For me saying that we see representations is more problematic and less parsimonious than saying we simply see things. — Janus

If we simply "see things" how do you account for hallucinations?

That we are aware of representations as well as the thing is more obvious with other senses such as smell. When you smell a lemon, you are aware of two things: that a lemon is nearby because you smell one, and the subjective sensation of smelling a lemon. Each of these two can occur without the other: you can be aware of lemons nearby without smelling them, and you can smell lemons without lemons being nearby, in the case of phantom smells. Any account of smell and any of the senses has to acknowledge these two distinct things.

I don't think hallucinations are problematic. I have never experienced an hallucination, visual or otherwise, that I thought was a real object or from a real object, and that includes my copious experiences with hallucinogens.

The point is not whether you confuse hallucination with reality, nor how much acid you've dropped. The point is you can't lump together awareness of objects with sensations, because hallucinations are subjective sensations without awareness of anything. Perceptions are both of these.

I would not class an hallucination as a perception because nothing is being perceived.

I would not class an hallucination as a perception because nothing is being perceived. — Janus

Perceptions combine the phenomenal experience of hallucinations with something being perceived. Hallucinations prove that perceptions are not unitary.

a perception because nothing is being perceived. — Janus

DO you not see the patent ridiculousness of the dual use of 'perception' yet?

Is the experience (G) different to the perception? Some might say that perception refers to our sensory experience of the worl — Luke

That's true, some might say that. But it makes no sense to me... If that's the 'ordinary usage' of those words (which, I don't think it is) they don't work for their purpose.

Perception isn't in the same category as G. It is hte set of A-B-C-D-..G as a process, to my mind.

And yet you seem to be completely incapable of saying why I am wrong. — Janus

You had the option to quote where I pointed out the reason for this statement. But you did not :)

you seem to be saying that colours and seeing colours are the same thing. — Janus

I would have thought it clear i was using your term here, hence the inverteds. What you term 'seeing colour' is, on my account, the experience of the visual sensation of xyx tone/hue combination. So, i'm happy to use your terms while talking to you, but describe my account if you see what I mean. But i understand the confusion nevertehless.

However, the part of the process that is prior to awareness seems irrelevant to the question of whether we see things or merely representations of things. Of course, we can say either and there is no matter of fact there but just different interpretations. — Janus

While I think the latter portion of this is a good way forward, generally, the former seems wrong to me. It definitely is irrelevant to me in practice, even on a totally Indirect account. I don't think thats what's being claimed, though. It's important insofar as it is the indirect cause of sensation (it, being whatever objects or set of objects, or plenum, one interacts with in the world). I think it's a litle hard to jettison that from the discussion. On most accounts, with out it, we get no sensation to be discussed as direct or indirect.

True, perceptions are of many things. I'm not sure what your point is though.

I would have thought it clear i was using your term here, hence the inverteds. — AmadeusD

I really don't know what you are talking about. You still haven't answered my question as to whether colour and seeing colour are the same thing. You seemed to be implying that they are. If you don't believe they are then fine, we agree on that much.

It's important insofar as it is the indirect cause of sensation — AmadeusD

I agree that it is the cause of sensation, I just don't see what the "indirect" is doing there. Perception is a complex process, and I haven't denied that. But sticking with the visual paradigm and according to the scientific analysis, the light reflected from perceptible objects affects our living sentient bodies and gives us information about the nature of the things we perceive. Thus, we see and can come to deeply understand those perceptible objects; I see no reason to doubt this. There would not seem to be any imaginable more direct ways of accessing perceptible objects (visually at least, since we might want to say that touching is more direct than seeing is).

"Maps and territories" seems apt here. I'm afraid I'm no longer as hopeful about this conversation as I once was.

Hmm.

Could you spell out what is being eliminated and how that is done? I assume it makes more sense of direct realism.

Is the experience (G) different to the perception? Some might say that perception refers to our sensory experience of the world.
— Luke

That's true, some might say that. But it makes no sense to me... — AmadeusD

That's strange, because the first line of one of the articles that you posted (here) in support of your definition of perception states that: "Perception refers to our sensory experience of the world."

More relevantly, the SEP article on The Problem of Perception that has been discussed throughout the thread, and which covers the topic of direct vs indirect realism, states in its opening paragraph:

The Problem of Perception is a pervasive and traditional problem about our ordinary conception of perceptual experience. The problem is created by the phenomena of perceptual illusion and hallucination: if these kinds of error are possible, how can perceptual experience be what we ordinarily understand it to be: something that enables direct perception of the world?

Perhaps I could have used the word/phrase “percept” or “perceptual experience” instead of “perception” for the sake of clarity. However, it is the perceptual experience of objects that is said to be direct or indirect. Even on your concept of a process of perception, what makes the process direct or indirect is the number of steps between the perceptual experience and its object.

