So was it irrational to write the check for $975 rather than for $1000? — Leontiskos

No. I was told to only pay $975 by my landlord, so that's what I did.

And though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind... — David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, § xii, 128

Aka: everybody is a realist when they walk out of the door.

No. I was told to only pay $975 by my landlord, so that's what I did. — Michael

Right, but how would it be rational to depend on his promise if obligations don't exist? If it is rational to write the check for $975, then it must be plausible that reminding him of his promise will produce an effect.

Aka: everybody is a realist when they walk out of the door. — Lionino

Relevant:

Here is a kind of puzzle or paradox that several philosophers have stressed. On the one hand, existence questions seem hard. The philosophical question of whether there are abstract entities does not seem to admit of an easy or trivial answer. At the same time, there seem to be trivial arguments settling questions like this in the affirmative. Consider for instance the arguments, “2+2=4. So there is a number which, when added to 2, yields 4. This something is a number. So there are numbers”, and “Fido is a dog. So Fido has the property of being a dog. So there are properties.” How should one resolve this paradox? One response is: adopt fictionalism. The idea would be that in the philosophy room we do not speak fictionally, but ordinarily we do. So in the philosophy room, the question of the existence of abstract entities is hard; outside it, the question is easy. When, ordinarily, a speaker utters a sentence that semantically expresses a proposition that entails that there are numbers, what she says is accurate so long as according to the relevant fiction, there are numbers. But when she utters the same sentence in the philosophy room, she speaks literally and then what she asserts is something highly non-trivial

Right, but how would it be rational to depend on his promise if obligations don't exist? — Leontiskos

He told me to only pay him $975. So I believed that he is only expecting me to pay him $975. So I only pay him $975.

This isn't rocket science.

He told me to only pay him $975. So I believed that he is only expecting me to pay him $975. So I only pay him $975. — Michael

That's right, and so I ask again: would it be rational for you to invoke his promise when he tells you that you underpaid?

That's right, and so I ask again: would it be rational for you to invoke his promise when he tells you that you underpaid? — Leontiskos

If there's reason to believe that it will work then yes. Much like it would be rational for me to appeal to the Bible if he were a Christian. But the Bible is still bullshit.

If there's reason to believe that it will work then yes. Much like it would be rational for me to appeal to the Bible if he were a Christian. But the Bible is still bullshit. — Michael

If you think the obligation is bullshit then how can you tell me that it was rational to pay him $975?

I could raise a few objections about that, but I will not. Instead, I will quote myself about a specific kind of fictionalist:

b. Field's fictionalism is that mathematical statements are false, and mathematical statements are given with a fictional operator: "According to arithmetics, there are infinitely many prime numbers". Whereas without the operator, the statement would be false, as numbers don't exist (standard semantics). — Lionino

If you think the obligation is bullshit then how can you tell me that it was rational to pay him $975? — Leontiskos

Because he told me to, and it's rational to pay less if the person asking you for money asks for less.

These questions are getting tiresome. If this is your desperate last attempt then it's an utter failure.

Because he told me to, and it's rational to pay less if the person asking you for money asks for less. — Michael

Then suppose you invoke the promise and he says, "Oh sorry, I forgot about that. Never mind."

Is he being irrational in this? Is he deluded and engaged in bullshit?

You say that his word is good enough to write the check for $975, but it is not good enough for you to invoke when he says you underpaid. You are contradicting yourself. You wrote the subsidized check on the basis of a promise - a real promise that involved obligations. Without those obligations it would make no sense to write the subsidized check, and given the promise it makes no sense not to invoke it when he says you underpaid.

The point here is not that the landlord must, of absolute necessity, honor his promise. That is a strawman form of obligation. The point is that it is rational for him to do so, and therefore it is rational for you to invoke the promise when he says you underpaid, and therefore it is rational for you to write the check for $975 in the first place.

This sort of thing happens all the time in real life. Compare this to a different person who writes a check for $975 for no reason. Do they have recourse? Of course not. They are in an entirely different situation. The only difference between the two cases is an obligation.

