Yep. Brian Greene became is own mission-giver. I mentioned that Frankl did as well. ?

Sure, but John - or at least the John of that statement - would say either (1) they are talking nonsense, or (2) they mean something different than he does when each respectively speaks about the meaning of life. Both paths remain open. This is how the inferential game is played. Saying certain things either rules out of contention other, certain things, or recognizes that someone else, using the same words, is simply talking about something else altogether.

We could ask him. Or ask Nietzsche what it takes to becomes your own divinity. He went on and on and on about it, didn't he?

the notion of an "author of life who intended it to have meaning" just is the traditional notion of God — John

If the idea of a "meaning of life" makes sense; it is only in the context of theological notions. — John

The question is whether the Nietzschean creating his own values or the Sartrean choosing his own life project are recycling a model that needs something in the slot marked "God".

---- Michael beat me again.---

I agree with the thesis of Fight Club. The test is whether the subject ever really gave up... abandoned all hope.

It could be that John and I are in disagreement. Wouldn't be the first time. :)

I agree with the thesis of Fight Club. The test is whether the subject ever really gave up... abandoned all hope. — Mongrel

I like the big showdown in Matrix 3, when That works for me.

Yep. :)

Either one can discuss this question sensibly, or one cannot. If the question is meaningful, one can specify the kind of answers which would be appropriate for it, and if it is not, this can't be done. — StreetlightX

This is sounding very 'Vienna School'. If by 'sensibly' you mean something like 'in terms of the senses' then there's your category error right there; theologists, mystics and religionists purport to be talking about something suprasensible. What kinds of "answers' to questions concerning the suprasensible would you expect. I predict you will say there cannot be any, a conclusion which would both be based upon and confirm your own presuppositions. With your orientation, of course there cannot be any such answers for you; but how can you presume to pontificate about what kinds of answers there might be for others?

↪Mongrel


the notion of an "author of life who intended it to have meaning" just is the traditional notion of God — John


If the idea of a "meaning of life" makes sense; it is only in the context of theological notions. — John — Michael

In this answer to MU earlier I already acknowledged that by 'transcendent' I meant 'an intuited or imagined context' that goes beyond the life and world we know, and that it is not necessarily thought in terms of an author or creator. For example the Brahmanic and Buddhist systems do not include a creator in the way the Abrahamic religions do, but they certainly provide a "meaning of life' which is thought in terms of the transcendent.

Here is the passage:

Everything in life, in the world, derives its meanings in the larger context of life or the world, itself. If life is the overarching context, then as such life cannot have a meaning in terms of any larger context, because there isn't one.

If there is a larger context than the life and world that we know, then the life and world that we know could have an overarching meaning in terms of that larger context.That larger context doesn't have to be the "author", or in other words, the creator, I suppose; but it must nevertheless be a transcendent bestower of meaning; an overarching meaning that goes beyond the meanings that are contingent upon the context of immanent life and world. — John

So "theological notions" should be taken in its broadest possible sense.

↪Michael
It could be that John and I are in disagreement. Wouldn't be the first time. :) — Mongrel

:-O 8-) ;) :)

I still don't think we were in disagreement.

No, nor do I.

Well that larger context is the inanimate thing we call the universe. Don't you agree? It isn't living, and there doesn't have to be an author of it, even though it is meaningful to us. I'm glad you've come to terms with this. What makes you think that there must be a "transcendent bestower of meaning" for this inanimate thing? As I explained already, the meaning we see in these inanimate things exists relative to us, and our intentions, not relative to some author, creator, or bestower. Nevertheless, that inanimate thing gives us a context larger than life. — Metaphysician Undercover

No I don't agree that the "inanimate thing we call the universe" is the "larger context"; it is just a part of the life and world we know, the part that is studied by astronomy and cosmology. In a sense we could say there is a transcendental "universe", if it is thought of as 'noumena', but then it would be inappropriate to refer to it as "inanimate".

I haven't anywhere said that there is a "transcendent bestower of meaning for this inanimate thing". If there is a bestower of meaning it is (for us at least) a bestower of human meaning, of meaning for human life; which is certainly not exhausted by "this inanimate thing we call the universe".

