Now Habermas asserts that, within rationality, (at least) two stances create performative contradictions. One is (borrowing from Rawls) the “first-person dictator” stance, in which I claim that trying to get my own way, as far as possible, is a perfectly rational position. The second is the familiar “free rider” stance, in which I claim that there is nothing contrary to reason in my letting everyone else do some necessary task that is difficult or tedious and requires near-total communal participation; my absence won’t be noticed, and I’ll get the benefit of the results. — J
Value is the essence of ethics, I mean, it is such that were it to be removed from an ethical issue, the issue itself would simply vanish. — Astrophel
Habermas is like Rorty and his insistence on the "solidarity" of our existence — Astrophel
So what, I commit a performative contradiction. Am I a piano key? asks Dostoyevsky. — Astrophel
...his insistence on the "solidarity" of our existence, yet not really having this solidarity evidenced in his basic philosophy; just the opposite: truth is made not discovered, he writes in Irony, Contingency and Solidarity. From whence comes this allegiance to reason given that reason itself, as Hume said long ago, has no ethical content, no content at all. Reason as such would just as soon wipe out all humanity without flinching. — Astrophel
The overriding idea here is we can only know what is ethical – what ought to be valued, what is worth valuing – by discovering whether certain procedural criteria can be fulfilled using the concept in question. For Kant, the criteria involved universalizability; for Rawls, they begin with fairness in an ideal “state of nature” situation (his Original Position). Habermas is in this tradition, and I’ve by no means mastered his theory of communicative action, which is complicated and has a lot of “rules of discourse.” But it is also procedural in that ethical values follow rationally from an understanding of what rationality itself is. And remember, for Habermas this understanding is not merely strategic or contextual. — J
“the conclusions that Rorty and Derrida draw” from the failure of more traditional rationalist projects.) — J
I know, there’s always the temptation to urge a kind of radical freedom, including freedom from the constraints of rationality. But Habermas is trying to make that position even less appealing. To commit a performative contradiction isn’t merely illogical, it also begins the process of cutting you off from community, and communication. I suppose the challenge from radical freedom can simply be repeated ad infinitum – So what if I go a little mad? So what if no one listens to me? So what if . . . -- but I think we enter somewhat fantastical territory at that point. — J
You mentioned Wittgenstein and ethics. Do you have the time to say more about his views? I haven’t read his Lecture on Ethics. Is the idea that values would not be found among the facts about the world? — J
From whence comes this allegiance to reason given that reason itself, as Hume said long ago, has no ethical content — Astrophel
How do you imagine Rorty might respond to this frame of his ideas? — Tom Storm
Because people's sense of what is valuable do not align with one another in often radical ways, a rational procedural ethics, like Habermas' . . . tries to find what is not so ambiguous to do the work of settling things, reducing ethics to principles. But this, I think I mentioned above, makes the procedure of ethics pragmatic, a working out of how to explain and convince, but, and this is an important point, this only replaces what failed in the original ethical problematic, which is the response of care, the "originary" procedural ethical remedy to issues where value is in play. — Astrophel
I don't think crazy people are irrational. They just work in a world of nontypical challenging circumstances — Astrophel
Now Habermas asserts that, within rationality, (at least) two stances create performative contradictions. One is (borrowing from Rawls) the “first-person dictator” stance, in which I claim that trying to get my own way, as far as possible, is a perfectly rational position. The second is the familiar “free rider” stance, in which I claim that there is nothing contrary to reason in my letting everyone else do some necessary task that is difficult or tedious and requires near-total communal participation; my absence won’t be noticed, and I’ll get the benefit of the results.