...but are refusing to make sense of them... — Michael

An obligation is simply something you ought to do. Your inability to make sense of obligation is not our problem. Eventually this reduces to a personal psychological issue.

But I wonder how widespread this inability is, and what place it plays in odd political ideals.

Edit: I was unable to make anything of this:

So the proper comparison would be:

1. You were given an order
2. Do this

I have no problem with (1). Is this all "you ought do this" means? — Michael

Aka: everybody is a realist when they walk out of the door. — Lionino

Yep. :up:

Much like it would be rational for me to appeal to the Bible if he were a Christian. But the Bible is still bullshit. — Michael

The Bible has a very high view of promising, a very high view of God's word (dabar):

So shall my word be that goes forth from my mouth;
it shall not return to me empty,
but it shall accomplish that which I purpose,
and prosper in the thing for which I sent it. — Isaiah 55:11 RSV

God's word is associated with his power. Why? Because the one who has power over his word is the one who has power over the future. It is the one who can make and fulfill promises who has power over the future. The one who is not able to make and fulfill promises has no power over himself or his surroundings, and he a fortiori has no power of the future. He is a shitty man:

Why is it bad to go back on promises, not only for others but also for oneself? It is bad because it is to be a shitty man, in the same way that to continually try to do something and fail at it is to be a shitty man. "By promising he directs what he himself is to do for another," and someone who continually reneges or simply fails in his promises is a failure. He is unable to direct himself. He is unable to do what he promises—and yes, also intends—to do. To fail to understand why promises involve obligations is a bit like failing to understand why reaching out to turn on the light involves turning on the light. "If it turns on, it turns on. If not, not. It has nothing to do with my reaching out." :scream: — Leontiskos

Well, Kant said "ought implies can". If this is correct then one cannot be obligated to do what one cannot do. But one can promise to do what one believes one can do, even if in fact one cannot do it. Therefore, one can promise to do what one cannot do. Therefore, promises do not entail obligations

lol, this is torturous, from the appeal to authority taken out of context on down.

Again, if you think a young man saying "I don't intend to get married," and a monk vowing to never marry are functionally equivalent I don't know what to tell you.

- He confuses what is achievable with what is deemed to be achievable in the same way that he earlier confused what is wrong with what is deemed to be wrong in the conversation about penalty/punishment. This is standard Moorean confusion.

An obligation is simply something you ought to do. — Banno

The "something you ought to do" is what needs to be explained. I understand what I've been told to do and what I've been advised to do, but beyond that nothing.

Your inability to make sense of obligation is not our problem. — Banno

But your inability to explain or justify obligations is – especially when you don't even try. It's telling. It suggests that Anscombe was right.

Again, if you think a young man saying "I don't intend to get married," and a monk vowing to never marry are functionally equivalent I don't know what to tell you. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You could tell me what the difference is.

But I should point out that you are misrepresenting my position. Here are two propositions:

1. I intend to find your cat
2. I will find your cat

There is something of a difference between these two. The first just expresses my intentions whereas the second (also) predicts the future. But in both cases the propositions are sincere if I intend to find your cat. No further conditions are involved. And then the same principle with these two propositions:

2. I will find your cat
3. I promise to find your cat

Such statements are sincere if I intend to find your cat. No further conditions are involved. The second no more requires or entails an obligation (whatever such a thing is) than the first. Especially as, as previously mentioned, whether or not I will find your cat is beyond my control alone. I may in fact be incapable of finding your cat because it has already been killed and incinerated.

This all seems to reduce to the claim that some authority has told me to do something. I understand and accept that. What I cannot make sense of is the conclusion "therefore I ought do as I'm told". What does this conclusion add that hasn't already been covered by the fact that some authority has told me to do something?