And again, I have not been referring to everyday "meaning(s) we see in inanimate things" but to what are understood to be overarching meanings concerning human life itself, the kinds of meanings that are understood to tell 'what it is all about'. [Brackets mine].

This is sounding very 'Vienna School'. If by 'sensibly' you mean something like 'in terms of the senses' then there's your category error right there; theologists, mystics and religionists purport to be talking about something suprasensible. What kinds of "answers' to questions concerning the suprasensible would you expect. — John

I've spent the entire thread explaining what I mean by 'sensibly'. If at this point it is still unclear to you, I can only conclude that you have not read much, or anything I've written. From where I stand, you seem to be confusing a point about semantics - how words, questions, and langauge more generally works - with... I dont know what. I'm beginning to suspect that you think I'm talking about the 'meaning' in the phrase 'the meaning of life', whereas I'm talking about the 'meaning' of phrase itself. That is, I'm talking about the rather pedestrian subject of semantics. You seem to be quite literally talking about something else entirely. Perhaps this is my fault. I should not have used such an awful example as 'the meaning of life'. It has always thrown people into fits of intellectual hystetics on account of it's utter vacuity.

OK, that does sound rather hysterical, so perhaps we ought to let it rest.

The first refers to the original language game, the other to the philosopher's thesis. No contradiction. — Πετροκότσυφας

You still haven't addressed the contradiction. The "original language game", and "the philosopher's thesis", are mutually exclusive. The latter implies confusion, the former a lack of confusion. If there is confusion to be dissolved, then what is present is the philosopher's thesis, not the original language game. If the original language game is what is present, then there is no philosopher's thesis, and no confusion to be dissolved.

The statement implies that there is confusion present, by referring to confusion to be dissolved. Therefore the philosopher's thesis is what is present, as the confusion which needs to be dissolved. The confusion cannot be dissolved by referring to the original language game, because this would require taking the words out of context (the philosopher's thesis) and putting them into a contradictory context (the original language-game).

Do you see the contradiction involved in interpreting words by referring to the meaning of those words in a context which is contradictory to the context in which the words actually occur? Would it not be contradictory to you, to refer to a context where "black" refers to something black, to understand the way that "black" is being used in a particular instance, if it's being used in this instance to refer to white things?.

Now you want to argue that there's no original lagnuage-game and that W. is more or less wrong. Well, he might as well be. But that was not what we were discussing. — Πετροκότσυφας

Yes, my argument is that if what you presented, is an appropriate interpretation of what Wittgenstein said, then he was wrong. But it is not necessarily my opinion, that Wittgenstein was wrong. This is not what I am arguing. What I am arguing, is that this interpretation which you have offered is inherently contradictory, and therefore wrong.

The section of the book quoted does not describe a method for resolving any confusions or problems. Wittgenstein says a lot about a particular type of problem which philosophers have, but he offers nothing as a remedy for this problem.

Your claim, that there is a way to dissolve these confusions implies that there is a resolution for this described problem, which is being offered. Remember he claims very strongly that this is all philosophers can do, describe things, not resolve problems. Their attempts to resolve problems only created problems.

Perhaps one could form the assumption that he believes that the problems shouldn't have been created in the first place, but he is describing a problem with philosophy which is already there. So the belief that philosophers ought naught to have created this confusion in the first place, is not an option for resolving it.

He clearly says at 124:

"Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it."

Do you believe that it is possible to remedy a problem without interfering with it? To remedy the problems caused by the unruly language use of some philosophers, would require interference. Where does Wittgenstein say that any philosopher should interfere with the actual use of language?

You do not seem to be distinguishing between prescription and description, and this is category error. If Wittgenstein insists that philosophy can only describe, and you claim that he goes on to prescribe, then if you are not saying that Wittgenstein contradicts himself, you are at best, accusing him of hypocrisy.

I'm pretty sure LW thought all he had to do was show us how foolish we were being and we would quit it of our own accord. There would be no need for him to tell us what to do (prescribing) so long as he could show us what we were doing (describing).

