I agree that there is a kind of circle happening here, or perhaps better, there are two possible paths toward understanding what the dictator is doing, and we keep going down first one, then the other. Down the first path, Dictator 1 remains in communication with others, and tries to justify himself. He attempts (with what sincerity we can't say) to stay within communicative rationality. According to Habermas, this is a performative contradiction because the dictator can't rationally do this. Like it or not, whether he acknowledges it or not, his performative contradiction takes him outside communicative action. — J

I would want to say that if he sincerely attempts to stay within communicative rationality then he isn't a dictator; and that a dictator is precisely someone who does not sincerely attempt to stay within communicative rationality. If someone is sincerely attempting to stay within communicative rationality, then they could not be engaged in performative contradiction, right? If this is right, then to say that his sincerity is unknown is also to say that his status as dictator is unknown. This is a large part of what is tripping me up. Additionally, assuming that he is not sincerely attempting to engage in communicative action, then it would seem that for our purposes he is in the same boat as Dictator 2.

(For Aquinas this relates to the subtle question of when one becomes culpable for a rational omission - it relates to the question of negligence. In this way the dictator is someone who is culpable for their irrationality, and this culpability would represent a sort of second-order irrationality.
It is the second-order irrationality that presumably concerns Habermas, for it is this that constitutes an intentional (or negligent) deviation from the rules of reason themselves.)

Down the other path, Dictator 2 makes no attempt to justify himself -- or perhaps, his justifications make no use of rational argument. Here we want to say that this person has never even entered the arena of communicative action. He might just as well refuse to respond at all (another type of Habermasian irrationality, as we know). — J

To reiterate, if the crucial question is whether one is truly engaging in communicative action, and Dictator 1 is not sincere, then both Dictator 1 and Dictator 2 fall on the same side of that question. It's just that Dictator 1 is more skillful or persuasive in his sophistry (given that Dictator 2 is giving irrational arguments, he is also trying to be persuasive to some extent).

I think we do have definitions, or at least descriptions, of what "rational" and "irrational" mean. We just have to constantly bear in mind that for Habermas, communicative rationality is not the same thing as standard strategic or goal-oriented rationality -- but nor does it replace it. It's an expansion of what it means to be rational. — J

Okay, that makes sense.

But I see a difference between trying to make a case for first-person dictatorship, and simply trying to be one. What I don't know is what kind of difference -- that is, whether the distinction is trivial or irrelevant to the overall conception. — J

Okay. I think the difference is interesting in the sense that it seems that the sincere Dictator 1 is on one side of Dictator 2, and the insincere Dictator 1 is on the other side. Or: | Sincere Dictator 1 > Dictator 2 > Insincere Dictator 1 | ...but again, I'm not sure someone who is sincerely engaged in communicative action can be called a dictator.

Can you say more? I'm not quite following. — J

Well, if you consider your "apophatic approach" above, it seems that his judgment will be to a large extent inscrutable. It surely cannot be arrived at by any guaranteed decision-procedure, any ready-made method.

(again, with what sincerity we can't say; see the discussion with Number2018 above) — J

Yes, it seems that things could get a lot more complicated in this case. I think some of what I am saying does get at 's points about verification procedures.

If Aquinas is right then we can talk about the ontology of the "dictator's" intention or negligence without committing ourselves to the possibility of verifying it epistemologically, and I have been taking this for granted. Intention and negligence are, of course, in principle capable of infinite recursion, and this is why they are not reducible to "naturalistic" decision procedures.

I alluded above to their different conceptions of how practical reason operates. Habermas opposes what he calls "monological" reasoning toward universality. He claims that Kant (and Rawls) do this. Instead, he favors actual dialogue, not thought experiments, an "actually carried out discourse." He wants, for instance, a genuine attempt to learn what exchanging roles would mean when we discuss fairness or justice, not merely the Rawlsian imagining of an Original Position. I would call this an improvement because it truly opens the discussion to the unexpected, and thus emphasizes the equality (not egalitarianism) of communicative action. — J

I find this interesting but engaging it may lead us too far astray. If we were to engage it the first question I would ask is whether Rawls could be seen as providing the first move in a dialogical exchange; or on the other hand, whether a dialogical exchange will always require a Rawlsian- (or Kantian-) like argument to set it into motion; or finally, whether a dialogical exchange will always ultimately conclude in a Rawlsian- (or Kantian-) like argument. Again, feel free to ignore this if it is too far off topic.

