Indirect Realism and Direct Realism

Michael

Do you think that indirect realists can accept that distal objects are the proximate cause of experience? That is the sense I meant. — fdrake

Well, certainly not when it comes to sight where the proximal cause is light. In the case of touch and taste they'd agree.

fdrake

Well, certainly not when it comes to sight where the proximal stimulus is the light. In the case of touch and taste they'd agree. — Michael

Thanks.

Why do you think that the proximate cause for touch and taste is the distal object but not for sight? How about hearing? Kinaesthesis?

Michael

Why do you think that the proximate cause for touch and taste is the distal object but not for sight? How about hearing? — fdrake

The proximal cause is the entity that stimulates the sense receptors. With sight it's light, with hearing it's sound, with smell it's odour molecules in the air, and with touch and taste it's the distal object itself.

This is the terminology adopted from here:

The process of perception begins with an object in the real world, known as the distal stimulus or distal object. By means of light, sound, or another physical process, the object stimulates the body's sensory organs. These sensory organs transform the input energy into neural activity—a process called transduction. This raw pattern of neural activity is called the proximal stimulus. These neural signals are then transmitted to the brain and processed. The resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus is the percept.

To explain the process of perception, an example could be an ordinary shoe. The shoe itself is the distal stimulus. When light from the shoe enters a person's eye and stimulates the retina, that stimulation is the proximal stimulus. The image of the shoe reconstructed by the brain of the person is the percept. Another example could be a ringing telephone. The ringing of the phone is the distal stimulus. The sound stimulating a person's auditory receptors is the proximal stimulus. The brain's interpretation of this as the "ringing of a telephone" is the percept.

The different kinds of sensation (such as warmth, sound, and taste) are called sensory modalities or stimulus modalities.

Pierre-Normand

I don't understand the distinction. Interpretation is a mental phenomenon. Either way, like above, I don't see how it's relevant to the dispute between direct and indirect realism. — Michael

Yes, interpretation is a mental act. The things that you perceive can (and must) be interpreted in this or that way to be perceived as such. There is no uninterpreted percept. However, when you imagine or hallucinate a duck, there can be no question of reinterpreting what it is that you imagined or hallucinated, as a rabbit, for imagining it as a duck furnishes the mental phenomenon with its specific content. This is a categorical distinction between perceiving an object, or picture, and experiencing an hallucination or illusion. So, when you suggest than when a person looks at an actual duck, the distal object (the duck) causes a mental phenomenon in their brain and it is this proximal object that they directly see (and infer the existence of an "external" duck from), I am asking, is this proximal object that they see something that is already interpreted or is it rather something that is still ambiguous (like, say, a structured bundle of colors and shapes)?

Michael

I am asking, is this proximal object that they see something that is already interpreted or still ambiguous (as, say, a bundle of colors and shapes)? — Pierre-Normand

It's interpreted. When there's something ambiguous like the duck-rabbit I can switch between seeing the duck and seeing the rabbit without any change in the shapes or colours.

Pierre-Normand

It's interpreted. When there's something ambiguous like the duck-rabbit I can "switch" between seeing the duck and seeing the rabbit without any change in the shapes or colours. — Michael

Why is it, then, that you can't focus your attention on the proximal mental image and reinterpret it? Isn't it because this "mental image" already is an act of interpreting what is out there rather than it being an act of "seeing" what's in the brain?

Michael

Why is it, then, that you can't focus your attention on the proximal mental image and reinterpret it? Isn't it because this "mental image" already is an act of interpreting what is out there rather than it being an act of "seeing" what's in the brain? — Pierre-Normand

I think you're reading something into the meaning of the word "seeing" that just isn't there.

When we have a visual experience we describe it using the English phrase "I see X". You seem to want to separate this phrase into three distinct parts such that "I", "see", and "X" are distinct entities. I think that this is sometimes a mistake, much like doing the same to the phrase "I feel pain" would be a mistake.

The indirect realist claims that we do not have direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are not constituents of experience. The constituents of experience – smells, tastes, colours – are (interpreted) mental phenomena, and I smell smells, taste tastes, and see colours. So the indirect realist, perhaps cumbersomely, says that we smell and taste and see mental phenomena.

