All I wanted to do was correct the error that consists in saying that the idea of a meaning of life is a category error, by pointing out that it makes logical sense in the context of traditional theological ideas of a transcendent creator and bestower of meaning. — John

This is not what you did. What you did instead is the equivalent of passing along class gossip: you pointed out that, allegedly, if you take at face value the good and totally unexamined authority of unnamed sources in the nebulous and ambiguously referenced 'theological tradition', meaning-of-life questions make sense in the context of traditional theological ideas. Whether they actually in fact do, is something you've not at all even addressed. Moreover, the onus here lies with you, not me - it's you who advanced the positive claim that they do so make sense, without so much as providing one iota of argument apart from a grossly fallacious argument from authority.

And note also that, as I clarified in my discussions with Warfer and Fanfer, my position isn't that meaning-of-life questions are inevitably category errors. It's that until demonstrated otherwise, they ought to be taken as such. And to repeat again what I said to Wayfarer, this sceptical stance ought to apply to all philosophical questions. If I singled out meaning of life questions, it's because of it's popularity and the general level of shallowness at which it is approached. I have no doubt that one can - and that people have - attempted to make good sense of it. But this sense will differ per argument, and without paying close attention to the exact, concrete argument at hand - the stakes involved, the articulation between terms - one cannot presuppose that such questions have any 'inherent' sense.

I mean, your whole 'argument' is as if, having asked you about the square root of -1, you were to assure me that, somewhere, out there, there is a textbook - which you will neither name nor cite - demonstrating that such a notion does in fact, make sense and can be answered (and of course, for the longest time, the very question did not make sense - at least, not until the invention of imaginary numbers).

It's a huge subject (and is, arguably, ultimately a matter of taste) as to whether theological notions are "conceptually vacuous"; that is whether theological notions themselves make sense. Atheists predictably will say "They don't" and theists will predictably say "they do". The two camps have very different founding assumptions; and mostly end up just taking past one another — John

And atheists might be right, in which case meaning-of-life questions are category errors. That theists have different founding assumptions isn't that those assumptions are correct. So the above really misses SX's point, which is less about arguing that meaning-of-life questions are category errors, and more about arguing that they could be.

If there is no "outside" to life (which would mean that there is nothing intentional which is not contingent upon being a part of life), then life cannot be coherently said to have an overarching meaning. — John

There are two ways in which "intentionality" relates to things. Intentionality can be within the thing, like when human beings act purposefully, they act with intention. But intentionality may also be projected onto the thing from an external source, such as when a tool has purpose. In this case, the object (the tool) is created with intention, it has an author. But objects do not necessarily need to be created to have a purpose, many natural things (things without an author) are purposeful. This is the case in my example of the geologist who finds meaning in the structures of rock. The structures are purposeful in relation to the geologist's intentions, to understand. Likewise, the structures of life are purposeful in relation to the biologist's intentions, to understand, and therefore meaningful, despite the fact that the biologist is not the author of life, nor does the biologist assume that life has an author. In relation to the biologist's desire to understand, the variety in the forms of life, has meaning.

Except if leaving everything as it is specifically refers to discoveries, theory building etc; which is where it refers. Philosophy does not invent, it does not discover, it does not make novel contributions to the content of what it describes, it is just describing it. It is in this sense that it leaves everything as it is. — Πετροκότσυφας

If this is the case though, it contradicts "dissolves confusions". Because "dissolving confusions" implies that the descriptions, theories, concepts etc., which are encountered, are confused. If everything is left as is, how are the confusions dissolved?

To avoid the contradiction implied by the statement, one must clarify what is referred to by "leaves everything as is", and what is referred to by "dissolves confusions", because the two phrases cannot refer to the same thing without contradiction. So "leave everything as is" must refer to the things which are being described, and "dissolves confusions" must refer to the descriptions. This requires a category separation between the things and the descriptions, to avoid the contradiction which appears at first reading.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1752/something-everyone-will-be-looking-for-eventually

Look. Look at this crap.

I put it on myself to try to understand what they're asking. If I really want to know, I probe. Sometimes the results of that are astonishing.

Continuing my metaphor, one sense of "doing the work" would be to say you have to go all the way down the alley to find out if it's a dead end, but on the other hand, I think what I was reaching for with the idea of "failure-sensitivity" was that it would surely be nice to be able to recognize that an alley will turn out to be dead end before going all the way down it.

If the character of philosophical problems is "I don't know my way around here," the question is how best to learn your way around.