The article proceeds to say:

A.D. Smith claims that what most authors have in mind in talking about the Problem of Perception is the “question of whether we can ever directly perceive the physical world”

You keep arguing against naive realism only, whereas the article indicates that there are also non-naive versions of direct realism, such as intentionalism. Therefore, the question of whether a perceptual experience is direct or indirect cannot be settled only by counting the number of steps in a process.

The question that needs to be settled is whether our perceptual experience can be directly of its object or whether our perceptual experience is always indirectly of a representation of its object. My position is that perceptual experiences necessarily involve representation, but that we do not perceive a representation. Instead, the representation helps to form the perceptual experience, which is then directly of its object.

I assume it makes more sense of direct realism. — creativesoul

To me it does, but then, this quintessential yankeevirgobabyboomer likes each thing in its place. This goes here does this, that goes there does that, working rather that interfering with each other.

Your offer of realism being that which has affect/effect makes it so everything having an affect or being effected, is real. I’d eliminate abstract conceptions having affect/effect from being real. Of course, that conception having an effect or being affected, is only so through another abstract conception. Rather than call those abstracts having affect/effect unreal, it’s suitable just to call them valid and their relation to each other, logical.

Whether by parsimony or necessity, makes no difference to the occassion, that the real is directly given to that creature capable of receiving it, which is merely to be undeniably affected by it, and with respect to the human creature, the inverse holds the same truth value, insofar as it is impossible to directly receive that which is not real, for we would never be aware of an affect.

it is impossible to directly receive that which is not real, for we would never be aware of an affect. — Mww

Seeing a beautiful sunset affects an observer differently to seeing a sunset.

Does this mean that abstract concepts such as beauty are real?

Does this mean that abstract concepts such as beauty are real? — RussellA

I’d eliminate abstract conceptions having affect/effect from being real. — Mww

If you took beauty to be an abstract conception, why would you ask me, of all people, if it meant that such conceptions are real, when I just stated for the record the elimination of them as being real?

My position is that perceptual experiences necessarily involve representation, but that we do not perceive a representation. Instead, the representation helps to form the perceptual experience, which is then directly of its object. — Luke

What exactly are we doing then, when we smell something but are unaware what it is?

True, perceptions are of many things. I'm not sure what your point is though. — Janus

Am I being that unclear? My point is not that perceptions are of many things. My point is that perception is not just "seeing an object", you have to at least conceptually recognize both phenomenal awareness and object awareness.

Am I being that unclear? My point is not that perceptions are of many things. My point is that perception is not just "seeing an object", you have to at least conceptually recognize both phenomenal awareness and object awareness. — hypericin

I see no reason to believe that objects in the environment do not appear more or less the same to animals and children as they do to adult humans. it seems reasonable to think that becoming familiar with objects in the environment would make them to stand out more clearly as "gestalts".

For humans becoming familiar with objects includes naming, conceptualizing them as particular kinds, at least at a rudimentary level. We "carve up" the world conceptually, but we do not do so arbitrarily, the nature of the things that make up the world are the primal constraint on that process of carving up, or at least that seems to me what is most plausible to believe, as there seems to be no other way to explain how it is we all see the same things down to very precise details.

My position is that perceptual experiences necessarily involve representation, but that we do not perceive a representation. Instead, the representation helps to form the perceptual experience, which is then directly of its object.
— Luke

What exactly are we doing then, when we smell something but are unaware what it is? — hypericin

Perception need not entail recognition or identification of objects. We can have a perceptual experience of an object (e.g. for the first time) and be unable to identify the object.

you have to at least conceptually recognize both phenomenal awareness and object awareness. — hypericin

Coming back in after not reading the diatribe since my last, we do indeed recognise the difference between dreaming of eating a steak and eating a steak. that's why we have words like "dream", "hallucination", "illusion".

It follows that we can tell when we are seeing things and when we are not.

And hence, that we on occasion see things.

You seem to be arguing the realist case.

I am interested in dropping the description and unhelpful arguments about what's "real". Seems the approach I've offered allows that to happen and focuses upon the effects/affects. I'm not sold on it, but the divorce of perception and reality has even less appeal to me. I also do not place much value on "the given".

It sems to me that some arguing against direct perception use the complexities of biological machinery as 'reason' to deny direct perception. Others include thought, belief, reasoning, and conceptual schema into their notion of perception and then use that as reason to deny direct perception. Others seems to presuppose that we need to perceive everything in order to perceive anything directly.

I'm confused about what would it take to qualify as direct perception to those who argue for indirect.

Anyone here have an answer?

I’d eliminate abstract conceptions having affect/effect from being real. — Mww

What if abstract conceptions only have effects if they are actually thought, and every actual thought is a neural (i.e. real) event?

Perception need not entail recognition or identification of objects. We can have a perceptual experience of an object (e.g. for the first time) and be unable to identify the object. — Luke

My position is that perceptual experiences necessarily involve representation, but that we do not perceive a representation. — luke

When you smell something you cannot attribute to an object, the only thing you are aware of is the phenomenal experience of the smell, which is exactly the representation of the odor molecules to conscious awareness.

