Correlationism is thus not the thesis that we must relate to something in order to know it, but rather that what we know of anything is true only for us. In this regard, correlationism is a form of scepticism for it asserts that whether or not things-in-themselves are this way is something we can never know because we can only ever know things as they appear to us, not as they are in themselves. For example, for the correlationist there is no answer to the question of whether carbon atoms exist apart from us and whether they decay at such and such a rate because we only ever know appearances. This is Meillassoux’s support for scientific realism. For the correlationist we are never able to get out of the correlation between thought and being to determine whether or not carbon itself has these properties or whether it is thought that bestows these properties, which is sometimes the view of scientific functionalism. Meillassoux calls this unsurpassable relation the correlationist circle.
To say that we know things only as they appear ‘to us’ is indeed to fall into scepticism and relativism. — Wayfarer
I don’t know if Meillassoux addresses that idea — Wayfarer
What then is an uninteresting phenomena? — jkop
However, scientific realism always pertains to the objective domain, that which can be made an object of analysis, measurement and observation. And the subject who performs that measurement is outside that scope. — Wayfarer
What is unseen in objective science? The first item that is unseen is my, your, own bodies – not the body as an object for anatomy, of course, but my body while it stands in front of any object whatsoever. If I am a scientist, I have a body. I go back and forth in the laboratory doing gestures, shaping chunks of matter, making instruments, in workshops essentially like this studio. But scientists dream of bypassing their bodies. When they build their theories, scientists act as if they were pure, point-like gazes from which they can enjoy the show put on by the world. This assumption extends to the scientists’ instruments as well, which are usually subtracted or forgotten in the ultimate outcome of their work. Science wants to understand ‘the world out there’; scientists no longer care about the instruments once they have used them to obtain whatever knowledge they’re after. — Michel Bitbol
But scientists dream of bypassing their bodies. When they build their theories, scientists act as if they were pure, point-like gazes from which they can enjoy the show put on by the world. — Michel Bitbol
Rocks also might be the wrong sort of thing to look at for a paradigmatic example of discrete objects. Rocks don't have much of a definite form. A rock broken in half becomes two rocks, generally speaking, and many rocks fused together become one rock, whereas "half a dog" is clearly a half. Rocks are largely bundles of causes external to them. They don't do much to determine themselves. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I believe uninteresting phenomena are those that lack primary qualities such as bulk, figure, texture, motion, and so on. — javi2541997
(Isn't something like that exactly the conundrum that was thrown up by the observer problem in quantum physics?) — Wayfarer
Aren't all scientific theories underdetermined? Does that mean science, in general, reflects our biases, our worldviews, our pet perspectives? — frank
A feeling, a country, and a state of mind. Clarky, I assume those exist by common convention, but I'm not sure how 'real' they are. Yes, the United States has a specified territory, but isn't this acknowledged as convention rather than reality? — javi2541997
What then is an uninteresting phenomena? — jkop
Any discrete object is discrete by virtue of standing out against a background. Think of this thesis:
The realm of the senses is all rabbit-duck and it's divided up into discrete-object-background complexes according to the organizing ability of your mind.
Is it possible to disprove this thesis?
. I'm personally pretty confident, for instance, that the measurement of the gravitational constant doesn't reflect our biases — mcdoodle
More controversially, it might be possible to extend this inherit relationality into an argument for an inherit "perspectiveness" to all physical interactions— relevant perspective (or something like it) without experience. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I don't understand this comment. If these things are prior to our purposes and conceptualisations, then how is this relationship 'for humans'?I meant in the sense that for humans, there existed objects - stuff, placeholders, particulars, whatevs you wanna call it - prior to our purposes and conceptualisations. — fdrake
I am kind of looking for specific examples. Chemical seems more concerned with 'bulk goods' rather than objects. Biology can work. It is a living thing, so it kind of has 'bounds', but I attacked those bounds in my OP. A tree can distinguish between the life form itself and the parts it sheds (leaves) every autumn, which thus arguably construe objects even while still on the tree.Regardless I think you're making a distinction between purposive/normative and physical, whereas there's other graduations - like you might think of chemical, biological, systemic, ecological, intentional etc strata as other strata of existence in which nonarbitrarily individuated objects may exist.
For purposes of this discussion, "All of whatever is indicated (e.g. 'this', 'that over there'), and not more than what is indicated". How said thing is indicated is not entirely defined, but pointing, touch, and semi-enveloping are good places to start. Yes, it depends on context, but the context is usually absent in the cases I care about. A phaser set to 'kill' (and not just disintegrate) implies a single biological context, and probably not meant as a way to dispose of a container of toxic waste, despite the wonderful utility of using it that way.and you may need to clarify what you would pre-theoretically count as an object.
This seems to presume a non-epistemological definition of 'real'. I'm all for that, but not all are (notably those holding that being is fundamentally tied to our experience), and I don't use a 'realist' definition of 'real' myself, but I state the definition it if I need to use it.The arche-fossil serves as the linch-pin for Meillassoux to assert that there is a reality independent of human perception and cognition. — Wayfarer
Sort of. What if something nonhuman has a meaningful concept of existence? How is that different from a human that isn't you having a meaningful concept of existence? Secondly, a meaningful concept of existence may be dependent on conceptions, but existence itself need not be.A counter-argument to that, is that any meaningful conception of existence just is a human conception.
Thank you for your contribution to the thread. I am enjoying the wider discussion this has inspired. No need to throw water on it yet.I think we are meandering away from the question in the OP. — L'éléphant
Best defined through the numerous examples in the OP, plus also the 'Midas' one that I thought of later. I'm sure there are more, but most examples are fictional since fiction can use a convention that the consumer of the fiction can presume, but that physics cannot.The question is:
Is there any physical basis for what constitutes a 'thing' or 'object'?
