Taxes are seen as an obligation of good citizens. Since citizens benefit from their state they are obliged to help support it. A person who refuses to pay taxes is failing to uphold a normative good in their community. They are a "bad citizen."

By contrast, consider if a random person walks up to you and demands money. In this case there is no norm. No one will say a person has "failed to be a good citizen," or failed at fulfilling any other sort of social role/norm if they refuse to acquiesce to a random imperative statement that is not grounded in normative measure, regardless of the threats or rewards they offer up to motivate agreement.

We might argue if such norms are truly just, if they are appropriate, etc., but that doesn't change the fact that they demonstrably exist and play a widespread role in human behavior and how people think about their actions.

This is all just meaningless word games... — Michael

I'm glad we're on the same page! (And I'm also glad you threw in the towel on your attempt to remove fault from punishment.)

Here is some of the crazy stuff you have been peddling:

• Obligations are commands
• To intend something is to promise
• To intend something while especially believing it is to promise
• To penalize or punish is to take something of value
• To penalize or punish is to take something of value as a response to an action

The thread is filled obvious refutations of all of these bizarre ideas.

I can only take the unwillingness of anyone to actually make sense of obligations as evidence that Anscombe was right. — Michael

I can only take the above to mean 1) you are deeply unintelligent, or 2) you are not trying to understand obligations, or promises, or penalties, etc. You don't strike me as unintelligent, so I conclude that you must not be trying to understand these things.

So then what is going on here? Presumably you are playing a kind of game where you throw away the dictionary, common use, and social practice; you redefine a whole swath of terms in accordance with your anti-obligation dogma; and then you see if you can give short, noncommittal answers to all of the objections that get directed against your project. I can't believe that you are actually trying to understand promises, because you accounts of promises have frankly been silly. What you are trying to do is defend a thesis at all costs.

Any attempts so far to show otherwise have amounted to nothing more than the bare assertion that "obligations exist". — Michael

As I have pointed out many times in the past, the answer is simple: obligation is simple, it is not complex. It is not reducible to other kinds of realities. All your arguments ever amount to is something like, "Show me how to derive obligation from my quasi-materialistic premises. You can't. I win." An obligation is not a product of quasi-materialistic premises. You may as well say, "I hold that everything is made of wood, and I deny that metal exists. If you cannot show me how wood is transmuted into metal I will not accept the existence of metal." The answer you usually get is, "Metal is not made of wood, but it does exist. Look around."

The thread is filled obvious refutations of all of these bizarre ideas. — Leontiskos

No it isn't. There is just the bare assertion that if I sincerely use the phrase "I promise to find your cat" then I am obligated to find your cat, without any explanation of what "I am obligated" means. And when I ask what "I am obligated" means I am not given an explanation but am instead given different examples of things that I am said to be obligated to do.

And it's all nonsense.

There's just me using a certain verb, intending to find your cat, possibly looking for your cat, possibly finding your cat, and possibly being told off if I don't. This simple, straightforward, parsimonious description of what actually happens (or doesn't happen) provides an exhaustive account of the reality of the situation, without the need for nebulous, abstract entities.

No there isn't. — Michael

Focusing only on the last few pages, and ignoring the 'penalty' conversation which you seem to have in large part already conceded:

Well, no. She also committed to marrying you. She did not just intend to do so... — Banno

Your girlfriend may well have intended to marry you, and this may have been so were it expressed or not. But she went further, making a promise, and thereby she also committed to marrying you... — Banno

To promise and to intend are two different things. We intend to do things in the future all the time, but it does not follow from this that we are making promises. — Leontiskos

"I intend to marry that woman over there." "Do you believe it will happen?" "Yes, I believe it with all my heart."

On your account he has just promised to marry the woman, which is obviously false. It is false because it has no relation to another (i.e. it does not regard something that he is to do for another). It is also false because he has not bound himself. — Leontiskos

"Honey, do you think we will ever get married?" "I fully intend to eventually." "So that's to say that you're not ready to propose?"

A man can tell a woman that he intends to marry her, and he can affirm his belief in this future act to the maximal degree, and yet not propose (promise) to marry her.* On your view this would not be possible.

* Technically a proposal is a mutual promise. — Leontiskos

And they all just baselessly assert "promises are more than just intentions". There's no justification for this assertion, or an explanation of what else there is.

You say "it is also false because he has not bound himself". But what does "bound himself" even mean? It's just more vacuous phrases.

So there is no difference between a man saying "I don't ever intend to marry," and a monk vowing to never marry? Seems pretty far fetched to me.

Can I be obligated to do something that I am incapable of doing?

I feel like the right word for things like laws, recessions, culture, etc. would be "incorporeal" as in "lacking a specific body." — Count Timothy von Icarus

So you'd be ok saying they don't exist in corporeal form, wouldn't you? In a context where you detect that "exist" is being used to talk about corporeal entities, would you agree that they don't exist?