You seem to think that there is the command and then also the obligation. I don't know what this second thing is, or how/why it follows from the command. — Michael

That this authority is recognized as legitimate. That you yourself has submitted to this procedure, or in any case, that by participating in the social fabric of society you accept the rules of the game. We all tacitly assume and subscribe to the principle that promises need to be kept and that therefore a: "but you promised!" is a reasonable reproach. One that can of course be countered, for instance by appealing to 'force majeure', but that in any case the claim itself is not illegitimate. That is different from the orders of a gang leader when he robs the bank and tells you to give him the money.

I think we're just going to disagree here. I said earlier that what exists is people saying and doing things. The rest is feelings and ad hoc explanations. I was hoping you'd agree that obligation comes down to personal sentiment because we could finally explore the way the private language argument blasts away the veracity of the stories we tell about obligation. But instead, you're saying the binding is out there for all to see. I'm not sure what you're talking about. — frank

Of course people say and do things, but what they say and do has consequences for the rights we bear, the debts we owe, and indeed the marriages we conclude. Because that is the case, because language is public, an obligation does not come down to personal sentiment. If that was the case we could change our obligations at whim and we cannot. The whole notion of an obligation is that it is not your personal sentiment but an outside force that imposes it on you. If it were different the notion would be meaningless and the notion is not meaningless. The binding is indeed there for 'all to see' at least for two people to see and maybe more. An obligation always has an outward component. Of course you could impose one on yourself, but that you could change at whim.

That this authority is recognized as legitimate. That you yourself has submitted to this procedure, or in any case, that by participating in the social fabric of society you accept the rules of the game. — Tobias

So I agree to do what I'm told. That's fine. But what does it mean to say that I ought do what I'm told?

We all tacitly assume and subscribe to the principle that promises need to be kept and that therefore a: "but you promised!" is a reasonable reproach. — Tobias

Do you just mean that it is pragmatic for us to do what we promise to do? That's fine. But what does it mean to say that we ought do what we promise to do?

And what special relevance is the verb "promise"? If instead of saying "I promise to do this" and "but you promised", what if we said "I will do this" and "but you said you would"? This certainly seems like the ordinary thing we do. Does this then entail that we enter into an obligation every time we assert our intention to do something, irrespective of whether or not it's a promise?

So I agree to do what I'm told. That's fine. But what does it mean to say that I ought do what I'm told? — Michael

Even if you agree or not you ought to do what you are told, because the authority that governs your conduct is legitimate. I might like to not fulfill the terms of my contract, but that is irrelevant, because I am bound by the terms of it. It is not mere whim, not by me, or my counter party. but my submission to a relevant institution.

Do you just mean that it is pragmatic for us to do what we promise to do? That's fine. But what does it mean to say that we ought do what we say we will do? — Michael

No, even when it is not pragmatic for you to do what you are told you ought to do it. If it was pragmatism, 'efficient breach of contract', would be a legal thing to do. It is not.

And what special relevance is the verb "promise"? If instead of saying "I promise to do this" and instead of saying "but you promised", what if we said "I will do this" and "but you said you would"? — Michael

It makes known your intention to oblige. I will do it given an indication of your conduct. I promise to do it expresses your wish to also be bound to do it (as you signal your acceptance of the institution of promising). Imagine the following perfectly believable conversation: "Will you help me move the house next month?" "sure I will!" "You will?" "yeah yeah, sure!" "You promise?" "Well, I can't promise it at this point because my father is ill and I might need go to the hospital at exactly that day, so I can't promise anything, but if there is a chance, I definitely will".

This certainly seems like the ordinary thing we do. Does this then also entail that we enter into an obligation every time we assert our intention to do something, irrespective of whether or not it's a promise? — Michael

Like I said, words are always context dependent. Sometimes an "I will" is construed as a promise. Certainly during a wedding ceremony. The "I do" actually has large scale legal consequences. In general though, no, that is the difference between expressing an intention and a promise.

... you ought to do what you are told ...

... I am bound by the terms of it ... — Tobias

What does "you ought" mean? What does "I am bound" mean?

Whenever someone uses such phrases, all I understand is "do this" (or at best "so-and-so says to do this"). I might even understand it with an additional "or else".

