"Stabilities" are represented as equilibriums which are artificial ideals thathave no real independent existence. So the ideal equilibrium is compared to reality in modeling, and how reality strays from the equilibrium, is known as change. But the reality is that things are changing, whether fast or slow, so the equilibrium is just an artificial tool, and does not represent any thing really independent. It's a fabricated mathematical tool.

I don't see why this should be the case. Protons seem to have beginnings and ends, which is why it seems fair to think of them as underlined by processes. However, they are remarkable stable otherwise. I don't see any reason to think we have "invented" rather than discovered protons, atoms, molecules, etc. Indeed, it's hard to see what we can even say about the world if these are to be considered purely as "inventions." To be sure, we invented ways of talking about them, systems for describing them, etc. But such systems didn't spring out of the ether; rather, they were developed by examining these phenomena.

We might accept G.M D’Ariano's claim that particles are like "the shadows on the walls of Plato's cave," because universal fields and information have the ontological high ground, and still accept that these incredibly robust stabilities have a real ontic existence. The fact is, the "particle zoo" is still not all that big. Our "universal process" is such that it results in a fairly small diversity of stabilities that emerge at small scales - the same sort of thing we see when we play around with the rules of various "toy universe" models.

I don't see why this should be the case. Protons seem to have beginnings and ends, which is why it seems fair to think of them as underlined by processes. However, they are remarkable stable otherwise. I don't see any reason to think we have "invented" rather than discovered protons, atoms, molecules, etc. Indeed, it's hard to see what we can even say about the world if these are to be considered purely as "inventions." To be sure, we invented ways of talking about them, systems for describing them, etc. But such systems didn't spring out of the ether; rather, they were developed by examining these phenomena. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I am not saying that we cannot think of mass as being composed of underlying processes, I am saying that this perspective does not solve any problems. To label a proton as "a stability" provides no sort of understanding. The concept which bears that name, "stability", is an invention, an ideal, and whatever it is that is supposed to be stable, the proposed underlying process, is not at all understood. So we have an invention called "a stability", and the thing called a proton is said to be this invented thing. This becomes more obvious if you describe an atom is "a stability", and a even more obvious if you describe a molecule as a "stability". Describing these things with the use of that ideal really says nothing about the constitution of the thing.

We might accept G.M D’Ariano's claim that particles are like "the shadows on the walls of Plato's cave," because universal fields and information have the ontological high ground, and still accept that these incredibly robust stabilities have a real ontic existence. The fact is, the "particle zoo" is still not all that big. Our "universal process" is such that it results in a fairly small diversity of stabilities that emerge at small scales - the same sort of thing we see when we play around with the rules of various "toy universe" models. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The issue is not the ontic existence of the stability itself, as this is what becomes evident to us through sensation, the thing represented as a stability, as something (an object, thing, or being) with temporal extension. The problem is in understanding the supposed underlying processes which happen to be stable. We tend to understand processes through reference to the things which are actively involved in the processes. So for example if a molecule is a stability of processes, the things involved in those processes are the atoms. And if an atom is a stability of processes, then the underlying things involved in those processes are the parts of the atoms. Now when we get to fundamental particles, you might say that there are "fundamental fields" which constitute the processes, but fields are mathematical constructs. Unless we determine a medium for the supposed wave activity, (the ether), the proposed processes have no substance, and they are simply mathematical constructs built to represent the observed stability.

We tend to understand processes through reference to the things which are actively involved in the processes.

I'd argue this is getting things backwards. We only understand "things" in terms of what they do. What properties does any thing have when it is interacting with nothing? You can only describe properties in terms of how something interacts with other things or how parts of it interact. Substances without process can't explain anything.

See the two quotes here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/885631

So for example if a molecule is a stability of processes, the things involved in those processes are the atoms. And if an atom is a stability of processes, then the underlying things involved in those processes are the parts of the atoms. Now when we get to fundamental particles, you might say that there are "fundamental fields" which constitute the processes, but fields are mathematical constructs

But the particles are mathematical constructs too. As Wilzeck puts it, with quarks the "it is the bit." These particles are entirely defined in mathematical terms. This is what ontic structural realism makes its hay on, the fact that they are defined as nothing but math. So, if being described in terms of mathematical constructs is disqualifying, then fundamental particles are every bit as problematic as fields.

