We know, according to Wittgenstein, that propositions are pictures of possible states of affairs (facts). “A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts (T. 2.2).” It has logico-pictorial form in common with the facts it depicts. And, as we’ve said over and over the picture (the proposition) by itself only represents the possibility that it mirrors or reflects reality or the facts (T. 2.201, 2.202, 2.203). “A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree [with reality]; it is correct or incorrect, true or false (T. 2.21).” How does it do this? The picture does this by displaying its pictorial form, and what the picture represents is its sense (T. 2.22, 2.221). The sense of a proposition is separate from whether it agrees with the facts. If this wasn’t the case, we wouldn’t understand the sense of false propositions. We cannot know from the picture alone whether it is true or false, it must be compared with reality (T. 2.223, 2.224). In other words, “There are no pictures that are true a priori (T. 2.225).” — Sam26

Nicely put :)

I agree with this, too.

:up:

Sorry, I'm falling behind. I'm in the middle of a move, and I'm recovering from a virus.

I've made a couple of misstatements that I have to also correct, as @Fooloso4 pointed out.

I have no problems with the way the thread is going.

Sorry Banno, but I think we disagree on the nature of objects. It's pretty clear what Wittgenstein had in mind, at least partially clear.

I am glad you took my remarks in the spirit in which they were intended. Of course, down the road I might see the need to revise my views. It would not be the first time! I think that anyone who thinks he has got it all right has got it wrong

Perhaps this is how one should think about these objects. The analysis of language demands that there are elementary propositions. These elementary propositions are about possible atomic facts, consisting in combinations of names. These names name elementary objects

Of course this is muddled, hence the PI. — Banno

I think I brought this a while ago, but we are finally getting to the crux of Wittgenstein's (assumptions on/glossing over) metaphysics. He asserts objects, makes little value in explaining them and then plows forward. I don't believe that's how it should work. There should at least be supplementary material if it doesn't fit into his case (Tractatus' argument). That is to say, "objects" in everyday speech can be taken for granted; "objects" in programming have a specific definitional use (and it's a logical entity of sorts, not a physical thing in the world, but has analogies thereof in programming-jargon). However, I dare pose that in the philosophical world of argumentation and grand-treatises, such important terms should not be glossed over and made so ambiguous so readily. Whether they are psychological, "real" or whatnot should be a matter of importance, as it contributes to clarity as to how the grand view the author is positing is constructed (is it facts or objects- the implications are enormously different!).

See this discussion.

Post 12

Trying to be clear about objects, so a step back.

We know this, viz., that objects, which make up the substance of the world, can be arranged to form any possible fact (state of affairs). This is basic to what an object is. You move from object  to atomic facts  to complex facts. Logic dictates this for Wittgenstein. Objects contain the possibility of arranging into any potential fact (“If things can occur in states of affairs, the possibility must be in them from the beginning (T. 2.0121).”). Whether the fact obtains depends on the arrangement of the objects in an atomic fact. Objects by themselves are mere potentiality, like any building block, but also unlike any building block we are familiar with.

My understanding of Wittgensteinian objects leads me to believe that they are the fundamental components of objective reality, i.e., they’re real things that combine. They combine to form states of affairs (T. 2.01). If states of affairs are objectively real, it would seem to follow that objects are real, at least in some sense. Otherwise, what would be combined to form states of affairs? They also seem real because they can occupy logical space. Obviously, Wittgenstein’s objects don’t exist, but Wittgenstein’s theory of objects is a theory that postulates them as real.

You must be careful about what you say about objects because you can’t ascribe external properties to objects, only internal properties (T. 2.01231). One such internal property is that they are simples, but it’s not the only internal property. Other internal properties include the ability to combine with other objects to form atomic facts, and that they make up the substance of the world of facts.

Keep in mind that to have a basic understanding of Wittgenstein’s picture theory you need not have a perfect understanding of objects or names. After all, we’re not trying to write a doctoral thesis.

so a step back. — Sam26

Your step back is a step forward. We are in agreement.

... arranged to form any possible fact (state of affairs). — Sam26

As you go on to say, objects contain the possibility of arranging into facts, but as stated it might be taken to mean that something arranges them. Objects arrange themselves. Facts are the result of such arrangements.

Objects by themselves are mere potentiality ... — Sam26

What do you mean "by themselves"? If they are mere potentiality what actualizes them?

Objects by themselves are mere potentiality ...
— Sam26

What do you mean "by themselves"? If they are mere potentiality what actualizes them? — Fooloso4

I'm thinking along the lines of what Wittgenstein said, viz., "...there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others (T. 2.0121)." In other words, it's only as they combine with others that we get atomic facts, otherwise we just have Witt's substance. Or it's only when they combine with other objects that they're actualized into atomic facts or complex facts. That's my take.

