I think this from Zahavi does not fit Kant's view:

"To recognize that all objects appear to us through the lens of some meaning (i.e., are, as Husserl calls them, intentional objects) does not mean that the further course of experience cannot confirm that they are indeed genuinely real objects."

When Kant argues against the 'idealism' of Berkeley and Descartes, the contact with 'real' objects is the immediacy of our outer sense:

Idealism assumed that the only immediate experience is inner experience, and that from that outer things could only be inferred, but, as in any case in which one infers from given effects to determinate causes, only unreliably, since the cause of the representations that we perhaps falsely ascribe to outer things can also lie in us. Yet here it is proved that outer experience is really immediate, *

(The following footnote goes to this sentence)

* The immediate consciousness of the existence of outer things is not presupposed but proved in the preceding theorem, whether we have insight into the possibility of this consciousness or not. The question about the latter would be whether we have only an inner sense but no outer one, rather merely outer imagination. But it is clear that in order for us even to imagine something as external, i.e., to exhibit it to sense in intuition, we must already have an outer sense, and by this means immediately distinguish the mere receptivity of an outer intuition from the spontaneity that characterizes every imagining. For even merely to imagine an outer sense would itself annihilate the faculty of intuition, which is to be determined through the imagination. — Critique of Pure Reason, B276

Trying to gain insight into "the possibility of this consciousness" is going to run afoul of the transcendental illusion discussed at A298 if that is going to require confirming "genuinely real objects." The objectivity of our experience is given. The conditions that make experience possible are beyond us. If reason is to be investigated in a different way, something in Kant's model has to go.

Edit to Add:
Reading the whole review, I see that a distinction is made between Husserl's and Kant's views:

Appealing to a notion of Kantian things in themselves in discussions of realism vs. idealism overlooks the fact that for Kant himself, the things-in-themselves to which we do have access in a positive sense are not the objects that physics describes. — Thomas Neenan

Another way to think about this, using terminology I don't believe was available to Kant: Objectivity would be universal intersubjectivity. — J

I think this is precisely what Kant was saying, in his terms. Objectivity as we understand it, is universal for humans. This is something Kant keeps on repeating in CPR. But of course it is a bit strange thing to say because it is obvious, that the same forms of perception and categories apply to non-human animals as well.

I don't know what to make out of this. It seems like there's heavy Leibnizian influence in the underlying metaphysics that Kant cannot spell out because of his goals in CPR. So it is all about interplay of subjects that all have the universal form of consciousness, but what kind of subjects? Any type of consciousness? Humans, animals, even non-animate "subjects"?

I'd like to get my hands on Opus Postunum. There's just so many open questions in CPR!

Regarding objectivity in Kant, there is a way of putting it which is less apologetic, less embarrassed about its apparently subjective flavour. For Kant, sensible access to things is subjective, but the resulting understanding is not, because the understanding applies a priori principles.

The specifically novel element here is that objectivity itself, that is, the validity of knowledge as such, is created by passing through subjectivity — by reflecting on the mechanisms of knowledge, its possibilities and its limits. In this system the subject becomes if not the creator, then at least the guarantor of objectivity. — Adorno, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

Objectivity is reached by passing through subjectivity, but is not thereby tainted by it. Unless we're clinging to the promise of God's perspectiveless perspective, this almost seems like common sense to me: knowing is something creatures do, and creatures have points of view. What's the problem?

In this move to an anthropocentric model of cognition, Kant proposes to investigate the world as it is given from a perspective, and this perspective is, for us, the human standpoint, the only one we know of (though we can conceive that other creatures have theirs). Hence, Kant introduces a radically finite perspective to human cognition . . . insofar as a standpoint puts limitations on experience: I cannot simultaneously see an object from the front and from the back. — Sebastian Luft, From being to givenness and back: Some remarks on the meaning of transcendental idealism in Kant and Husserl (PDF)

However, this doesn't make the understanding finite and subjective:

For, the point of Kant’s entire critical project is precisely to justify the belief that despite our subjective perspective on things, we can have objective, a priori cognition. As a priori, it is a-perspectival. Cognition exists, as human cognition, but it is a priori cognition.

I think the upshot is that I was wrong to respond to @Hanover by saying that according to Kant, the human understanding, like human perception, is not the only one possible: human understanding is the only knowledge-generating mechanism possible (although it might not be only human; rational extra-terrestrials could have the same understanding), but it could apply to different kinds of perception.

The picture we're left with is something like this: whatever kind of subjective perspective rational creatures might have on things, their understanding allows them to achieve the same knowledge of those things, which are thereby the very same things, even though they are "for us".

