...but in that trashy book of lies, the guardian, so you won't have seen it. — Banno

For almost a decade after qualifying, Duxbury worked as a livestock specialist and a stud person for national farming companies.

Is that some UKian agricultural usage which is very different from USian usage?

It's a farm hand specific stud horse programmes, to my knowledge.

:wink:

Maybe you need to get out more.

...a stud person for national farming companies.

Is that some UKian agricultural usage which is very different from USian usage? — wonderer1

A special program to breed more blind farmers?

I thank you, at least, for making this one easy to respond to:

Suffice to say, in response to your clear implications, nothing you've provided gives me anything new. It may be worth stepping back from the constant internal accusations you throw at people, which undergird many of your responses :) — AmadeusD

recognising it as a cow consists in not running for the gate because it's a bull, keeping a eye out for pats on the surrounding ground, counting how many cows there are as opposed to kangaroos, and so on. That is it consist in interacting with the cow and with other things. You know it is a cow by those interactions - indeed, knowing it is a cow is those interactions. — Banno

I think you've identified one factor. If that's all there was, the art of identification would be unlearnable. But that is about interpretation of what you sense. I told you I sensed an odor, and I know I've encountered it before, but I don't know what to call it, and I don't know where it comes from (although it may be that I know it, but the memory is unavailable for some reason).

So my phenomenology says interpretation is secondary. Language is secondary. You can recognize what you sense even though you can't identify it. I can, anyway. You may not be able to.

Veridical experiences are caused by some appropriate proximal stimulus, e.g. seeing the colour red when light with a wavelength of 700nm interacts with the eyes, or feeling pain when putting one’s hand in a fire. — Michael

What you're missing is the fact that light carries a great deal of information about distal objects, from which it follows that, contrary to your claims, we do have reliable knowledge of distal objects. Perhaps you're trading on the absurd demand for certainty. We have reliable, certain in the relative but not certain in the artificial "absolute" sense, knowledge of external objects.

it follows that, contrary to your claims, we do have reliable knowledge of distal objects. — Janus

It does not. Though, your point is a good one for less-discursive IRists.

e have reliable, certain in the relative but not certain in the artificial "absolute" sense, knowledge of external objects. — Janus

This seems to betray the idea that we have some 'direct' relationship with those objects, no?

This seems to betray the idea that we have some 'direct' relationship with those objects, no? — AmadeusD

No it just shows how inadequate the 'direct/ indirect' parlance is, and how pointless it is to be arguing over what amount to merely different ways of talking in different contexts.

We have a reliable relationship with those objects, and with the world, and that is all that matters.

We have a reliable relationship with those objects, and with the world, and that is all that matters. — Janus

While I didn't skip over the line before this one, this strikes me as giving up. It's all that matters for every-day consideration, but within this thread that is wholly inadequate, I think.

Returning to the previous line, yes. But clearing up the language gives us every reason to reject DR so I can see why this is the case :)

I am, partially, joking. I realise this isn't cut and dried.

While I didn't skip over the line before this one, this strikes me as giving up. It's all that matters for every-day consideration, but within this thread that is wholly inadequate, I think. — AmadeusD

The point is that attempting to frame what we (reliably?) know about perception in a way that undermines the very assumption of reliability we are relying upon is a self-defeating exercise. And attempting to frame things in absolute terms, as though there is a real fact of the matter, rather than merely competing or alternative interpretations and their attendant ways of speaking is a lost cause in any case.

Our thinking is inevitably dualistic, and we have no reason to think reality is dualistic, so we have to accept our limitations and uncertainty if we want to be intellectually honest. So, we have every reason to reject the whole debate as being wrongheaded from the get-go.

Given that both "I see cows" and "I see colours" is true, what do you think direct and indirect realists are arguing about? — Michael

I think direct and indirect realists are arguing over whether we perceive the world directly or whether we perceive mental representations (or some other intermediary) of the world.

While I believe that mental representations are necessarily involved in perception, or that perceptions are mental representations, I reject the indirect realist view that we perceive mental representations.

My view is that the brain represents the world to us in cases of sensory perception, and that the representation is the act of seeing; Therefore, we do not perceive the representation. If perceptions are mental representations, as per my view, then it would require a prior mental representation in order to perceive the first mental representation; a prior perception in order to perceive the first perception.

You claim that "I see cows" and "I see colours" is true, but on the proviso that you see colours directly and see cows only indirectly. I make no such distinction. When I see cows and their colours, I make no distinction between seeing the colours directly and the cows indirectly. My brain represents the cows to me in the act of seeing, and the colours are a part of that singular representation. I do not see a mental representation; I see the cows. And I see them in colour.

How, then, do I see colours if they are not in the world? Because that's just what human seeing is (normally); that's how our brains visually represent the world. That's what it means to "see" objects.