Likewise laws continue to exist regardless of whether anyone is thinking of them at any particular moment. It would seem weird to say they flit in and out of existence as they enter someone's mental awareness. "Japanese culture," would be the same way. It exists in mental awareness, in synapses, in artifacts of all sorts, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Incorporeal entities might be described as eternal, in that they don't age. We imagine that the law written in 1860 is the same law we have today. It hasn't changed at all. Nothing that exists in time is changeless in that way. One term that mathematicians use for this sort of entity is "abstract.". If it's incorporeal, but I can be wrong about it's properties, it's an abstract object. Are you cool with that language?

In a context where you detect that "exist" is being used to talk about corporeal entities, would you agree that they don't exist? — frank

In such a strict context of corporeal entities, interpersonal relationships - such as friendships - do not exist either: a relationship cannot be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, etc. and its attributes cannot be mathematically measured, and so is not corporeal. But for most of us at least, though we know them to exist, interpersonal relationships are never "changeless and eternal abstract objects".

Promises entail a commitment to do all that is within one’s means to do to bring about the future reality of that promised so that it in fact becomes manifest. So that one makes a commitment to steadfastly intend that which one promises. Intentions in general, though, can very well change on a whim, if not also via deliberative reasoning, this without any commitment to in fact fulfilling that which is momentarily intended—such that here one merely involves oneself in a possible future outcome without in any way committing to it.

Why am I mentioning this? Only because I feel obliged to some hereabouts (no, not to you @Michaell) to share a good humored joke:

Q: What is the difference between the chicken and the pig in a breakfast of eggs and ham?
A: The chicken was merely involved; the pig was committed.

Hence, in its own equivocal way, clearly evidencing there being quite the substantial difference between mere involvement with possible future realities (i.e., mere intentions at large) and commitment to them (i.e., promises).

I think this argument sort’a works. Gives me reason to smile at least.

That said, I’ll be taking my leave.

And they all just baselessly assert "promises are more than just intentions". There's no justification for this assertion... — Michael

Oh really? So when I tell my friend, "I intend to marry that woman over there," who holds my promise? Who is the promisee? You haven't even figured out that a promise involves a relation between two people and an intention does not. You seem to be clueless as to what a promise is.

I am not sure what the relevance of the question is. The answer would seem to be "yes," in some cases. The Spartans with King Leonidas had a duty to try to protect him against the Persian army, but clearly they were going to be incapable of doing it in the long run.



Maybe I shouldn't have used "incorporeal," due to its past associations. I really just wanted to get at how these things exist in a way that is substrate independent and without any definite/discrete "body." A recession has existence within time, it begins and ends. I think cultures, along with their laws, do as well. "Minoan culture," doesn't exist anymore, although we can certainly point to it (same with material artefacts that no longer exist, e.g. the Twin Towers).

I would say a recession exists in the same way songs do, or War and Peace, the Star Spangled Banner, punk rock, etc. I don't know if there is any equivocity at play in saying these things exist in the same way tables and rocks exist.

I wouldn't say recessions or laws are either eternal or "abstract objects."

I am not sure what the relevance of the question is. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, Kant said "ought implies can". If this is correct then one cannot be obligated to do what one cannot do. But one can promise to do what one believes one can do, even if in fact one cannot do it. Therefore, one can promise to do what one cannot do. Therefore, promises do not entail obligations.

You seem to be clueless as to what a promise is. — Leontiskos

People use the phrase "I promise to do so-and-so". That's all a promise is; the use of those words with honest intentions.

People use the phrase "I promise to do so-and-so". That's all a promise is; the use of those words with honest intentions. — Michael

Honest intentions to do what!? This completely begs the question.

Do you admit that promises have an enormous impact on day to day life?

Honest intentions to do what!? — Leontiskos

To do what was promised. In using the phrase "I promise to find your cat" with the honest intention to find your cat I have promised to find your cat. That's all there is to the matter. All this further talk of "obligation" and "being bound" is vacuous.

I tell my landlord that I replaced the furnace filters. He tells me, "Thanks, go ahead and deduct that from your rent." At the beginning of the next month I pay $975 rather than $1000 for my rent. My landlord informs me that I have underpaid, as the rent is $1000. Do I have recourse? Why?

Do I have recourse? — Leontiskos

Speak to a lawyer.

Speak to a lawyer. — Michael

Whenever your position falls apart you bury your head in the sand.

Whenever your position falls apart you bury your head in the sand. — Leontiskos

My position hasn't fallen apart and I'm not burying my head in the sand.

I don't understand what kind of answer you want to a question like that.