I'd argue this is getting things backwards. We only understand "things" in terms of what they do. What properties does any thing have when it is interacting with nothing? You can only describe properties in terms of how something interacts with other things or how parts of it interact. Substances without process can't explain anything. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's really irrelevant, because the point is that we understand that it is things which are interacting. It's obvious that we understand things through interactions, that's what sensation is, an interaction. But, as I said earlier, these are the two incompatible aspects of reality, the passive thing (being), and the activity (becoming). One is not reducible to the other. Therefore the attempt to reduce everything to processes provides no advantage over the attempt to reduce everything to substance. We need to account for the reality of both, as distinct and not reducible to one another. That is, the thing, and what the thing is doing

But the particles are mathematical constructs too. As Wilzeck puts it, with quarks the "it is the bit." These particles are entirely defined in mathematical terms. This is what ontic structural realism makes its hay on, the fact that they are defined as nothing but math. So, if being described in terms of mathematical constructs is disqualifying, then fundamental particles are every bit as problematic as fields. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The particle is defined by its interaction with the equipment that detects it, which is substance. The fields represent the potential for interaction. So the particles are not "mathematical constructs" in the way that the fields are. "Particles" is an assumption made from, and supported by, sense observation, just like the existence of a table, chair, or any other object is an assumption supported by sense observation.

We might accept G.M D’Ariano's claim that particles are like "the shadows on the walls of Plato's cave," because universal fields and information have the ontological high ground, and still accept that these incredibly robust stabilities have a real ontic existence. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Plato's cave/shadow analogy distinguished between noumenal Ideality and phenomenal Reality, but some philosophers debate which is really real. Personally, I behave as-if the material reality (cave & shadows) is all around me, even as the mental realm (fire & illumination) is within me. Likewise, thanks to my BothAnd philosophy, I have no problem accepting the scientific evidence for an invisible universal mathematical field of potential (fire) that somehow engenders sub-atomic tangible particles of stuff that aggregate into the "real" milieu (cave) that allows me to "grasp" both things and ideas. :smile:

We might accept G.M D’Ariano's claim that particles are like "the shadows on the walls of Plato's cave," — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here is passage that is particularly relevant. Socrates and Glaucon are discussing what happens when those who have passed through 'the difficult passage' out of the cave return to it, out of compassion for those remaining, who are the subjects of the first paragraph:

“And suppose they received certain honours and praises from one another, and there were privileges for whoever discerns the passing shadows most keenly, and is best at remembering which of them usually comes first or last, which are simultaneous, and on that basis is best able to predict what is going to happen next. Do you think he would have any desire for these prizes, or envy those who are honoured by the prisoners and hold power over them? Or would he much prefer the fate described by Homer and ‘work as a serf for a man with no land’, and suffer anything at all, rather than hold their opinions and live as they do?”

“I think it is just as you say. He would accept any fate rather than live as they do.”

“Yes, and think about this,” I said. “If such a person were to go back down, and sit in the same seat, would not his eyes become filled with darkness after this sudden return from the sunlight?”

“Very much so,” he said.

“Now, suppose that he had to compete once more with those perpetual prisoners in recognising these shadows, while his eyesight was still poor, before his eyes had adjusted. Since it would take some time to become accustomed to the dark, would he not become a figure of fun? Would they not say that he went up, but came back down with his eyes ruined, and that it is not worth even trying to go upwards? And if they could somehow get their hands on and kill a person who was trying to free people and lead them upwards, would they not do just that?”

“Definitely,” he said. — Republic, Book 7

I do wonder whether the frequently-aired complaint that 'quantum physics is incomplete' might arise because of the fact that matter does not exhaust the totality of existence.

So, if that's what you're saying is 'ideologically-driven', then I agree, but I don't agree it is characteristic of science as such. — Wayfarer

Can one do science without scientism?

Of course. To say otherwise would be stereotyping. Scientists come from all kinds of cultures and backgrounds and have a huge diversity of views.

I do wonder whether the frequently-aired complaint that 'quantum physics is incomplete' might arise because of the fact that matter does not exhaust the totality of existence — Wayfarer

Good point. :up:

Good point. — jgill

Can you explain why? I'm not seeing it.

