Why can't you? — Leontiskos

Because a promise is sincere only if one intends to do as one promises.

Because a promise is sincere only if one intends to do as one promises. — Michael

Right, and is it not also true that if a promise is sincere then one will do what they promised (unless some unforeseen impediment intervenes)?

Right, and is it not also true that if a promise is sincere then one will do what they promised (unless some unforeseen impediment intervenes)? — Leontiskos

No, because I may choose not to, i.e. I changed my mind.

No, because I may choose not to. — Michael

So you responded, "No, because I may be prevented from doing so." But then you deleted that post and wrote a different one after thinking more carefully about my parenthetical remark. That's good.

Now a promise means not only that you intend to fulfill it at the moment it is made, but also that you intend to fulfill it up until the time it is fulfilled, barring the intervention of unforeseen impediments.

So suppose that yesterday you told a client that you would meet with him today at 2:30. But today comes around and you "choose not to." You choose not to, and instead go golfing. Your client waits for you at the coffee shop and eventually leaves, frustrated. On his way home he drives past the golf course and sees you teeing off on hole #3. What will he say to you? What will you say to him? Will it be sufficient to tell him that you "chose not to" meet with him?

I think promises are for societies where people lie all the time. If you make an oath, you're signaling that you're telling the truth for a change. Otherwise, there's no difference between giving a promise and just doing as Jesus advised, "let your yes mean yes:"

Mattew 5:33 “Again you have heard that it was said to those who lived long ago: Don’t make a false solemn pledge, but you should follow through on what you have pledged to the Lord.[d] 34 But I say to you that you must not pledge at all. You must not pledge by heaven, because it’s God’s throne. 35 You must not pledge by the earth, because it’s God’s footstool. You must not pledge by Jerusalem, because it’s the city of the great king. 36 And you must not pledge by your head, because you can’t turn one hair white or black. 37 Let your yes mean yes, and your no mean no. Anything more than this comes from the evil one."

What will he say to you? What will you say to him? Will it be sufficient to tell him that you "chose not to" meet with him? — Leontiskos

Sufficient for what? I don’t really understand the question or how it relates to my comments to Banno.

Sufficient for what? I don’t really understand the question or how it relates to my comments to Banno. — Michael

Sufficient to avoid the conclusion that your promise was insincere.

Sufficient to avoid the conclusion that your promise was insincere. — Leontiskos

My promise was sincere because I intended to fulfil it when I made it. I was being honest at the time. I just happened to change my mind after making it.

My promise was sincere because I intended to fulfil it when I made it. I was being honest at the time. I just happened to change my mind after the fact. — Michael

And that is the sort of thing you tell your professional clients?

And that is the sort of thing you tell your professional clients? — Leontiskos

No.

What relevance is this question?

Is this like "analysis of knowledge" in analytic philosophy where whole books are written about the meaning of a specific word because the dictionary definition is not specific enough for the taste of the philosophers in question?

@Michael, how odd.

So for you, someone who places themselves under an obligation is not, thereby, under an obligation.

Ok.

Michael, how odd. — Banno

The only oddity is why you continually misrepresent what I am saying.

I am saying that you haven't shown that anyone places themselves under an obligation when they promise something.

It certainly doesn't follow from Searle's account, even if his conditions (7) and (8) are correct. Intentions do not prima facie entail the intended.

I'll make this exceptionally simple for you @Banno, as it seems I must.

Prima facie these are two different propositions:

1. S intends that the utterance of T will place him under an obligation to do A
2. The utterance of T will place S under an obligation to do A

In Searle's list of necessary and sufficient conditions, he uses (1) – and (1) does not prima facie entail (2).

As a comparison, these are two different propositions:

3. S intends to do A
4. S will do A

In Searle's list of necessary and sufficient conditions, he uses (3) – and (3) does not entail (4).

To defend your position you must either show that (1) entails (2) (and justify Searle's claim that (1) is a necessary condition) or find some other way to justify (2) – as well as actually explain what obligations are.

Is this like "analysis of knowledge" in analytic philosophy where whole books are written about the meaning of a specific word because the dictionary definition is not specific enough for the taste of the philosophers in question? — Lionino

Something like that.

For example, I think that this is a sufficient account:

a) I promise to do something. If I do it then I did as I promised. If I don't do it then I didn't do as I promised.

Whereas others want to bring in talk of obligations and being held to a promise and of promises existing. It isn't clear what any of these things mean, or what they add to (a). To borrow from Anscombe, they seem like terms with "mere mesmeric force" and no real substance.

It's like when Margaret Thatcher said, "There's no such thing as Society." If you really don't understand what she was saying, that's your choice. Most of us understand it perfectly. — frank

The question is, was she right? Of course I understand what she was saying. I also understand what it does when saying that. It was a way to get rid of social policy. I think that is always. Metaphysics, the question what is really real, is idle speculation. What we need to know is, what does ascribing 'reality' or 'existence' to a certain something do? The question is not 'does a promise exist'.

