Deflationary accounts of truth (such as disquotationalism or prosententialism) stress the pragmatic function of "truth" predicates while denying that truth is a property of the propositions they are predicated of. This sort of pragmatism about truth is somewhat different from the pragmatism of, say, Richard Rorty, who claims that what makes a belief "true" is nothing over and above the fact that believing it is useful. It is this latter form of pragmatism that you may be thinking of. Yet, there is an affinity between those two sorts of pragmatism. (Robert Brandom, who was a student of Rorty, defended a form of prosententialism.) — Pierre-Normand

However, suppose we grant you such a pragmatist conception of truth. The question regarding how "inner" perceptual states refer to "external" empirical facts about the world thereby gets translated into questions regarding the pragmatic function that enjoying such phenomenological states can serve. — Pierre-Normand

The definition of indirect realism offered by ChatGPT states that our experiences (presumably our perceptual experiences) are mediated by mental representations or ideas. It contrasts this with "directly perceiving external objects themselves", i.e. direct realism. — Luke

It posits that our experiences of the world are mediated by mental representations or ideas, rather than directly perceiving external objects themselves.

the fact or state of having been affected by or gained knowledge through direct observation or participation

You seem to agree with the direct realist that perceptual experience of external objects is direct (or you don't appear to argue for an intermediary between them). — Luke

However, if your perceptual experience is, e.g., the taste of strawberries, then is your awareness of the taste of strawberries different to your perceptual experience of the taste of strawberries? — Luke

How does the perceptual experience mediate the awareness? — Luke

You said earlier that a perceptual experience entails awareness of that perceptual experience; that it entails its own awareness. In that case, what does awareness of the perceptual experience add to the perceptual experience that the perceptual experience itself lacks? — Luke

However, if perceptual experiences are merely "representational" without being "representations" — Luke

ots of biological phenomena emerge from bio-chemical events (e.g. photosynthesis), so you'd need a good counter-argument with which you could reject the idea that conscious experiences emerge from brain states. — jkop

All of what? — jkop

Furthermore, brain states are necessary for any conscious experience, veridical or hallucinatory, but this has little to do with the directness of perception, which is supposedly what you wish to reject. — jkop

The content of the visual experience and the rain are inseparable in the sense that it is the visible property of the rain that determines the phenomenal character of the visual experience. The fact that they are separate things is beside the point. — jkop

That would be true if I defined truth as usefulness, but that's not what I had in mind. Contemporary forms of indirect realism start with the assumption that we can rely on our perceptions of things like human anatomy and physiology. Representational models of human perception are natural developments from there. — frank

In the case that they do actually "flip around", is that simply the brain trying to revert back to familiarity? If so, a thought experiment I offered early in this discussion is worth revisiting: consider that half the population were born with their eyes upside down relative to the other half. I suspect that in such a scenario half the population would see when standing what the other half would see when hanging upside down. They each grew up accustomed to their point of view and so successfully navigate the world, using the same word to describe the direction of the sky and the same word to describe the direction of the ground. What would it mean to say that one or the other orientation is the "correct" one, and how would they determine which orientation is correct? — Michael

"Experience" here is certainly not what we have been calling "perceptual experiences", aka qualia. — hypericin

Reading through the GPT definition, I see little substantive difference with my own. — hypericin

According to indirect realism, when we perceive the world, what we are actually experiencing are mental representations or perceptions that are caused by external objects. These mental representations are often considered to be in the mind and are distinct from the external objects they represent.

In other words, indirect realism suggests that we do not directly perceive external objects such as tables, chairs, or trees. Instead, we perceive representations or perceptions of these objects that are constructed by our senses and mental processes. This theory acknowledges that there is a real external world but asserts that our understanding and experience of it are indirect and mediated by mental representations. — GPT definition of indirect realism

The "taste" and the "awareness of the taste" verbally designate parts or aspects of what may be the same thing: the perceptual experience of tasting strawberries. As I've said before, my argument does not hinge on these being ontologically distinct things. — hypericin

Direct perceptual experiences are representations.
The representations are of real objects.
Therefore, Direct perceptual experiences are representations of real objects.
and
"Direct perceptual experiencs" are of real objects
but not
"Direct perceptual experiences" are directly of real objects — hypericin

I would rather say
"Direct perceptual experiences" are indirectly of real objects — hypericin

In your thought experiment, somehow, this relative inversion between the contents of the two species' (or genders') respective visual experiences is a feature of their "private" qualia and is initially caused by the orientation of their eyes. But what does it even mean to say that an animal was born with its eyes "upside down"? Aren't eyes typically, functionally and anatomically, symmetrical across the horizontal plane? And since our eyes are camera obscura that already map the external world to "upside down" retinal images, aren't all of our eyes already "upside down" on your view? — Pierre-Normand

So I simply imagine that some organism is born with their eyes naturally positioned in such a way, and so relative to the way I ordinarily see the word, they see the world upside down (and vice versa). — Michael

But isn't that our eyes? Our eyes receive light physically upside down. Our brains spin it around.