(I wanted to squeeze this in, for now I will be offline until Friday.)

‘Clear cognitive commitment’ means that the speaker and her hearer, involved in the speech act, can offer a socially justified account of their communicative action. The intention should have the possibility of making it public, transparent,
and defendable: — Number2018

Thanks, that makes sense.

The point I defend here is that even if "in general, we "read" each other's illocutionary stances very well," in most cases, we cannot accurately account for our performative situations. When asked about our or other intentions, we usually quickly resort to standard explanatory schemes. Habermas admits the necessity of covering the gap. "In order to make necessary statements, we need to change our perspective…We need a theoretically constituted perspective." Yet, the rationality of verifying procedure remains at the level of the logical-positivist constative utterance. In fact, Habermas's commitment to communication verification requirements means resorting to the dogmatic question of reference or constative truth. He has pushed the philosophy of performative forces back to the search for the founding transcendental conditions. — Number2018

There's a lot to unpack here.

- Could you give an example of how a person would resort to standard explanatory schemes concerning their intentions?

- How does the issue of necessary statements arise in this context?

- T/F is certainly one way of deciding a verification question, but why must the verifying procedure remain at this level? Why would the procedure be (necessarily) dogmatic?

I agree that Habermas is searching for transcendental conditions. Are you placing this in opposition to a particular understanding of performativity?

Again, I appreciate your willingness to break this down for me.

Thank you for interesting questions.

- Could you give an example of how a person would resort to standard explanatory schemes concerning their intentions?

- How does the issue of necessary statements arise in this context? — J

Often, one could resort to exposing her intentions during an interview or responding to a personal or professional conflict or misconduct. For Habermas, the primary example of communication coordination is a psychoanalytical dialogue during which participants reach a shared understanding of the common semantic content. He assumes that the asymmetrical inception may establish a symmetrical dialogue where a person and analyst have the same interpretation of the client’s background. Yet, it could be shown that psychoanalysis operates as the framework that imposes a set of boundaries and conditions, pre-given in advance. The participants recognize one another in their proper roles while their statements establish certain points. Seemingly natural and spontaneous, the dialogue is structured to constitute the normative character of the Other, her acts and statements.

- T/F is certainly one way of deciding a verification question, but why must the verifying procedure remain at this level? Why would the procedure be (necessarily) dogmatic? — J

In a more exact sense, the verifying procedure can proceed at two different levels: “Every speech-act-immanent obligation can be made good at two levels: immediately, in the context of the utterance, through indicating a corresponding normative context, or in discourse or in subsequent actions. If the immediate justification does not dispel an ad hoc doubt, we pass to the level of discourse where the subject of discursive examination is the validity of the underlying norm.” (Habermas “Communication and the Evolution of Society”p 67) So, when the ‘underlying norm’ is not immediately apparent, one needs to proceed to the more complicated process of exposing the inherent normative nature.

I agree that Habermas is searching for transcendental conditions. Are you placing this in opposition to a particular understanding of performativity? — J

Habermas’s project is about creating universal pragmatics as a development of the philosophy of performativity and a foundation for a general theory of society. He views his philosophy as opposing the radical critique of Reason in contemporary poststructuralism. He argues that Nietzsche, Derrida, and Foucault are exclusively focused on the role of power, and they cannot escape the ‘performative contradiction’ involved in using Reason to criticize Reason. Emphasizing the role of “the normative content that has to be acquired and justified from the rational potential inherent in everyday practice,” Habermas separates the theory of performativity from diagnosing an entanglement of forces that inheres in any seemingly settled state.

“Every speech-act-immanent obligation can be made good at two levels: immediately, in the context of the utterance, through indicating a corresponding normative context, or in discourse or in subsequent actions. If the immediate justification does not dispel an ad hoc doubt, we pass to the level of discourse where the subject of discursive examination is the validity of the underlying norm.” (Habermas “Communication and the Evolution of Society”p 67) So, when the ‘underlying norm’ is not immediately apparent, one needs to proceed to the more complicated process of exposing the inherent normative nature. — Number2018

Very interesting, thanks.

He views his philosophy as opposing the radical critique of Reason in contemporary poststructuralism. He argues that Nietzsche, Derrida, and Foucault are exclusively focused on the role of power, and they cannot escape the ‘performative contradiction’ involved in using Reason to criticize Reason. — Number2018

Agreed. Richard J. Bernstein, in Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, says this:

Despite his manifest break with the Kantian tradition of transcendental argument, [Habermas] nevertheless leads us to think that a new reconstructive science of communicative action can establish what Kant and his philosophic successors failed to establish -- a solid ground for a communicative ethics.

