I say this too because I notice a tendency whereby when you question Wittgenstein's ideas, the only answer that seems to be legitimate to the majority who jump on these threads is to quote another line from Wittgenstein.. As if you cannot refute Wittgenstein, you can only have varying levels of understanding of Wittgenstein. — schopenhauer1
Help me understand why it is SPECIFICALLY Wittgenstein where I see this?? — schopenhauer1
I notice a tendency whereby when you question Wittgenstein's ideas, the only answer that seems to be legitimate to the majority who jump on these threads is to quote another line from Wittgenstein.. As if you cannot refute Wittgenstein, you can only have varying levels of understanding of Wittgenstein. — schopenhauer1
Help me understand why it is SPECIFICALLY Wittgenstein where I see this?? — schopenhauer1
That is painting with a broad brush. Are you assigning all who evince interest in the writings as gatekeepers?
For my part, the work is an interesting kind of argument and not a Prolegomena for any future Metaphysics. If I resist that latter conclusion, am I, too, a gatekeeper? — Paine
It seems like Wittgenstein's work is inherently resistant to interaction with the rest of philosophy. Thoughts? — Leontiskos
For what its worth, Wittgenstein was a complex philosopher. His methodology was methodological nominalism, and when you apply methodological nominalism towards philosophy as therapy, you get a complex relationship between examples elucidating a way out of the bottle for the fly, which is the whole of the Philosophical Investigations. Compound the fact that the Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus was meant as a preface to the Philosophical Investigations, then you might have a lot of questions about what the TLP and then the PI meant. In my opinion, if people started with the blue and brown books, which were presented in a university setting where Wittgenstein taught for a brief while, you might find it easier to understand Wittgenstein. — Shawn
Are you suggesting that I am 'gatekeeping' that thread? I didn't have much to say about Wittgenstein anyway.
Sorry if it seemed like it. — Shawn
I mean... :yikes: — schopenhauer1
Wittgenstein strikes me as someone who was trying to be original, to such an extent that he becomes opaque and even somewhat mystical (again, almost like a guru). — Leontiskos
The aphoristic style lends itself to people reading it like a prophet.. holy writ almost. — schopenhauer1
It seems like Wittgenstein's work is inherently resistant to interaction with the rest of philosophy. — Leontiskos
I would question whether this is a particularly helpful or good faith way to pose the question. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I would question whether this is a particularly helpful or good faith way to pose the question. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Maybe because no one understands (or accepts)What is it about SPECIFICALLY Wittgenstein that it elicits the worst forms of elitism and gatekeeping in this forum? — schopenhauer1
(1) Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.
(2) I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when I said: philosophy ought really to be written only as a poetic composition.
(3) The difficulty in philosophy is to say no more than we know.
(4) A serious and good philosophical work could be written consisting entirely of jokes.
(5) The classifications made by philosophers and psychologists are like trying to classify clouds by their shape.
(6) Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.
(7) What is your aim in philosophy? To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle — Ludwig Wittgenstein
Second, clearly Nietzsche is the king when it comes to devotees citing his words as Scripture. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Certainly, there is a tendency for hardcore Wittgensteinans to denigrate the value of many areas of philosophy. This stems from the idea that they can't meaningfully be spoken about. — Count Timothy von Icarus
You might find Rorty's typology of Wittgenstein's descendents interesting here. In general, it's going to be the "therapeutic Wittgensteinians," who see a good deal of philosophy as simply time wasting incoherence, which he sort of gets at. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But because of his early work Wittgenstein also attracts people who find a natural home in analytic philosophy, and analytic philosophy has its own problems with labeling whole huge swaths of philosophy as "incoherent," and thus not worthy of discussion. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Also, you get the problem of people mistaking complexity for good argument—pointing to the characteristics of formal systems when the question at hand has to do with metaphysics, epistemology, etc. I have attorneys in my family and they do this all the time in political conversations , pointing to what the current law is, special legal terminology, etc., when the issue being discussed is really "what is just in this case" (i.e., what the law ought to be). — Count Timothy von Icarus
This is hardly unique though. Eliminitivists very often seem to confuse presenting an avalanche of facts and the complexity of neuroscience with good argumentation, and this can lead to the tendency to fall into a pernicious habit of equating mastery of complex terminology with sound reasoning or even intelligence (you can see this with Continental philosophy at times too). — Count Timothy von Icarus
Since I find Russell to be particularly uncharitable, I don't mind calling him out as an exemplar of someone who used to point to cutting edge mathematics that few people understood in his day to try to put his arguments over the top by simply making them impossible to understand and then only time and the dispersion of knowledge in these areas has allowed people to point out that some of his appeals to mathematics are simply not very good arguments. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I think it might be fair to say that a bit of hubris overflows into the audience too. I mean, this is a guy who claimed to have "solved philosophy," and IIRC from some biographical thing I read he never bothered to read Aristotle in his lifetime. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Antonia Soulez (sorry, I cannot find a public link to it) makes interesting observations that Wittgenstein's references to Plato, Kant, Russell, etcetera are not designed to solve their problems but as instances of what concerns his views and development. That suggests a conscious departure from the "philosophy of history" discussion.
Some have made that departure to be a parting shot, an assassination in Deleuze's view or a trip to the couch for various expressions of "therapy."
As an opponent of the means of 'natural sciences" to explain everything, I think it is helpful to compare Wittgenstein to others who did something seemingly similar but chose to wear the ermine of The Philosopher of History.
Heidegger is the true antipode to Wittgenstein. — Paine
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. — Ludwig Wittgenstein
Heidegger is the true antipode to Wittgenstein. — Paine
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