None of this has the constructive flavour you had in mind though. When doing mathematics, it's as if you build a special flashlight for each problem that will allow you to see what you need to see. You make your tools. So that's one way.

I've been wondering if maybe instead of talking as if you choose from preexisting domains, the domain is something you construct with the question. Theoretical entities are in an obvious sense constructed, and maybe these are the members of the domain you construct. Asking a question would be the first step in building, rather than finding, an answer.

Moreover, the onus here lies with you, not me - it's you who advanced the positive claim that they do so make sense, without so much as providing one iota of argument apart from a grossly fallacious argument from authority. — StreetlightX

The irony is amazing; it was you that initially made the completely unsupported claim that talk about the 'meaning of life' is a category error. I merely pointed out that that claim is based on the presumption that this life provides the totality of possible context. The onus is on you to support your unsupported claim and demonstrate that this life must be the only possible context of meaning.

And what I wrote was not in any sense an "argument from authority"; it was merely pointing out that people who believe in God find the idea of a meaning of life perfectly coherent; which leaves you with the monumental task of demonstrating that they must be deluded. And you need to demonstrate that without relying on any presuppositions that they, the allegedly deluded, would not share. Good luck with that!

And atheists might be right, in which case meaning-of-life questions are category errors. That theists have different founding assumptions isn't that those assumptions are correct. So the above really misses SX's point, which is less about arguing that meaning-of-life questions are category errors, and more about arguing that they could be. — Michael

Sure they could be category errors, and by the same token, so could the atheist's claim that meaning of life talk is meaningless. The problem is that neither of these possibilities can ever be definitely demonstrated, which means that what one thinks about it will perennially remain a matter of taste, a matter of faith.

I mean what's the point of arguing that something could be a category error, but I can never demonstrate that it is?

Sure, but you continue to ignore that little word: "overarching".

It's that until demonstrated otherwise, they ought to be taken as such. — StreetlightX

So your favoured principle is "Guilty until proven innocent"? That in itself is revealingly tendentious; why not the other way around?

I mean, your whole 'argument' is as if, having asked you about the square root of -1, you were to assure me that, somewhere, out there, there is a textbook - which you will neither name nor cite - demonstrating that such a notion does in fact, make sense and can be answered (and of course, for the longest time, the very question did not make sense - at least, not until the invention of imaginary numbers). — StreetlightX

This is truly a lame and lazy analogy! Surely you can do better than that? Face the truth man; you're deeply biased here.

Look at this crap. — StreetlightX

Agree. I like the light-handed moderation on this forum, but at the same time, there are a lot of crap posters around who ask meaningless questions with no real philosophical interests or skills. Trolls, basically. They should be shown the door.

Sure, but you continue to ignore that little word: "overarching". — John

No, I'm not ignoring "overarching" you are simply misusing the word "overarching", and that's what I'm trying to demonstrate. The "overarching meaning" would be the broadest, most general sense of the word. And the overarching meaning of "meaning" allows that we can speak about meaning without an author. It is only a restricted, more limited sense of "meaning" which requires an author, the type of meaning found in language, and this is clearly not the "overarching meaning".

So, confusions (i.e. philosophical theses, theories) are dissolved once we show their meaninglessness by describing the original language-game from which the philosopher borrowed the words (about which he constructs theories). The original language-game remains intact, the thesis advanced by the philosopher is shown as non-sense, a pseudo-thesis. — Πετροκότσυφας

You seem to be missing the point. In the original language-game, better referred to as "games", the words are commonly used in many different ways, perhaps corresponding to many different games, with many different objects (end goals). The category error, which the philosopher has to deal with involves taking the word as it is employed in one language-game, and assuming that it has the same use in another language-game, as it has in that original game.

There is no such thing as "the original home" for most words, and even if there was, to designate that the meaning of the word is according to its original home, when it is being used in a categorically different way, is to commit a category error. So in actuality, the philosopher has to deal with the confusion created by those who assign meaning according to some presupposed "original language-game" rather than according to the context (game) in which the word is being used.

No, I'm not ignoring "overarching" you are simply misusing the word "overarching", and that's what I'm trying to demonstrate. The "overarching meaning" would be the broadest, most general sense of the word. And the overarching meaning of "meaning" allows that we can speak about meaning without an author. It is only a restricted, more limited sense of "meaning" which requires an author, the type of meaning found in language, and this is clearly not the "overarching meaning". — Metaphysician Undercover

Apparently you are thinking of "overarching" in a different sense than I am; which is fine, the word, as with all words is polysemous. I will explain again how I am using thew word; which hopefully will clear up your confusion.