Sure. Oaths, covenants, verbal contracts, and promises are ideas that come to us as parts of a religious heritage. — frank

That seems a sociological claim, and to me a rather dubious one. Aren't covenants, verbal contracts and promises not just very handy devices by way of which we structure our relations towards one another? We do not need God to make them handy.

I think promises are for societies where people lie all the time. If you make an oath, you're signaling that you're telling the truth for a change. Otherwise, there's no difference between giving a promise and just doing as Jesus advised, "let your yes mean yes:" — frank

Welcome to current society. Lying is actually pretty common, "Does my ass look fat in that dress, no of course not honey", or "I will be at your brothers party on Saturday" When push comes to shove it is raining... Promising is a way to make the other reflect on his/her yes or no, it lends emphasis and indeed brings forth obligations, in more or less strong degrees of enforceability. That is also why parents ask their children "do you promise to be good?" . They know what a promise is before they had any religious education.

For us, all the divine trappings have fallen away. There's nothing but people talking, people behaving in a certain way. — frank

I would leave the 'nothing but' out, but for the rest I agree with you. Though stating that institutions are products of social action is something else than stating that therefore they do not exist. Thatcher's quote is often used as an example of methodological individualism. That position is not unproblematic. The 'I' that does things is also shaped by the institutions in which it exists. I am myself much more partial to Anthony Giddens' structuration theory.

People don't usually talk about whether promises exist somehow, but if we had to make sense of that, we'd say the proposition involved in the promise exists as an abstract object. — frank

No, they do not and probably for good reason. The only reason I can think of why it might be meaningful to discuss the existence of a certain something it to know what it does when we ascribe or take away the quality of existence of that something. If we decide on God not existing, prayer makes little sense. For this reason the existence of God is hotly debated I guess. What one does when one denies existence is to decrease them in importance. That is also what denying the existence of promises does. What holds for promises actually holds for all other concepts. Truth is also never found 'floating around', kindness is not, 'principles of good governance' aren't and so on. Yet all these concepts do things in the world.

it's an element of intellectual life. So yes, they exist. In another sense, they don't. — frank

If that is the conclusion I would think it merits some investigation in what you consider meaningful for existence. What does it matter for the existence of something to be an aspect of intellectual life? My hunch is that it is 'dirt and dunamis' as you put it in an earlier post. What advantage does it have to hold on to a position that cannot make sense of the distinction between rules of evidence and existence?

Perhaps we are indeed running around in circles, but I would like to know what attracts you to such a physicalist position? Materialism is all back in favour, but I am trying to wrap my head around why one would go out of his or her way to absolutize this position and rather deny the existence of anything else or relegate it to 'existing in some sense'. But well, if you see nothing in it feel free to disregard.

Something like that. — Michael

That seems of no use to people who write/philosophise in other languages.

I'm sure people of other languages make the same arguments about the words in their language – some of which may be exactly translatable into English with no change in meaning, and some of which may not.

I'm sure people of other languages make the same arguments about the words in their language — Michael

Considering that analytic philosophy, as it is today rather than relating to Frege and the Vienna Circle, is a phenomenon particular of the English-speaking world, I wouldn't say so. I at least have not seen any book written in German about what 'wissen' mean or in Spanish about 'conocer'.

Considering that analytic philosophy, as it is today rather than relating to Frege and the Vienna Circle, is a phenomenon particular of the English-speaking world, I wouldn't say so. I at least have not seen any book written in German about what 'wissen' mean or in Spanish about 'conocer'. — Lionino

Well, Plato certainly asked that question in ancient Greek. It's where "justified true belief" comes from.

It's like when Margaret Thatcher said, "There's no such thing as Society." If you really don't understand what she was saying, that's your choice. Most of us understand it perfectly.
— frank

The question is, was she right? Of course I understand what she was saying. I also understand what it does when saying that. It was a way to get rid of social policy. I think that is always. Metaphysics, the question what is really real, is idle speculation. What we need to know is, what does ascribing 'reality' or 'existence' to a certain something do? The question is not 'does a promise exist'. — Tobias

I'm an ontological anti-realist. I don't believe the categories of physical, mental, and abstract should be cashed out as more than elements of a worldview. I take that a lot more seriously than most, but I'm still bound to pay attention to what my worldview says. It says mind-dependent items don't exist as any more than the shenanigans of the mind. Is that part of my worldview problematic? Sure. But my worldview grew organically out of the experiences of my kind. It's part of my foundation.

