Moral propositions are (meant to be) binding upon oneself and others — Leontiskos
I don't understand what you mean by saying:
but then moral propositions do not exist, which seems pretty absurd. — Bob Ross
Can you explain?
If torturing babies is morally repugnant to me, then why can I not say that it is truly morally wrong for me?
I think the easier rejoinder might be to let go of one or the other belief, if they agree with the argument, but redefine Moral Subjectivism in a palatable way -- for instance, a Moral Subjectivist will often say that it's not beliefs about the Moral Proposition which make it true, but our sentiments which make it true -- there's not a cognitive justification so much as a cognitive expression of feeling. What makes "One ought not murder the innocent" true is that when a person says
(1) "One ought not murder the innocent",
that statements means
(2) "I feel like murdering the innocent is abhorrent"
The problem wouldn't be that these beliefs are arbitrary, but rather that they are determined by a biology, social and personal history, etc. that can be completely explained without any reference to "goodness," e.g., for the eliminitivist/epiphenomenalism, an explanation entirely in mechanical terms. — Count Timothy von Icarus
So, it seems that the truth value of a proposition can be more or less independent of beliefs about it. In some cases, they seem like there will be quite a bit of interdependence. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I think it does though. My criticism is that P1 begs the question. — Lionino
I think the moral subjectivism will outright reject that very first premise. — Lionino
you would have to transform moral judgments from “one ought to X” to “I believe one ought to X”. — Bob Ross
As long as it is meant to binding then it fulfills the necessary condition I set out—a necessary condition which subjectivism and emotivism do not meet. — Leontiskos
To say more would be to go beyond the scope of this thread and the argument at hand ... — Leontiskos
Prohibitions against abortion are the same kind of propositions as prohibitions against murder. — Leontiskos
... and to move into a discussion of your personal political positions, which is probably what you are aiming at. — Leontiskos
According to Wikipedia ethical subjectivism is cognitive-propositional, and I have found this to be the case among self-professed subjectivists. I don't think you are disputing this even though your thesis draws near to emotivism, but here is the problem I see with subjectivism and emotivism:
Moral propositions are (meant to be) binding upon oneself and others
Subjectivist and emotivist propositions are in no way binding upon oneself and others
Therefore, subjectivist and emotivist propositions are not moral propositions
(I.e. Subjectivism and emotivism are therefore not moral theories, because they fail to achieve normativity.)
"I feel like murdering is abhorrent" (subjectivism) and "Boo murder!" (emotivism) are in no way binding on others, and they are arguably not even binding on oneself. Feelings do not seem to be adequate to justify moral propositions. Going back to the OP, I would say that it is not only beliefs that are inadequate to justify moral propositions, but that feelings are also inadequate. — Leontiskos
What you just described is moral non-cognitivism (e.g., emotivism); and NOT moral subjectivism. You have abandoned moral subjectivism for a different position; which, prima facie, is fine but does not contend with my OP. — Bob Ross
I think the problem is that those who attempt to reduce moral deliberation to some set of self consistent propositions forget that what is at issue is not an abstracted analysis of the truth of moral propositions, but how our lives and those of others are benefited and harmed by what we say and do and think. — Fooloso4
Thanks for the correction. So a subjectivist must be cognitivist. I didn't understand that. — Moliere
EDIT: Oh, regarding the end -- what makes feelings inadequate? And what if they aren't justifiers so much as truth-makers? — Moliere
...so goes it that the sentiments make moral propositions true. — Moliere
I don't know that you deviated from cognitivism. You spoke of "a cognitive expression of feeling," which is a bit opaque but still prima facie cognitive. — Leontiskos
My point was that whether we are talking about subjectivism (cognitivism) or emotivism (non-cognitivism), they both seem to fail for the same reason. — Leontiskos
I don't think they are truth-makers either. I just don't see how feelings confer moral obligations. I think the burden of proof is on the person who claims that their mere feelings establish moral obligations of some kind. — Leontiskos
Are you just playing devil's advocate, or do you actually believe that feelings can make moral propositions true? I mean, I don't usually say, "I wonder if I have an obligation to do such-and-such? Let me check in with Moliere's feelings to know for sure..." :razz: — Leontiskos
True, but I could see how I slipped from cognitivism at the beginning into emotivism at the end when going back and re-reading, so it was muddled and confusing. — Moliere
I'm playing with the idea, yeah, but I also genuinely doubt that the position must be internally inconsistent... — Moliere
I think people take up duties out of emotional commitments to something or someone, and if they cease to have that emotional tie then the duty loses its appeal and what was a commitment becomes an ideal.
