Unfacetiously, I don't know "what" my overall thinking on the matter might be labeled, if labeled it must be. But if the concept expressed in that sentence quoted sounds like biological reductionism, so be it. And if biological reductionism is somehow anathema (I don't know that it is, I'm assuming) perhaps it is redeemable with some fresh modifications. Perhaps I'm intellectually reckless. My ego prefers "open minded."

I'm not at all concerned with any universal, or objective meaning. But I'm not going to give up my own. The kind of mind humans have is, perhaps, the only thing in the universe that contemplates such things. I intend to as long as I'm able.

And if biological reductionism is somehow anathema (I don't know that it is, I'm assuming) perhaps it is redeemable with some fresh modifications. — ENOAH

Hey no problems, it's a discussion forum, we're here to kick ideas around.

I have an aversion to the kind of evolutionary naturalist accounts of mind advanced by Dennett and evolutionary materialism, that we're all just gene machines acting out a survival algorithm for unconscious biological drives. But then:

We too, in Reality, are beings driven by evolution to respond to triggers in various ways. What is real human consciousness? Aware-ing those processes, those triggers, drives, responses, organically. What is beyond that for humans, no less than for dogs, is what Mind, a system of evolved Signifiers, superimposes on those drives and responses.

Signifiers become the almost exclusive triggers for organic responses, like feelings and movement; empty, fleeting images stored in memory, autonomously constructing Fiction in ways evolved over dozens of millennia, and still evolving, and displacing Reality; usurping sensation, displacing it with perception, feelings with emotions, and image-ing with ideas. — ENOAH

is a pretty far-out post, really. There ways of interpreting it, but I think, here, you're kind of extrapolating the idea of biological evolution beyond its proper domain.

You can look at mind as the manifestation of brain-consciousness. Or you can look at mind as the correlate of the products of the "sciences of the spirit" (Geistwissenschaften). — Pantagruel

That is an area in which German culture has an advantage of the Anglo-american. There is no equivalent term in English.

The questioning is enough — Patterner

The means is enough without an end? Means can justify the end, and the end can justify the means. But the means by itself? Surely we are looking for a truthful answer here, and that is the end we want.

Just seems that this field is difficult and - not saying I know the answer either. Just that it seems an impossibility.

I hope to be proven wrong. I’ll be reading all the Chalmer articles over the next while and will go through the exercise of trying to see things from his point of view. Most interesting - and what I’m most looking forward to - is to find out the grounds for his points of view, as that is usually the crucial part. But that way of thinking - foundationalism - also has flaws, so I’ll keep an open mind.

I sounded curt. Sorry.

Now that I quickly familiarized myself with what you meant, I already realized my presumptiousness.

What I was saying can be seen as falling in with biological reductionism.

But briefly, here is how I would say a modified or qualified BR.

1. Of course science is--within conventional terms--right that all of our experiences have at the root neurons and chemistry. There must be that fleshy infrastructure.

2. Mind isn't that fleshy infrastructure. It has evolved a "life of its own" but it is not structured by matter. It is structured by the images in memory saved by the organism to create the appropriate triggers for survival. They now operate autonomously giving "us" as in the flesh, a displacement of our organic being, with an illusion of meaning, linear narrative, etc. etc. It qualifies the BR with an existent, but empty, thing displacing the BR "stuff" with its dynamics. It is not Dualism, because Mind is empty, structured by representations, not Real.

3. Back to that fleshy infrastructure. Ironically, BR fails to do it justice. Everyone, including BR wants Mind to be real. So they just say Brain is Mind. But Mind is empty. And the Body is the locus of the real being. We look at BR and scoff at how they reduce mind to brain function. While ironically, brain functioning is our Reality. The Narrative mind is the Fiction we are inescapably attuned to.

Interestingly enough, what we experience is just a disjointed set of static inputs. The mind is what makes these into a reality. So the brain provides the static data, and the mind provides the dynamic effect on which thought is born. As a working theory.