Can you explain why? I'm not seeing it — Janus

As a retired math person I can see the possibility of the mathematics of Quantum theory somehow reifying into a form of reality. However, I suspect not.

Well this is a relief. I thought that I was a real person for a sec…. Turns out I’m just a probability.

Thanks, that much I could see. The part I couldn't get was how that ties in with a purportedly frequent complaint that QM is not complete. Are any theories complete (and consistent)? Anyway, I just don't see what matter has to do with the question of completeness. That said, I'm very open to being schooled on this.

My observation was simply the resemblance between that passage from the Republic, which talks of ‘honours’ that the ‘cave-dwellers’ receive for ‘whoever discerns the passing shadows most keenly, and is best at remembering which of them usually comes first or last, which are simultaneous, and on that basis is best able to predict what is going to happen next.’ It seems an apt analogy for particle physics, as nobody really knows if there is an underlying reality, or if so what it comprises. Recall Neils Bohr’s often-quoted aphorism, ‘physics concerns not nature herself, but what we can say about nature’.

At this time, as is well-known, there are challenging fundamental conundrums about the standard model of physics and other matters. All I’m saying is, maybe that is because physics itself is not after all fundamental. But as everything is defined in terms of matter (or matter-energy) then the question is ‘what else could it be’? I would guess there are dissident theorists (and probably some pretty far-out ideas) about that, and I’m not trying to prove the point. I feign no hypothesis - just idle musing.

Recall Neils Bohr’s often-quoted aphorism, ‘physics concerns what we can say about nature’. — Wayfarer

Everything we can say about nature is just what we can say about nature, so I don't see why physics should be any different.

Physics concerns what appears to us as most fundamental, so to speculate that there might be something more fundamental is not really saying anything substantive at all. There is perhaps no limit to the non-substantive things we could say or at least the limit would only be the imagination, but are such non-substantive imaginings really of any importance for our understanding of the world and our place in it?

The scientific method, by its very definition, does not purport to derive any truth from its usage. So this sort of thing is par for the course no? Can you image the scientific best guess reality 100 years from now? 1000? Can you imagine that it would not change? Let it all compete and be open to ideas that seem odd. You never know ;). Physics is as fundamental as we can get. It just changes slowly over time. By standing on the shoulders of giants can we see a tiny bit more (newton). And woe to those (for those?) who reject the attempts.

Can you image the scientific best guess reality 100 years from now? — Metaphyzik

The article this thread is from distinguishes science per se from physicalism:

the claim that there’s nothing but physical reality is either false or empty. If ‘physical reality’ means reality as physics describes it, then the assertion that only physical phenomena exist is false. Why? Because physical science – including biology and computational neuroscience – doesn’t include an account of consciousness. This is not to say that consciousness is something unnatural or supernatural. The point is that physical science doesn’t include an account of experience; but we know that experience exists, so the claim that the only things that exist are what physical science tells us is false. On the other hand, if ‘physical reality’ means reality according to some future and complete physics, then the claim that there is nothing else but physical reality is empty, because we have no idea what such a future physics will look like, especially in relation to consciousness.

This problem is known as Hempel’s dilemma, named after the illustrious philosopher of science Carl Gustav Hempel (1905-97). Faced with this quandary, some philosophers argue that we should define ‘physical’ such that it rules out radical emergentism (that life and the mind are emergent from but irreducible to physical reality) and panpsychism (that mind is fundamental and exists everywhere, including at the microphysical level). This move would give physicalism a definite content, but at the cost of trying to legislate in advance what ‘physical’ can mean, instead of leaving its meaning to be determined by physics.

Interesting idea for sure. Thanks for the clarity!

But why would there never be a physical accounting of consciousness? If AGI is ever to happen - which if it does it would be a long way into the future, then this would be a good counter to this argument, no? If we are to build a “positronic brain” for lack of a better word (and cause I love Star Trek) then wouldn’t we have to account for it physically? Is such a facticity impossible? Perhaps, but perhaps not. Iterative AI will never bear such fruit, but quantum computing (and dna computing) - just for speeds really - may at some point allow for a feedback loop that could be conscious.