The direct (naive) realist claims that we do have direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are constituents of experience. The constituents of experience – smells, tastes, colours – are mind-independent properties of distal objects, and I smell smells, taste tastes, and see colours. So the direct realist says that we smell and taste and see mind-independent properties of distal objects.

You (and others) seem to be getting unnecessarily lost in the grammar of "I see X", but this is a red herring. The relevant concern is the reasoning that precedes such a claim, i.e. are distal objects and their properties constituents of experience and so do we have direct knowledge of distal objects and their properties. If you accept that they're not and that we don't then you're an indirect realist, even if you don't like indirect realist grammar and would rather continue to say "I see distal objects".

Lionino

So idealists believe our perceptions are the objects? What brand of idealists does that? — Mww

Well, in broad lines, Berkeley. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berkeley/#2.1.1

Perceptions are that which affords the immediate consciousness of the real, in a sensation. — Mww

Which doesn't protect you against the uncertainty of whether those perceptions are really of the outside world or generated by your own mind.

creativesoul

The indirect realist claims that we do not have direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are not constituents of experience. The constituents of experience – smells, tastes, colours – are (interpreted) mental phenomena, and I smell smells, taste tastes, and see colours. So the indirect realist, perhaps cumbersomely, says that we smell and taste and see mental phenomena. — Michael

Veridical perception, hallucination, and illusions. You claim they share the same constituents, and the difference is in their causes.

Can you set out the different causes?

The direct (naive) realist claims that we do have direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are constituents of experience. The constituents of experience – smells, tastes, colours – are mind-independent properties of distal objects, and I smell smells, taste tastes, and see colours. So the direct realist says that we smell and taste and see mind-independent properties of distal objects. — Michael

There's the semantic hijacking. Odd coming from someone who has charged so many here, including myself, with strawmen. I consider myself a direct realist as I argue that distal objects are necessary for all three kinds of perception. They are what's being perceived in every veridical and illusory case, but they're absent during hallucination(which is the biological machinery behaving as it has in past despite no distal object). Since all three kinds are existentially dependent upon distal objects, but hallucinations do not include distal objects, there are differences in their constitution, although they are all three existentially dependent upon distal objects. Hallucinations arise from veridical experience. Whether or not I'm a 'naive' realist about perception/experience, I'll leave for others. I don't care about the label. I care about the accounting practices being used to characterize the evolutionary progression of biological machinery.

Coffee does not have an inherent property of taste. Cake does not have an inherent property of smell. Cups do not have an inherent property of color. We taste coffee. We smell cake. We see red cups. Tasting coffee is an experience. Smelling cake is an experience. Seeing red cups is an experience. Without coffee there can be no experience of tasting coffee. Without experience of tasting coffee there can be no hallucination thereof. Without cake there can be no experience of smelling cake. Without experience of smelling cake, there can be no hallucination of smelling cake. Without cups with a specific reflective outer layer, there can be no seeing red cups. Without seeing red cups, there can be no hallucination thereof.

You (and others) seem to be getting unnecessarily lost in the grammar of "I see X", but this is a red herring. The relevant concern is the reasoning that precedes such a claim, i.e. are distal objects and their properties constituents of experience and so do we have direct knowledge of distal objects and their properties. If you accept that they're not and that we don't then you're an indirect realist, even if you don't like indirect realist grammar and would rather continue to say "I see distal objects". — Michael

Semantic hijacking of "experience".

Without cups...

Mww

Perceptions are that which affords the immediate consciousness of the real, in a sensation.
— Mww

Which doesn't protect you against the uncertainty of whether those perceptions are really of the outside world or generated by your own mind. — Lionino

If it be granted the senses inform but do not judge, the notion here of protection from mental uncertainty regarding mere perception, is moot.

The physiological certainty on the other hand, manifest as an affect on the sensory apparatuses by real things external to those apparatuses, which just is that affordance, and from which sensations necessarily follow, is given and is thereby incontestable, insofar as the negation or denial of a given, is self-contradictory.

To even suppose the mind generates the very perceptions which occassion the pursuit of knowledge as a cognitive terminus, is to anesthetize the human intellectual system from its empirical predicates, which is tantamount to denying to Nature its proper authority as arbiter of human experience.