How to define the mind? By function? By requirements? How it changes? How it works?

By function: a liver cleans the blood. The liver isn’t the act of cleaning, it is the physical thing that cleans. The act of cleaning is a physical process.

A brain thinks. At least at some point a brain is necessary for thought so there is obviously some connection. But the brain isn’t the act of thinking, it is the physical thing that thinks. The act of thinking is a physical process. Regardless of what more it might be.

How to get from the physical process to the mind? What logical construct makes sense to enable such a leap? It obviously happens but what can we know about it? Without knowing how that happens what does that say about the things we do know about the mind?

The means is enough without an end? Means can justify the end, and the end can justify the means. But the means by itself? Surely we are looking for a truthful answer here, and that is the end we want. — Metaphyzik

Not saying I wouldn't be happy to get an answer. :grin:

My question arises because neuroscience has changed the thinking of mind completely. — Jack Cummins

Perhaps, of a scant few, but Everydayman couldn’t care less if he tried, unless neuroscience lowers his grocery bill.

It is probably true that many people are not interested in neuroscience in their daily lives and beliefs. It is the area of both those who are interested in psychology and philosophy mainly, which is only a certain 'minority', although it does seem that psychology is becoming one of the most popular subjects for study. It is often a choice for both self knowledge and career pathways.

Having read your post and the linked one, I would say that I am definitely in favour of reasoned arguments and that is why I read philosophy rather simply books in the 'mind, body and spirit category', which often come with a lack of rigour in thinking.

The area of reason, a priori logic, in conjunction with a posteri logic, evidence, the evidence of empiricism by Kant, is extremely complex. The difficulty may be about putting the two together, which is where speculation comes in. To argue on the basis of one's own experience in making the link is weak and may be contrasted by evidence based knowledge, but even this comes with bias and the critical role of observer in experiments and research. This is where the interpretative leanings, especially in relation to materialism and idealism come in.

I know that you don't subscribe to this clear division and are well read in the approach of substance dualism. This is one way of seeing it of various options, including non dualism and pansychism. I do have a certain amount of sympathy for panpsychism in its argument for rudimentary consciousness underlying all matter and for non dualism, as mind and matter being entwined in a complex interface. This would also go hand in hand with phenomenology, especially the role of intentionality which is at the basis of the role of human consciousness in the overall scheme of understanding.

psychology is becoming one of the most popular subjects for study. — Jack Cummins

Probably because on the one hand there’s no math in it and on the other, it’s socially more inviting than sports analytics.

What do you see as the overriding and outstanding issues of the philosophy of mind in the twentieth first century? Is there any essential debate beyond the scope of psychology? — Jack Cummins

Getting back to your original question: I’d rather answer it as if you’d asked, “What should be the outstanding issues?” I’m sure @Wayfarer and others may be right in describing the current dominance of reductive physicalism within academia, but fashions change.

The most important scientific questions should focus on trying to learn what consciousness is – whether it’s a biological phenomenon exclusively, and whether some Copernican revolution will emerge in our understanding of how the mental and the physical are lawfully connected. Fascinating as this is, it’s not for philosophers to weigh in on.

Rather, I think the “essential debate” for us hasn’t changed much. It was, and is, “How can the subjective processes and procedures of consciousness produce things like ‛ideas,’ ‛concepts,’ ‛meanings,’ ‛truths’? How can these interior, 1st-person-point-of-view results be given a description that does justice to what they seem to demonstrate – namely, that reasons are not caused, and are not causes, in the same way that physical processes are?” I reveal my biases here, of course. Many would argue that the questions are absurd, as nothing of the kind actually happens. But for those of us who think that reasons do provide justifications and, often, objective truths, our problem is to explain what we mean by this, and how it could be possible in what seems to be a causally closed physical world, a world that, in theory at least, should be completely explainable in its own terms, without recourse to esoterica like “mental content”.

