This word 'ought', having become a word of mere mesmeric force, could not, in the character of having that force, be inferred from anything whatever. It may be objected that it could be inferred from other "moral ought" sentences: but that cannot be true. The appearance that this is so is produced by the fact that we say "All men are φ" and "Socrates is a man" implies "Socrates is φ." But here "φ" is a dummy predicate. We mean that if you substitute a real predicate for "φ" the implication is valid. A real predicate is required; not just a word containing no intelligible thought: a word retaining the suggestion of force, and apt to have a strong psychological effect, but which no longer signifies a real concept.
Yes, but the naturalistic frame begs some sort of explanation for obligations, not claiming they "don't exist," which is clearly not the case. — Count Timothy von Icarus
It wouldn't make sense to say "Babe Ruth was good as baseball," has no truth value. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Nor would it make sense to say "in chess the bishop can change what color square it is on," simply because it is physically possible for a player to violate the rules of chess and switch their bishop onto a new color with an illegal move. — Count Timothy von Icarus
As for the "if... then" phrasing, this is just confusing things. In natural language if/then stands in for all sorts of entailment and implication, e.g. material, casual, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus
an imaginary problem — Leontiskos
Serious answer would probably be that analytics cut themselves off from most pre-analytic philosophy, did everything "in-house" which entailed a lot of reinventing of the wheel in ways that look horribly philistine and only appeal to a very specific niche of people who like goofy decontextualized thought experiments, [...]
Why is it clearly not the case?
Even if they are reducible to something else, they certainly exist, and I think you'd be hard pressed to make a compelling argument that they reduce to "individual preferences," as some sort of unanalyzable primitive either. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Because obligations are everywhere in human culture and they dictate a great deal of behavior. They show up everywhere, in economics, in law, in finance, in ethics, in dramas. — Count Timothy von Icarus
And though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind... — David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, § xii, 128
I can't tell what you mean by obligations being "incoherent." I presume that when your mechanic finishes working on your car and hands you receipt stating that you are obligated to pay him some amount you don't stand in front of him dumbfounded, unsure of what is being said to you, nor that your annual tax bill provokes complete puzzlement. — Count Timothy von Icarus
And obligations are clearly not the same thing as all imperative statements. "Watch out, those stairs are icy," is an imperative statement with no obligation. — Count Timothy von Icarus
The terms of a loan, by contrast, will speak about obligations.
So I assume you mean something like: "there is no reason why people should honor obligations outside of individual preferences," or something to that effect. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But for the person committed to reductive materialism it seems that "personal preference," cannot be were explanation stops. Why is personal preference what it is? Well here we are going to need to call in biology, psychology, economics, sociology, history, etc. People don't have the preferences they have for no reason at all. — Count Timothy von Icarus
The driving assumption behind reductive explanations seems to generally be smallism, the idea that any facts about large scale things must be reducible to facts about smaller parts — Count Timothy von Icarus
For one thing, laws themselves end up affecting history, sociology, psychology, etc. The influence is bidirectional. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I'm still waiting on a reply to this. — Michael
In this context what is the difference between these two propositions?
1. He is more likely to fulfil his obligations
2. He is more likely to complete the contract
If they're the same then I have no objections, except to point out that the introduction of the term “obligation” is unnecessary, and evidently susceptible to misunderstanding.
If they're different then I need (1) explained, and to know why (2) is not a sufficient account. — Michael
The use of "I promise" over "I intend" is just to emphasise the strength of one's belief that it will happen. — Michael
When our father says, "Yes, I intend for us to go on vacation next summer, and more than that, I promise you that we will go on vacation come hell or high water!," does the latter part of that sentence change nothing at all? As I have said in many ways, the sort of directing involved in promising extends over the temporal duration of the promise. We can "hold him to it." If summer is near and there is no sign of travel arrangements, we have a right to apply a pressure to our father in a way that we would not if he had not promised. — Leontiskos
As a further example, consider something like "I'll try to do this, but I can't promise that I will". This isn't me saying that I intend to but am not obligated to; it is me saying that I am not certain that I will. — Michael
The use of "I promise" over "I intend" is just to emphasise the strength of one's belief that it will happen. — Michael
A contract establishes an obligation, and therefore someone who is more likely to fulfill his obligations is more likely to fulfill his contracts. — Leontiskos
A contract tells the party what he is to do, and therefore someone who does what the contract tells him to do is more likely to fulfil his contracts. — Michael
You are recasting the entire social sphere. Your "promises" and "contracts" are not real promises or contracts. Your "penalties" are not real penalties. Your "debts" ("owes") are not real debts — Leontiskos
Dictionaries should solve it, but they won't for Michael. Michael will sooner deny every form of future accountability rather than abandon his strange [dogmatic] position. He will deny promises, oaths, contracts, marriages - you name it. The more reductio that is applied, the muddier he is willing to get. — Leontiskos
As it stands, what they are hasn't been explained, what purpose they serve hasn't been explained, and what evidence there is for them hasn't been explained.
They just seem to be meaningless and superfluous. — Michael
Michael will sooner deny every form of future accountability rather than abandon his strange [dogmatic] position. — Leontiskos
I don't deny future accountability. I have repeatedly said that if I don't do as I'm told, whether it be by some authority figure or by the terms of a contract, then I will be penalised. — Michael
You are recasting the entire social sphere. Your "promises" and "contracts" are not real promises or contracts. Your "penalties" are not real penalties. Your "debts" ("owes") are not real debts. — Leontiskos
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, child abuse, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated as part of a pattern or practice of assault or torture against a child or children; or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree.
Any other murder is murder in the second degree.
Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life;
Whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
It is just the case that if you murder then you will be punished. — Michael
It is just the case that if you murder then you will be punished. — Michael
There is no need to imagine phantom abstract entities. — Michael
And by "punished" you presumably do not mean what every dictionary in the world says, because then we would be right back to the equivocation on "penalty." — Leontiskos
I mean that I will be put in prison or executed. — Michael
As I've said, taking away something you value is not punishment. If it was then the thief who stole your car has necessarily punished you. — Leontiskos
It's a punishment because it was done in response to something I did. — Michael
You're missing the word "wrong" at the very end of your sentence. — Leontiskos
Criminals have punished people who testified against them in court. Was it wrong of them to testify against the criminal in court? What does "wrong" even mean? — Michael
If you break a contract you should say, "They think they are punishing or penalizing me, but really they are just taking away something that I value." — Leontiskos
Criminals have punished people who testified against them in court. — Michael
Does it interest you to ask what kind of thing a law is? You don't feel it must be reducible, you don't believe they're mental objects. What are they?
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