This is going much further into the Tractatus than I intended, but it's interesting.

"...there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others (T. 2.0121)." — Sam26

I take him to be saying that combining with others is what it is to be an object, and that there is no object that cannot combine with any other object.

Both are true, I believe. As I pointed out in post 12, one of the internal properties of objects is that they can combine with other objects. Whether it does combine depends on whether or not the atomic fact obtains.

The purpose of the post above "Taking a step back..." was to clarify my earlier statements, in which I used a couple of terms in a different sense than Witt. This caused you to think I meant one thing when I meant another. My error. I think we're pretty close to interpreting objects in the same way.

Whether it does combine depends on whether or not the atomic fact obtains. — Sam26

Are you saying that somehow the fact plays some role in whether or not x and y do combine? Or that if and when they combine the result is a fact?

Are you saying that somehow the fact plays some role in whether or not x and y do combine? Or that if and when they combine the result is a fact? — Fooloso4

No, I wouldn't go that far. My intention was not to go this far into the meanings of these Wittgensteinian concepts and their place in the world. It's beyond the scope of this thread.

I dont understand why Wittgenstein thinks language has anything to do with abstract thought. Language is both noise and an understanding of the noise in HOW it relates to thoughts. Thoughts are what philosophy is about and language is just a tool. I know Wittgenstein had an aversion to normal philosophy, but i find his attempt to turn abstraction into language to be lame

Post 13

According to K.T. Fann Wittgenstein is trying to answer two questions “How are propositions related to the world?” and “How are propositions related to one another (Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy, p. 8)?” These questions are related to Wittgenstein’s goal, viz., “My whole task consists in explaining the nature of the proposition (Nb. p. 39).”

It's already been stated in earlier posts that Wittgenstein assumes a priori that if we can talk about the world, then some propositions must be connected with the world. These propositions are called elementary propositions, and what determines their truth or falsity is the world, not other propositions. Complex propositions, made up of elementary propositions, are truth-functions of elementary propositions (e.g., T. 5). Elementary propositions are combined using truth-functional connectives such as disjunction, conjunction, negation, and implication (T. 5.101).

We know that elementary propositions consist of names in immediate combination (T. 4.221). “It is a nexus, a concatenation, of names (T. 4.22)” We also know that Wittgensteinian names are not the kind of names we’re used to, viz., dog, cat, Plato, pencil, etc. Names are simples that cannot be dissected “…by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign (T. 3.26).” “Names are simple symbols: I [Wittgenstein] indicate them by single letters (‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’) (T. 4.24).”

Wittgenstein was a traditionalist in his early philosophy because his view was that the meaning of a name was the object it denotes. “A name means an object. The object is its meaning (T. 3.203).” So, elementary propositions, composed of names, if true, are arranged in a way that pictures or mirrors the objects in the corresponding atomic facts, which make up states of affairs. Objects are important in that they provide meaningful referents for our language. Objects are the building blocks of states of affairs, and thus the world (reality). Objects also play an important role in showing the limits of language and what can be meaningfully said. There is nothing for names in elementary propositions to latch onto besides objects in atomic facts, which make up the substance of the world (T. 2.021). In other words, you can't go beyond the substance of the world using language. The mystical, for Wittgenstein, which does go beyond the world, can only be shown not said.

Some of this has already been said, but hopefully wording it a bit differently will help to clarify misunderstandings.

I think some clarification regarding the term 'object' might be helpful. At first I was puzzled because he used 'object' to refer both the simple and compound objects. 'Object' is what he calls a "formal" or "pseudo-concept". (4.126 - 4.1272)

Formal or pseudo-concepts are expressed in conceptual notion by a "variable name" such as 'x' Particular objects such as tables and chairs and books, however, are concepts proper. The distinction between formal and proper concepts is not made along the lines of simple or complex, but between what has been identified or specified and what has not. Analogously the formal concept 'number' can refer to any or every number, but 'six' or 'eleven' is not a formal concept. The former is expressed by the variable name 'x' and the the latter by the sign '6' or '11'.

In a proposition the variable 'x' is not a "name" in the ordinary sense of the term. The simplest sentences are not made up of variable names. But Wittgenstein's investigation is logical or conceptual not empirical. In a complete empirical investigation objects would not have variable names. The simple objects would be identified and distinguished in the simplest propositions as particulars with particular rather than variable names.