Lionino

If it be granted the senses inform but do not judge, the notion here of protection from mental uncertainty regarding mere perception, is moot. — Mww

That is true — I just felt the need to point it out anyway.

The physiological certainty on the other hand, manifest as an affect on the sensory apparatuses by real things external to those apparatuses, which just is that affordance, and from which sensations necessarily follow, is given and is thereby incontestable, insofar as the negation or denial of a given, is self-contradictory. — Mww

I don't fully understand this, maybe there are typos? Can you rephrase?

To even suppose the mind generates the very perceptions which occassion the pursuit of knowledge as a cognitive terminus, is to anesthetize the human intellectual system from its empirical predicates, which is tantamount to denying to Nature its proper authority as arbiter of human experience. — Mww

That is true, but it is possible to deny nature of its authority by doubting our access to it, in an intellectual exercise of skepticism (brain-in-a-vat as an example).

Michael

Veridical perception, hallucination, and illusions. You claim they share the same constituents, and the difference is in their causes.

Can you set out the different causes? — creativesoul

Veridical experiences are caused by some appropriate proximal stimulus, e.g. seeing the colour red when light with a wavelength of 700nm interacts with the eyes, or feeling pain when putting one’s hand in a fire.

Illusions are like veridical experiences but where the features of the experience provide a misleading representation of the proximal stimulus or distal object, e.g. if the shape in the percept is a bent line but the shape of the distal object is a straight line. This usually occurs when something manipulates the proximal stimulus (e.g. light) before it reaches the sense organ (e.g. eyes).

Hallucinations occur without some appropriate proximal stimulus, e.g. seeing coloured shapes when one’s eyes are closed because one has eaten psychedelics.

They are what's being perceived in every veridical and illusory case — creativesoul

Which means what?

I have been trying to explain that when naive realists claim that some distal object is (directly) perceived they mean that the object is a literal constituent of the experience and that when indirect realists claim that some distal object is not (directly) perceived they mean that the object is not a literal constituent of the experience.

Since all three kinds are existentially dependent upon distal objects, but hallucinations do not include distal objects, there are differences in their constitution — creativesoul

That doesn’t follow. That X depends on Y is not that Y is a constituent of X. A painting depends on a painter but the painter is not a constituent of the painting. The constituents of the painting are just paint and a canvas.

You seem to be confusing constituent with cause. See here for why that’s wrong. Intentionalism is not naive realism.

Mww

Can you rephrase? — Lionino

Hmmmm…ok, try this: guy stubs his toe on a tree root, cannot then legitimately deny he stubbed his toe on a tree root. He might claim he didn’t in order to save face after removing the leaves from his hair and whatnot, but reason won’t allow him to intelligently disregard the fact there was a time when he was no longer upright, however temporary that condition may have been.

While this a trivial example, the principle which sustains it is nonetheless congruent with that for which experience, hence the perception which is its occassion, is merely possible. Although, there is precedent wherein denial of a sensation follows from the inability to comprehend its cause, but this is improper application of human cognitive methodology. Guy might say he didn’t see the thing because he couldn’t figure out what it was, but this is only half true, in that he is justified in not knowing a thing but that doesn’t relieve him of admitting its being met with his own sensibility.

Dunno if that was any help or not. Might’a just made it worse, for which I offer apologies.

Lionino

↪Mww

If I do understand it, it doesn't seem to account for hallucinations, and if it does, I am not sure how "real" in

Perceptions are that which affords the immediate consciousness of the real — Mww

is valid.

Mww

….doesn't seem to account for hallucinations…. — Lionino

In the interest of metaphysical doctrines by which the rules of a given system are determined, hallucinations are merely the exceptions to them. In conjunction then, with the current understandings, in which hallucinations are different from delusions, the former sensory the latter cognitive, it is theoretically consistent and logically sufficient to find something they both have in common, and, is susceptible to error on its own accord.

A good candidate for that, is imagination, an added bonus resident in the fact imagination is that faculty whose function it is to synthesis the conceptions in a relation, from which follows that if imagination combines, say, concepts that do not belong to each in the construction of its sensory phenomena, e.g., flying animals with antlers, hallucinations are given, and if imagination combines concepts in the construction of its cognitions, e.g., to see one mountain is to see them all, delusions are given.