Let’s be clear that the question is not about whether such stances produce violations of the ethical norms that most of us abide by. Rather, we’re asking, “Are such stances irrational, given the commitments to communicative action that Habermas advocates (which view rationality as more than strategic)? Would it be irrational to argue for them within Habermasian dialogue?” — J
I don't have philosophical background but you've concisely summarized a reaction I had to Rorty which I assumed might have been my lack of philosophical sophistication. How do you imagine Rorty might respond to this frame of his ideas? Surely it was put to him as it seems an obvious critique. — Tom Storm
I remember hearing a lecture by Rorty (early 2000's) He said something like - 'If life has a meaning it is to make things better for our descendants.' How would he provide justification? I tend to think that Rorty, despite the Irony and anti-metaphysics, was essentially a romantic figure. — Tom Storm
Where I'm going with this is: Can we turn away from this modern problematic, which certainly raises all the doubts you cite, and find something in the more basic concept of communicative action that would be transcendental in Habermas's sense that it would remain in any background of any "common lifeworld"? In other words, perhaps we can find a way of showing that a commitment to intersubjectivity transcends the (temporary, contingent) modern, and is built in to the structure of communicative action itself. — J
Concerning the dictator and the free rider: I'm not sure what you mean. You ask what makes these stances "understandable and articulable." Do you mean by us, as samples of ethical stances that may or may not be rational? Or do you mean within Habermasian communicative action, as samples of stances that cannot be argued because they are performative contradictions? If you could say more about that, I could better understand your further point about embedded practices that separate normal from abnormal. — J
This is because, as Habermas writes, there is a “speech-act-immanent obligation to provide justification” for any claim raised within the context of communicative action. — J
Yet, we should not take ‘a commitment to intersubjectivity’, ‘achieving a mutual understanding,’ and ‘sharing a common lifeworld’s horizon’ as a set of ultimate transcendental conditions. — Number2018
Both stances are applied here in a double sense: as theoretical constructions and as examples of our daily pragmatical encounters. Therefore, both domains inform each other and create a shortcut; they are overloaded with our habitual experience. This situation makes the stances completely understandable but raises questions about the grounds of our social expositions — Number2018
I am wondering what reason we have to think that the first-person dictator and the free rider are engaged in what Habermas calls "communicative action."* It seems to me that such persons are explicitly intending to not participate in "communicative action." They wish to be uncooperative, not cooperative. Therefore they don't seem to have the obligation you speak of. They would say, "I am not raising a claim within the context of communicative action, and therefore I have no such obligation." — Leontiskos
I am curious to see an argument you would give in favor of the Habermasian position, and I am specifically interested to see how (if at all) it deviates from Kantianism. — Leontiskos
Yes, this is similar to the first point that White raises when he pushes back on Habermas's communicative action schema: "Is the obligation to provide justification really a necessary one (does it have to follow from the idea of communicative action itself)?" I think you're pointing to an ambiguity in Habermas (or Habermas as I've been presenting him; I may be the one who doesn't read him clearly). It's this: Are we being asked to imagine the dictator, say, simply stating their position and then refusing further discussion? Or are we supposed to imagine this person arguing for the position? This would seem to make a big difference along the lines you're wondering about. At what point does the schema begin? If I say, "I am not making a claim within the context of communicative action," have I already performatively contradicted myself, according to Habermas? — J
I more or less agree with this, though as I say, I don't know if I'm agreeing on Habermas's behalf or not. — J
But only some, unless we take a very cynical view of "reaching an understanding." — J
Also, the term "first-person dictator" can be a little misleading. The dictator is not imagined as doing what real-life dictators mostly do, which is, as you say, commanding and threatening. The first-person dictator position is an ethical stance, which claims that it's perfectly rational for me to try to get other people to do what I want, as far as possible. This desire needn't be fulfilled only by standard dictatorial tactics. In part this is why I think it's plausible that Habermas might be picturing the first-person dictator as being willing to stay engaged in communicative action. — J
Staying with Plato, Thrasymachus could be said to espouse the first-person dictator position. It's often been asked, Why does Thrasymachus, given his views, bother talking in the agora at all? (Pride in his rhetorical skills, perhaps.). For Habermas, I think Thrasymachus is an example of a first-person dictator who wants to convince others that his views are correct, but is in performative contradiction by doing so. — J
It is a flat out rejection of "the place" where these foundational ideas have their existence: metaphysics (in case you are interested, a great look at this comes from Heidegger's The Word of Nietzsche; God Is Dead, where he calls N a metaphysician because "will to power", he claims, is just a continuation of the "place" of metaphysics). To see the post modern move, think of metaphysics as a completely empty concept! As meaningless as 'ummgablgdt'. Just nothing at all. It is not only God and Christian platonism that goes down the drain, but the possibility itself of making sense of the context in which these occur. I am Rorty's opposite, really: loosely speaking, he says nothing is metaphysical. I say everything is metaphysical! — Astrophel
I take it that this more specific kind of [first-person] dictator is a sophist or propagandist, engaged in duplicity or dissimulation, which are often included as a form of lying. — Leontiskos
The difficulty with the sophist is that they are slippery, namely because they wish to appear to be engaging in "communicative action," when in fact they are not. — Leontiskos
The integrity of the intersubjective project will paradoxically depend on the ability of participants to make definitive—and to that extent non-communicative—judgments. — Leontiskos
For the sake of argument: Why couldn’t the dictator genuinely believe that it’s rational to advocate dominance over others? In that case, he’d be offering what he perceives to be genuine arguments in his favor. The other case is the one you’re imagining: The dictator tries to get the better of others by using rhetoric, specious arguments, etc.