Interestingly, Bernstein believes this is only one way to describe Habermas's project. He argues that the emphasis should fall more on "pragmatic" than "transcendental," and that Gadamer, for instance, is essentially an ally in this approach, despite their differences. But overall I think you're right to locate Habermas in the tradition of seeking transcendental grounds for our allegiance to Reason. As I was saying in the OP, the valuable progress I see in Habermas is his expansion and analysis of what reason is and does, in actual communication.

If someone is sincerely attempting to stay within communicative rationality, then they could not be engaged in performative contradiction, right? If this is right, then to say that his sincerity is unknown is also to say that his status as dictator is unknown. This is a large part of what is tripping me up. — Leontiskos

Yes, it's complex. I keep thinking, though, that a "sincere dictator" isn't impossible. Consider two scenarios: 1. A rational egoist of some stripe enters into dialogue and lays out a case for an essentially first-personal approach to ethics. In the process of doing this, it becomes clear that a consequence of their case is that there's nothing irrational about trying to get people to do what you want. This puts the dictator in performative contradiction, but it doesn't mean that their sincerity breaks down. The dictator sincerely believes that using duplicitous arguments is OK. 2. The first-person dictator isn't intelligent enough to understand the implications of their theory. The dictator sincerely believes that there's no contradiction, but that's wrong. When it's pointed out, the dictator doesn't understand, and persists in trying to make the case. Here the dictator is in contradiction and perhaps revealed as not much of a philosopher, but again, is their sincerity really in doubt?

To summarize, you keep picturing the dictator as wily and manipulative, fully aware of what they're doing, but that may be giving them too much credit, in a way.

Well, if you consider your "apophatic approach" above, it seems that his judgment will be to a large extent inscrutable. It surely cannot be arrived at by any guaranteed decision-procedure, any ready-made method. — Leontiskos

OK, I understand now. And this would be different from how the referee makes his judgments in a basketball game, I presume. Maybe we need to soften words like "inscrutable" and "incorrigible" (as in "the truth which the judgment discerns will presumably be 'incorrigible'"). Rather than "inscrutable," I think your description that disavows "any guaranteed decision-procedure, any ready-made method" is much closer to the mark. And I don't see incorrigibility as really obtaining here. Communicative action is meant to be reliable, resilient, ethical, useful, truth-discovering, etc., but these results are neither certain nor incorrigible -- at least that's my reading of Habermas.

the first question I would ask is whether Rawls could be seen as providing the first move in a dialogical exchange; or on the other hand, whether a dialogical exchange will always require a Rawlsian- (or Kantian-) like argument to set it into motion; or finally, whether a dialogical exchange will always ultimately conclude in a Rawlsian- (or Kantian-) like argument. Again, feel free to ignore this if it is too far off topic. — Leontiskos

Good questions, and I wonder about them too. It's all very well to oppose a Habermasian "actually carried out discourse" with something more abstract, like the Original Position, but what is Habermas really picturing here? Who calls the meeting into session (seriously)? What sort of time commitments are the participants imagined as having? Is there a kind of pre-nup that specifies the normative commitments? My only experience with an "actually carried out discourse" that resembles this somewhat is Quaker governance at my college.

Yes, it's complex. I keep thinking, though, that a "sincere dictator" isn't impossible. Consider two scenarios: 1. A rational egoist of some stripe enters into dialogue and lays out a case for an essentially first-personal approach to ethics. In the process of doing this, it becomes clear that a consequence of their case is that there's nothing irrational about trying to get people to do what you want. This puts the dictator in performative contradiction, but it doesn't mean that their sincerity breaks down. The dictator sincerely believes that using duplicitous arguments is OK. 2. The first-person dictator isn't intelligent enough to understand the implications of their theory. The dictator sincerely believes that there's no contradiction, but that's wrong. When it's pointed out, the dictator doesn't understand, and persists in trying to make the case. Here the dictator is in contradiction and perhaps revealed as not much of a philosopher, but again, is their sincerity really in doubt? — J

I would say that case (1) need not involve "duplicitous arguments," and therefore it is not clear that a rational egoist is a dictator. The key is that egoism as a doctrine need not engage in duplicity, and the effect is that interactions between individuals will be interactions between self-consciously egoist individuals, such that all are "playing by the same rules." On egoism either no one is engaged in communicative action, or else everyone is partially engaged to the same extent. The person in case (2) does not seem to be a dictator, both because they are merely making an innocuous mistake, and because they remain within communicative/egalitarian action, trying to convince and persuade their interlocutors.