Everything in life, in the world, derives its meanings in the larger context of life or the world, itself. If life is the overarching context, then as such life cannot have a meaning in terms of any larger context, because there isn't one.

If there is a larger context than the life and world that we know, then the life and world that we know could have an overarching meaning in terms of that larger context.That larger context doesn't have to be the "author", or in other words, the creator, I suppose; but it must nevertheless be a transcendent bestower of meaning; an overarching meaning that goes beyond the meanings that are contingent upon the context of immanent life and world.

So your favoured principle is "Guilty until proven innocent"? — John

Yes. This is about the third time I've affirmed this in this thread. And this was the entire point of the OP so short of you not having read it, I don't understand why you find this so surprising. The idea, to explain for about the fifth time, is that the questions attain their sense only to the degree that the very terms of the question are articulated, that until someone explicates, in concreto, the stakes and scope of a question - 'what kind of answer' would be appropriate - there is no reason - and I mean this quite literally, as in, there is no way a chain of inferences can be formed in order to construct a line of reason - to assume that any philosophical question makes sense. Your response to this has been, seemingly, to say that one ought to take it on compelete faith that, because some people say certain questions make sense, that they do in fact make sense. It's kind of mind-boggling.

If there is a larger context than the life and world that we know, then the life and world that we know could have an overarching meaning in terms of that larger context.That larger context doesn't have to be the "author", or in other words, the creator, I suppose; but it must nevertheless be a transcendent bestower of meaning; an overarching meaning that goes beyond the meanings that are contingent upon the context of immanent life and world. — John

Well that larger context is the inanimate thing we call the universe. Don't you agree? It isn't living, and there doesn't have to be an author of it, even though it is meaningful to us. I'm glad you've come to terms with this. What makes you think that there must be a "transcendent bestower of meaning" for this inanimate thing? As I explained already, the meaning we see in these inanimate things exists relative to us, and our intentions, not relative to some author, creator, or bestower. Nevertheless, that inanimate thing gives us a context larger than life.

I've been wondering if maybe instead of talking as if you choose from preexisting domains, the domain is something you construct with the question. Theoretical entities are in an obvious sense constructed, and maybe these are the members of the domain you construct. Asking a question would be the first step in building, rather than finding, an answer. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, exactly this! This is what I've been trying to get at with the idea that solutions are coeval with the explication of questions. Hence the citation of Deleuze's quote in the OP: "every problem always has the solution it deserves, in terms of the way in which it is stated... and of the means and terms at our disposal for stating it." What I wanted to suggest is that category errors, or rather, our ability to divine them, serve as guides through this process of construction. The construction of 'theoretical entities' - I just want to say philosophy - is never a purely 'free', subjective' act as it were; we are constrained by a certain logic of sense - of the need to avoid category errors, of making sure we do not run together terms that belong to different categories; much in the same way that a chess player - who can technically make any number of creative, interesting, and unforeseen moves - is constrained by certain rules; the difference or disanalogy being that in philosophy, or in language more generally, the 'rules' evolve along with the moves, as it were.

This is why, in a certain sense, unelaborated philosophical questions are not questions at all; they are, as it were, words strung together in certain grammatically correct forms that, sans articulation, lack sense. They provide no impetus, no orientation, with respect to what 'category' it's corresponding 'solution' is meant to fall in.

Well, I already knew you were inaptly demanding explanations, in terms of principles appropriate to contexts of immanent meaning, of positions that affirm transcendent meaning. In other words you have committed a category error. And that was precisely my criticism of your obviously tendentious position. It's common knowledge that the kinds of accounts in concrete terms you ask for cannot be given in the context of theology; that's been known for millennia, so what's new?

What in the world - or not in the world? - is 'transcendent meaning'?

Overarching meaning that is understood to be given by a transcendent reality. Surely you knew this already? Are you that unfamiliar with religions and theologies?

It's true that the idea might be wrong. There might be no such reality. How are you going to demonstrafe that, though? I think the problem is that you simply have no feel for and thus do not understand the experiences, presumptions and mindsets of people who affirm such things.

No discussion of category mistakes would be complete without anybody mentioning "religion".

To me it almost always feels like when people are debating (more often quarreling) something about "religion" one person's "religion" is apples, another person's is oranges, another person's is blackberries, etc., whether they sense it or not. Fruitless discussions, usually (no pun intended).

That's right because religious experiences cannot be intersubjectively corroborated.

One person will say this constitutes very good reason to expunge religion from human discourse and life. Another person will say, on the contrary, it is reason to value it most highly.

