An agent is you or I, not a proposition. A judgement might be put in propositional terms, if that is what you mean. — Banno
I do not follow what this says. In so far as agency produces an effect, of course it can be put into propositional terms. I went to the fridge to get a beer. I gather that we agree that actions can be put into statements. That's not metaphysics. — Banno
Are you claiming not to have any beliefs about the way things are? About chairs and cups and trees and so on? Folk believe in chairs and cups and trees, and have beliefs about them, but have enough sense to realise that chairs and cups and trees are different to beliefs. If you think that somehow all there are, are beliefs about beliefs, then enjoy your solipsism, and I'll leave you to it. — Banno
Simply the cup's having a handle. Sure, that the cup has a handle is a human expression, but that does not imply that the cup is a belief, or that the cup has no handle.
You sometimes misjudge, perhaps believing the cup has a handle when it does not. But if all there are, are your beliefs, then such a situation could not even be framed. — Banno
The world does not much care what you believe, and will continue to inflict novelty and surprise on your beliefs.
The world is what is the case, not what you believe to be the case.
Which is the point at which I entered the this thread. — Banno
A monadic predicate like "the cup has a handle". Which is a very different proposition to "Astrophel does not believe that the cup has a handle". You've segregated yourself from the world by poor logic. — Banno
Everyone's a realist in some sense, no? :wink: — jkop
John Searle argues that many of the great modern philosophers use perceptual verbs ambiguously in two different senses.
1. In a constitutive sense. The perception is understood as what is constitutive for having it, such as brain events or a perceptual process that exists only for the one who has the perception.
2. In an intentionalistic sense, The perception is understood as what is perceived, or what the perception is about. For example, the visual perception of the lamp. — jkop
That’s right, but because novelty is not a neutral in-itself, the world will inflict novelty within the boundaries of specifically organized discursive structures of intelligibility. — Joshs
Depends on what is meant by a proposition. — Astrophel
Just so. It is a bit foggy this morning, so I may be overusing misty metaphors, but here again one might hope Astrophel's cloud might eventually also condense into something a bit more transparent.You are jumping from topic to topic chaotically. First, JTB, then intentionality, now solipsism. — Lionino
That is, I know the beer is in the fridge because I put it there. — Banno
you already know about refrigerators and their capacity to contain beer — Astrophel
. One recognises novelty from a base of familiarity. If that is what you are trying to say, then yes. But the world need not be bound by what you are capable of recognising, if that is what you are trying to imply.
Otherwise, we would understand novelty as soon as we encounter it. But while we might recognise that something is new, it does not follow that we recognise what that something is. — Banno
But once again I am attempting to condense a droplet of clarity from the cloud of chestnuts and quotes that habituate your posts. By not setting your account out clearly, you leave yourself plausible deniability.
Which I find wearying. — Banno
Who do you count amongst your brethren? Foucault is the better of those you list.How many postmodern writers have you read who you believe to have set out their account clearly? — Joshs
We can never be radically surprised by the world.
I entered this thread in order to set out a distinction between belief and truth, which ↪Astrophel apparently conflates.
What are you doing here — Banno
In one way, I agree with you. However, I have great difficulty in understanding the philosophical dialect you are speaking after that. One problem (which does not occur here) is that I suspect that the term "language" is often taken to mean a single structure; that is reinforced when you give it a capital letter "Language". I don't think language has a single, overall, structure. (I wonder if Platonism is not the back of that idea.) Wittgenstein compares language to an ancient city with many overlapping and interacting structures, and that seems more helpful to me.Isn't that exactly what eventually but (almost?) inevitably happens when there are gaps in the Language structures. — ENOAH
There is an idea that I like in this, if I've understood it. It is the idea that we need to start with the world, rather than with language. Then we can see language as part of the world and as developing within it. So the question is not, "how does language reach the world?" but rather "how does language develop within the world?". Whether it involves transcendence or not, the starting-point must be our lives as actual physical human beings.We dont use a concept to establish a world without concepts, we find ourselves thrown into a world ( we ‘are’ a self by continually transcending toward the world) and speak from amidst the beings ( things, concepts, uses) that are actualized from out of that world which projects itself — Joshs
You mention that this ambiguity allows us to stipulate perception in sense 1 but not sense 2 (hallucinating the lamp, or "seeing a lamp that isn't there"). But does it also support the reverse? That is, can I maintain that my sense-2 perception of the lamp is genuine, and a legitimate use of the word "perception," without committing myself to some story about how it supervenes (or otherwise connects) to a sense-1 perception? — J
You’re misreading the meaning of transcendence of the object for Husserl. What transcends the noematic appearance of the spatial object is not external to the subjective process. It is immanent to it. — Joshs
What you refer to as the "3" of Heidegger's description of artist, art, and relation between these, can be found in Aquinas' description of the Holy Trinity. His description refers to father, son, and the relation between these two, represented in the Holy Trinity as as Holy Spirit. I believe this specific trinity, the Holy Trinity, was first described by Augustine, but the derivation of trinities in general may be traced back to Plato's tripartite soul. In Augustine the Holy Trinity is described by the analogy of memory, reason (or understanding), and will. — Metaphysician Undercover
Derrida in particular, bring the temporal nature of being to the forefront. — Metaphysician Undercover
Your question 'how is knowledge that you see a lamp possible' follows from the assumption that you never see the lamp, only something prior to the seeing, in your own seeing.
