what constitutes an 'object' is entirely a matter of language/convention. There's no physical basis for it. I can talk about the blue gutter and that, by convention, identifies an object distinct from the red gutter despite them both being parts of a greater (not separated) pipe. — noAxioms
Sure.It's more the latter though, right? — Count Timothy von Icarus
I agree. "RRBGGGRWW" gives a neat compression of the image.I think this is an area where information theory gives us a very good set of tools for understanding this sort of thing. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yep....even in the physical science the "differences that make a difference" are context dependent. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Then you've used language to invoke a convention. I can't do that with any of tools I mentioned. I cannot explain to my device what my intent is when using it.If I call a ball an object — Philosophim
I contest this.Some objects are socially constructed and exist only by conventions, other objects are physical and exist regardless of conventions. — jkop
All particles anywhere are parts, bound by fields of force and such. Earth's mass pulls on planets in the Andromeda galaxy Does that mean that Earth and some other planet are one object? Where does the influence end?Talk of a gutter is conventional, but what it refers to consists of physical parts bound by fields of force into a recognizable whole.
I would argue that there are no real objects in the world. It is just a matter of how our brains carve things up, some of this determined by our evolutionary history, some by cultural practices. — petrichor
Dinosaurs have intent. Predator and prey both need to recognize each other as distinct objects/threats/kin etc. Their convention is sufficiently pragmatic for their needs. — noAxioms
I contest this. — noAxioms
A forest is a recognizable object that consists of trees. Neither is a random swarm of unrecognizable gunk from which we construct recognizable objects. — jkop
A number of people seem to have conceded my point that the demarcation of an object is strictly an ideal, a mental convention. — noAxioms
All examples of something for which intent has been conveyed by some sort of language. These things aren't required to 'do your function to' 'that', all without language. The function is clear enough, but the 'that' part isn't if the 'object' in question hasn't in any way been described. A license plate reader cannot function if it doesn't know to only process 'license platey' sorts of portions of images.Well, we do have machines that do this sort of thing, e.g., autonomous spotter drones that can distinguish tanks and IFVs from other objects. Less excitingly, there are license plate readers with can distinguish discrete characters on a moving vehicle. — Count Timothy von Icarus
This is more in line with the topic. A part is indicated. The question is, is it a part, or is it the 'object' in question? It might be part of something larger, and that larger thing may itself be designated to be part of something even larger, with no obvious end to the game. Hence, the convention is needed. There is no physical way to resolve this without the convention, and the convention isn't physical.The Problem of the Many is, to my mind, a problem that only shows up if we accept the starting presuppositions of a substance metaphysics, where objects properties inhere in their constituent parts—a building block view where "things are what they are made of." — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes, which is why the discussion of the problem is relevant.On such a view, it's a serious problem that objects can't be identified in terms of discrete ensembles of building blocks.
Agree, so long as 'minds' is not anthropocentrically defined.Ultimately, I do think Locke's view of "real essences" having to be defined in terms of "mental essences" gets something right here. Without minds, without the plurality of phenomenological horizons, you have a world of complete unity.
So since there's no people holding interest in my examples, you seem to agree with my views? There is no 'thing' outside of intent/convention.There's a good definition - a thing is a phenomenon that holds interest for people. — T Clark
Same comment. In the absence of the convention, there is only disarray, no objects. My topic is about the absence of convention, not how the convention might come to be by that which finds use for it.If there was nothing there until we perform the convention of constructing an object, our objects would be in total disarray, incommunicable, unspeakable to another object-maker — Fire Ologist
So since there's no people holding interest in my examples, you seem to agree with my views? There is no 'thing' outside of intent/convention. — noAxioms
The tao that can be told
is not the eternal Tao
The name that can be named
is not the eternal Name.
The unnamable is the eternally real.
Naming is the origin
of all particular things. — Lao Tzu
Return is the movement of the Tao.
Yielding is the way of the Tao.
All things are born of being.
Being is born of non-being. — Lao Tzu
Dinosaurs have intent. Predator and prey both need to recognize each other as distinct objects/threats/kin etc. Their convention is sufficiently pragmatic for their needs. — noAxioms
My topic is about the absence of convention — noAxioms
since I am trying to find object in the absence of language.
— noAxioms
Dinosaurs. — fdrake
sucrose counts as an object for amylase, and populations of amylase enzymes count as an object for the evolution of digestive systems. You might want to call those physical... — fdrake
Object, of course, here, is the "thing" that philosophical theories have been trying to explain. And if the OP's definition of "object" is a philosophical one, the answer is yes.Is there any physical basis for what constitutes a 'thing' or 'object'? — noAxioms
While this is tenable and I believe in this, this is not what's being asked.He argues that such objects, which existed long before humans and consciousness, demonstrate that the universe has a history that is not contingent on human observation. — Wayfarer
We call a triangle a mathematical object. — L'éléphant
Something that has a shape and measurement is a physical thing.But it's not a physical thing. It's an idea. — Wayfarer
What if the phaser hits a bug on the guy's shirt? Does just the bug disappear or does the guy (the intended target) go as well? — noAxioms
Something that has a shape and measurement is a physical thing.
↪Wayfarer It (triangle) is finite and complete. — L'éléphant
This is more in line with the topic. A part is indicated. The question is, is it a part, or is it the 'object' in question? It might be part of something larger, and that larger thing may itself be designated to be part of something even larger, with no obvious end to the game. Hence, the convention is needed. There is no physical way to resolve this without the convention, and the convention isn't physical.
But it's not a physical thing. It's an idea.
Well, supposing that the world can be adequately described with mathematics, there would be a big difference between the mathematical entities consistent with "triangle" and those consistent with "any being having a first person subjective experience of a triangle or triangularity," right? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Meaning that our understanding of existence, including the existence of dinosaurs, is implicitly dependent on the human conceptual framework. — Wayfarer
Sapiens, the statement that ‘dinosaurs existed’ is only meaningful within the conceptual framework provided by an observing mind - with 'prior to' being part of that framework. — Wayfarer
Is love real? The United States of America? One of my dreams? — T Clark
Humans can name, make an object or thing out of, anything. — T Clark
There's a good definition - a thing is a phenomenon that holds interest for people. — T Clark
You'd get something out of reading it I think. — fdrake
Although the book is written with clarity and consistency, it presupposes a familiarity not only with dogmatic metaphysics, post-Kantian critical philosophy, phenomenology and post-Heideggerian philosophy, but also and above all with Alain Badiou's materialist ontology, and more specifically, with his ontological re-formulation of post-Cantorean set theory, as well as his conception of the event as what exceeds the grasp of an ontology of being qua being
I think the price of entry is a little steep :yikes: . — Wayfarer
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