So, in a practical sense at least, our feelings are very important when it comes to moral propositions and maintaining duty. — Moliere
Article 1. Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?
[...]
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good if our love is good."
I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above (I-II:18:5). If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will.
[...] — Aquinas, ST I-II.24.1
There is nothing about “I believe torturing babies is wrong” being true that obligates you not to torture babies: it is a non-normative statement about your belief about babies being tortured. It isn’t expressing that “I shouldn’t torture babies”. — Bob Ross
a proposition cannot be made true or false relative to a belief, and this is why they have to rewrite it as "I believe <...>" as they can't evaluate coherently "<...>" relative to a belief — Bob Ross
Truth isn't a truth-maker, though. In the same way that states of affairs make statements true (but the state of affairs isn't truth) so goes it that the sentiments make moral propositions true.
The moral proposition is still true, but truth is not an emotion, and so it's perfectly fine to claim that emotions are the truth-makers of moral propositions.
There is nothing about any moral proposition that obligates anyone to adhere to it. If torturing babies is morally repugnant to me, I am unlikely to torture babies,
It follows that I believe it to be a normative claim.
How do moral propositions become normative under your view?
What you described, is that a belief about a proposition can make that proposition true or false. — Bob Ross
a proposition cannot be made true or false relative to a belief, and this is why they have to rewrite it as "I believe <...>" as they can't evaluate coherently "<...>" relative to a belief — Bob Ross
The first part of the above quoted is what you are setting out to prove, the second part I can't figure out what it means. What is the part that can't be coherently evaluated? "One ought not to kill"? All the parts of the phrase are well-defined and refer to outside things, even "ought", which is that a course of action is preferrable over another. Janus expressed the same feeling above. The MS evaluates the proposition according to whether he believes it or not. Yes, the belief includes the proposition, is your argument that this goes in a circle?
unless you are referring to MSs that do explicitly convert moral propositions X to «I believe X»,
I am not following, I guess. Are you saying that moral judgments are propositional, but that they are made true by desires? E.g., "one ought not X" is true or false relative to whether or not "I desire one ought not X"? — Bob Ross
If so, then that is plagued by the same issue: a desire about a proposition cannot make it true; and that's why emotivists reject that moral judgments are propositional---they have to.
But we don't need to be too serious all the time, and there's something fun in the exercise, I think — Moliere
(The Act of Creation)The systematic abuse of a terminology specially invented for that purpose.
(CV, p. 47)The language used by philosophers is already deformed, as though by shoes that are too tight.
If you want to start a thread on abortion or the epistemology of moral obligation or intractable disagreement then you should go do that; I'm not biting on the derailment. — Leontiskos
Moral propositions are (meant to be) binding upon oneself and others — Leontiskos
The question is whether ethics concerns statements of type (1) or type (2). — Leontiskos
When we do philosophy we are usually concerned with statements of type (1) — Leontiskos
When we engage in ethical reasoning, are we inquiring into whether people believe something, or whether something is right or wrong? — Leontiskos
The original question you are supposed to be addressing is whether or not moral judgements are propositional, true, and objective; and not whether or not people treat moral judgments as if they are propositional based off of their desires. — Bob Ross
I took the tone of the thread to be serious — Fooloso4
I think it's mistaken but not necessarily inconsistent. — Leontiskos
I would want to say that emotion often reinforces duty, but does not cause duty. For example, a friendship implies duties to the friend, and there will be an emotional reinforcement of this reality, but it does not follow that the duty derives from the emotion. In this case you have a rational emotion, because it is reinforcing a true duty. But given that there are also irrational emotions, emotion is not the per se thing that informs practical reason. We legitimately act from emotion-as-a-sign, but not from emotion-as-a-cause. We should say, "This emotion probably signifies that I have a good reason to do such-and-such," not, "This emotion proves that I should do such-and-such." A key problem with emotion-based moral theories is that they fail to make sense of the fact that moral obligations sometimes require us to ignore the emotions at play. Going back to Plato, the passions are not primary; they should not constitute the charioteer. They are secondary, and as such can be well-formed or malformed. — Leontiskos
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