Much of what you say is agreeable. On the connections and differences between K and H, I got a lot from that paper I linked to in my last post:

Sebastian Luft, "From being to givenness and back: Some remarks on the meaning of transcendental idealism in Kant and Husserl" (PDF)

By “universal” he means it holds for all rational creatures, and it's based on a priori structures of knowledge that are independent of experience (though they only produce knowledge when applied to experience). — Jamal

In Kant's Critique of Judgment the judgment that something is beautiful or sublime is independent of concepts. That is, it is universal but not based on the a priori structures of knowledge that are independent of experience.

... a judgment of taste involves the consciousness that all interest is kept out of it, it must also involve a claim to being valid for everyone, but without having a universality based on concepts. In other words, a judgment of taste must involve a claim to subjective universality.
(Critique of Judgment 54) — Fooloso4

.

I think objectivity and subjectivity are two poles of the same concept. They appear together because each is in the meaning of the other, so to speak. Objectivity is fundamentally the perspective that isn't subjective. It's the narrator of the story as opposed to the first person account.

Kant explains why objectivity as we know it has a framework that appears to be a priori. Locke was wrong that we're blank slates that nature writes upon. Whatever is happening, it's not that.

That leaves us with a secondary kind of objectivity: the story of the thing-in-itself. We don't have access to that kind of objectivity. What we have access to is our own map-making.

I hear the Tractatus as an anti-explanation — Paine

Exactly.

That's interesting, thanks. I have not read the Critique of Judgment and was not aware of any non-conceptually grounded universality. I am guessing that, roughly speaking, this has something to do with the form of an aesthetic judgement: it's not "I like this," which would be subjective but not universal, but "this is beautiful," which has the same form as "this is triangular," judgements that demand assent or denial. Others may disagree that it is beautiful, but the point is that the judgement would, if true, have the consequence that these people are wrong—and this just is how these judgements work. Something like that perhaps.

The idea that aesthetic judgments are subjective is often taken to mean "beauty is in the eye of the beholder". In which case whatever someone believes is beautiful is beautiful for that person. But Kant rejects this. A judgment of taste is for Kant not the same as, say, a preference for chocolate over vanilla ice cream.

This leads to consideration of the connection between:

1) judgments of beauty or the sublime and judgments of science or nature
2) judgments of beauty and moral judgments

If I understand him correctly these are not separate areas of inquiry but interconnected and interrelated parts of the whole.

:up:

I have an understanding of Kant's aesthetic judgment, and I've basically been nodding along with you so far. (it's the part on teleological judgment i still get lost in)

The thing I'd highlight that differentiates the critique of judgment from the critique of pure reason is that it's universal, but not scientific knowledge -- instead it's the relationships between the cognitive faculties which give rise to the sublime or the beautiful. It's that interaction between the faculties(powers) which justifies these inferences, though they are certainly different from both scientific and moral inferences or knowledge.

The third critique, in my crib sheet sort of way, is what differentiates analytic from continental philosophy from the historical perspective: do you emphasize scientific knowledge, or do you emphasize aesthetic judgment?

Kant, as is his philosophical perogative, would have it both ways -- and so I agree with the interpretation that the critiques form a unity. (though, I'm a Pluhar reader so that would be the way I read it)

EDIT: Also worth noting that as much as I love Kant I still believe he's basically wrong -- but in an important way. So before I can say how I still have to understand that last half of the Critique of Judgment....

The indirect realism* which the empirical sciences confirm—

Do they? It seems to me like intentionality theory was developed precisely because indirect realism makes naturalists uncomfortable. That is, it's a modification to help exorcise the specter of the Cartesian theater that indirect realism often finds haunting it.

In any event, might Aristotle or Aquinas not hew closer to the modern cognitive sciences, given the dominance of computational theories of mind and information theory? In Aristotle's telling, it is the form of objects that is communicated to us, e.g. the patterns in light waves corresponding to the image a tree (Aquinas' conception of "intentions in the media," is probably the better analogy here). This synchs up pretty well with information theoretic explanations of communications and data processing re sensory systems.

These explanations might also be worked into an indirect realist account, but in their original form I don't think they'd fall under that definition. For Aristotle, we experience the form of the objects experienced, the matter is not communicated, but it is precisely the form that makes an object what it is. It is the intelligibility of the object, whereas the matter is grounding potential. Re essence, form trumps matter, and experiencing objects' intelligibility, even if incompletely, is to experience the object.

But I suppose the bigger difference would be in framing: "we experience representations" versus "representation of communicated form is how things are experienced." I am not sure how much help the empirical sciences will be in resolving this distinction. Likewise, phenominalism or subjective idealism, while certainly not being popular with practicing scientists (or more generally) seem like they could still be formulated such that they are empirically identical with realism or indirect realism.