And if one believes that we are always striving and improving in our understanding, then the idea that we can disregard a future because it would be empty based on our current understanding seems odd to me. I like the logic of that article, but its boundaries are open to debate imho. Why would they have to be empty? We don’t understand if reality at its root is a wave or particle - or how it can be both, for instance (I am out of date here - but it’s an example from the past) but the idea is that there would be no necessity to assume it is empty (aka it doesn’t exist) because we don’t understand it.

Maybe I don’t understand it. But Hempel’s dilemma seems like a self imposed problem based on a particular division of the world - that seems / probably is a useful and brilliant conceptual tool. Perhaps we don’t need to always use that tool - and as always that would be a decision based on what we accept at the start.

You know, Shakespeare and Horacio?

But why would there never be a physical accounting of consciousness? — Metaphyzik

That is the subject of David Chalmer’s 1996, paper, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, which has triggered a lot of debate. The gist of the argument is that no physical explanation can account for the nature of subjective experience which is by definition first-person, although you’d have to read the paper for the details of the argument.

But the general drift of the Blind Spot argument is against physicalism, which is the belief that everything can be reduced to physics. Hempel’s dilemma is that physics is subject to constant revision, so what we think of as physical, or non-physical, now, might be completely different in 10 or 100 years.

Facing up to the problem of consciousness can be found here https://consc.net/papers/facing.pdf

The original article this thread was based on can be found here

https://aeon.co/essays/the-blind-spot-of-science-is-the-neglect-of-lived-experience

Great I’ll take a closer look, thanks for the links!

That's really irrelevant, because the point is that we understand that it isthings which are interacting.

Yes, that is the defining claim of a substance-based metaphysics. I fail to see how this is a knock against process-metaphysics. It's saying "if we assume substance metaphysics is true, then process metaphysics isn't." Well obviously.

I will agree that substance metaphysics is more intuitive. However, our understanding of nature has often required us to drop intuitive models for less intuitive ones.

The particle is defined by its interaction with the equipment that detects it, which is substance. The fields represent the potential for interaction. So the particles are not "mathematical constructs" in the way that the fields are. "Particles" is an assumption made from, and supported by, sense observation, just like the existence of a table, chair, or any other object is an assumption supported by sense observation.

This just seems like question begging. If a particle is defined by "interactions" it seems just as correct to say it is defined by processes. To claim that "detection equipment" is fundamentally substance just assumes the truth of substance metaphysics.

There exist entirely consistent process-based explanations of physics. The existence of fields is likewise supported by sense observation in the same exact way that particles are.

Substance explanations have had a bad track record in general:

here is, however, a historical move away from substance models toward process models: almost every science has had an initial phase in which its basic phenomena were conceptualized in terms of some kind of substance — in which the central issues were to determine what kind of substance — but has moved beyond that to a recognition of those phenomena as processes. This shift is manifest in, for example, understanding fire in terms of phlogiston to understanding fire in terms of combustion, heat in terms of random kinetic motion rather than the substance caloric, life in terms of certain kinds of far from thermodynamic equilibrium processes rather than in terms of vital fluid, and so on. Sciences of the mind, arguably, have not yet made this transition

In particular, it seems hard to explain quantum foam, virtual particles, the spontaneous emergence of quark condensate, etc. in terms of "fundamental things." The "fundamental things" brought in to explain these are universal fields. But then you just have a thing, and it is changes in the thing, which are always occurring by the thing's very nature, which do all the explanatory lifting. That starts to sound a lot like process metaphysics.

What is meant by "stabilities" is also not unexplainable In brief:

The default for substances and Democritean “atoms” is stability. Change requires explanation, and there are no self-movers. This is reversed in a process view, with change always occurring, and it is the stabilities of organizations or patterns of process, if such should occur, that require explanation.

There are two basic categories of process stability. The first is what might be called energy well stabilities. These are process organizations that will remain stable so long as no above threshold energy impinges on them. Contemporary atoms would be a canonical example: they are constituted as organizations of process that can remain stable for cosmological time periods [but they can be created or destroyed].

The second category of process stability is that of process organizations that are far from thermodynamic equilibrium. Unlike energy well stabilities, these require ongoing maintenance of their far from equilibrium conditions. Otherwise, they go to equilibrium and cease to exist...

