead engaging in contemplation (which does seem to be implied by what you are saying), is really just debating an ancillary claim you made. — Dan
I would maintain though that a vision of freedom where maintaining one's freedom requires a flight from all definiteness is contradictory, for the reasons I have stated. Here, the exercise of freedom itself makes one less free. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Being determined by circumstance seems like a definite limit on freedom however. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But if our ends are not determined rationally, but rather as a coping response to circumstance, then it seems to me they are less than fully free. — Count Timothy von Icarus
It seems like "survival" is functioning as the overarching end here. But sometimes it seems like some ends trump survival, e.g. Socrates' acceptance of death. If we are always oriented towards survival rather than what we think is truly best, that will be a constraint on freedom of action. We could consider here the case where Socrates succumbs to cowardice and flees even though he knew he ought not do so. Here, he is not free to do what he thinks is best, but is rather ruled over by circumstance and fear. — Count Timothy von Icarus
If an agent is "oriented towards no specific end," but rather the ends are "determined by circumstance," then how is it not circumstance in the driver's seat? No doubt, we have to deal with the circumstances we face, but freedom would seem to come from mastering them to the extent possible. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I think Plato has a very good argument for why reason has to guide free action. We can't very well be fully free if we don't understand why we are acting or why it is good to do so. But the "rule of the rational part of the soul," would seem to require determinant aims. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Laws are a restriction of freedom because they come with a threat against said freedom attached. — Dan
Perhaps I can clarify with an example. Let's say I choose to chop off my leg. This prevents me from doing a bunch of stuff with it in the future, but this is not problematic. So long as I am choosing to remove/destroy the thing, then I am choosing to give up those things and therefore my freedom over them. — Dan
Right, but mastering circumstances towards what end? Presumably we want to take control of circumstances to direct them towards some end we find good, else why bother trying to shape them at all? — Count Timothy von Icarus
And it seems to me that survival can be superceded as an end—that we can recognize higher ends (e.g. Socrates, St. Paul, Boethius, Origen, etc.) — Count Timothy von Icarus
Because a threat to your freedom is being imposed in one case (you better not steal or else), and in the other case you are just acting in a not very considered way, which is your "right" (term isn't quite accurate, but useful in this context). — Dan
If you want to steal my car and prevent you doing that, that hasn't violated your freedom in a morally relevant way (depending on how I do the preventing) because stealing my car was not your choice to make. — Dan
No, a habit isn't a restriction of one's freedom. — Dan
No, the principle I'm claiming is that my car, being my property, is something that belongs to me and not something that you get to make choices over, morally speaking. — Dan
Whether or not to steal my car is not a choice that belongs to you, because it is [my car. — Dan
Freedom of choice vs freedom to act is not a distinction I am drawing. — Dan
No, I don't imply that you shouldn't make that choice (though in this case you shouldn't). What I am saying is that your freedom to make that choice is not morally valuable because that choice doesn't belong to you. My freedom to keep my car on the other hand is valuable because my car does belong to me. — Dan
It doesn't matter whether you are habituated to good action or bad action, both are still available to you. You have free will and your habits do not get in the way of you exercising that to choose to do good, or do bad. — Dan
Whether that choice belongs to you is very much morally relevant, because that is the type of freedom that FC is trying to protect: that over those choices that belong to the person in question. — Dan
No, I am saying that only the freedom to make certain kinds of choices is morally valuable. Specifically, the choices over that which belongs to the person, their mind, their body, and their property. — Dan
You can characterize them as neural pathways if like, but a reinforced neural pathway does not prevent a person from choosing to think differently. — Dan
People are able to act against their habits and, in some cases, they are morally required to do so. Knowing the right thing to do and not doing it does not show that you were unable to do it. — Dan
No, I am not saying that being "under the influence of habit" affects whether a choice belongs to a person at all. I am saying that habits are not a relevant factor because they don't restrict freedom. I am also saying, seperately, that the only freedom that is morally relevant is the kind over those things which belong to us. These are two seperate claims. — Dan
What I am claiming is that the measure of moral value is the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices. By "their own choices" I mean choices over those things that belong to them, their minds, bodies and property. — Dan
I mean, a choice being "difficult" in that sense is morally irrelevant. It's not a real restriction on the choice. — Dan
Again, laws restrict our freedom because they come with threats attached. If laws didn't carry the threat of punishment, they wouldn't restrict our freedom either. — Dan
That is like saying that nailing your hands to a wall doesn't restrict your freedom, since it is your hands that are preventing you from moving. The two thoughts are not morally similar, as one requires the person to choose while their freedom is at risk (due to the threat of punishment) while the other is just someone choosing not to do something. — Dan
In the case of the habit, the person's choice isn't being restricted at all. — Dan
The most significant restriction to one's freedom of choice is a failure to consider all the possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover
Proceeding with the choice firmly decided restricts one's freedom to choose otherwise. — Metaphysician Undercover
A restriction would mean you are unable to do the thing. In this case, you're just misguided. — AmadeusD
Any instance where a further option is suggested to you leaves you open to considering it. Your personal habits only prevent you from bringing options up within yourself - and even then, not really. Habits are flimsy, mentally speaking, versus the ability to take on new information. — AmadeusD
It's just you not thinking about an option that you had. — Dan
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