While this is all well and good, there is nothing contained in synthesis itself of which we are conscious. Thus, another faculty is required, such that the errors the system makes are brought to the attention of that which is conscious of them, and this faculty, is judgement, a component of understanding. Here, in judgement, the phenomenon “flying animal with antlers” is just confusing, where the delusion from cognition, is utterly irrational

But even that is not enough, insofar as there must be a means for self-correction, given that both hallucination with its empirical ground or delusion with its logical ground, contradict experience. And that faculty, is the Mighty and Highly Esteemed Judge Advocate General, reason.

But with respect to your misgivings, I submit that the objects of hallucination are just as real as far as the physiology of perception and the necessary subsequent sensations given from them, as those that are not hallucinatory. None of my senses can tell the difference between a hallucination and a not-hallucination. So saying, the possibility of error arises from a glitch in the system downstream from mere perception, at least from a metaphysical point of view.

Which is probably why we have psychologists nowadays, so we can be told what’s wrong with us, rather than accepting the intrinsic fallibility of the system with which Nature….theoretically…..saw fit to burden us, and allowing it the opportunity….theoretically….to fix itself.

See what happens when you say there weren’t any idealists here? One of ‘em inevitably has to pipe up and put forth his brand of stuff, just to prove you wrong. (Grin)

Banno

Thanks for mentioning the SPR article on the problem of perception. Tim Crane, who authored it, was the perfect person for the job. What feature of intentionalism is it that you wish to retain that you think might be compatible with disjunctivism? — Pierre-Normand

Well, I've been using Austin's arguments here, despite being well aware of Anscombe's excellent critique. For the purposes of this thread the story is about why indirect realism is wrong; that's a different topic to which story is right. There's a whole lot more going on here than ever gets addressed in these threads.

But to be a bit more specific, we've all by now seen the man in the gorilla suit in the basketball game. Our perception is directed, intentional. While you are reading this you are ignoring the stuff going on around you, the itch of those haemorrhoids, the noise from the other room, the smell of the coffee. Other views of perception fail to give this aspect its proper place, they are excessively passive. This is the advantage of intentionalism: that perception is intentional, an action we perform.

I'm not convinced that intentionalism is obligated to accept the common kind claim, as is suggested in the SEP article.

Perhaps a thread specifically on The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature would attract some interest. But it's not an easy paper.

Thanks for the question.

Banno

There's a qualitative difference only in the sense that there's a qualitative difference between photorealism and cubism; it's still just paint on canvas. It's not as if in the veridical case distal objects and their properties are constituents of the experience. — Michael

Amusing, but it's a qualitative difference like there's a qualitative difference between cubism and method acting. While you might get to watch either, the context is quite different, as is the way one thinks about each.

It's not as if in the veridical case distal objects and their properties are constituents of the experience. — Michael

Isn't that the very point at issue?

The discussion moves on to talk of interpretation. I don't think that term quite strong enough. it doesn't capture the way in which we are embedded in what we see, touch, smell and feel, nor how that is set in place by our interactions with others, especially in terms of language.

frank

By the way, I'm presently detecting an odor that I know I've smelled before, but I can't remember what it is or what it's called. I think it may be a flower, but I don't know. That shows that you don't have to know a name for something to recognize it and be keenly aware of it. Although I have Asperger's, so I may be wired differently.

Pierre-Normand

Well, I've been using Austin's arguments here, despite being well aware of Anscombe's excellent critique. For the purposes of this thread the story is about why indirect realism is wrong; that's a different topic to which story is right. There's a whole lot more going on here than ever gets addressed in these threads.

But to be a bit more specific, we've all by now seen the man in the gorilla suit in the basketball game. Our perception is directed, intentional. While you are reading this you are ignoring the stuff going on around you, the itch of those haemorrhoids, the noise from the other room, the smell of the coffee. Other views of perception fail to give this aspect its proper place, they are excessively passive. This is the advantage of intentionalism: that perception is intentional, an action we perform.

I'm not convinced that intentionalism is obligated to accept the common kind claim, as is suggested in the SEP article.