If they mean more than this then I need it explained. I keep asking for someone to make sense of these phrases and nobody ever does. They just reassert the claims "you ought do this" and "you are bound by this". You might as well just replace the terms "ought" and "bound" with "floogle".

If it was pragmatism, 'efficient breach of contract', would be a legal thing to do. It is not.

...

The "I do" actually has large scale legal consequences. — Tobias

What does the law have to do with obligation? Does "you ought do this" just mean "do this or you will be fined/imprisoned"? I have no problem with this latter claim.

You could tell me what the difference is.

In the first case changing one's mind simply reflects a change in opinion. "Oh, he finally found the right woman and decided marriage was for him." The change in opinion doesn't really reflect on the individual within the context of their culture.

In the second case, the monk changing his mind entails much else:
He has to leave his vocation and change his entire lifestyle.
He had to leave what is essentially his adopted family.
He is breaking a "sacred vow," and might be seen by many as "a bad monk."
If we consider Thomas Merton's considerable difficulties after falling in love with his nurse while in the hospital, we could also consider here that even questioning if one should break the vow can become a life defining personal struggle of immense emotional import, whereas young men claim they "don't intend to ever get married," all the time and regularly default on that claim without any concern for "what people will think of me."

The social customs and expectations at play in each situation are not the same. If the claim is that such social customs and expectations, the substance of "duty," aren't 'real,' that starts to seem to me a lot like begging the question (while also being implausible).

I've never suggested that there won't be undesirable consequences to not doing what one promised to do. In fact I've explicitly accepted such things.

Are you now saying that "you ought do this" just means "do this or you will face undesirable consequences"? Because I have no problem with this latter claim.

Are you now saying that "you ought do this" just means "do this or you will face undesirable consequences"? Because I have no problem with this latter claim.

No. Are people widely accepted to have a duty to give a mugger their money when they demand it? Nope. Might they face harm if they refuse to do what the mugger demands? Yes.

If obligations and duties are the same thing as "someone saying do this or else," who exactly is doing the saying? Who tells Orestes "avenge your father's murder or else?" What explicit threat does he face?

The fact that Orestes had this duty, that it was socially recognized in his culture, is a historical fact. His obligation emerges from his culture and his social role, not from any particular person saying "do this or else."

No. Are people widely accepted to have a duty to give a mugger their money when they demand it? Nope. Might they face harm if they refuse to do what the mugger demands? Yes.

If obligations and duties are the same thing as "someone saying do this or else," who exactly is doing the saying? Who tells Orestes "avenge your father's murder or else?" What explicit threat does he face?

The fact that Orestes had this duty, that it was socially recognized in his culture, is a historical fact. His obligation emerges from his culture and his social role, not from any particular person saying "do this or else." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Then why did you bring up undesirable consequences when I asked you to make sense of obligations?

I just want to know what "you ought" means. You keep asserting "you ought do this" and "you ought do that", and now you're asserting that "you ought" doesn't just mean "do this or else".

I need an actual explanation.

If obligations and duties are the same thing as "someone saying do this or else," who exactly is doing the saying? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Your parents, your teachers, your employer, your government, FIFA, FIDE, etc.

What does "you ought" mean? What does "I am bound" mean? — Michael

I keep telling you and you keep running around in circles. You are bound means that there is an outside authority to which you have submitted by following its procedures, that exert some sort of legitimate power over you that compels you to do x. This is different from the command to do x. A command is based on whim and therefore arbitrary whereas a promise or any speech act that incurs obligations is based on procedure. I can only explain distinctions by focusing on its differences. Of course you can ask me what compels means and what power means but than you are like the child that just goes nahnahnahnah when something is explained.

Whenever someone uses such phrases, all I understand is "do this" (or at best "so-and-so says to do this"). I might even understand it with an additional "or else". — Michael

Yes, that is commonly what you understand, and what many people at face value understand. Even Austin did. Yet the distinction between a command and legitimate authority needs to be made when one wants to make sense of law and obligation. Your everyday understanding of those terms is fine in general, but not when engaging in conceptual analysis.

