I'm only saying that "I believe that aliens exist" is true iff I believe that aliens exist.
Therefore your conclusion that "a belief cannot make a proposition true or false" is false.
P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.
which is self-evident when they rewrite "one ought not torture babies" as "I believe one ought not torture babies" — Bob Ross
I don't think Michael is saying that the the truth of the proposition is dependent on what "we" believe. He is saying that the truth is dependent on what the person referenced by "I" believes in that proposition.that "I believe that aliens exist" is not dependent on what we believe about it, so you have failed to demonstrate what belief makes the proposition true or false." — Bob Ross
Being that "I believe one ought not torture babies" is "one ought not torture babies"
"I believe one ought not torture babies" is a moral proposition
I would say: "that you believe that aliens exist, is not a belief about the proposition: that "I believe that aliens exist" is not dependent on what we believe about it, so you have failed to demonstrate what belief makes the proposition true or false." — Bob Ross
P: "I believe that aliens exist"
P2: "I believe that I believe that aliens exist"
I would say that the truth of P is relative to a belief, namely my belief regarding aliens. However, I think you are right in saying that it is not necessarily relative to the belief expressed by P2. — Leontiskos
1. "Aliens exist"
2. "I believe that aliens exist" — Leontiskos
The main point is that even though some propositions depend on beliefs, ethical propositions such as <Do not torture babies> do not depend on beliefs, and are therefore not made true or false in virtue of a belief. — Leontiskos
I completely agree with your assessment, and I think you understand what I am trying to convey. — Bob Ross
However, to be fair, I see how C1 was worded in a way that did provide the ambiguity necessary to birth this dispute; so I just re-worded it in the OP to better reflect what I am saying (and what I am not saying). — Bob Ross
P: "I believe that aliens exist"
P2: "I believe that I believe that aliens exist"
I would say that the truth of P is relative to a belief
In short, if a belief is a (cognitive) disposition towards whether or not a proposition is true or false; then it plainly follows that beliefs do not make propositions true or false. Thusly, moral propositions cannot be true or false relative to cognitive dispositions. — Bob Ross
I would be wary to say that P has its truth relative to a belief; because this would mean that "I believe that aliens exist", P, is true or false depending on if I believe "I believe that aliens exist", P. — Bob Ross
1. "Aliens exist"
2. "I believe that aliens exist" — Leontiskos
I admit it can be confusing, and this is why we have to be very careful: the proposition "I believe <...>" is about a belief of the subject-at-hand, but whether or not it is true is not dependent on any beliefs about it. — Bob Ross
C1: Therefore, a belief cannot make a proposition true or false. — Bob Ross
C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false.
In other words the truth of the proposition is clearly dependent on an actual belief - something you appeared to deny when you wrote.
A claim that "john "believes X" is not dependent on any belief about John' s beliefs (your point) but it is dependent on whether John'shas that beliefsabout X (Michael's point)
The problem with this sort of rectification, is that the moral judgment is no longer a proposition: the indexical statement is the proposition. Therefore, the moral subjectivist is no longer accepting (implicitly) moral cognitivism. — Bob Ross
I think we are historically/culturally/linguistically situated — Fooloso4
but not thereby determined. — Fooloso4
A belief about a proposition cannot make it true or false (e.g., "aliens exist" cannot be made true or false relative to any belief formulated about it); but a proposition can be made true or false relative to a belief which it is about. — Bob Ross
but then moral propositions do not exist, which seems pretty absurd. — Bob Ross
Likewise, in this version of the position, one can't say that the moral proposition "one ought not torture babies" is true for them: they would have to say that "I believe one ought not torture babies" is true for them. I think most moral subjectivists do not realize this, and fall into the (internally inconsistent) trap that I outlined in the OP.
They would no longer be discussing ethics, essentially.
"α" is an inconsistent position for a moral subjectivist to hold (and this is the main point of the OP): a proposition cannot be made true or false relative to a belief, and this is why they have to rewrite it as "I believe <...>" as they can't evaluate coherently "<...>" relative to a belief.
For a moral subjectivist to be consistent, they will have to deny that "<...>" is a moral proposition and hold, instead, that "I believe <...>" is the moral proposition. At this point, "β", they have defeated their own position: they were supposed to demonstrating that "<...>" is true relative to a belief and NOT "I believe <...>".
Being that "I believe one ought not torture babies" is "one ought not torture babies"
Those can't be equal: they are obviously not the same proposition. A person who holds this, does not understand what propositions are. "1 + 1 = 2" != "I believe 1 + 1 = 2".
"I believe one ought not torture babies" is a moral proposition
Yes, if they do this, then, like I stated above, they have defeated they own position: they were supposed to be arguing that "one ought not torture babies" is a moral proposition and NOT "I believe <...>". — Bob Ross
The internally inconsistent part, is that, in a nutshell, a moral subjectivist claims that moral propositions in the traditional sense (e.g., "one ought not torture babies for fun") can be true or false relative to a belief about it; and results in an inconsistent view, for the vast majority of moral subjectivists, of the nature of a belief and a proposition. The inconsistency is exemplified easily in the way that moral subjectivists readily convert moral propositions into propositions about beliefs while incoherently maintaining that the original moral proposition has been preserved. — Bob Ross
Under moral subjectivism, the following is true:
1. A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition; and
2. Beliefs make moral propositions true or false.
These two statements are inconsistent with each other, and here’s a quick syllogistic demonstration of why:
P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.
P2: A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false.
P3: Beliefs make moral propositions true or false.
P4: C1 and P3 being true are logically contradictory.
C2: Therefore, moral subjectivism is internally inconsistent.
In short, if a belief is a (cognitive) disposition towards whether or not a proposition is true or false; then it plainly follows that beliefs do not make propositions true or false. Thusly, moral propositions cannot be true or false relative to cognitive dispositions. — Bob Ross
Well, the whole idea behind moral subjectivism being internally inconsistent is that they take (1) beliefs (which are stances) to make propositions true or false, while conceding, in their own rewriting of the propositions, that (2) propositions cannot be made true or false by beliefs; which is self-evident when they rewrite "one ought not torture babies" as "I believe one ought not torture babies".
I don't think that begs the question, but I see why you would think that. — Bob Ross
I think the easier rejoinder might be to let go of one or the other belief, if they agree with the argument, but redefine Moral Subjectivism in a palatable way -- for instance, a Moral Subjectivist will often say that it's not beliefs about the Moral Proposition which make it true, but our sentiments which make it true -- there's not a cognitive justification so much as a cognitive expression of feeling. What makes "One ought not murder the innocent" true is that when a person says
(1) "One ought not murder the innocent",
that statements means
(2) "I feel like murdering the innocent is abhorrent" — Moliere
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