Perhaps a thread specifically on The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature would attract some interest. But it's not an easy paper. — Banno

I haven't read Anscombe's paper. I have read Austin's Sense and Sensibilia and was very impressed by it. The active character of perception that you rightly stress doesn't clash with the outlook of the disjunctivist authors that I mentioned. Tim Crane in his SEP article means "intentionalism" in a different way to signify intentional content, or "intentional inexistence" in Brentano's sense.

"Intentionalists hold that what is in common between veridical experiences and indistinguishable hallucinations/illusions is their intentional content: roughly speaking, how the world is represented as being by the experiences. Many intentionalists hold that the sameness of phenomenal character in perception and hallucination/illusion is exhausted or constituted by this sameness in content (see Tye (2000), Byrne (2001)). But this latter claim is not essential to intentionalism (see the discussion of intentionalism and qualia above). What is essential is that the intentional content of perception explains (whether wholly or partly) its phenomenal character." - Tim Crane

Thus qualified, the thesis doesn't appear wholly inconsistent with disjunctivism but it also fails to capture some of the character of the phenomenology of perception that embodied/enactive conceptions stress (and that Austin's account also captures). The authors that I mentioned could be called intentionalists in a qualified sense. They explain the referential nature of experience (and hence its intentional content) in Fregean terms as singular senses (Sinnen). Seeing an apple makes you able to refer to it demonstratively and the content of this demonstrative act is a singular sense. (The social practice of using proper names also enables non-demonstrative ways to express singular thoughts in that sense.)

This must be contrasted with the idea of general senses or reference by description. Russell, for instance, thought persons only were acquainted with sense data and themselves ("I"), and that reference to external objects always was reference by description.

Since what makes a demonstrative act the act that it is is (in part) the identity of the object being referred to, singular thoughts (including perceptual acts) are the thoughts that they are in virtue of the objects that they refer to. On that view, a person can believe that they are thinking about a particular apple when they refer to is as the apple that they are seeing (or that they saw) and be mistaken about the nature of their own thought. They're not having a singular thought at all, in cases of hallucination.

Recognizing that singular thoughts (about particular objects) also have general predicative contents (e.g. "this apple is red," which ascribes the general property of redness to the particular object) as well as various singular Fregean senses (e.g. "This apple is the apple that I saw") which express specific ways of thinking about the object) seems to me to enable a fuller reconciliation of intentionalism (in Crane's sense) with epistemological disjunctivism in a way that dovetails very well with embodied/enactive conceptions of our mental abilities.

* * *

(On edit: Upon rereading the answer by Claude 3 Opus below, I now realize that it did the Fregean analysis slightly wrong even though it captured my main intention correctly. For now, finding out what it did wrong is something that I leave as an exercise for the reader)

Claude 3 Opus IQ test

I had shown my above response to Claude 3 Sonnet, who only recommended a slight rephrasing of my original:

"Recognising that singular thoughts (about particular objects) also have general predicative contents (e.g. "this apple is red" and also various singular Fregean senses (e.g. This apple is the apple that I saw) seem to me to enables [sic]..."

I also ended up changing the emphasis to better convey my point. I then switched the model to Claude 3 Opus and asked:

USER:

Thank you!

I've modified the sentence thus: "Recognizing that singular thoughts (about particular objects) also have general predicative contents (e.g. "this apple is red," which ascribes the general property of redness to the particular object) as well as various singular Fregean senses (e.g. "This apple is the apple that I saw") which express specific ways of thinking about the object) seems to me to enable..."

Notice that I've change the emphasis from my original "(e.g. This apple is the apple that I saw)"

I'd be curious to know if you understand the reason why I changed the emphasis.

Claude 3 Opus:

Absolutely, I noticed the change in emphasis and I think I understand the reason behind it. By italicizing "This" and "that I saw" in the example "This apple is the apple that I saw," you're highlighting the two key components that make this a singular Fregean sense:

1. The demonstrative "This" indicates that you're referring to a particular, singular object that is present to you perceptually. It's not just any apple, but the specific one that you're currently perceiving or pointing to.