... it's the part on teleological judgment i still get lost in ... — Moliere

I can't be of much help, but can suggest a possible way forward.

Sections V through VIII of Kant's introduction are entitled:

V. The Principle of the Formal Purposiveness of Nature Is a Transcendental Principle of Judgment
VI. On the Connection of the Feeling of Pleasure with the Concept of the Purposiveness of Nature
VII. On the Aesthetic Presentation of the Purposiveness of Nature

This is not an account of an object, nature, by a subject, Kant. The principle of the purposiveness of nature is a transcendental principle.

↪javra

The indirect realism* which the empirical sciences confirm—

Do they? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here's why I so far uphold the statement which you've quoted (any and all metaphysical implications of such perspective being to me irrelevant to the science involved):

Humans are known to be highly visual animals, so I’ll address our awareness of objects via sight. Birds, bees, and other lesser animals are know by science to visually perceive the world in drastically different ways relative to the average human. We see a flower as uniform yellow. A bee will see it as having different shades and shapes of ultraviolet. What the bee sees is no more (in)correct or (in)accurate than what we see. Yet the two species will see different things, that nevertheless yet hold the same spatiotemporal properties.

The spatiotemporal properties of objects, of the world in general (as difficult as this subject matter is), will nevertheless be commonly apprehended by all animate, hence sentient, beings—from bacteria to humans—which in any way causally interact. All else which is apprehended of objects and the world is indicated by scientific findings to be relative to, by in large, the species of sentient being concerned.

It should be noted that whatever we perceptually know of ultraviolet and infrared is, for us, yet perceived via neither (we view technologically interpreted ultraviolet and infrared only via what is relative to the human species visible light; we however have no clue of what a bee or snake experiences … other than that whatever they experience holds the same spatiotemporal properties as what we experience).

We infer there being gravitational fields, but we do not perceive them via magnetoception as objects of awareness in the world. We infer there being electric fields, but we do not perceive them via electroreception as being objects of awareness in the world. The list is by my account expansive.

Here’s an overview of non-human senses currently known to science. And I deem it very presumptuous to uphold that we have via science now discovered all the physiological senses that can possibly occur.

In short, science confirms what whatever that objective object we term a yellow flower is, it is neither in fact of a strictly uniform hew that is thereby devoid of patterns within petals nor are its petals it in fact of a complex pattern of hew. The flower is not perceptually both at the same time and in the same respect (although it is both at the same time in terms of its spatiotemporal properties which allows for both human-relative visible light and ultraviolet light to reflected from it). It is of uniform hew to one species of life and comprised of patterns of hew to another. This, again, because what the flower is as objective (fully impartial) object in the world will be interpreted differently by the different physiological senses of different species of life.

As to objects being mediated via concepts, consider the following scenario: one sees all the colors, shapes, angles, and lines which would otherwise constitute a house but, maybe because one hold’s no conception of what a house is, one then nevertheless does not see a house. Then there is the scientifically known disorder of agnosia, wherein—as in the example just provided—one sees all the specific concrete attributes of an object without being able to recognize the object. Taken together, these two examples serve to illustrate how the objects we all (typically) recognize in the world are all mediated via concepts—and science does evidence that perception via physiological senses can well occur in the absence of object recognition.

So that yellow flower that is actually out there in the world as a yellow flower would in fact not be were it not for the mind-dependent concept(s) of “yellow flower”.

Although all of this is a summery of sorts, I do take it to evidence that our scientific knowledge confirms that, for one example, the yellow flower which all of us humans can effortlessly agree occurs out there in the world independently of our senses and concepts is, in fact, fully contingent on our senses and concepts—this in all, or at least nearly all, respects other than its spatiotemporal properties (neither of which are phenomena in Kantian terms). To some other species of life, the very same spatiotemporal object which can be apprehended by all coexistent sentience will then be neither yellow nor a flower.

And this outlook I've just addressed which is confirmed by our current scientific knowledge I further take to be a variant of indirect, rather than direct, realism.

I'm of course open to being corrected, though.

I like it.

A tentative comment i'd make, at risk of upsetting some of the more stringently critical here, is that its entirely possible we in fact do have an electrical sense of some kind, and that this would support the view you outline.

People "intuiting" that they are immediately to receive a phone call or text message on their cell phone may be understood by the body 'receiving' the signal ahead of the device (for some, as-yet unknown reason), and subsequently giving a certain sensation(not-yet-articulable) that tells the brain to act as if that is about to occur. I have nothing but anecdote to support this (though, seems widespread - not mine alone) and some Sheldrake work (lol) so, ignore if appropriate. But i find it very interesting, and think it would expand Kantian terms interestingly.