If some creature had upside down eyes relative to us, it would be up to their brain how they experience the visual orientation, not necessarily the way their eyes are positioned. — flannel jesus

What your eyes and brain do when hanging upside down is conceivably what some other organism's eyes and brain do when standing on their feet. Neither point of view is privileged. — Michael

As movements consist of rotations and translations, the vestibular system comprises two components: the semicircular canals, which indicate rotational movements; and the otoliths, which indicate linear accelerations. The vestibular system sends signals primarily to the neural structures that control eye movement; these provide the anatomical basis of the vestibulo-ocular reflex, which is required for clear vision. Signals are also sent to the muscles that keep an animal upright and in general control posture; these provide the anatomical means required to enable an animal to maintain its desired position in space.

The brain uses information from the vestibular system in the head and from proprioception throughout the body to enable the animal to understand its body's dynamics and kinematics (including its position and acceleration) from moment to moment. How these two perceptive sources are integrated to provide the underlying structure of the sensorium is unknown.

I had presented a challenge for indirect realists to explain how the phenomenology of perceiving an apple to be within reach, say, can be deemed to be true to the facts (or a case of misperception) if the intrinsic features of the representation don't include such things as expectations that the apple can indeed be reached by the perceiver's outstretched hand. It is those expectations that define the truth conditions of the visual content, in this particular case. — Pierre-Normand

There may indeed be some usefulness for purpose of neuroscientific inquiry to postulate internal "representations" on the retina or in the brain that enable the perceiver to attune their perceptual contents with their skills to act in the world. But those "representations" don't figure as objects directly seen by the perceivers. Just like those "upside down" retinal images, they are not seen by the embodied perceiver at all. They play a causal role in the enablement of the subjet's sensorimotor skills, but it is those (fallible) skills themselves that imbue their perceptual experiences with world-directed intentional purport. — Pierre-Normand

Your inability to discern the illusion doesn't stem from a failure to spot some inner difference in qualia, but from the mirror's efficacy in disrupting your engaged, bodily perspective on your surroundings. — Pierre-Normand

This raises a deeper question for the common-factor theorist: if perceptual experience is just a matter of inner sensations or representations caused by some stimulus, what makes it a perception "of" anything in the external world at all? What are the conditions of satisfaction that determine whether a perceptual experience is veridical or not — whether it matches mind-independent reality?

The common-factor view seems to lack the resources to answer this question. There's no way to directly compare an inner perceptual representation with an outer state of affairs to see if they match. Representational content and veridicality conditions can't be grounded in purely internal phenomenal character. — Pierre-Normand

The disjunctivist, in contrast, can ground perceptual content and veridicality in the perceiver's embodied capacities for successful interaction with their environment. Consider the experience of seeing an apple as within reach. On the disjunctivist view, the phenomenal character of this experience isn't exhausted by an inner sensation or mental image. Rather, it consists in your very readiness to engage with the apple — your expectation that you can successfully reach out and grasp it. — Pierre-Normand

The common-factor theorist, in treating perceptual content as purely internal and independent of bodily skills, misses this crucial difference. They can't account for the world-involving, normative character of perception — the fact that our experiences inherently refer beyond themselves to the environment, and can match or fail to match reality. — Pierre-Normand

User
Please clarify a response that another instance of you gave to a user:
1. How were you defining "experience" here? As "qualia", "contact with the world", or something else?

2. Which of these two formulations better captures what you mean by indirect realism. "Awareness of the world is mediated by representations or ideas, which we experience as qualia?" Or, "Qualia are mediated by representations or ideas"?

Another User
what is indirect realism

Another ChatGPT
Indirect realism, also known as representationalism or epistemological dualism, is a philosophical theory regarding perception and reality. It posits that our experiences of the world are mediated by mental representations or ideas, rather than directly perceiving external objects themselves.
According to indirect realism, when we perceive the world, what we are actually experiencing are mental representations or perceptions that are caused by external objects. These mental representations are often considered to be in the mind and are distinct from the external objects they represent.
In other words, indirect realism suggests that we do not directly perceive external objects such as tables, chairs, or trees. Instead, we perceive representations or perceptions of these objects that are constructed by our senses and mental processes. This theory acknowledges that there is a real external world but asserts that our understanding and experience of it are indirect and mediated by mental representations.
One of the key proponents of indirect realism was the philosopher John Locke, who argued that the mind receives sensory information from the external world and constructs perceptions based on this information. Other philosophers, such as George Berkeley and David Hume, also contributed to the development of indirect realism, albeit with variations in emphasis and interpretation.