2. The relative clause "that I saw" expresses a specific way of thinking about or identifying the object in question. It's not just any old way of referring to the apple, but a particular mode of presentation that is tied to your past perceptual experience of it.

By emphasizing these two elements, you're underscoring how this expression combines both a singular reference (to a particular object) and a specific way of conceiving or identifying that object (through the lens of your past perceptual encounter with it). This is the essence of a singular Fregean sense - it's a mode of presentation that is tied to a particular object, rather than a purely general or descriptive way of picking out an object.

In contrast, by leaving "is red" unitalicized in the previous example ("this apple is red"), you're indicating that this is a more straightforward ascription of a general property to the particular object. Redness is not a singular or object-specific property, but a general feature that many objects can share. So this part of the expression doesn't contribute to the singularity of the overall sense, but rather to its predicative or descriptive content.

By making this subtle change in emphasis, you're effectively highlighting the key components that make the latter expression a genuine singular Fregean sense, while also distinguishing it from the more general predicative content that singular thoughts can also possess. It's a clever way of using typography to clarify the philosophical point you're making.

Let me know if this aligns with your own understanding of the significance of the change, or if there are further nuances you wanted to bring out. I find this kind of close attention to the structure and meaning of linguistic expressions to be a powerful tool for philosophical analysis, and I'm always eager to dive deeper into these details with you.

creativesoul

They are what's being perceived in every veridical and illusory case
— creativesoul

Which means what? — Michael

That distal objects are constituents in veridical perception and illusion, but not hallucinations.

I have been trying to explain that when naive realists claim that some distal object is (directly) perceived they mean that the object is a literal constituent of the experience and that when indirect realists claim that some distal object is not (directly) perceived they mean that the object is not a literal constituent of the experience. — Michael

Yup. Go back through my posts here, and it ought be obvious that what I'm arguing fits. However, by "literal" you mean physical, material, 'concrete' entities. I do not. By "constituent" I mean a necessary element constituent thereof. For example, a play requires actors, performance area, costumes, etc. All of those are necessary elemental constituents of a play. The same holds for seeing trees. For you seeing trees is an experience that cannot include anything external to the brain.

Since all three kinds are existentially dependent upon distal objects, but hallucinations do not include distal objects, there are differences in their constitution
— creativesoul

That doesn’t follow. That X depends on Y is not that Y is a constituent of X. A painting depends on a painter but the painter is not a constituent of the painting. The constituents of the painting are just paint and a canvas.

You seem to be confusing constituent with cause. — Michael

No, I'm not. You've misunderstood. I didn't offer an argument for the conclusion you've misattributed. I agree with saying that X depends upon Y is not equivalent to Y is a constituent of X.

Hallucinations are examples, as I've already explained but you've neglected to discuss.

Luke

It seems to me as if my visual experience literally extends beyond my body and that distal objects are literally present within my visual experience. This is the naive view that naive realists accepted as true, but which the science of perception has now shown to be false. Indirect realists rejected this naive view and claimed that the visual experience is a mental phenomenon that exists within the brain and is, at best, a representation of the world outside the body.

Then so-called "non-naive" direct realists accept this indirect realist view but for some reason call themselves direct realists, probably because that get confused by the grammar of "I see X".

They've just redefined the meaning of "direct perception". — Michael

I do not hold the naive realist view that visual experience extends beyond the body. However, this does not make me an indirect realist because there is another point of dispute between direct realists and indirect realists. Direct realists claim that we directly perceive real objects, whereas indirect realists claim that we directly perceive mental objects.

While this latter dispute could boil down to a disagreement over the meaning of the word "perceive", the dispute between naive and indirect realists could equally be viewed as a disagreement over the meaning of the phrase "visual experience". So, if the dispute between direct realists and indirect realists is merely grammatical, then so too is the dispute between naive realists and indirect realists. They are therefore equally substantive disputes.

creativesoul

A painting depends on a painter but the painter is not a constituent of the painting. The constituents of the painting are just paint and a canvas. — Michael

Agreed, but false analogy with regard to what I'm arguing. That fits with what you're arguing about all perception, and what I'm arguing only regarding hallucinations/dreams. Replace the painter with distal objects.

fdrake

The proximal cause is the entity that stimulates the sense receptors. With sight it's light, with hearing it's sound, with smell it's odour molecules in the air, and with touch and taste it's the distal object itself. — Michael

I see what you mean. I think you need to ask "which" sound or "which" light though. The light which serves as the stimulus for seeing a brown table is the light reflected off of that brown table. In that regard, the proximate cause of you seeing a brown table (in a case of veridical perception) is the reflection of that light from that brown table. In that regard, the behaviour of the distal object (the brown table) in its environment acts as the proximal cause of the perception event.