I'm pretty sure LW thought all he had to do was show us how foolish we were being and we would quit it of our own accord. There would be no need for him to tell us what to do (prescribing) so long as he could show us what we were doing (describing). — Srap Tasmaner

Wittgenstein's overall project in PI is to obscure the distinction between a descriptive rule and a prescriptive rule. Perhaps he believed that he could conflate these categorically distinct things, making them one and the same. But looking for the one essence of "rule" is just to make the mistake of philosophers. "Rule" is commonly used in these two categorically distinct ways, "rule" in the sense of a descriptive rule, and "rule" in the sense of a prescriptive rule. The ambiguity created by his writing style will lead an uninitiated philosopher into apprehending descriptive rules as if they were prescriptive rules.

So for instance, we describe the way language is used, and one might refer to this as "rules". These rules are a type of inductive conclusion (similar to the "laws" of physics) and form the basis for dictionary definitions. Dictionary definitions are descriptive rules. If we refer to these descriptions of how language is used, as "rules", they are, de facto, descriptive rules. Notice, it is very clear when Wittgenstein defines "rule" in PI, that in order to say that one follows a rule, that individual must be observed to be acting in accordance with the rule. There can be no private rule.

The unsuspecting reader, who is perhaps not well trained in interpreting philosophical language use, might perceive that the described activity of rule-following, is the activity of human beings obeying a prescriptive rule. But Wittgenstein clearly excludes this possibility with his definition of "rule following" (observed to be acting in accordance with a rule). He furthers this exclusion with the so-called private language argument, such that there can be no reasonable doubt that "rule" according to Wittgenstein's description in PI, refers to a descriptive rule.

However, Wittgenstein introduces the word "game" to refer to the way that language is used by human beings. We all understand games as having prescriptive rules, dictating the way that one must play the game in order to avoid expulsion from the game. The unsuspecting reader, who is not rigorous in interpretation, will think that the descriptive rules of language, which Wittgenstein refers to, are actually the prescriptive rules of a language "game". This is a category error which results in a massive quantity of misinterpretation of Wittgenstein's work

Consider this example Πετροκότσυφας.

1. Prescriptive rule: Stop your car at every red light, or suffer penalty.
2. The act of following a prescriptive rule: What goes on in my mind when I approach a light which has turned yellow, or is red, which inclines me to make the car stop. This is following a prescriptive rule, what goes on within one's mind.
3. Observation of human beings who follow prescriptive rules: The human beings are observed to stop their cars at red lights.
4. Descriptive rule: Human beings stop their cars at red lights.

Notice that between 1 and 4, 2 and 3 exist as necessary intermediaries. There is a separation between 1 and 4, which cannot be removed in order to make 1 and 4 refer to the very same thing. The real existence of 2 and 3 imply that 1 and 4 are distinct. If you think that Wittgenstein in PI has removed 2 and 3, to make 1 and 4 the very same thing, then you have interpreted Wittgenstein wrongly, because what he has done is to shed light on the existence of 2 and 3, and the separation between 1 and 4.

4. Descriptive rule: Human beings stop their cars at red lights. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think what you are calling a "descriptive rule" is actually a rule.

don't think what you are calling a "descriptive rule" is actually a rule. — Luke

Sure it's a rule, inductive conclusions create rules. All human beings are animals. Objects fall when dropped. These are rules produced by inductive conclusions. The laws of physics are "rules" aren't they? Ever hear the expression "exception to the rule"? And that's how Wittgenstein defines "rule". When someone is observed as doing something in the way which is designated as the correct way (the way described by the rule) they can be said to be following a rule. I think that this is very clearly what I am calling a "descriptive rule". Remember W says philosophy may only describe things.

Furthermore, there are no prescriptive rules of language. No rules say that we must use this word in such and such a way, or that we cannot use that word in such a way. The only rules in reference to language use are what I call descriptive rules, inductive conclusions concerning the way that people use words, like dictionary definitions. So it is impossible that what Wittgenstein refers to as "rules", in relation to language use, is prescriptive rules, because there are none.

Sure it's a rule, inductive conclusions create rules. All human beings are animals. Objects fall when dropped. These are rules produced by inductive conclusions. The laws of physics are "rules" aren't they? Ever hear the expression "exception to the rule"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Your "descriptive rules" are not prescriptive then? Or are you conflating the two?

Is an inductive conclusion the same as a "descriptive rule", or does an inductive conclusion produce a "descriptive rule"?