The best philosopher I know on this subject is Thomas Nagel. Both The Last Word and The View from Nowhere lay out the case for why we can’t reductively explain, e.g., logic and mathematics without running up against paradox and contradiction.

In a number of discussions,I have had dialogue with 180 Proof, in which he argues that I am raising an issue in psychology as opposed to phllosophy. I can see his point but I am not sure that it is that simple, because all psychological models rest on philosophical assumptions. — Jack Cummins

In a later post, you replied to : "what do you expect from me?". As a survivor of many of his Either/Or broadside attacks, I will presume to guess what he wants : for you to take a hard stand on one side or the other of the Mind/Matter or Soul/Body issue. He typically demands "simple" Black & White answers to complex philosophical questions. What he wants from you is true/false syllogistic logic, which requires proven premises.

But, as you implied, Psychology is not Physics ; it is a soft science, where the evidence is mostly human opinions & feelings. Likewise, Philosophy is a soft science, where even "experts" like 180 are swapping personal beliefs ; presumably, in hopes of learning to view a problem from different subjective perspectives. Socratic dialogue*1 ideally begins from the position of "know nothing" rather than know-it-all.

Since most of the "hard" (metaphysical) questions --- that have survived syllogistic reasoning for thousands of years --- are resistant to "simple" factual answers, I think it is prudent to approach them as Socrates did, from a position of self-doubt : my current belief could be wrong. Consequently, I have developed my own personal approach to hard questions that I call The BothAnd Principle*2.

Don't expect 180 to respect such "mealy-mouth" reasoning though. He will hold you to a high standard : his own "true" belief on the question in question. :cool:

Note --- “Hard” sciences include subjects like Physics, Math, and Chemistry, while “soft” sciences include topics like Sociology and Philosophy. The terms hard and soft refer to the "hard" standard of the scientific method.


*1. The Socratic Method says Reich, “is better used to demonstrate complexity, difficulty, and uncertainty than to elicit facts about the world.” The aim of the questioning is to probe the underlying beliefs upon which each participant’s statements, arguments and assumptions are built.
https://tilt.colostate.edu/the-socratic-method/

*2.   The BothAnd Philosophy :
***   Philosophy is the study of ideas & beliefs. Not which are right or wrong – that is the province of Religion and Politics – but which are closer to universal Truth. That unreachable goal can only be approximated by Reason & Consensus, which is the method of Science. In addition to ivory tower theories, applied Philosophy attempts to observe the behavior of wild ideas in their natural habitat.
***   The BothAnd philosophy is primarily Metaphysical, in that it is concerned with Ontology, Epistemology, & Cosmology. Those categories include abstract & general concepts, such as : G*D, existence, causation, Logic, Mathematics, & Forms. Unlike pragmatic scientific "facts" about the physical world, idealistic Metaphysics is a battle-ground of opinions & emotions.
***   The BothAnd principle is one of Balance, Symmetry and Proportion. It eschews the absolutist positions of Idealism vs Realism, in favor of the relative compromises of Pragmatism. The methodology is Holistic (both/and) instead of Reductive (either/or). It espouses the Practical Wisdom of the Greek philosophers, instead of the Perfect Revelations of the Hebrew Priests. The BA principle of practical wisdom requires “skin in the game”*3 to provide real-world feedback, which counter-balances the extremes of Idealism & Realism. That feedback establishes limits to freedom and boundaries to risk-taking. BA is a principle of Character & Virtue, viewed as Phronesis or Pragmatism, instead of Piety or Perfectionism.
***   The BA philosophy is intended to be based on empirical evidence where possible, but to incorporate reasonable speculation were necessary. As my personal philosophy, the basic principle is fleshed-out in the worldview of Enformationism, which goes out of the Real world only insofar as  to establish the universal Ground of Being, and the active principle in Evolution.
*** Phronesis : an Ancient Greek word for a type of wisdom or intelligence. It is more specifically a type of wisdom relevant to practical action, implying both good judgment and excellence of character and habits, or practical virtue.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page10.html

