What you say seems to imply that you think that seeing a particular colour and that particular colour are the same thing. — Janus
colours are obviously visual sensations.(of Blue, let's say) 'seeing a colour' is that sensation — AmadeusD
For a "perception to be directly of worldly objects " makes sense to me by contrast with the case when the perception is mediated by other objects, i.e. a photo of an apple vs an apple. — hypericin
A perception happens when an object in the world directly (touch, taste) or indirectly (smell, sight, hearing) stimulates nerve endings — hypericin
the only part of this process the subject is directly aware of is the perceptual experience itself. — hypericin
all meaningful experience consists of correlations drawn between different things. — creativesoul
Our differences may be a matter of taxonomy….. — creativesoul
……Maybe not if you're a mind/body dualist or physical/mental dualist. — creativesoul
some language less creatures can see red cups in very much the same way we do, given similar enough biological machinery. However, that same creature cannot know that they're seeing a green cup — creativesoul
If you refer to a dualism of aspects as opposed to a dualism of substances then I agree. — Janus
You seem to count as real only that which the senses apprehend. — Janus
My point earler was that on that criterion causation is not real. — Janus
A perception happens when an object in the world directly (touch, taste) or indirectly (smell, sight, hearing) stimulates nerve endings
— hypericin
It's unclear to me how you are distinguishing direct from indirect here. — Luke
I agree. However, the typical contrast for the indirect realist seems to be that a perception is, instead, directly of a representation. — Luke
How does the lack of awareness of a perceptual experience differ from the lack of a perceptual experience? — Luke
why you seem to consider the perceptual experience itself to be insufficient. — Luke
A perception happens when an object in the world directly (touch, taste) or indirectly (smell, sight, hearing) stimulates nerve endings, which transmit information to the brain, which (somehow) produces the perceptual experience. — hypericin
As such, causality/causation is no more than a metaphysical explanatory device representing either the progression or regression of real things in relation to each other.
Yea? Nay? — Mww
I would say it is real, although it cannot be directly observed. — Janus
I don't have a problem with the idea that there may be real things which we cannot deomstrate to be real. — Janus
Object perception in smell, sight, hearing are indirectly mediated by molecules, light, and sound waves respectively. — hypericin
But to be clear, this is not the indirection we are discussing. — hypericin
Who is the typical indirect realist here? — hypericin
How does the lack of awareness of a perceptual experience differ from the lack of a perceptual experience?
— Luke
There is no difference.
I'm not sure why you are getting hung up over "awareness of perceptual experience". We already agreed that the self is aware of perceptual experience. — hypericin
When I say, "the self is only directly aware of perceptual experience", to point out that the self is *not* directly aware of what the perception is *of*, nor any of the other components of perception, would you have me say, "the self is only directly perceptual experience"? The "aware of" is necessitated by English. — hypericin
Perceptual experience is a necessary but insufficient condition for perception. If the perceptual experience is there but other parts are missing, we have things like dreams, hallucinations, and nerve misfirings. — hypericin
I probably go further than you in thinking that even though it cannot be demonstrated, it is plausible to think that space, time. energy. entropy and causation are human-independently real given what a remarkably coherent synthesis the sciences present. But I also acknowledge there is no definitive measure of plausibility, so... — Janus
…..it is plausible to think….. — Janus
what advantage is gained by affirming something as real without the possibility of demonstrating it? — Mww
Here is a diagram of my conception of perception. Which parts do you disagree with? — hypericin
But mostly, I believe that the dispute between direct realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not we have direct perceptions/perceptual experiences of real world objects — Luke
I also believe that a real world object is not part of a perception, and that only a representation of a real world object is part of a perception. I don't have physical (real world) objects in my mind; only representations of them. — Luke
whether or not we have direct awareness of our perceptions/perceptual experiences — Luke
I think Spinoza's solution, that there is only one substance with both attributes, works. — Janus
Of all those choices, this is provably closest to the case, but you know….that leaves us with phosphate and calcium ions, nanovolts and picometers that think. Or, a brain full of nothing but extended substances that don’t think.
We are well and truly screwed, ain’t we? (Grin) — Mww
I believe that a perception is equivalent to a perceptual experience. My brain and nerves are not what I have perceptual experiences of, so I would not include these as being part of a perception. (Your diagram indicates that the brain generates the perception, and that the nerves transmit the perception, so maybe you agree.) — Luke
You seem to believe that the dispute between direct realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not we have direct awareness of our perceptions/perceptual experiences, instead of direct perceptions of real world objects. In fact, you appear to agree that we have direct perceptions of real world objects. — Luke
But mostly, I believe that the dispute between direct realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not we have direct perceptions/perceptual experiences of real world objects
— Luke
I also believe that a real world object is not part of a perception, and that only a representation of a real world object is part of a perception. I don't have physical (real world) objects in my mind; only representations of them.
— Luke
It would have been good if either this, or your other conception of the conflict, were actually agree upon in the first pages of this thread. Read together, these two passages end the dispute. — AmadeusD
But mostly, I believe that the dispute between direct realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not we have direct perceptions/perceptual experiences of real world objects
— Luke
I also believe that a real world object is not part of a perception, and that only a representation of a real world object is part of a perception. I don't have physical (real world) objects in my mind; only representations of them.
— Luke
It would have been good if either this, or your other conception of the conflict, were actually agree upon in the first pages of this thread. Read together, these two passages end the dispute. I have a feeling even Banno would be shown to be prevaricating on this account of the terms. — AmadeusD
If DR amounted merely to a claim of 'direct perception of representations' it would be a useless term - a fig leaf. — AmadeusD
You are conflating perception and perceptual experience. A "perceptual experience" is not a perception when you are hallucinating, dreaming, etc. There is nothing you are perceiving, you are only experiencing. I call a "perception" the overall process that connects real world objects with the perceiving self, and "perceptual experience" what the self actually subjectively experiences. — hypericin
Is this a disagreement on terminology, or substance? If terminology, what other word could fill the role I am giving "perception"? — hypericin
The dispute is over whether perceptions allow direct or indirect awareness of real world objects. — hypericin
The dispute is over what our perceptual experiences are of, and whether they are of real world objects or are of representations of real world objects. Direct realists claim that our perceptual experiences are of real world objects. Indirect realists claim that our perceptual experiences are of representations of real world objects. — Luke
It might be the naive realists' view that physical objects are in our minds, but I'm not defending naive realism — Luke
To describe what is part or is not part of the content of a perceptual experience--what is included in the experience--says nothing about whether that perceptual experience is of a real world object or is of a representation of a real world object. — Luke
I see no inconsistency in maintaining that although the content of our perceptual experiences consists of representations, those perceptual experiences are of real world objects. — Luke
This is the claim made by indirect realists, not by direct realists. — Luke
all meaningful experience consists of correlations drawn between different things.
— creativesoul
Can we agree from this, that experience is a stand-alone entity? — Mww
It has always been my position that simply the nature of our human intellect makes non-dualism impossible — Mww
some language less creatures can see red cups in very much the same way we do, given similar enough biological machinery. However, that same creature cannot know that they're seeing a green cup
— creativesoul
….cannot know they’re NOT seeing a green cup? — Mww
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.