ChatGPT
1. In the context of the response, "experience" is defined as the mental representations or perceptions that are caused by external objects. This aligns more closely with the concept of "contact with the world" rather than "qualia". Qualia refers to the subjective or qualitative properties of experiences, such as what it feels like to see a particular color or to taste a specific flavor. In contrast, the "experience" referred to in the response is about the process of perceiving and interpreting sensory information from the external world.

2. The first formulation, "Awareness of the world is mediated by representations or ideas, which we experience as qualia," better captures the meaning of indirect realism as described in the response. This is because indirect realism posits that our awareness or perception of the world is mediated by mental representations or ideas. These representations or ideas are what we experience, and they can be associated with qualia, which are the subjective or qualitative properties of these experiences. The second formulation, "Qualia are mediated by representations or ideas," seems to suggest that qualia themselves are mediated, which is not the primary focus of indirect realism.

User
To point 1, expand on the differentiation between "mental representation" and qualia. To my understanding, qualia are mental representations of the exernal world.

ChatGPT
Sure, I'd be happy to clarify the distinction between "mental representations" and "qualia".

"Mental representations" and "qualia" are both concepts used in philosophy and cognitive science to describe aspects of our mental life, but they refer to different things.

Mental representations are a theoretical construct used to explain how the mind represents information about the world. They are often thought of as internal models or maps of the world that our mind uses to guide our interactions with our environment. For example, if you see a chair, your mind forms a mental representation of that chair, which includes information about its shape, size, color, and location.

Qualia, on the other hand, refers to the subjective or conscious experience of the world. It's the "what it's like" aspect of conscious experience. For example, the redness of a red apple, the sweetness of a candy, or the pain from a headache are all examples of qualia. These are subjective experiences that are difficult to describe or convey to others because they are inherently personal and subjective.
While mental representations are about the information content of our mental states, qualia are about the subjective quality of our conscious experiences. In the context of indirect realism, mental representations are the internal models or maps that our mind uses to interpret sensory data, while qualia would be the subjective experience of those representations.

So, while it's true that qualia are a kind of mental representation in the sense that they represent aspects of our subjective experience, not all mental representations are qualia. Some mental representations might be unconscious or lack a subjective quality, and thus would not be considered qualia.

User
Can the qoute "Instead, we perceive representations or perceptions of these objects that are constructed by our senses and mental processes." be rephrased as ""Instead, we are aware of representations or perceptions of these objects that are constructed by our senses and mental processes." to make clear that awareness of perceptions is itself not an act of perception?

ChatGPT
Absolutely, your rephrasing is a valid interpretation and helps to clarify the concept. Here's how it would look:
"Instead, we are aware of representations or perceptions of these objects that are constructed by our senses and mental processes."
This statement emphasizes that our awareness is not a direct perception of the external world, but rather an awareness of the mental representations or perceptions that our senses and mental processes construct. This aligns with the core idea of indirect realism, which posits that our understanding and experience of the world are indirect and mediated by these mental representations.

simply say that there is no fool proof way to establish veridicality. — hypericin

why this relationship, while part of the perception, is not actually discernable as part of the perception. — hypericin

P1 if we were directly acquainted with external objects, then hallucinatory and veridical experiences would be subjectively distinct — Ashriel

P1 if there is a long causal process between the object that we perceive and our perception of the object, then we do not know the object directly — Ashriel

A banana fly probably doesn't know what a rail road is, but all the same, the further away something is the smaller it appears for the fly as well as for the human. — jkop

The issue that would be helpful to have clarified is what would "directly" perceiving an object imply? How would it differ from what we have (whatever its epistemic status may end up being) ? — Manuel

It's an interesting case, though I think we should keep in check that brains are assumed to be very complex objects with an extremely rich - and largely unknown - inner structure. — Manuel

If telepathy followed, I don't think direct realism would stand (nor indirect to be fair, I don't think for most cases these terms are too helpful). — Manuel

e have instances, rare to be sure, in which we can read exactly what we had in each other's mind — Manuel