The problem I have with indirect realism, although it correctly identifies the necessity of representation, is that it begins from a position prior to representation or perception, and from there it claims to perceive representations. Indirect realists posit an intermediary mental representation between our perceptions and the world, but if our perceptions are mental representations, as I posit, then in order to perceive this intermediary representation of the world, a (second) representation of this intermediary representation is required. And so on.

If perceptions are mental representations, then we do not perceive mental representations (of objects). The only possible intermediary between a perception and a real object must be located in the (external) world.

If that's the same as what you mean by "I see cows" or "I see colours", then I guess we are both direct realists.

What you're missing is the fact that light carries a great deal of information about distal objects, from which it follows that, contrary to your claims, we do have reliable knowledge of distal objects. Perhaps you're trading on the absurd demand for certainty. We have reliable, certain in the relative but not certain in the artificial "absolute" sense, knowledge of external objects. — Janus

I didn't say that we don't have reliable knowledge. I said that we don't have direct knowledge.

I don’t see how this relates to whether we perceive objects directly or indirectly or, in particular, how it relates to the supposed perception of representations or perceptual intermediaries. This is the philosophical substance of the dispute as I understand it. Direct realists claim we do not perceive any perceptual intermediary or representation, whereas indirect realists claim that we do.

Furthermore, I don’t see why a direct realist must hold the view that “distal objects and their properties are constituents of experience” in the physical sense that you suppose. A direct realist can have an unmediated perception without the perception needing to be the perceived object. Otherwise, it’s just a strawman of perception. — Luke

What does it mean to directly see something?

By "directly see X" naive and indirect realists mean that X is a constituent of experience, so when naive realists say that we directly see distal objects they are saying that distal objects are constituents of experience and when indirect realists say that we don't directly see distal objects they are saying that distal objects are not constituents of experience.

You're welcome to mean something else by "directly see X" but in doing so you're no longer addressing indirect realism.

I think there's this assumption you're making that there's some singular agreed upon meaning of "directly see X" that everyone is using and that each group just disagrees on which things satisfy this meaning, but that's a mistake. See Semantic Direct Realism.

Either we see distal objects, or we see mental phenomena. It cannot be both. — creativesoul

Yes it can. I feel pain and I feel the fire. I see cows and I see colours.

I'll offer you the same answer as given to Frank, above. Blind, illiterate mutes can herd cows. You account seems a bit ableist...

We do not simply passively "experience" cows. we feed them, move them into yards, slaughter them and eat them.

All this by way of pointing out that the "constituents of our experience" are not one way, from world to mind; we also change what is in the world, and this is part of our experience of the world. While you read this, you are already formulating your reply.

And you do not feed, herd, slaughter and eat sense impressions. — Banno

The debate between naive and indirect realists does not concern whether or not we can feed or slaughter cows. It concerns whether or not our perception of cows counts as "direct perception" according to some relevant meaning of "direct perception".

To put it simply, "we feed cows, therefore direct realism is true" is a very obvious non sequitur.

Specifically, the debate between naive and indirect realists concerns the relationship between the phenomenal character of experience and the mind-independent nature of distal objects (and its epistemological implications).

That seems non-productively reductionist to me.
— wonderer1

It seems consistent with the scientific evidence. Experience exists within the brain. Distal objects exist outside the brain. Therefore, distal objects are not constituents of experience. — Michael

This just seems another example of how this discussion doesn't seem to be about much more than semantic preferences.

It is quite consistent with scientific evidence to say that experiences occur in space-time regions, and an example of such an occurrence would be light reflecting off a cow and into my eye, resulting in my recognition that 'there is a cow playing a causal role in my experience'.

This way of conceivng of experiences allows, "I shared the experience of seeing the total eclipse with...", to make sense. Conceiving of experiences in a way that doesn't allow for shared experiences is not a way of thinking that I would expect scientists to be very inclined to.

Why would the brain represent the world to you if you weren’t to view the representation?

And attempting to frame things in absolute terms, as though there is a real fact of the matter, rather than merely competing or alternative interpretations and their attendant ways of speaking is a lost cause in any case. — Janus

This is what I intimate strikes me as giving up.
I do not think you're adequately grappling with the problem. AS noted, when the language and grammar are clear, and we're not instantiating multiple concepts with one term or too-closely-related terms, two things happen: your position becomes untenable, because it is utterly clear that: DR is nonsensical, unless you refuse to get to the bottom of it, and return to misusing language (for that purpose, that is).

Obviously, I agree that large parts of the framing are wrong, and that most of the exchanges in this thread (largely Banno, unfortunately) ensure that this framing is adhered to, instead of progressing - but it is entirely counter to intuition and clear language that there is no appreciable distinction, or that its an issue of interpretation. We have an empirical consideration we are trying to name. There is nothing grey about htis.