Your "descriptive rules" are not prescriptive then? Or are you conflating the two? — Luke

No, descriptive rules are not prescriptive rules, to conflate the two is category error. That's the point I'm making. This is the is/ought separation, we cannot derive a rule for what we ought to do, from a description of what is the case. In the case of language use, we cannot derive rules for how we ought to use symbols from descriptive rules of how symbols are used.

Suppose that everyone says "2+2=4", such that this forms the descriptive rule, "human beings say 2+2=4". There is nothing here to imply the prescriptive rule, "human beings ought to say 2+2=4". To produce that prescriptive rule we must refer to something further, and this something further, might be found in the meaning of "2+2=4". We may though, as Wittgenstein explains, declare that the person saying "2+2=4" is "correct". But "correct" here means acting in a way which is consistent with the descriptive rule. It does not mean "doing what one ought to do". To assign that meaning to "correct", "doing what one ought to do", from how Wittgenstein defines "correct", would be a category mistake.

Is an inductive conclusion the same as a "descriptive rule", or does an inductive conclusion produce a "descriptive rule"? — Luke

Inductive reasoning produces descriptive rules, so an inductive conclusion is often stated as a descriptive rule.

Suppose that everyone says "2+2=4", such that this forms the descriptive rule, "human beings say 2+2=4". There is nothing here to imply the prescriptive rule, "human beings ought to say 2+2=4". To produce that prescriptive rule we must refer to something further, and this something further, might be found in the meaning of "2+2=4". — Metaphysician Undercover

But the problem is precisely here: the people who all say "2+2=4" have access to its meaning, if you like, and they all do say it because they all ought to. And they all ought to because they all do -- that's what it means to be part of speech community. You're in a loop flipping between prescription and description.

The approach that makes the most sense to me at the moment is Lewis's: we each prefer to conform on the condition that everyone conforms, and it's easy to get from there to normative conventions.

But the problem is precisely here: the people who all say "2+2=4" have access to its meaning, if you like, and they all do say it because they all ought to. And they all ought to because they all do -- that's what it means to be part of speech community. You're in a loop flipping between prescription and description. — Srap Tasmaner

The loop is not necessary though it's a vicious circle imposed upon one's own thinking, by oneself, circular reasoning. If we really look at what "ought" means we see that when there is something which we ought to do, there are reasons why we ought to do it, which go far beyond :"because everyone else is doing it".

In PI, Wittgenstein asks this question of what does "ought" mean from the perspective of what does it mean to obey an order. What does it mean to follow the rules in a game? What does it mean to be guided by a sign? Instead of describing this as a case of doing what one ought to do, and proceeding toward examining what it means for a person to do what one ought to do, he describes it as a case of doing what everyone else is doing. This category mistake sets up the vicious circle, as "correct" is defined as acting in a way which is in accordance with a descriptive rule, rather than as doing what one ought to do. Doing what one ought to do really cannot be defined by doing what everyone else is doing, and to do so is a category mistake.

The approach that makes the most sense to me at the moment is Lewis's: we each prefer to conform on the condition that everyone conforms, and it's easy to get from there to normative conventions. — Srap Tasmaner

This condition, "the condition that everyone conforms" is artificial though, it's made up as a way to make sense of the problems created by the category error. There really is no such condition at play here. What is the case, is that we conform because we want to conform, we apprehend conformation as beneficial to ourselves. There is no such condition. We want to do what we ought to do, because we apprehend it as good. In the case of language, doing what we ought to do allows us to be understood, and this is apprehended as beneficial.

What we have here is a case study of trying to create categories: descriptive and prescriptive.

Categories can be taught and used out of habit with exceptions. They can be enforced by law. They can be implicit by cultural pressures. They can be created on a whim. If there is some consensus on a population the category can find some stickiness.

However, those that are created in a whim have the hardest time finding stickiness because it inhibits freedom. Even those who have the greatest tendency to look for authority might resist newly created categories.

There are only category errors when there are agreements about categories within a given population arrived at in a variety of ways. Without agreement there is only disagreement (as in this thread). Education of habit is one of the primary ways to create categories. Unfortunately, for Wittgenstein, his writings are not part of the elementary school curriculum.