*3. Skin In The Game, by Nassim Nicholas Taleb;  researcher in philosophical, mathematical, and (mostly) practical problems with probability. It investigates the adverse impact of having people act and make decisions without shouldering any downside if things go wrong. Philosophy, unlike War & Politics, allows people to pontificate on forums without consequences.
https://thepowermoves.com/skin-in-the-game/

I am interested by the way in which Sheldrake develops his ideas to explain past life memories. It is consistent with the understanding of past lives by some Buddhist thinkers in which there is more of an underlying continuity of past life forms as opposed to concrete entities and in line with the fluid conception of self. The mistake which some people may make in querying past lives is to think it involves the specific stream of narrative personal identity, or the ego consciousness.

The general understanding is consistent with the relationship between a person and 'other minds', including ancestors and other living people. It is likely to involve a web of system interconnections. This would link with the idea of a collective unconscious, or to choose another philosophical term, intersubjective relationships in nature. It involves the evolution of consciousness in nature.

Some people may grow up with vestiges of past lives. I read, 'Past Lives, Past Masters', by Andrew Weiss, in which he, with no previous belief in reincarnation undertook the hypnotherapy of a patient. It involved the revelation of detailed memories from past lives, leading Weiss to consider the nature of past lives seriously. He ends up concluding that it was unclear if it was based on actual lives lived by the woman and himself or the tapping into the collective unconscious.

I am not sure why the idea of the collective unconscious is rejected by so many. It is at the juncture of 'science and spirituality', as you suggest, and this may be where it seen by many as problematic. I am extremely influenced by Carl Jung's ideas, as you and others on the site may be aware. I don't know why the ideas of Jung are seen as pseudoscience because they give a more flexible idea of 'mind' than many other approaches.

Jung draws upon ideas which may be seen as 'supernatural', which was the objection of Freud, but he does also draw upon ideas of biological naturalism. The idea of the collective unconscious is neither completely biological materialism or idealism, possibly fusing them in a complex way and drawing upon the Platonic idea of archetypes. I found the writings of Anthony Stevens helpful here because he traces such ideas in relation to biology as opposed to some 'supernatural' thought.

Even the idea of the supernatural is open to critical scrutiny, as argued by the biologist, Lyall Watson, in his 'Supernature', who sees the whole approach of extrasensory perception as being problematic when seen as 'paranormal', as opposed to being about the complexity of 'minds' in nature.

I am not wishing to ignore your post previous to the one above. I am simply just going through the replies and the only reason I replied to @180 Proof's post first was because I have more regular interaction with him and it was mainly on this basis that I started the post. I see all posts as being important and do wish to pay attention to them and, besides, the thread topics are for general interaction and not simply dialogue with me.

My software of my phone makes quoting difficult but I am trying to engage fully and hope that your ideas, and everyone else's are appreciated. I will look at your initial response to me now, as I am out in a quiet space.

I have read your initial post and the one you just read, although connecting with some of the links is difficult, or sometimes is difficult to enlarge on my phone. Sometimes, this limits my own responses and I am still inclined towards 'paper books', but realise that the web is a source of so many ideas.

The distinction between hard and soft science is a particularly important area, especially in what may emerge as the 'hard problem of consciousness'. Hard is often equated with science and the understanding of the brain, especially cognitive science.

I remember once weiting in a student essay about the debate as to whether psychology is a science or art. I was inclined to the position that the emphasis upon it being science was limited because if ignores the artistry and metaphysical imagination in inherent conceptions at the core of psychology. I later did some courses which were science based in nursing and saw the limitations of psychology being seen as 'hard science, and this issue may arise in approaches to the nature of 'mind' and consciousness.

Is there any definition, or list of characteristics, of mind (I wish that button was italics instead of bold) that is agreed upon by most people here? I would think it would help to have a working definition of the subject of the conversation. Surely there is some agreement?

Your question above is an interesting one because it does involve the one of what constitutes a 'mind'. One interesting discussion may be Gilbert Ryle's analysis of the idea itself and he argues that it may be 'a category mistake', based on the thinking of Descartes.