So, we have every reason to reject the whole debate as being wrongheaded from the get-go. — Janus

This may be the case, if you don't like the conclusions intimated by cleaning up the discussion - and that seems a very common way to duck out in these, admittedly very, very trying, circumstances. But i push forward... I don't like the idea that we ahve no direct access to the world. It seems patent. Its uncomfortable. The two are not linked.

in these, admittedly very, very trying, circumstances. But i push forward... — AmadeusD

:lol: Life is so hard sometimes.

:up:

I didn't say that we don't have reliable knowledge. I said that we don't have direct knowledge. — Michael

How could we have reliable knowledge of objects if they were not experienced by us?

This is all just hand-waving and insinuation. When you present an actual argument I'll address it.

How could we have reliable knowledge of objects if they were not experienced by us? — Janus

Are you referencing the problem of induction? There is no clear answer to that. According to the scientific method a statistical significance of five sigma is accepted as the criterion for reliable knowledge of unobservable entities like the Higgs boson. In everyday life we're not so strict. I did not directly experience Joe Biden's inauguration but I think I have reliable knowledge that he was inaugurated.

Regularity, predictability, and common sense seem like sufficient criterion for most cases. But it's not infallible, hence the warrant for healthy scepticism.

Why would the brain represent the world to you if you weren’t to view the representation? — NOS4A2

The representation is the condition for seeing something, not some thing that you see.

According to the scientific method, a statistical significance of five sigma is accepted as the criterion for reliable knowledge of unobservable entities like the Higgs boson. — Michael

Think how much greater than five sigma confidence people would have to have in all those distal objects such as measurement instruments, computers, and a bunch of scientists, to have a reason to believe a five sigma level confidence for the Higgs Boson.

Either we see distal objects, or we see mental phenomena. It cannot be both.
— creativesoul

Yes it can. I feel pain and I feel the fire. I see cows and I see colours. — Michael

Well, you're right about one thing, we can see both, but not in the way you're claiming. I've mentioned before about hallucinations and that they are existentially dependent upon earlier seeing the real thing(veridical experiences). What you're doing here is incoherent/self-contradictory.

Earlier you claimed that there are no distal objects in experience. By definition, nonetheless. There cannot be according to the notion of experience you've been arguing for/from.

Seeing is experience. Cows are distal objects. Fire is as well. We see constituents. Earlier you replaced distal objects with representations thereof.

How do you reconcile that?

Think how much greater than five sigma confidence people would have to have in all those distal objects such as measurement instruments, computers, and a bunch of scientists, to have a reason to believe a five sigma level confidence for the Higgs Boson. — wonderer1

Yup. There's the performative contradiction Janus pointed at earlier.

I don't like the idea that we have no direct access to the world. — AmadeusD

What does our biological machinery do then, if not directly connect us to the world? Sometimes the causal chain is longer than others, but it is a direct link between the creature and the world nonetheless.

Biological machinery interacts physically with distal objects.

The indirect realist uses knowledge of how biological machinery works as ground to deny that we directly perceive distal objects. If we adhere strictly to the preferred framing of folk like Michael and perhaps yourself(?), we would have to deny any and all physical contact between cows and eyes. If we extend that criterion to other senses, we would be forced to say that physically forcing our face into a pudding pie and withdrawing it would not count as directly perceiving the pie. Even if and when our eyes were/are open.

Are you referencing the problem of induction? — Michael

No, I'm not talking about inferences to the explanations for observed phenomena, I'm talking about observed phenomena. Things are experienced and that is how we comes to know their characteristics and attributes. If we were not able to observe, interact with, act upon and be acted upon by things we would know nothing about them. But that is not the case, things are experienced by us, and we do know things about them.

So it seems absurd to say that things are not constituents of our experience. This is the only salient issue, not the pointless debate about preferred parlances between 'direct' and 'indirect', either of which can be rendered as a coherent way of speaking about what we know about perception (and if we didn't know anything about distal objects, we would not know anything about perception). It all just depends on context.

The representation is the condition for seeing something, not some thing that you see.

The condition of the body, I presume?

I’m curious because as far as I know representations prohibit us from seeing the world, and I’m interested in how you can see (or represent) around them.

The condition of the body, I presume? — NOS4A2

Yes.

I’m curious because as far as I know representations prohibit us from seeing the world, and I’m interested in how you can see (or represent) around them. — NOS4A2

How do representations prohibit us from seeing the world? I think you may be referring to seeing a representation of the world (instead of the world)?

What I am talking about is sight as a representation (an internal representation) of the world. In order to see anything, the things we see are internally represented. So we need an internal representation in order to see the world (or to see anything). That’s a very basic description of my understanding of how sight works.

What you are referring to—seeing a representation of the world instead of the world—would require us to have sight, or an internal representation, in the first place. Otherwise, we would not see anything, including seeing a representation instead of the world.

ETA: You don’t see an internal representation; sight is an internal representation.