If they mean more than this then I need it explained. I keep asking for someone to make sense of these phrases and nobody ever does. — Michael

I just did. You just do not accept the explanation and want something more. I cannot force you to accept anything, in other words, you are not obliged to ;) However, if you like to make sense of law and obligation it is wise to accept it.

What does the law have to do with obligation? Does "you ought do this" just mean "do this or you will be fined/imprisoned"? I have no problem with this latter claim. — Michael

No it does not. That would be spanning the horse behind the carriage. You will be imprisoned because you violating a certain obligation (not all) which is laid down in law, under which you are bound by participating in society and in a democratic society at least, is legitimized by democratic procedures, hence is not arbitrary. The imprisonment is also not arbitrary and based on some whim but again on legitimate authority and proper procedure.

Who exactly makes these statements? Presumably they can also release people from them if the obligation "just is" the statement "you should do this?"

So who can go up to a lifeguard and say, "see that drowning kid? You don't have to save them," such that no one will hold them responsible for not saving the child? Who exactly can go up to the monk and say "that sacred vow? Forget about it," such that no one will see them as having reneged on their vow?

One key difference here is that obligations and duties are emergent, bigger than the imperatives of any one person.

But to make it simple, are you actually claiming that "Orestes had an obligation to avenge his father's death because that was a norm in ancient Greek culture," is a false statement? If it isn't false (it isn't) then who exactly told him "do this or else?"

The difference should be obvious here. Obligations can't be reduced to imperative statements.

Then why did you bring up undesirable consequences when I asked you to make sense of obligations?

Because you claimed "I intend to..." and "I vow to..." are functionally the same statement. The examples I gave show they are not functionally the same, people take them to mean different things and act on them differently. This is a real difference in the world. Saying "people should see them as the same because I can't understand duties," doesn't obviate this is an obvious factual difference.

You are bound means that there is an outside authority to which you have submitted by following its procedures — Tobias

Which just means that I agree to do what some outside authority says.

that exert some sort of legitimate power over you that compels you to do x — Tobias

I don't understand what this means. Is this a physical compulsion? A psychological compulsion?

I keep telling you and you keep running around in circles. — Tobias

Because you engage in the circular claim "you ought do what this authority tells you to do". I want to know what the "you ought" part of this sentence means. A reference back to this authority is no explanation at all.

All I understand by the phrase "you ought do what this authority tells you to do" is "do what this authority tells you to do".

You will be imprisoned because you violating a certain obligation (not all) which is laid down in law, under which you are bound by participating in society and in a democratic society at least, is legitimized by democratic procedures, hence is not arbitrary. — Tobias

I addressed this here. All this talk of "violating obligations" and "being bound" is vacuous and superfluous. It is just the case that the law says "anyone who is found guilty of murder is to be imprisoned". We then choose to murder or not with this knowledge in mind, and will inevitably face whatever consequences follow if we choose to murder. There's nothing more to it.

So who can go up to a lifeguard and say, "see that drowning kid? You don't have to save them," such that no one will hold them responsible for not saving the child? — Count Timothy von Icarus

You're bringing up consequences again. Why do you keep doing this when you say that consequences have nothing to do with the meaning of "you ought"?

But to make it simple, are you actually claiming that "Orestes had an obligation to avenge his father's death because that was a norm in ancient Greek culture," is a false statement? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I am saying that I don't know what "Orestes had an obligation" means. I am asking you what it means and you appear to be doing everything in your power to avoid answering.

I could perhaps interpret it as "the Greeks demand that people avenge their father's murder, and Orestes' father was murdered", which is true. Beyond that I don't know what else it is saying.

You're bringing up consequences again. Why do you keep doing this when you say that consequences have nothing to do with the meaning of "you ought"?

I didn't say that. Consequences and obligations are related.

Anyhow, you didn't answer the questions above. If duties are just imperative statements, who is making these statements? Isn't it a little odd that presumed duties cannot be "released" by any single individual in most cases (e.g. the lifeguard example)? What sort of imperative statement is made by no one in particular?