The problem which I see with this is the reductive thinking which became apparent in the thinking of the pop writing of Daniell Dennett, of 'consciousness as an illusion', which may have become extremely influential in the the understanding of the nature of consciousness and 'mind'. It is extremely reductive and the issue may be that it leaves out the reflective nature of 'mind' as agency, which was also apparent in the determinist psychology of BF Skinner.

The idea of 'mind' may be seen on the basis of behaviour , but also involves inner experience. The distinction between the inner and outer may be an important one, although it is somewhat blurry at times. Also feel free to suggest what you would list as the characteristics of 'mind', which may be important at this time as human intelligence is facing the competition of artificial intelligence. Here, I would argue that the idea of intelligence is a question in the concept of mind. This involves the nature of sentience and its role in human mental and emotional states, as opposed to 'mind' as pure reasoning intelligence.

You make some important points and the issue of whether it is biological may be an important one. The primacy of biology may be so central to ideas of essentialism, including the basis of nature and nurture in thinking about free will and even ideas about what is gender. At times, the emphasis on biology may be so strong, as suggested by @Gnomon in his argument about the nature of the division between 'soft' and 'hard' science'. Mental states may be reduced to biology, which may end up with the nature of human imagination being dismissed or seen as a mere 'add on' feature in the nature of consciousness rather than imagination being seen as the an essential aspect, as realised in the numinous states of meditation and artistic creativity.

I have read Nagel' s writing on, 'The View From Nowhere', and found it helpful in thinking of the nature of awareness. It may go back to the epistemological limits of Kant, but in a more specific way. It is not possible to stand outside of consciousness in understanding. In other words, the capacity of 'mind' and the whole scope and nature of mental states may be inherent in the process of philosophical understanding. It may be asked, to what extent is self awareness, both introspection and taking on board more objective measures, essential to all philosophical understanding, even those related to the interpretation of scientific evidence and its role in human understanding?

 Likewise, Philosophy is a soft science... — Gnomon

:sweat:

As Witty says (and many others back to antiquity point out): "Philosophy is not a theory but an activity." –TLP, 4.112 (i.e. NOT SCIENCE)

In a later post, you replied to ↪180 Proof : "what do you expect from me?". As a survivor of many of his Either/Or broadside attacks, I will presume to guess what he wants:

Instead of "I will presume to guess" (i.e. making sh*t up), Gnomon, just read what I actually wrote in reply to @Jack Cummins ...

Same as every other member of TPF, Jack, I expect from you what I expect from myself: good reasoning and valid arguments rather than unwarranted opinions or superstitions ... — 180 Proof

Speaking of which:

... somewhere in the middle of that Idealism---Realism range ... — Gnomon

Clarify, if you can, why you believe "Idealism and Realism" are disparate conceptual positions on a continuum which are different by degrees rather than different in kind.

Your reply reveals an unintended ambiguity in what I wrote. By talking about consciousness as an "exclusively biological phenomenon" I was meaning to contrast that view with another current hypothesis, that nonbiological entities like computers might also be conscious. But you quite plausibly took this in a different direction: whether a "biological" -- in the sense of physical or scientific -- understanding of consciousness would necessarily be reductionist, leaving no room for what you call "add-on" features like imagination or, in my examples, rationality.

Pretending to be a scientist for a moment, my hunch is that consciousness will indeed prove to be an exclusively biological phenomenon, in the sense I originally meant. But that would have no bearing on whether the subjective products of consciousness have the objective or universal qualities that Nagel and others believe they do. That's why I think it remains a philosophical rather than a scientific question.

What is the basis of good argument and I wonder about its linguistics and grammar. One aspect which I wonder about in your writing is your use of italics and sentence breaks, as they may lead to ambiguities. I am not sure if these are intentional and about the limits of logic and language? Generally, in the understanding of the nature of understanding of 'mind', I wonder about language and its limit. Wittgenstein may have recognised the limits of language but this may be so germane in the understanding of 'mind' and consciousness' and pinning these down to logic and science...