— noAxioms
Object, of course, here, is the "thing" that philosophical theories have been trying to explain.
Off topic, but agree, that would be a category error. A 'thing' is created in time, essentially assembled from pre-existing stuff into its thingness for a duration.Yes, there is a physical basis for what constitute a thing: it has to be finite, it is complete in our conception of it, and we have a coherent idea of what this thing is.
That is why we will never call the universe a thing.
Some do.We don't call consciousness or the mind a thing
I mentioned a tree in the Midas example a ways up, which illustrates the ambiguity of what exactly was indicated.We call the trees things.
But that's an answer isn't it? There's no one line, and yet a line is shown to be in the fiction, as more or less expected by the consumer of the fiction. The answer is, the fiction cannot ever be real unless we either missed something, or there's a way to convey the convention to the 'device'.The sci-fi examples or the Midas Touch I think are unanswerable. There is no one canonical dividing line for entities to refer to when dividing objects. — Count Timothy von Icarus
That's a pretty good example. We want it to ignore uninteresting stuff, but cannot always. We want it to convey discreet interesting 'objects' but it doesn't always. A fetal ultrasound is going to see some of Mom's guts, but the range and aim is designed to minimize this. The navy sonar picks up whales when it wants subs, and it maybe misses some of the subs. Heck, do they have sonar-resistant subs like they do for ships with minimal radar profies? Don't see how that is easily done without making them a lot less quiet moving through the water, which would defeat the purpose.Real world examples here might be instructive. If we want to delineate the boundaries of something for a machine using ultrasound, radar, etc., we might have it calibrated "just-so" as to have returns only come on the sort of thing we want to delineate.
Both bulk substances, not 'objects', but still another very relevant example.Another good example might be using a specific sort of solvent so that only the thing you wish to dissolve ends up being washed away. Draino, for instance, is going to interact with hair, soap scum, etc. in a way different from how it interacts with a metal pipe, and this difference essentially delineates between "pipe" and "clog."
Well, once the word 'tree' is used, the convention has been stated. We know what a tree is, and it may or may not cover the underground parts, but it is definitely separate from some other tree.Am I understanding you to be saying that you are unsure of whether trees are "things" or "objects?" — NotAristotle
That's why the phaser set to 'kill' is somewhat clearly defined. Life forms usually have reasonably clear boundaries, but we still have trouble shooting the spider off Kirk's chest. A phaser set to 'disintegrate' (same function) has far more trouble delimiting its job.whereas "half a dog" is clearly a half. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Not, relativism, no!!! Don't fall down into that wretched pit of scum and villainy (with me).To say that we know things only as they appear ‘to us’ is indeed to fall into scepticism and relativism. — Wayfarer
I was partly asking what all is part of a human, but I'm also asking what all is included in 'that ->' when pointing at a human, but I'm actually pointing to the bug.So tying this back to the OP noAxioms, it means that if we question the makeup of a human (does it include the clothes or bugs on the sleeve) — frank
This presumes that the physical device (which artificially made to serve a pragmatic purpose) will be able to glean the pragmatic intent when being used. Bottom line, don't use a big gun to shoot a bug off your buddy's chest.we'll find that however we approach the question, the conclusion will be an exercise in pragmatism.
So this got me thinking, and I could only conclude that what constitutes an 'object' is entirely a matter of language/convention. There's no physical basis for it. — noAxioms
I'm trying to get a classical device like the fictional phaser to apply its function to a classical object without using language to convey intent. — noAxioms
The biggest hurdle to this this task is fundamentally you are trying to find object in the absence of language, but you have to use language as an instrument to do it. — Fire Ologist
How to design the gun to do the right thing? — noAxioms
A lot of scientific effort goes into eliminating the possibility that something about the bodies, or environment, or unwanted product of equipment, of experimenters is influencing outcomes. — mcdoodle
I don't understand this comment. If these things are prior to our purposes and conceptualisations, then how is this relationship 'for humans'? — noAxioms
I was partly asking what all is part of a human, but I'm also asking what all is included in 'that ->' when pointing at a human, but I'm actually pointing to the bug. — noAxioms
Midas touches a twig. What turns to gold? The twig, branch, tree, forest? — noAxioms
Midas touches a twig. What turns to gold? The twig, branch, tree, forest? The word 'tree' was never conveyed. The intent might not even be there. The touch may have been unintended. — noAxioms
But the question abou the tree was illustrated in my Midas example when I first brough that up. Midas touches a twig. What turns to gold? The twig, branch, tree, forest? The word 'tree' was never conveyed. The intent might not even be there. The touch may have been unintended.
Answer of course is that it's fiction, so there's no requirement for there to be a correct answer. There never seems to be an answer, which seems to support my suggestion of the lack of physical basis for what constitutes all of the 'thing' indicated. — noAxioms
Midas touches a twig. What turns to gold? The twig, branch, tree, forest?
— noAxioms
That's an easy one; it would be the tree in its entirety that turns to gold. Not the branch nor the forest, for neither of these are standalone things like the tree is, unless the branch is broken off the tree. — NotAristotle
Dinosaurs are temporally prior to human existence - they happened before. Thus however they behaved is prior to human faculties of reason - we developed later. Thus there existed a time in which dinosaurs were not judged by human intellects. Thus there was a time dinosaurs weren't conditioned by the human understanding. But they still had properties and stuff. Like they had teeth and bowel movements. They had feet. — fdrake
Do you think that discovery, had it been made at the time, would have discredited Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’? — Wayfarer
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