To summarize, you keep picturing the dictator as wily and manipulative, fully aware of what they're doing, but that may be giving them too much credit, in a way. — J

As above, they need only be negligent, not malicious. The point as I see it is that someone is either a dictator or else they are not a dictator, and part of being a dictator is insincerity vis-a-vis egalitarian values. At every point you give a mixture, someone who is part dictator and part non-dictator. For example, in case (2) the person is a dictator insofar as they are privileging their own perspective over that of the other participants, failing to give equal consideration. Yet they are not a dictator insofar as they "persist in trying to make the case," because someone who believes that they are obligated to argue and convince others is granting those others a quasi-equal status. Their sincerity doesn't make them a sincere dictator, it makes them a non-dictator (if the sincerity is sufficient). Let me put it this way: no one can be fully dictatorial while being at the same time fully sincere vis-a-vis communicative action. Sincerity of this kind always impairs dictatorship.

OK, I understand now. And this would be different from how the referee makes his judgments in a basketball game, I presume. Maybe we need to soften words like "inscrutable" and "incorrigible" (as in "the truth which the judgment discerns will presumably be 'incorrigible'"). Rather than "inscrutable," I think your description that disavows "any guaranteed decision-procedure, any ready-made method" is much closer to the mark. And I don't see incorrigibility as really obtaining here. Communicative action is meant to be reliable, resilient, ethical, useful, truth-discovering, etc., but these results are neither certain nor incorrigible -- at least that's my reading of Habermas. — J

First, I would say that the referee's judgments are inscrutable in the same way. He makes a definitive decision in himself. Even if he gets fired later his decision will stand. Second, the whole point here is that the necessary definitive decision goes beyond Habermas' communicative action. Habermas does not want incorrigibility to obtain, and yet it must obtain if rationality is to prevail over democratic consensus.

At some point a decision must be made for oneself. Adverting to my thread, communicative action relies on a variety of hypothetical ought-judgments vis-a-vis other participants. But at the end of the day a definitive judgment must be made: a non-hypothetical ought-judgment. The President can deliberate with his cabinet as much as he likes, but when all is said and done he must render a decision, and he is the one responsible for the decision rendered.

In a 2008 address, Pope Benedict XVI makes mention of Rawls and Habermas:

. . .I find it significant that Habermas speaks of sensibility to the truth as a necessary element in the process of political argument, thereby reintroducing the concept of truth into philosophical and political debate.

At this point, though, Pilate’s question becomes unavoidable: What is truth? And how can it be recognized? If in our search for an answer we have recourse to “public reason”, as Rawls does, then further questions necessarily follow: What is reasonable? How is reason shown to be true?. . . — La Sapienza (Science, Technology, and Faith), by Pope Benedict XVI

The point I would make is that immanentism is harmful to truth/rationality, whether it occurs in authoritarian or democratic forms. Intersubjective or contextualist (democratic) ethics/politics is not simply the remedy to tyranny; it becomes its own form of tyranny when it is divorced from a "sensibility to the truth." It seems like Habermas is at least aware of this problem, whether or not his theory ultimately accounts for it.

Good questions, and I wonder about them too. It's all very well to oppose a Habermasian "actually carried out discourse" with something more abstract, like the Original Position, but what is Habermas really picturing here? Who calls the meeting into session (seriously)? What sort of time commitments are the participants imagined as having? Is there a kind of pre-nup that specifies the normative commitments? My only experience with an "actually carried out discourse" that resembles this somewhat is Quaker governance at my college. — J

Right, and some of it does smell like idealistic democratization, or perhaps an unfettered democratic principle. As Ratzinger (Benedict XVI) has often pointed out, the democratic principle and the rational principle are not the same thing, and are therefore liable to come into tension. I still see Habermas as trying construct a democratic (egalitarian) rationality, and as Aristotle points out, there is a kind of rationality proper to democratic regimes, but this is not the highest form of rationality.

After reading Number2018's posts more closely I read a bit on Habermas. I had mistakenly assumed that Habermas was explicitly restricting communicative action to "constative utterance." I didn't realize that his theory was meant to be so broad, undergirding society itself.