I don't understand what kind of answer you want to a question like that. — Michael

I am wondering if I have recourse. What would you do in that situation? Would you invoke the promise he made? Why?

I am wondering if I have recourse. What would you do in that situation? — Leontiskos

I just told you; I'd speak to a lawyer.

Would you invoke the promise he made? Why? — Leontiskos

Perhaps, and to convince him not to ask me for more money? I don't know why you think asking for the pragmatic course of action has any relevance to the philosophical dispute regarding the existence of abstract entities like obligations.

Perhaps, and to convince him not to ask me for more money? — Michael

So you would invoke his promise in order to convince him that he should not require an additional $25?

1. You ought do this
2. Do this
The first appears to be a truth-apt proposition, whereas the second isn’t. But beyond this appearance I cannot make sense of a meaningful difference between them. The use of the term “ought” seems to do nothing more than make a command seem like a truth-apt proposition. — Michael

You conclude that there are no such thing as obligations.

Compare:

1. You were asked to give an answer to what we get when we add six and five.
2. What is six and five?

The first appears to be a truth-apt proposition, whereas the second isn’t. Beyond this appearance is there a meaningful difference between them? Will you say that the use of the term "asked" seems to do nothing more then make a question seem like a truth-apt proposition?

Do you also conclude that there are no such things as answers?

I think not. Answers are brought about by asking questions, just as obligations are bought about by (amongst other things) commands and promises.

Or this:

1. She greeted you
2. "Hello"

The use of the term "greeted" seems to do nothing more than make "Hello" seem like a truth-apt proposition?

Will you conclude that there is no such thing as a greeting?

We bring answers and greetings into existence; they are things we do with words, and a part of our social life. As are obligations.

Anscombe argued against the moral "ought" found in ethics, but was very clear that there was a place for "non -emphatic ought" apart from a moral sense:

I will end by describing the advantages of using the word "ought" in a non-emphatic fashion, and not in a special "moral" sense; of discarding the term "wrong" in a "moral" sense, and using such notions as 'unjust'. — MMP, p.13

There follows a passionate defence of the justice. Your girlfriend did you an injustice when she reneged on the promise she made. It was an injustice because she undertook an obligation to you, which she did not fulfil. One ought fulfil one's obligations, since that is what an obligation is.

To my eye, this and my last post answer your objection.

Heading back a few days and a few pages, this was all in answer to your attempted defence of

There is nothing that exists beyond the act. — AmadeusD

I will maintain that questions, greetings and obligations are examples of things that exist "beyond the act", along with property, currency, marriage, incorporation, institutionalisation, legality... and a few other things.

So you would invoke his promise in order to convince him that he should not require an additional $25? — Leontiskos

Yes, if I thought it would work. And if he's religious I might appeal to Christian charity, even though I'm an atheist.

Yes, if I thought it would work. — Michael

And why is it plausible that it might work? Why would this move plausibly convince him to do as you wish?

Maybe I shouldn't have used "incorporeal," due to its past associations. I really just wanted to get at how these things exist in a way that is substrate independent and without any definite/discrete "body." A recession has existence within time, it begins and ends. I think cultures, along with their laws, do as well. "Minoan culture," doesn't exist anymore, although we can certainly point to it (same with material artefacts that no longer exist, e.g. the Twin Towers). — Count Timothy von Icarus

It sounds like you're most comfortable leaving the parameters of the issue fuzzy. You don't want reduction, you don't want obligation to reduce to personal feelings, which are mental objects, and you don't want it to be described by the established jargon of abstract object.

It's possible that your cup of tea would be the ordinary language philosophical approach. That way you don't really need to talk about anything metaphysical. The cost of that approach is mass confusion, though. Always the best ingredient of an interesting discussion, huh? :grin:

You conclude that there are no such thing as obligations. — Banno

No, I conclude that obligations are commands fictitiously treated as if they were truth-apt propositions.

You and others are claiming that obligations are more than this, but are refusing to make sense of them or justify their inclusion despite repeated requests.

Compare:
1. You were asked to give an answer to what we get when we add six and five.
2. What is six and five?

...

Or this:
1. She greeted you
2. "Hello" — Banno

So the proper comparison would be:

1. You were given an order
2. Do this

I have no problem with (1). Is this all "you ought do this" means?

And why is it plausible that it might work? Why would this move plausibly convince him to do as you wish? — Leontiskos

Because, like you, he might believe in obligations.

I don't know why you are appealing to human psychology and the pragmatics of interpersonal relations. None of this proves your assertion that there is more to a promise than just the use of the phrase "I promise to do so-and-so" with the honest intention to do so-and-so. And none of this is you making sense of obligations.

It's all just red herrings.

Because, like you, he might believe in obligations. — Michael

So was it irrational to write the check for $975 rather than for $1000? Are you claiming that you would never have written the check for $975?