To ask how it is possible to know that you see the lamp under the assumption that you never see it is not only impossible to answer but confused. You can dig deeper than Kant, but the root problem arises from that assumption, which in turn is derived from a rejection of naive realism.
Assuming naive realism, then you do in fact see the lamp, not something else in your own seeing. Seeing it, and the fact that it is there and visible, makes it possible to know that you're seeing it. — jkop
When I wrote "dialect", I did not mean "dialectic". But maybe you are pointing to the same issue - mutual comprehension. There's only one philosophy that seriously tried not to use specialized philosophical dialect/language/dialectic - "ordinary language philosophy" - and that didn't end well. (I say that it turned out that ordinary language was just another speciality.) I think we have to look at some sort of translation between philosophies if there is to be any kind of dialogue. You are clearly succeeding in that, because I at least have the impression that I can partly understand what you are saying.I am not necessarily using any philosophical dialectic, — ENOAH
Everything is an over-simplification. There's no final statement of a philosophical doctrine. What matters is relevance to the matter at hand. I need to think over what you say, but I will respond - as briefly as I can.This was an over simplification. But, alas, oversimplifying, I find, is unavoidable in a forum like this. — ENOAH
It is worse than that. If you know that you never see the lamp, you must know what it would be like to see the lamp. That means it is possible to see the lamp (under some circumstances). This "assumption" involves changing the meaning of "see". But the idea that hallucinating that you see a lamp (etc.) assumes that "hallucinating" is like seeing, but different. So even the conclusion that when we think we see a lamp we are hallucinating see the lamp, still assumes that it is possible to see the lamp.Your question 'how is knowledge that you see a lamp possible' follows from the assumption that you never see the lamp, only something prior to the seeing, in your own seeing. — jkop
Surely, more accurately, that something is, is found in a true proposition (but not in a false one). But I would agree that a (meaningful) domain of discourse includes criteria for distinguishing between truth and falsity. But discourse is not, as formal logic is supposed to be, a structure fixed for all circumstances - the rules can break down, but they can be revised. That seems to me to address, at least partly, the fundamental concerns here.That something is, is found in a proposition. Quantification or domain of discourse. — Banno
Where, I wonder, does Derrida do this? — Astrophel
Certainly does NOT follow from the assumption that I never see the lamp. Not sure where this comes from. — Astrophel
I don't think perceptions are different from beliefs. All perceptions are apperceptions. When you see a cup, you know what it is IN the seeing, that is, the cup is already known prior to the seeing, and seeing it is a confirmation about the conformity between what you see and the predelineated "cupness" that you come into the perceptual encounter with that allows you to spontaneously without question or analysis note that it is indeed a cup — Astrophel
But a question that looks at the knowledge relation between me and my lamp and asks how it this possible? It is stunning in its simplicity as an existential query. I mean, forget philosophy. Two objects, a brain and a lamp. Causality fails instantly. So how? — Astrophel
Yes, historically and throughout disparate cultures and eras, and through all different minds. Hegel lived before Darwin. I think his ideas could make significant use of natural selection, and might have spread to "all minds."
If we were to one day meet ETs and exchange ideas with them, I think we'd be including them as well. Being coming to know itself as self happens everywhere there is subjectivity.
I think selection-like processes at work in the cosmos more generally and the sort of fractal recurrence we see at different scales would have really interested Hegel. Astronomy was in its infancy in his day though, I don't even think our galaxy was known as a thing back then, although Kant had proposed the nebular theory of solar system development by then. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Just so. It is a bit foggy this morning, so I may be overusing misty metaphors, but here again one might hope Astrophel's cloud might eventually also condense into something a bit more transparent.
For now it might be best left to itself. — Banno
If seeing the lamp means confirming a conformed version of the lamp, then the word 'seeing' is used in a different sense than when seeing means the visual experience of the lamp's visible features. In this sense you never see the lamp but something else, a figment of conformity, whose visual features are conceptual, not empirical. — jkop
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