In your account, when we smell this unidentifiable smell, you say the perception involves a representation, but we are somehow unaware of this representation. We aren't aware of the object, and we aren't aware of its perceptual representation. What is it then that we are aware of?

I'm confused about what would it take to qualify as direct perception to those who argue for indirect.

Anyone here have an answer? — creativesoul

I have an answer no one has given yet that I think is the correct one: lower organisms that do not use representational perception perceive directly.

Think of an amoeba, light hits a photo receptor, and by some logic the amoeba moves one way or the other.

If you regard this as "perception", then this is direct perception. If however perception for you entails the kind of representational perception we use, where the brain generates a virtual world for the centralized decision maker to evaluate and respond to, then perception is inherently indirect.

In your account, when we smell this unidentifiable smell, you say the perception involves a representation, but we are somehow unaware of this representation. — hypericin

We may be unaware of what happens behind the scenes to produce our perceptual experience of the smell, but (presumably, in the scenario you describe) we are not unaware of our perceptual experience of the smell. It could be said that a perceptual experience simply is a representation. However, I made the weaker assertion that representation is only involved in a perceptual experience, because language and knowledge can also form part of a perceptual experience. These allow us (e.g.) to identify or recognise a smell as the smell of X, or to see and identify an object as an X, etc.

What I said was that we may be unable to identify or recognise the smell (as X), or that we may be unable to identify or recognise the object (that emitted the odour molecules) that is the source of the smell. This need not imply that we are unaware of the representation or unaware of the perceptual experience.

Moreover, if a perceptual experience is a representation (or is a representation plus language), then we do not have a perceptual experience of this representation. As I've said, the representation helps to form the perceptual experience.

I am interested in dropping the description and unhelpful arguments about what's "real". Seems the approach I've offered allows that to happen and focuses upon the effects/affects. — creativesoul

I thought your approach was…..

Now, whatever shall we do with realism?
— Mww

That which is real has affects/effects. — creativesoul

….and because I don’t subscribe to that approach in toto, isn’t the onus on me to describe the disagreement and argue the support for it?

….the divorce of perception and reality has even less appeal to me. — creativesoul

Agreed, this being the starting point of our current discourse.

I also do not place much value on "the given". — creativesoul

Ehhhhh…..that just indicates we don’t have to go look for things perceived. They’re everywhere we are, which means for us there is nowhere they’re not, which is the same as being given. Epistemologists cherish the term, ontologists hate it.
—————

I’d eliminate abstract conceptions having affect/effect from being real.
— Mww

What if abstract conceptions only have effects if they are actually thought, and every actual thought is a neural (i.e. real) event? — Janus

Doesn’t that just say neural events are real? No one doubts that, but no one can map from such physical neural event to a metaphysical abstract conception with apodeictic certainty, either. Probably less chance of self-contradiction, if it be the case neural events can be real and causal, but abstract conceptions are limited to being causal.

...

I really don't know what you are talking about. You still haven't answered my question as to whether colour and seeing colour are the same thing. You seemed to be implying that they are. If you don't believe they are then fine, we agree on that much. — Janus

I have, in fact, directly (hehe) responded twice. And the quote you used here was a clarifying statement. It is lost on me what you're not understanding at this point. I am sorry for that.

There would not seem to be any imaginable more direct ways of accessing perceptible objects — Janus

Several have been presented in this thread alone. They just aren't available to humans. Which is why to an IRist, this seems like a dumb conversation, overall. There really isn't a debate. It's as if you're saying a mirror gives direct images of things.

Doesn’t that just say neural events are real? No one doubts that, but no one can map from such physical neural event to a metaphysical abstract conception with apodeictic certainty, either. — Mww

The only certainties we have (barring global skepticism) are empirical and logical. To me, because it seems most plausible, because we seem to have no cogent reason to doubt, that thoughts are neural events, then I count them as real and causal. I think apodeictic certainty is overrated, but that's just me I guess.

No straight answers or arguments or anything interesting, so nothing to respond to...

It could be said that a perceptual experience simply is a representation. However, I made the weaker assertion that representation is only involved in a perceptual experience, because language and knowledge can also form part of a perceptual experience. — Luke

This is not necessarily weaker, just different. It seems more accurate to say that perceptual experience is a representation, and that language and knowledge might be stimulated by the perceptual experience, or might not, depending on whether we attend to it . After all, we receive a torrent of representative perceptual experience all the time, and most of it is unreflected upon. Only a small fraction receives attention, and anything like linguistic content.

Perceptual experience without language and knowledge is still perceptual experience. But language and knowledge without perceptual experience is just language and knowledge. Logically, language and knowledge is something that may be added onto perceptual experience, while the representation constitutes it.

This is not nitpicking, these distinctions are crucial to the discussion. If knowledge of an object is part of the perceptual experience itself, it may be considered as immediate as the representation. But if it only follows/stimulated from the representation, then this seems implausible

Moreover, if a perceptual experience is a representation (or is a representation plus language), then we do not have a perceptual experience of this representation. — Luke

Agreed