We still have no clue how the brain causes these inner thoughts to arise. Something important is hidden from us, but direct/indirect does not enter — Manuel

but he could also tell me exactly what he is thinking — Manuel

Why is it that when we hang upside down the world appears upside down? Because given the physical structure of our eyes and the way the light interacts with them that is the resulting visual experience. The physiological (including mental) response to stimulation is presumably deterministic. It stands to reason that if my eyes were fixed in that position and the rest of my body were rotated back around so that I was standing then the world would continue to appear upside down. The physics of visual perception is unaffected by the repositioning of my feet. So I simply imagine that some organism is born with their eyes naturally positioned in such a way, and so relative to the way I ordinarily see the word, they see the world upside down (and vice versa). — Michael

It makes no sense to me to claim that one or the other point of view is “correct”. Exactly like smells and tastes and colours, visual geometry is determined by the individual’s biology. There’s no “correct” smell of a rose, no “correct” taste of sugar, no “correct” colour of grass, no “correct” visual position, and no “correct” visual size (e.g everything might appear bigger to me than to you – including the marks on a ruler – because I have a more magnified vision). Photoreception isn't special.

However, we (or at least I) have apparently been misusing the phrase "mental representation". According to ChatGPT, this refers to a pre-conscious mental state, not qualia itself. Which is confusing, since (at least I maintain) that qualia themselves are mental represntaitons. — hypericin

User
can this distinction [between awareness and perception] also be collapsed?

ChatGPT
Yes, the distinction between awareness and perception can also be collapsed or blurred in certain contexts or philosophical perspectives.

Some philosophical theories, such as direct realism or naive realism, argue that perception and awareness are essentially the same thing. According to these views, when we perceive the world, we are directly aware of external objects as they are, without any intermediary mental representations. In other words, perception is immediate and unmediated, and our awareness of the world is synonymous with our sensory experiences.

On the other hand, certain forms of idealism or phenomenology propose that awareness and perception are inseparable aspects of conscious experience. From this perspective, our awareness of the world is not just about recognizing sensory stimuli but also involves the active interpretation and structuring of those stimuli by the mind. In this view, perception is not a passive reception of sensory data but rather an active engagement with the world that shapes our awareness.

Additionally, in everyday language and common usage, the terms "awareness" and "perception" are often used interchangeably or in overlapping ways. People might say they are "aware of" something when they mean they perceive it, or they might describe their perceptions as a form of awareness.

So, while there are philosophical distinctions between awareness and perception, they are not always rigidly maintained, and the relationship between them can vary depending on the philosophical framework or context of discussion.

You have had the thought of another person. Nothing more direct could be perceived, I don't think. — AmadeusD

So, in the Telepathy case, 'perception' retrieved or received data directly from another's mind with no interloping/interceding/mediating stage or medium - but the brain still has to make that into an experience of hearing words (or whatever it might be). — AmadeusD

World maps are indeed conventional, like many other artificial symbols, but misleading as an analogy for visual perception. Visual perception is not an artificial construct relative conventions or habits. It is a biological and physical state of affairs, which is actual for any creature that can see.

For example, an object seen from far away appears smaller than when it is seen from a closer distance. Therefore, the rails of a railroad track appear to converge towards the horizon, and for an observer on the street the vertical sides of a tall building appear to converge towards the sky. These and similar relations are physical facts that determine the appearances of the objects in visual perception. A banana fly probably doesn't know what a rail road is, but all the same, the further away something is the smaller it appears for the fly as well as for the human. — jkop

Now, it's true that when your turn you head all the way upside down, some illusion regarding the orientation of the external world may ensue. — Pierre-Normand

I take this to mean that the phrase "mental representations" can sometimes be used to refer to, or to include, unconscious states/processes, which is unlike how the word "qualia" is typically used. — Luke

I do not think this has ever occurred. It is not possible, as best I can tell, or as far as I know. More than happy to be put right here, though. It would be very exciting! But, forgive any skepticism that comes along with.. — AmadeusD

So, in the Telepathy case, 'perception' retrieved or received data directly from another's mind with no interloping/interceding/mediating stage or medium - but the brain still has to make that into an experience of hearing words (or whatever it might be). So, for this part whether or not something is Direct, or Indirectly perceived is irrelevant. But I don't think that's been the issue at hand. I am sorry if i'm misunderstanding here. — AmadeusD

He could not. He could tell you what his interpretation, as a physical mode of communication required, of his thought into an intelligible medium for traversing space and time. You can see here exactly why this is indirect vs telepathy proper. Some argue that speech is telepathy - but this misses the point, i think. — AmadeusD

I take this to mean that the phrase "mental representations" can sometimes be used to refer to, or to include, unconscious states/processes, which is unlike how the word "qualia" is typically used.
— Luke

I would take that to mean that representation is sometimes in the form of innate nervous responses (like algorithms) that don't involve phenomenal consciousness. — frank