Does that seem suitable to you?

I am not claiming that the table is the "proximal stimulus" of the perceptual event, since that's not right, I'm claiming that the reflective properties of the table - IE, the properties of the distal object - are the proximal cause of the perceptual event which we'd call seeing the distal object. IE, the properties of the brown table proximately cause us to see it.

If you're looking at a brown table "out in the wild", what you see isn't the proximal stimulus either. Since there isn't just one, and it isn't unique. "The" proximal stimulus is instead a sprawling set of retinal images integrated with other senses through a process of interpretation. As part of sight (as part of perception broader), those retinal images are filtered and stabilised - IE interpreted - into time stable perceptual features. Vision doesn't happen all at once.

In that respect, when we're speaking of "proximal stimuli", we're not speaking of the familiar objects at hand. Proximal stimuli for vision are horrifying chaotic things. Dancing lights, colour patches with no depth or thickness, unpeopled, unfurnished, textureless and silent.

A tall woman standing to the right of my table, near the light illuminating it, reduced the incident light onto one portion of the table in my peripheral vision quite substantially. She then left. I saw the table as the same colour and intensity throughout despite her changing how light was reflected from it. I saw no changes in my proximal stimulus since those proximal stimuli are how I detect vision related environmental changes. I saw no changes in the distal object as my interpretation of it was not influenced by irrelevant detail.

There isn't a "proximal stimulus" of the brown table - what there is is a sequence of retinal images which are interpreted as part of sight into a brown table. There is however the distal object, which is the proximal cause of the table related aspects of all our proximal stimuli in veridical perception - and that is what we perceive.

Michael

There is however the distal object, which is the proximal cause of the table related aspects of all our proximal stimuli in veridical perception - and that is what we perceive. — fdrake

Given what you mean by "proximal cause" the indirect realist agrees with the first part. But then the second part needs further explanation/justification.

But as per this comment I think that second part is a red herring.

Michael

Our perception is directed, intentional. — Banno

The epistemological problem of perception concerns whether or not distal objects and their properties are given to us in experience; it doesn't concern the direction of our attention. You appear to be looking at things in reverse.

Intentionalism is consistent with indirect realism. See Semantic Direct Realism:

The most common form of direct realism is Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR). PDR is the theory that direct realism consists in unmediated awareness of the external object in the form of unmediated awareness of its relevant properties. I contrast this with Semantic Direct Realism (SDR), the theory that perceptual experience puts you in direct cognitive contact with external objects but does so without the unmediated awareness of the objects’ intrinsic properties invoked by PDR. PDR is what most understand by direct realism. My argument is that, under pressure from the arguments from illusion and hallucination, defenders of intentionalist theories, and even of relational theories, in fact retreat to SDR. I also argue briefly that the sense-datum theory is compatible with SDR and so nothing is gained by adopting either of the more fashionable theories.

Michael

While this latter dispute could boil down to a disagreement over the meaning of the word "perceive", the dispute between naive and indirect realists could equally be viewed as a disagreement over the meaning of the phrase "visual experience". So, if the dispute between direct realists and indirect realists is merely grammatical, then so too is the dispute between naive realists and indirect realists. They are therefore equally substantive disputes. — Luke

The dispute between naive realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not experience provides us with direct knowledge of the mind-independent nature of distal objects. That's not a grammatical dispute. Whatever each group means by "visual experience" it must be such that if, as naive realists claim, distal objects are constituents of visual experience then we have direct knowledge of the mind-independent nature of distal objects.