Aside from the track record and difficulties in being adapted to modern physics, I'd also count against substance metaphysics the way it splits the world into subjective/objective, provided strong emergence is barred. But if strong emergence isn't barred, then it seems like interactions, process, ends up generating new fundamental properties/substances. But then process now again seems to be driving the explanatory vehicle.

Positing a metaphysical realm of substances or atoms induces a fundamental split in the overall metaphysics of the world. In particular, the realm of substances or atoms is a realm that might be held to involve fact, cause, and other physicalistic properties and phenomena, but it excludes such phenomena as normativity, intentionality, and modality into a second metaphysical realm. It induces a split metaphysics.

quantum physics is incomplete — Wayfarer

This relates to the lack of quantum theories explaining some observed phenomenons. The overwhelming majority of scientists will agree that it is matter that will explain things like entanglement and local gravity, and it is not due to bias, as many scientists will not agree that it is matter that will explain consciousness.

The overwhelming majority of scientists will agree that it is matter that will explain things like entanglement and local gravity — Lionino

So, if there are anomolies in the movement of galaxies, they can only be due to matter, even if it is of a kind we have no knowledge of. Because, what else is there?

So, if there are anomolies in the movement of galaxies, they can only be due to matter, even if it is of a kind we have no knowledge of. Because, what else is there? — Wayfarer

Well, I was under the impression that by 'matter' you meant physical things in general instead of just conventional matter. But if that is not the case then, nevermind. :yum:

Yes, that is the defining claim of a substance-based metaphysics. I fail to see how this is a knock against process-metaphysics. It's saying "if we assume substance metaphysics is true, then process metaphysics isn't." Well obviously.

I will agree that substance metaphysics is more intuitive. However, our understanding of nature has often required us to drop intuitive models for less intuitive ones. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The point is that neither substance metaphysics nor process metaphysics is adequate because nature reveals to us, the reality of both aspects. And, since one is incompatible with the other, nature cannot be solely described by one or the other. That is why dualism provides the best approach. Neither substance metaphysics nor process metaphysics can provide what is required for a complete understanding

This just seems like question begging. If a particle is defined by "interactions" it seems just as correct to say it is defined by processes. To claim that "detection equipment" is fundamentally substance just assumes the truth of substance metaphysics. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The issue is in the nature of empirical observation, and the language applied for description. We observe things and make statements, and so we describe the world in this way. You can argue that this constitutes assumptions which beg the question, but it's really just a matter of what constitutes "truth". We must start with true premises, to produce sound conclusions, and true premises describe things (substance). As Aristotle demonstrated, becoming (process) defies the law of excluded middle, so simple descriptions of processes cannot provide us with true premises. If we adhere strictly to process metaphysics we have no truth and no sound logic. Then we get ontologies like model-dependent realism. It doesn't really matter that you might argue that requesting true premises is begging the question, because assuming that there is such a thing as truth is to make a substance assumption, because truth is simply what we want. Dismiss it as "intuition" if you want, but most philosophers agree that to dismiss intuition is to make a mistake.

For anyone else interested, here is the link for Facing Up to the Problems of Consciousness

https://consc.net/papers/facing.pdf

And while there consc.net also has his recent thoughts, which are probably worth a read too. And look at first glance to be in the same genre.

Happy thinking!

John Vervaeke dialogue with Evan Thompson on The Blind Spot. He says it’s Part 2, although part 1 doesn’t seem to be published yet. In any case, the essay at the head of this thread is sufficient intro to the general gist of the blind spot. Here the discussion is the impact of ‘blind spot metaphysics’ on biology. The conversation starts with a clear differentiation of organism and mechanism, the meaning of ‘autonomy’ in respect of organic life, and I really like that it moves on to the sense in which agency is instantiated even in very rudimentary forms of life such as bacteria.

i presume this is Part 1: Part 1

Yeah, probably! I was aware of that episode, but it didn’t occur to me that this was the episode he was referring to. Thanks for that.

He says it’s Part 2, although part 1 doesn’t seem to be published yet. — Wayfarer

That's the trend, leave room for the prequel. Biologists should get themselves up to date with the modern trends, and instead of leading people toward believing in abiogenesis, they should leave an opening for the prequel, the prior agency.