I guess at some point when discussing this Wittgenstein's logic begins to break down, but I'm not sure where it begins breaking down. I point this out because we know that there are no such things as names and objects in the Wittgensteinian sense. That said, when Wittgenstein states that "the variable name 'x' is the proper sign for the pseudo-concept object (T. 4.1272)." - he is simply saying something about the essence of symbolic representation in formal logic. 'X' is simply a placeholder for any object within a particular domain, and Wittgenstein has created his own domain with his concept of objects. The concept of an object, as Wittgenstein envisions it, is not real in the sense that it lacks empirical content or logical significance within his analysis. However, 'x' may still function as a sign within his logical context even though what it represents is considered a pseudo concept.

Strangely, he refers to objects as pseudo-concepts, and at the same time, they form the building blocks of atomic facts. Maybe it's a pseudo-concept because no concept can capture their essence. I'm not sure.

I must point out that you don't have to understand all of this to understand Wittgenstein's basic ideas in the Tractatus.

when Wittgenstein states that "the variable name 'x' is the proper sign for the pseudo-concept object (T. 4.1272)." - he is simply saying something about the essence of symbolic representation in formal logic. — Sam26

He is saying something about conceptual notation, but it is important to understand why formal concepts are represented as variables and proper concepts are not.

The concept of an object, as Wittgenstein envisions it, is not real in the sense that it lacks empirical content or logical significance within his analysis. — Sam26

I agree that it lacks empirical content, but it does have logical significance. Objects make up the substance of the world and play an essential role in the logical structure of the world.

Strangely, he refers to objects as pseudo-concepts, and at the same time, they form the building blocks of atomic facts. Maybe it's a pseudo-concept because no concept can capture their essence. I'm not sure. — Sam26

Note what else he regards as pseuo-concepts:

‘complex’, ‘fact’, ‘function’, ‘number’, etc.(4.1272)

In a proposition a proper concept tells us what is the case. "The book is on the table", but "The object is on the object" is nonsense.

I must point out that you don't have to understand all of this to understand Wittgenstein's basic ideas in the Tractatus. — Sam26

I don't think anyone understands all of it. I regard it more as an activity of thinking through interpretation rather than an examination of a set of doctrines (4.112). Despite what he says in the preface, I don't think the truth of the thoughts communicated are unassailable or definitive. Or that he has found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems. Nor do I think that the problems he addresses are the extent of the problems of philosophy.

I'm going to write one or two more posts to sum this up in the coming days.

The above discussion was very helpful, and I agree with a lot of what was said.

The way I understand it, when Witt is talking about the distinction between formal or pseudo-concepts, and proper concepts he is trying to get the reader to understand the logical form of each one, but he's running into problems due to language.

Its as Fooloso pointed out, I think, when he uses variable names such as "x", in proper analysis, the variable would be replaced by a proper concept which could logically fall under the pseudo concept. Because of this, we can see that pseudo concepts like "number" or "fact" cannot be talked about in the traditional sense. We can't say what a "number" is - we can give examples of proper concepts that fall under it...like 5 or 3, but we can't define their structure in any meaningful way. We either know what they mean, or we don't, but we bring this knowledge to the table, so to speak.

I did say that I was going to sum this up in a couple more posts, but it seems there will be a few more than I thought.

Post 14

There is a clear, at least at a certain level of analysis, ontology in the Tractatus. Reality for Wittgenstein is composed of facts, not things [not Wittgensteinian objects] (T. 1.1). In other words, reality is not composed of individual objects, i.e., in isolation, but objects in combination, which form atomic facts and facts proper. As has been said many times throughout this thread objects are simple and unanalyzable, and they only exist as the smallest constituent parts of states of affairs (facts). “[O]jects fit into one another like the links of a chain (T. 2.03).” Objects are necessarily prior to the facts in the same way atoms are prior to material objects. This does not mean that atoms are like Wittgensteinian objects, i.e., atoms are not simple or unanalyzable in the same sense that objects are.

If the world had no substance, and by extension no objects, then whether a proposition was true or false would depend on other propositions (T. 2.0211, 2.0212). (However, it seems to me that it would be hard to imagine propositions without a world of some kind, and thus facts of some kind.)

In 2.0212 Wittgenstein first introduces the idea of a picture and its connection with truth and falsity, then, in 2.1 he says “We picture facts to ourselves.” We have now moved from the world of facts to thoughts. When we picture facts to ourselves we are modeling reality (T. 2.12). “A logical picture of facts is a thought (T. 3). “In a proposition a thought finds an expression… (T. 3.1).” We move from thoughts, specifically pictures of possible states of affairs, to expressing these thoughts/pictures using propositions. “[A] proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world (T. 3.12).” What a proposition projects is not included in the proposition, but its possibility is, and so a proposition does not contain its sense but the possibility of expressing it (T. 3.13).