In fact, the more I think about it, the more I think Habermas wants us to imagine the first, “genuine” type of dictator. Remember, the key point is the rationality of the position. Anyone can try to dominate others by false rhetorical tactics, and those tactics needn’t be rational in the least. What we want to know is, if the dictator is willing to argue for his actual ethical stance, and claim that his use of shabby, irrational pseudo-arguments is a completely rational means to his ends, could he do it without contradiction? — J
This would be the dissimulating type, above. But consider Thrasymachus again – is he dissimulating? (He’s not a sophist, of course.) I read his arguments as entirely sincere. Indeed, if he’d thought about them more carefully, and taken a better measure of Socrates, he’d have either kept silent or come up with another plan to get his own way (or show off his rhetorical chops!); being sincere didn't work. I’m not too comfortable saying that Socrates reveals a performative contradiction in Thrasymachus’ position, but he certainly reveals that position as undefendable, at least by Thrasymachus, and even causes him to blush with shame. — J
Very interesting. For me, this raises a characteristically modern ethical problem: To what extent is this kind of judgment possible? The analogy with a basketball game places the referee above the intersubjective system (the game), but is this really the case? In one sense, he’s the judge, and his call on a particular play is authoritative; he doesn’t require everyone to agree with him. But in another sense, the referee is completely at the mercy of the rules, to the extent that he’s an accurate and fair judge. — J
Habermas wants the rules of his “game” to arise from “transcendental/pragmatic” intersubjective agreement. The transcendental part is important. This isn’t just a matter of consensus. We’re supposed to understand communicative rationality as invoking certain background conditions that are necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) for rationality to exist. It then becomes pragmatic, because we agree on ways to apply such rationality in our time, in our circumstances. — J
We encounter the dictator and the free-rider in actual life, not merely as philosophical possibilities. We've gotten so used to hearing both these stances expressed (with varying degrees of subtlety, presumably) that we "understand them completely," but we need to ask whether this is really the case. Are we simply assuming their rationality -- a kind of "familiarity breeds plausibility" situation? — J
You place on the one hand the dictator who "tries to get the better of others by using rhetoric, specious arguments," and on the other hand the dictator who uses, "shabby, irrational pseudo-arguments [as] a completely rational means to his ends." They seem like the same thing, not two different things. — Leontiskos
I would welcome the idea that Habermas is open to transcending intersubjectivity and/or consensus, but it remains true that if Habermas is not able to definitively judge someone like the first-person dictator then I don't see how the transcendental part will help him. — Leontiskos
The rules need to be enforced, else they may as well not exist. — Leontiskos
And so the question recurs, "In virtue of what does Habermas' obligation apply to the dictator?" — Leontiskos
I appreciate your patience in trying to understand my posts. — Number2018
for Habermas, the claim for rationality is non-separatable from the binding force of reciprocal recognition of validity claims: "With their illocutionary acts, speaker and hearer raise validity claims and demand they be recognized. But this recognition need not follow irrationally, since the validity claims have a cognitive character and can be checked" — Number2018
Both stances do not satisfy this description of communicative action. One cannot demand recognition of the validity of her egoistic, self-selfish intentions. — Number2018
For Searle, any language usage is precluded by the communication of intended meanings. On the contrary, for Derrida, communication is carried along not by clear subjective intentions but by impersonal performative forces. — Number2018
The stance may be incorporated within endless performative recontextualizations so that Habermas's requirement of the clear cognitive commitment to communication cannot be univocally verified. — Number2018
the performative nature of the participants' illocutionary force remains opaque and undetermined not just in the discussed examples but in most non-normative social situations. — Number2018
