↪013zen You're not saying there are untrue facts are you? Every proposition represents a possible fact, but whether the proposition is true or not is dependent on whether it is a correct picture of the fact/state of affairs. — Sam26

I am saying:

1. Fact can either be the case or not be the case.

In the event that it is the case, a certain set of atomic facts obtain. In the event of a fact not being the case, a certain set of atomic facts does not obtain.

In the event that they obtain, Witt calls it a positive fact. In the event that they do not obtain, Witt calls it a negative fact.

"The existence and non-existence of atomic facts is the reality. (The existence of atomic facts we also call a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact.)" (2.06).

I agree with that, I've said that over and over again. Do you disagree with that @Banno?

Not at all.

I haven't read the replies here in detail, focusing on your posts instead. My interest is in the change between Tract and PI. In Tract, objects and atomic propositions are taken as essential, I suspect as the result of a transcendental argument: without these, language could not work; language works; therefore there must be objects and atomic propositions.

But this is rejected in PI, replaced by meaning as use, and simples as whatever is needed for the language game.

You mean atomic facts, right?

1. Fact can either be the case or not be the case. — 013zen

No. If you had said "possible facts can either be the case or not be the case", I would agree. All facts are the case.

Then followed with

In the event that it is the case, a certain set of atomic facts obtain. In the event of a possible fact not being the case, a certain set of atomic facts do not obtain.

Geez, I think I'm misreading @013zen I need a break. Talk later.

Sorry - elementary propositions - Popper used "atomic propositions" and I was reading his account in Anscombe.

This is too fast for sufficient care.

(I had written that before your last post... yes, I'm going for a walk.)

Now we can be lost together!
— Fooloso4

This is why we do philosophy, after all. — 013zen

As Wittgenstein said:

When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there.

(CV 65)

So, there we see clearly what Wittgenstein has in mind here. — 013zen

Perhaps. I thought we understood this in the same way but your next post indicates that we don't.

"The young man is starting college tomorrow." — 013zen

To simplify this a bit I would analyse this as: a (young man) stands in relation (R) to b (college)

Any young man, any college, any date, etc. — 013zen

Yes, the variables can stand for anything, real or imagined. The logical structure and relation stays the same. His analysis is logical. It says nothing about the content or beings in the world.

The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs.
Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition.

(3.1431)

That is, the sense of a proposition does not require that objects be simple.

Objects make up the substance of the world

(2.021)

What does this mean? As he goes on to say:

It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something—a form—in common with it. (2.022)

Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form. (2.023)

There must be objects, if the world is to have unalterable form. (2.026)

Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same. (2.027)

Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing
and unstable. (2.0271)

What subsists, unalterable objects, are not the changeable spatial objects such as tables and chairs we encounter in the world. They are not objects to be found in the world if we are able to analyse compound object completely. They are what all object in the world have. They are formal properties. Internal relations. The possibility of combining. They are purely logical or formal.

Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them.
— Fooloso4

I don't quite agree with this. As Anscombe says, simple objects are demanded by the nature of Language (see her text, p.29), referencing 2.021 and 2.0211.

The rejection of this view strikes me as one of the main departures from the Tractatus found in the PI. — Banno

Does Anscombe mention a single simple object? The claim that language demands it is not the same as actually identifying either a simple object or a simple name.

Does Anscombe mention a single simple object? — Fooloso4

I doubt it. Look for yourself. That there are such things is implied by the structure of language Wittgenstein develops. What they are is irrelevant. See p. 28 op.cit - I can't easily quote from it here. What they are is an issue for psychology.

And this is what was later rejected in the PI. Anscombe does not mince words and is not protective of the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus.

But what elementary propositions are not, is simple observation statements.

Perhaps this is how one should think about these objects. The analysis of language demands that there are elementary propositions. These elementary propositions are about possible atomic facts, consisting in combinations of names. These names name elementary objects

Of course this is muddled, hence the PI.

To simplify this a bit I would analyse this as: a (young man) stands in relation (R) to b (college) — Fooloso4

Yes, I'd also think this analyzes into aRb, in which case, if I'm understanding correctly, "a" and "b" would be our objects with R just being a possible relation that can hold between them. Not itself an object.

I believe that we might have a similar understanding which is simply being obfuscated due to loose language.

As Frege once pointed out (I can't recall exactly where at this moment)...due to the nature of everyday language, we often times have to rely on the good nature of our interlocutors when trying to get our points across. Especially when approaching technical issues.

I'll look for the quote tomorrow. I believe I have an idea which paper it's from.

That there are such things is implied by the structure of language Wittgenstein develops. What they are is irrelevant. See p. 28 op.cit - I can't easily quote from it here. What they are is an issue for psychology. — Banno

In the passage where Anscombe quotes Wittgenstein he does not say that what objects are is irrelevant or a matter of psychology. He is responding to Russell's question about the constituents and components of a thought. This in support of Anscombe's point, contra Popper, that:

...whatever elementary propositions may be, they are not simple observation statements

Whatever they may be is not irrelevant and not an issue for psychology. In fact, she goes on to say:

If the elementary propositions of the Tractatus are not simple observation statements, it seems necessary to find some other account of them before we can grasp the doctrines of the book even in vague outline.