Overarching meaning that is understood to be given by a transcendent reality. Surely you knew this already? Are you that unfamiliar with religions and theologies?

It's true that the idea might be wrong. There might be no such reality. How are you going to demonstrate that, though? I think the problem is that you simply have no feel for and thus do not understand the experiences, presumptions and mindsets of people who affirm such things. — John

I really think you're talking past me entirely here. The question 'what is the meaning of life?', like any other question, either is, or is not meaningful. Either one can discuss this question sensibly, or one cannot. If the question is meaningful, one can specify the kind of answers which would be appropriate for it, and if it is not, this can't be done. This is a simple point about sense and language, and applies to all questions, theological or not, and in fact, philosophical and not. In light of this, I don't understand the relevance of this invocation of 'transcendent meaning'. Are you trying to suggest that the question has meaning in a way that, er, no mortal can understand or some such thing?

Here's some more chess analogizing...

There's an idea known as "the move the position demands." Among more accomplished players, this is the maxim that the move you want to play, even and perhaps especially if it seems impossible, is the move to look at. It may not be playable immediately, but maybe it can be prepared, and the threat of it can force your opponent into something undesirable. But sometimes it is playable immediately -- you just have to look pretty deeply to see why. You have to calculate.

Calculating variations is the sense-making part. The idea of the move is important, but the variations give it substance. The best ideas are grounded in the concrete position on the board, rather than in your preconceived ideas or your preferences. If you can look at the position on the board with an open mind, it will tell you what to do. Sadly, you have to be a damn good player for the board to talk to you.

So there are two steps: begin by letting the data lead the way -- a candidate move is much like an hypothesis and the best ones practically hold up a neon sign, IF you are tuned into the data (the board) the right way. But then there's the analysis, which is first of all a check on your intuition. But it can be more: your first idea might fail, but if it had something to it, it should provide an entry point to understanding the position better, and the right move will show up in your calculation. (Bad candidate moves don't touch the essence of the position on the board, so the variations you get for them can go right by the best move without so much as a hello.)

Nope, I think I got the point, which was what W. means when he says that he leaves everything as it is. I've shown you what he means (or at least what I think he means) and now you just changed the subject. — Πετροκότσυφας

Yes, you've shown what Wittgenstein means by "leaves everything as it is". But "dissolves confusions" remains contradictory to this. And when I speak of dissolving confusions you charge me with changing the subject.

Are you trying to suggest that the question has meaning in a way that, er, no mortal can understand or some such thing — StreetlightX

When people ask after the meaning of life, translate "meaning" as purpose. If you're polylingual, you know better than to ask why it translates this way. It just does.

The purpose of most things is transcendent to the thing in question. The purpose of a hammer is not found in the hammer. Purpose, in the case of life, is often stated as a mission. The Romans were on a mission from Mars to bring order to the earth. The Christian mission is obscure and wildly varied.

Lacking mission-giving divinities, purpose is still available and still has a transcendent quality. See Victor Frankl. Brian Greene also talks about his childhood encounter with Sisyphus and the purpose that followed.

Oh look it took you three lines and a single post to do what John has been dancing around for three pages now. Although John of course might disagree with you on that last bit, given that he affirmed, in his initial post, that the question is incoherent without such an 'author'. And what this in turn shows is that both of you are articulating your terms differently. For you, life is the kind of thing that could have purpose, with or without a God. For John, life is not even in principle the kind of thing that could have 'meaning' without such an author (that way is closed on pain of incoherence). Both of you are attributing different senses to your terms. But one can only find this out, of course, by getting you - or whoever - to undertake such articulation. A third person might articulate the terms of the question differently yet again, ad infinitum.

So well done on attributing some kind of minimal sense to the question, without which, it would remain an incoherent one. That said, it is still unclear why life is treated by both of you differently. Neither of you have articulated why life can (in your case), or can't (in John's case) be attributed meaning in the absence of an author. This would crystallize the sense of the question further... - and in turn clarify what kind of a solution would correspond with it. And so philosophy happens.

Neither of you have articulated why life can (in your case), or can't (in John's case) be attributed meaning in the absence of an author. — StreetlightX

John and I are not in disagreement. Frankl became his own author while stuck in a concentration camp.

This is all psychologically precarious stuff. Poor little Eros faces all the horror and depravity in life. Take it a little at a time. That's my advice.

The question about the meaning of life ('meaning', that is, taken in an overarching sense) is coherent if your premise is that life has an "author" who intended it to have such a meaning, and the question is incoherent otherwise. — John

My bolding.