I'm sorry if I wasn't clear about the difference between the two. Dictator 1 makes a genuine argument for his ethical stance -- he tries to show why it's rational to get others to do what he wants -- and in the course of making that argument, he mentions (not uses) the shabby pseudo-arguments that are part of his tactics, and perhaps explains why there's nothing wrong with using such rhetoric in service of his rational ends. Dictator 2 merely deploys the bad arguments. Does that help? I'm trying to highlight the difference between making a rational case for using irrational arguments, and actually using them. One could be quite sincere in the first case, but never in the second. — J
But what happens next? That's the "enforcement" part, I suppose. What you say about the dangers of not enforcing rules is no doubt true, but it's a bit outside the scope of what Habermas is arguing for. To carry that thought further, I think we would need to get more precise about what sort of group is engaged in this communicative action. — J
Two answers suggest themselves. The first is, Yes, of course he can. That is exactly what a performative contradiction is -- a violation of the rules. — J
Habermasian communicative rationality begins from the intersubjective origins or constraints of rationality itself. — J
Habermasian communicative rationality begins from the intersubjective origins or constraints of rationality itself. So Ref Habermas, in appealing to rules like "no performative contradiction," isn't appealing to something that transcends intersubjectivity itself. Nor is it something he could have discovered by himself, in solitary transcendental reflection (that would be missing the pragmatic turn). But nor is he saying, "Well, you guys decide and we'll go with the majority opinion." If "definitive" can describe this, then I think a Habermasian judgment can be definitive. — J
In virtue of the dictator's desire, if they have one, to be rational. This sounds weak, but we have to remember that Habermas doesn't think you can just remove yourself from dialogue. That too is, for him, unreasonable. Stephen K. White puts it well: "A refusal by the first-person dictator or the free rider to justify himself requires a systematic renunciation of communicative action which throws his rationality radically into question." — J
For Heidegger, overcoming metaphysics doesn't mean leaving it behind. Like Derrida, he recognizes that it is a matter of revealing what is left unsaid by metaphysics. Metaphysics is ontotheology, the twin features of the ontic, in the form of beings, and the theological, in the guise of the Being of beings, the manner of disclosure of beings as a whole. What metaphysics conceals is the establishment (and re-establishment) of the grounding of Beings as a whole in the uncanniness of the displacing transit of temporality. As long as there are beings there will
be metaphysics. — Joshs
The stance may be incorporated within endless performative recontextualizations so that Habermas's requirement of the clear cognitive commitment to communication cannot be univocally verified.
— Number2018
Excellent point. Does it damage Habermas's theory? It may well, if we insist on understanding "clear cognitive commitment" as being the same as having an intention, and bring to bear some of the standard puzzles about intention. — J
the performative nature of the participants' illocutionary force remains opaque and undetermined not just in the discussed examples but in most non-normative social situations.
— Number2018
Why do you say this? Again, I may not be understanding clearly, but I would have said that "opaque" is much too strong, "undetermined" usually not the case, and that in general we "read" each other's illocutionary stances very well. The question I see being raised is more along the lines of, "But doesn't Habermas assume intention as trumping performance?" How we then go on to determine intention is a separate and, I'm saying, generally easier question. Could you say more? — J
I suppose this brings us back to the same question of what the "first-person dictator" even is, and it feels like we are going in circles. I think the problem is that we have no definition of what 'rational' and 'irrational' are supposed to mean. — Leontiskos
Now you keep raising the possibility that the dictator rationally justify his actions. — Leontiskos
I think what you are saying is that Habermasian judgment is bound up with transcendental reason itself. . . . The implication here would be that the first-person dictator is fundamentally irrational, and that therefore his use of reason is really a faux-use of reason; a performative contradiction.
Personally I think Habermas is more or less correct in this. — Leontiskos
Still, there is no way to pragmatically test whether a "Habermasian definitive judgment" is true. — Leontiskos
I am still unclear about how Habermas is supposed to have improved on Kant. — Leontiskos
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