One need only take a quick look at other secondary sources to see that scholars still do not have an agreed upon account.

(To quote try highlighting and control C. to copy and control V to paste,)

Post 10

We know that the idea of propositions being pictures, as presented in his picture theory of propositions, is central to his thinking in the Tractatus. So, propositions represent reality through their pictorial form. The elements of a picture include several things, including the following: Names, of course, are part of what is included in the elements of a picture, names correspond to the objects, i.e., the arrangement of names corresponds to the arrangement of objects that make up atomic facts and hence complex facts.

Second, is the logical structure of the picture (all propositions whether true or false have a logical structure). The logical structure of the picture (the proposition) also includes the logical connectives, such as disjunction, conjunction, negation, etc., and they determine the truth-possibilities of propositions (T. 4.31).

Another way to talk about the elements of a proposition is to refer to the representational content of the picture. So, the elements of a picture can be talked about in different ways. A propositional picture is a particular picture, say of A as opposed to B, because of how the pictorial elements of A (the form of the picture) relate to the situation pictured. They are identical (T. 2.15).

Post 11

We know, according to Wittgenstein, that propositions are pictures of possible states of affairs (facts). “A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts (T. 2.2).” It has logico-pictorial form in common with the facts it depicts. And, as we’ve said over and over the picture (the proposition) by itself only represents the possibility that it mirrors or reflects reality or the facts (T. 2.201, 2.202, 2.203). “A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree [with reality]; it is correct or incorrect, true or false (T. 2.21).” How does it do this? The picture does this by displaying its pictorial form, and what the picture represents is its sense (T. 2.22, 2.221). The sense of a proposition is separate from whether it agrees with the facts. If this wasn’t the case, we wouldn’t understand the sense of false propositions. We cannot know from the picture alone whether it is true or false, it must be compared with reality (T. 2.223, 2.224). In other words, “There are no pictures that are true a priori (T. 2.225).”

This ends my comments on the second of the seven main propositions of the Tractatus.

Ok, but elementary propositions are not atomic objects.

See also the last whole paragraph on p.27. "The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology.

I'll leave you to your musings.

↪Fooloso4 Ok, but elementary propositions are not atomic objects. — Banno

Did I say or imply otherwise? Why bring this up?

See also the last whole paragraph on p.27. "The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology. — Banno

Right, but the epistemological problem and the problem of what elementary objects are are two different issues. Anscombe remarks:

But it is fair to say that at the time when he wrote the Tractatus, Wittgenstein pretended that epistemology had nothing to do with the foundations of logic and the theory of meaning, with which he was concerned.

(28)

Saying he pretended suggests he knew better.

He does say a few important things about what they are:

In order to avoid the impression of interrupting and interfering I decided to delete the rest of my post and start a new topic of Tractarian objects,

Did I say or imply otherwise? Why bring this up? — Fooloso4

Because you seemed to me not to be differentiating between atomic objects and elementary propositions.

Because you seemed to me not to be differentiating between atomic objects and elementary propositions. — Banno

Where do you think I failed to differentiate them?

In the post above, ( ) where you quote my comment about simple objects and then go on to reply to it as if it were about elementary propositions.

↪Fooloso4 In the post above, (↪Fooloso4 )where you quote my comment about simple objects and then go on to reply to it as if it were about elementary propositions. — Banno

First off, what you referred to was not about simple objects:

He is responding to Russell's question about the constituents and components of a thought. — Fooloso4

Second, come on Banno! This is basic stuff. We have been through this before, if not in this thread then in others.

The elementary proposition consists of names. (4.22) A name means an object. (3.203)

I picked that this passage:

If the elementary propositions of the Tractatus are not simple observation statements, it seems necessary to find some other account of them before we can grasp the doctrines of the book even in vague outline.

because it is part of her argument that shows, contrary to your claim that what objects are is irrelevant or a matter of psychology, that an account of them is important for understanding the Tractatus. An account of elementary propositions must necessarily include an account of names and the objects the are names of. As she says prior to this on page 28:

And that there should be simple names and simple objects is equally presented as a demand at 3.23

It makes no sense to say that an account of elementary propositions is important but to address what an object is is irrelevant.

First off, what you referred to was not about simple objects: — Fooloso4

That was what I was talking about.

I've no clear idea of what you are talking about, if not objects. Here is where you joined my part of the conversation:

Does Anscombe mention a single simple object? The claim that language demands it is not the same as actually identifying either a simple object or a simple name. — Fooloso4

That sentence appears to me to be about objects.

You are all over the place.