What is the basis of good argument — Jack Cummins

Valid inferences, contextual relevance, clearly defined / precisely used terms, etc.

understanding of 'mind' and consciousness'

... such as Socratically provoked by this post:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/891620

I am not disputing valid inferences and terms but it is so complex, involving logic and linguistics. The complexity of this may be why a site such as this are needed when the basics and minor aspects are both important in the grasp and understanding of 'mind', including its experiential and theoretical nature.

I am not disputing valid inferences and terms — Jack Cummins

Maybe not, you just don't bother with making – pinning yourself down with – "good arguments".

The whole nature of ambiguity may arise in thinking about the idea of 'mind'. It may be the very nature of ambiguity which is a problem in psychological and philosophical understanding. It may be a wish to put 'reality' and ideas into boxes, when there are so many inherent problems. I hope that in acknowledging the nature of ambiguity of this I am not seen as the antiphilospher, or, perhaps, I should stand as the antiphilospher, as seeing the problematic and blurry areas of philosophy, especially the nature of 'mind'. Each person may experience 'mind' and try to come up with valid explanatory logic, for better or worse.

I am sorry if you see me as not making 'good' arguments. I wonder what are the essentials for making 'good' arguments in relation to understanding the nature of 'mind'. Even the idea of 'good' is a value judgement, although I would presume that your idea is based more on the basis of the concept of 'truth', especially in relation to accuracy.

I am not sure to what extent each of us comes from an entirely different basis of motivation and logic. I am certainly opposed to mystification of ideas. If anything, the nature of conceptual and psychological understanding may be important. For example, I know that my own psychological issues with Christian philosophy stem from issues of sexuality. This takes it back from the philosophical issues to the psychological ones. In this respect, I see the area of psychology and philosophy as being of equal importance..I am not sure to what extent each is primary and psychology or philosophy as the key area for debate. To what extent do you see the nature of psychology or philosophy as as the foundation for thinking?

"Philosophy is not a theory but an activity." –TLP, 4.112 (i.e. NOT SCIENCE) — 180 Proof

Not sure what you're getting at. Biology, physics, and chemistry, to name a few, are not theories.

It could be asked what are theories?.lThey may involve theories and evidence in understanding.The biggest danger may be where theories and models may taken as absolutes as opposed to representations of ideas and understanding in the human 'mind".The concept of 'mind' may be limited. but this may also apply to the theories and models related to the nature of 'mind', mental states and consciousness.

Biology, physics, and chemistry, to name a few, are not theories. — Patterner

We produce 'testable empirical theories' (i.e. explanations of how transformations of specified states-of-affairs happen) using sciences, not philosophy which, lacking any empirical means, only clarifies and re/interprets what we think we know (or mean) but frequently do not such as 'theories' (and their constitutive elements e.g. assumptions, principles, methods, formalisms, etc).

I wonder what are the essentials for making 'good' arguments in relation to understanding the nature of 'mind'. — Jack Cummins

IMO, begin by deciding whether "the nature of mind" is 'natural or supernatural' and thereby following lines of philosophical inquiry and argument consistent with either the best available scientific research or the most venerable esoteric traditions. Without this decision, all one can do is confuse many issues (e.g. compare apples & onions) and generate the very "ambiguity" one's own indecisiveness generates and then blames for being "too complex". And if the initial decision (i.e. either natural or supernatural) does not cash out in the end, one has learned at least that and might start over pursuing the alternative course of reflection and inquiry; however, if both paths are cul de sacs, then one is nonetheless in good company of countless seekers who at least understand how to live within (their) cul de sacs. So what if we "fail" (S. Beckett)? Why are you seemingly so intellectually afraid to fail, Jack? To decide is, after all, the thrust of Kant's motto (borrowed from the poet Horace): Sapere Aude. :fire: