We ought to associate intentionality with the act itself, which is the means, rather than with the end. Intention is a cause, and what is caused is action. — Metaphysician Undercover
Intentionality is not just about what is aimed at, it is also about what is the reason for a certain type of action. — Pantagruel
But that is undemonstrable and is easily refuted by people who are born with eyes and yet are blind
For example, we can say that the Sun will be extinct in X years exactly, that is a Telos that we understand, and we can do all the tests we want and that will not prove that it will be extinct in X years
You can say that the telos of life is to reproduce and survive
Do we say that people who do not want to have children have no life? And people who commit suicide? Thousands of similar examples can be proposed
The point is that you cannot take as a necessity that which is a possibility.
Yes, that is what I am arguing. We ought to associate intentionality with the act itself, which is the means, rather than with the end
Intention is a cause, and what is caused is action.
we see that intention causes an act
I am using "intentional" to signify something which is cause by an act of intention
This creates the issue of what exactly does direct the conscious actions which are not consistent with the apprehended good
This is just an example of a thing not fulfilling its end properly; and NOT that it had no end. It is uncontroversially true that the body develops the eyes for seeing all else being equal. When the circumstances impede, then there can be an eye which is developed in an impoverished manner. — Bob Ross
the assumption that "seeing" is somehow magically contained in the development of the eye is actually conditioned by elements external to the eye (e.g. the light that the eye needs for vision, and this is evidently external to the eye, it cannot be said that light belongs to the teleological identity of the eye); but mainly it is never demonstrated a priori, only a posteriori — JuanZu
“… the origin of the emergence of a thing and its ultimate usefulness, its practical application and incorporation into a system of ends, are toto coelo separate; that anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior to it; that everything that occurs in the organic world consists of overpowering, dominating, and in their turn, overpowering and dominating consist of re-interpretation, adjustment, in the process of which their former ‘meaning' and ‘purpose' must necessarily be obscured or completely obliterated.
No matter how perfectly you have understood the usefulness of any physiological organ (or legal institution, social custom, political usage, art form or religious rite), you have not yet thereby grasped how it emerged: uncomfortable and unpleasant as this may sound to more elderly ears,– for people down the ages have believed that the obvious purpose of a thing, its utility, form and shape, are its reason for existence, the eye is made to see, the hand to grasp…the whole history of a ‘thing', an organ, a tradition can to this extent be a continuous chain of signs, continually revealing new interpretations and adaptations, the causes of which need not be connected even amongst themselves, but rather sometimes just follow and replace one another at random.”
Your view of intentionality strips out the essence of intention and swaps it for causality; which of no use when we analyze the intentions of someone. — Bob Ross
The intention is wrapped up, inextricably, with the action; and what is caused is an effect. — Bob Ross
What is intentional is what is related to the intention; and the intention is the end which is being aimed at. — Bob Ross
You can’t implicate someone as intentionally doing something they entirely did not foresee happening just because it resulted from an act of intention towards something else. — Bob Ross
I don’t understand what you mean by a “conscious act” which is not intentional (in the traditional sense of intentionality); and this seems to be the crux of your argument. If I consciously decide to do X, then I intentionally did X—even if X is the end I am trying to actualize. — Bob Ross
There doesn't have to be a standard for there to be a spectrum. — Pantagruel
I personally know lots of people that live their lives recklessly and whose "intentions" routinely cause all kinds of havoc and produce all kinds of "unintended consequences". — Pantagruel
I think Aristotle's mean is very important. People think happiness is about chasing pleasures and avoiding pains, but they also fail to observe the mean in explicitly moral thinking. For example, I was recently having a discussion with Joshs over his idea that all blame/culpability should be eradicated from society (link). This is a common contemporary trope, "Blame/culpability is bad, therefore we should go to the extreme of getting rid of it altogether" (Joshs takes the culturally popular route of saying that everyone is always doing their very best, and therefore it is illogical to blame anyone for anything).
For Aristotle it is never that simple. We can't just run to the extreme and call it a day. Things like blame and anger will involve a mean, and because of this there will be appropriate and inappropriate forms of blame and anger. The key is learning to blame and become angry when we ought to blame and become angry, and learning not to blame and become angry when we ought not blame and become angry. — Leontiskos
Another side of accidents that touches upon consequences well beyond our view is reflected in Aristotle saying there could be no science of them. That is oddly echoed in Chaos theory and the delicate efficacy of the butterfly effect. The big garden is not being tended. — Paine
This is emotional reasoning. — Leontiskos
To attribute the cause to some philosophical jargon that no one cares about except philosophy hobbyists seems far fetched. — Mikie
Then you are not talking about intentionality as it is commonly and predominantly understood. So we are talking past each other. I am only interested in intentionality as it is largely understood. Your view of intentionality strips out the essence of intention and swaps it for causality; which of no use when we analyze the intentions of someone. — Bob Ross
I understand and try to practice a version of reducing harm by changing what is in my power while knowing that it is hopefully a kind of subtraction of bad from consequences I will never learn about. That is how I hear Hillel saying: "do not do unto others what you would not have done to you." The criteria are immediately available. — Paine
As a parting shot, chaos theory is trying to bring into a Logos what Aristotle had written off. There is something about emergence which is more "universal" than our previous models imagined. — Paine
And there's nothing wrong with that, although it does deviate from the previous topic of the butterfly effect, chaos theory, and the "tending of the big garden." You said that the big garden is not being tended. Should it be? — Leontiskos
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.