What an atomic object is, as Anscombe argues, is unimportant to the argument in the Tractatus as presented. I'm arguing along with Copi and Anscombe that names refer to particulars, along the lines of individual variables in modern logic. Further I think that the way in which simples are viewed is one of the main changes between the Tractatus and the PI.

But the vital thing here, which permeates all of Wittgenstein's work, is that the world is not made of objects but of facts.

That's the view that I, and I think @Sam26, are setting out. And again, while your tone suggests that you adamantly disagree with me, I really do not know what it is you are suggesting, and hence how you agree or disagree with what I have said.

So unless you are able to explain what it is you are saying in a way that is comprehensible, I do not see how this conversation might proceed.

Let's take a step back:

Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them.
— Fooloso4

I don't quite agree with this. As Anscombe says, simple objects are demanded by the nature of Language (see her text, p.29), referencing 2.021 and 2.0211. — Banno

To which I asked again:

Does Anscombe mention a single simple object? The claim that language demands it is not the same as actually identifying either a simple object or a simple name. — Fooloso4

The simple answer is no, she does not. To claim that language demands it is not to identify one.

With me so far?

In your response to this you said:

What they are is irrelevant. See p. 28 op.cit - I can't easily quote from it here. What they are is an issue for psychology. — Banno

What do we find at the top for page 28? Anscombe quotes Wittgenstein:

‘I don’t know what the constituents of a thought are but I know that it must have constituents which correspond to the words of language. Again the kind of relation of the constituents of the thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It would be a matter of psychology to find out.’

It is the constituents of a thought that he says is irrelevant. That is what is a matter of psychology. The constituents of a thought is not an object. That the constituents of a thought are irrelevant and a matter of psychology does not mean that the question of what an object is is either irrelevant or a matter of psychology.

What an atomic object is, as Anscombe argues, is unimportant to the argument in the Tractatus as presented. — Banno

Does she say this? Where?

On the top of page 29 she says:

The objects form the substance of the world.

That objects form the substance of the world is not unimportant. It is fundamental.

But the vital thing here, which permeates all of Wittgenstein's work, is that the world is not made of objects but of facts. — Banno

And the facts are made up of objects. The question of what objects are is deeply problematic. I can understand why you and Sam want to skip over it. As I said above, I will be addressing it in a separate thread.

I don't find much to disagree with here, and I didn't skip over objects.

My apologies. I stand corrected. My attention was drawn elsewhere and I forgot to return to this.

You said:

Objects are the fundamental building blocks of reality; they make up the substance of the world. — Sam26

While it is true that they make up the substance of the world, I think the building block analogy is misleading. You did point out that they are not material, but building blocks and the building are made of the same kind of stuff. The substance of the world and the world, however, are not.

Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form (T. 2.023).” You can think of form as the way things are arranged in a picture. — Sam26

This unalterable form is not an arrangement. Objects have within them the possibilities of forming arrangements, but the form of objects is logical form. Unfortunately, he uses the term 'form' in different ways. There is the unalterable form (singular) and the forms (plural) of objects in configuration.

In another post you say:

Fourth, as we’ve already pointed out, objects form the substance of reality. They form this substance by combining into atomic facts or the structure of the world (reality). — Sam26

They do not form the substance by combining. They are the substance. And I think this is the crux of the matter. What does he mean by substance? As I mentioned above, I will be starting a thread on this, but if you want to discuss it here I'm game.

As I mentioned above, I will be starting a thread on this, but if you want to discuss it here I'm game. — Fooloso4

Do you have something in mind for this specifically, or would it be alright if I tried typing up a thread? I say this because I was working through this a bit and think I have something to perhaps start off the discussion. Otherwise, I'd be happy to wait until you started your thread and comment there :)

I also don't want to sidetrack this project, if I am being unhelpful.

I have no objection to you starting it.

Okay, I started something: here

That is to say, it would be a matter of empirical investigation to find out, both what the constituents of a thought are and how they are related to the ‘objects’ occurring in facts, that is to say, to the objects designated by the ‘names’ in language. — Summary, p. 28

What the objects are is "a matter of empirical investigation to find out", not an issue to be addressed in The Tractatus. It is irrelevant to the work at hand. As I said, what an atomic object is, as Anscombe argues, unimportant to the argument in the Tractatus as presented.

Immediately, Anscombe adds:

That this is fantastically untrue is shewn by any serious investigation into epistemology, such as Wittgenstein made in Philosophical Investigations. But it is fair to say that at the time when he wrote the Tractatus, Wittgenstein pretended that epistemology had nothing to do with the foundations of logic and the theory of meaning, with which he was concerned. The passage about the ‘elucidation’ of names, where he says that one must be ‘acquainted’ with their objects, gives him the lie. — op cit.

Now it remains unclear to me what you are claiming, but I don't much care.

If you or suppose Wittgenstein to be arguing that the world is made of objects, that objects are the fundamental building blocks in the Tractatus, you have badly misunderstood what is being argued.

Now it remains unclear to me what you are claiming, but I don't much care. — Banno

Well then, I will leave it there.