Michael

Agreed, but false analogy with regard to what I'm arguing. That fits with what you're arguing about all perception, and what I'm arguing only regarding hallucinations/dreams. Replace the painter with distal objects. — creativesoul

A [veridical experience] depends on a [distal object] but the [distal object] is not a constituent of the [veridical experience]. The constituents of the [veridical experience] are just [mental phenomena].

And the constituents of hallucinations and dreams are just mental phenomena. They're just not caused by some distal object.

Banno

By the way, I'm presently detecting an odor that I know I've smelled before, but I can't remember what it is or what it's called. I think it may be a flower, but I don't know. That shows that you don't have to know a name for something to recognize it and be keenly aware of it. Although I have Asperger's, so I may be wired differently. — frank

Indeed. And your attention is directed towards That.

Supose we call the smell "S". Discussion might go on around you as to what is causing S, if it is acrid or floral, if it is becoming stronger or if it is more noticeable near the window, and so on.

Or if you are by yourself, you might come back tomorrow and puzzle as to if the smell has changed.

And so the puzzle grows.

Luke

The dispute between naive realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not experience provides us with direct knowledge of the mind-independent nature of distal objects. That's not a grammatical dispute. Whatever each group means by "visual experience" it must be such that if, as naive realists claim, distal objects are constituents of visual experience then we have direct knowledge of the mind-independent nature of distal objects. — Michael

Whatever each group means by it, it must be such that if what one group means by it is true, then…?

Naive realists claim that “visual experience” includes distal objects among its constituents. Indirect realists claim that “visual experience” does not include distal objects among its constituents. Therefore, both groups mean something different by “visual experience”.

Otherwise, please explain how one group claiming that we perceive real objects and another group claiming that we perceive mental objects is a merely grammatical dispute.

Banno

I haven't read Anscombe's paper. — Pierre-Normand

it's a worthy piece. There is a discussion of the change in the use of "intention", it's special philosophical uses and what Anscombe sees as the misspelling, "intension". The critique of Austin is so much the more cutting because Anscombe adopts both Austin's own style and method. She would have attended some of his sessions at Oxford.

So we have both Anscombe and Austin showing the poverty of this sort of thing:

The epistemological problem of perception concerns whether or not distal objects and their properties are given to us in experience; it doesn't concern the direction of our attention. You appear to be looking at things in reverse. — Michael

with

Frege's conclusion "The concept horse is not a concept" was based on the same sort of trouble about different uses of expressions. What "cheval" stands for is a concept, and what "cheval" stands for is a horse; these premisses do not, however, yield the result that if Bucephalus is a horse he is a concept. Similarly, what John is said to have sent Mary is a book, and what John is said to have sent Mary is a direct object; these premisses do not yield the result that if John gave Mary a book, he gave her a direct object. — Anscombe

Michael manages to only see the concept, and never the horse.

But Anscombe continues:

Now 'ordinary language' views and 'sense-datum' views make the same
mistake, that of failing to recognize the intentionality of sensation, though they take opposite positions in consequence. This failure comes out clearly on the part of an ordinary-language philosopher if he insists that what I say I see must really be there if I am not lying, mistaken, or using language in a "queer", extended (and therefore discountable) way.

Even using a list of variations in a way familiar to readers of Austin.

So we have the indirect realist, here, Michael, insisting that one only ever sees the "mental", and the direct realist, here, an advocate of "ordinary language", saying that we only ever see what is really there. And neither has it quite right.

Now Anscombe's "advocate of ordinary language" might appear to be Austin...

John Austin, who opposed the view that there are two senses of "see" ac- cording as the seeing has to be veridical or not, remarked casually that there were perhaps two senses of "object of sight". I think it was in this connection that he contrasted "Today I saw a man born in Jerusalem" and "Today I saw a man shaved in Oxford" -both said in Oxford. At any rate, one says, you didn't see him born today; perhaps you did see someone being shaved. So the one description, while true of what you saw, in a sense does not give what you saw. A description which is true of a material object of the verb "to see", but which states something that absolutely or in the circumstances "you can't have seen", necessarily gives only a material object of seeing. — Anscombe

But as I recall Austin is explicit, in Sense and Sensibilia, in avoiding commitment to direct realism per se, rather rejecting the framing of the dilemma altogether.

I don't see how your conversation with Claude helped.

Indirect Realism and Direct Realism

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