The 'I' that does things is also shaped by the institutions in which it exists. — Tobias

True. I'm conditioned by my environment, including the human world. Still, what exists is me and other individuals, not a phantom society. Don't jump to the conclusion that my take on Thatcher's comment is simple. My interest is in understanding the world. It's not a football game where I cheer for one side.

it's an element of intellectual life. So yes, they exist. In another sense, they don't.
— frank

If that is the conclusion I would think it merits some investigation in what you consider meaningful for existence. What does it matter for the existence of something to be an aspect of intellectual life? My hunch is that it is 'dirt and dunamis' as you put it in an earlier post. What advantage does it have to hold on to a position that cannot make sense of the distinction between rules of evidence and existence? — Tobias

My worldview says dirt and dynamos exist. A philosophical analysis will say we should probably deflate the concept of existence so that we don't run into problems denying the existence of things we can't do without. By and large, I think we're in agreement.

It is true you see something like JTB in Theaitetos, but I don't think what Plato and the (anti-)JTBers are doing are quite the same thing. The SEP says "It became something of a convenient fiction to suppose that this analysis was widely accepted throughout much of the history of philosophy. In fact, however, the JTB analysis was first articulated in the twentieth century by its attackers".

Perhaps for another thread.

That seems of no use to people who write/philosophise in other languages. — Lionino

I'd go farther and say it is of no use to anyone, period. :grin:

Dictionaries should solve it, but they won't for Michael. Michael will sooner deny every form of future accountability rather than abandon his strange position. He will deny promises, oaths, contracts, marriages - you name it. The more reductio that is applied, the muddier he is willing to get.

No.

What relevance is this question? — Michael

It is relevant because, like you so often do on these forums, you whip up an imaginary problem. You have no difficulty understanding the obligation that a promise creates in real life, but when you hop on the philosophy forum you magically forget what you know. It's no wonder that philosophy is so often associated with foolish pretense. "A promise means not only that you intend to fulfill it at the moment it is made, but also that you intend to fulfill it up until the time it is fulfilled, barring the intervention of unforeseen impediments" ().

Nowadays, if a philosopher finds he cannot answer the philosophical question ‘What is time?’ or ‘Is time real?’, he applies for a research grant to work on the problem during next year’s sabbatical. He does not suppose that the arrival of next year is actually in doubt. Alternatively, he may agree that any puzzlement about the nature of time, or any argument for doubting the reality of time, is in fact a puzzlement about, or an argument for doubting, the truth of the proposition that next year’s sabbatical will come, but contend that this is of course a strictly theoretical or philosophical worry, not a worry that needs to be reckoned with in the ordinary business of life. Either way he insulates his ordinary first-order judgements from the effects of his philosophising.

The practice of insulation, as I shall continue to call it, can be conceived in various ways. There are plenty of philosophers for whom Wittgenstein’s well-known remark (1953 §124), that philosophy ‘leaves everything as it is’, describes not the end-point but the starting-point of their philosophising. — Myles Burnyeat, The Sceptic in his Place and Time

Dictionaries should solve it — Leontiskos

I am of the same opinion. I don't think philosophy has any business dealing with analytic statements (red is a colour), that is up to lexicography in the prescriptive sphere and semantics in the descriptive — kidnapping-common-words-to-turn-them-into-jargon aside.

You seem to have missed the point. The utterance of T counts as placing S under an obligation to do A.

That is, promising counts as placing oneself under an obligation.

That is what making a promise consists in.

If you just happen to change your mind thereafter, that does not remove the obligation.

Your mention of Anscombe was interesting. Do you care to fill it out? I wouldn't have taken you as an advocate of divine command theory - are you going to claim we can only promise before god?

Anscombe talks of obligation as if it functions only under a law, citing medieval etymology. From what I understand the word derives from obligationem, "a binding". It's the "counts as" that is peculiar, binding and worthy of consideration.

Again, someone who places themselves under an obligation is, thereby, under an obligation.

@Michael is presumably saying that obligations don't exist, because you can't place yourself under an obligation, because there is nothing about the past that can oblige one to act in any particular way in the present. He wants to rewrite all future claims about one's own behavior in terms of strict conditional logic, and because conditional logic cannot represent the inner dynamics of things like promising and obligation, for Michael they must not exist at all.

So for Michael promises don't exist, and what he calls a "promise" is a promise shorn of all obligation.

From what I understand the word derives from obligationem — Banno

If the word derived from obligationem it would be obligationem. It derives from French obligacion (today 'obligation', English followed French in changing the spelling of the -cion suffix for -tion around the 16th century), and obligacion derived from obligationem.

From my experience, French people have little issues with their own words.

Ok.

...directly from Latin obligationem (nominative obligatio) "an engaging or pledging," literally "a binding" (but rarely used in this sense), noun of action from past-participle stem of obligare "to bind, bind up, bandage," figuratively "put under obligation" (see oblige). The notion is of binding with promises or by law or duty. — Etymology online

Is this not correct?

My access to the OED is not functioning at present. I don't see what it is you are saying is problematic.

Doch, the beginning is missing:

c. 1300, obligacioun, "a binding pledge, commitment to fulfill a promise or meet conditions of a bargain," from Old French obligacion "obligation, duty, responsibility" (early 13c.) and directly from Latin obligationem [...]

Which is what I say.