↪javra
I like it. — AmadeusD

Cool. :smile:

A tentative comment i'd make, at risk of upsetting some of the more stringently critical here, is that its entirely possible we in fact do have an electrical sense of some kind, — AmadeusD

I can respect the hypothesis. Since it concerns a possible human physiological sense, it is then open in principle to scientific investigation via which validation or falsification could be obtained.

But, for the record, this is often not as easily done as it is said. Take the possibility of human pheromones for example. At least some scientific experiments seem to indicate that humans might have such a physiological sense (below is provided one example of such (1) and a general history or the research (2) which also addresses the complications involved with it). But, if we do in fact have this sense in any capacity, it would obviously be largely, if not entirely, subliminal—this in contrast to how it appears to be in many a lesser animal (e.g., their Flehmen response, which by all accounts appears to be a consciously enacted behavior aimed at a greater pheromone perception).

Still, there so far are a number of problems with such studies on human pheromone perception; (3) provides a succinct abstract of them. So, to date, neither are human pheromones confirmed by science nor are they falsified by science. This despite the scientific investigation that has gone into the matter.

----------

1) Pheromones and their effect on women’s mood and sexuality

2) Chapter 19: Human Pheromones - Do They Exist?

3) Reproducible research into human chemical communication by cues and pheromones: learning from psychology's renaissance

-----------

It's one subject of interest to me that in some ways relates to your post, so I thought I'd share.

I think the upshot is that I was wrong to respond to Hanover by saying that according to Kant, the human understanding, like human perception, is not the only one possible: human understanding is the only knowledge-generating mechanism possible (although it might not be only human; rational extra-terrestrials could have the same understanding), but it could apply to different kinds of perception.

The picture we're left with is something like this: whatever kind of subjective perspective rational creatures might have on things, their understanding allows them to achieve the same knowledge of those things, which are thereby the very same things, even though they are "for us". — Jamal

This is the way out of subjectivity, but I don't know that it works. If you claim there are all sorts of ways to perceive that are ideosyncratic to the organism, but all these variations are rectified by the human mind's ability to assimilate and assess the information received, then you are eliminating the subjectivity with this divine power we have. That is, we all understand that the dog we see is a mere shadow of a dog, but since we can transcend that simple experience (and, as you say, think about our thinking about the phenomenal state of the dog) and realize its limitations and thereby understand the dog in a real way, we are no longer in a state of subjective knowledge.

If our perceptions are ideosyncratic to our human composition and do not necessarily provide consistent representations of the noumena, as in a bat might see things differently from us, but we clear up the evil genius' deceptions with the clarity of our reasoning, then we're neither deceived about reality nor are our subjective limitations ultimately limiting.

This seems fraught with the problem that sometimes my reasoning does in fact prove invalid and that it does in fact vary from other people's. This is the same reason I don't accept that human perception is an exact representation of the noumena. If we just want to posit accuracy in final understanding of an object, why the whole rigamarole distinguishing between reasoning and perception and why not just say WYSIWYG, what you see is what you get, and our perceptions are somehow magically and divinely true facsimiles of reality?

Although all of this is a summery of sorts, I do take it to evidence that our scientific knowledge confirms that, for one example, the yellow flower which all of us humans can effortlessly agree occurs out there in the world independently of our senses and concepts is, in fact, fully contingent on our senses and concepts—this in all, or at least nearly all, respects other than its spatiotemporal properties (neither of which are phenomena in Kantian terms). To some other species of life, the very same spatiotemporal object which can be apprehended by all coexistent sentience will then be neither yellow nor a flower. — javra

Science doesn't confirm that there's a flower independent of our senses and concepts. It starts with that assumption.

Spaciotemporal properties are aspects of the phenomena for Kant, or aspects of what we intuit. You're thinking of Locke when you say those properties are independent of us. Kant showed that whatever those properties are, we somehow know about them a priori. We don't learn about them.

You can take the above and create a picture of humans projecting a framework of space and time for the things they encounter, but I think this is going a step further than the insights actually warrant. All we can really take confidently from Kant is that we aren't blank slates.

I don't disagree with anything you wrote. However, contemporary versions of direct realism, intentionality theories, and phenomenological theories all explain the same phenomena. Each of these have their own problems, but it doesn't seem readily apparent that some have significantly worse problems than others. The result is that I would tend to say that "indirect realism can be made consistent with the empirical sciences," rather than "the empirical sciences confirm indirect realism," which would seem to imply that we can eliminate competing theories based on the empirical sciences.

Obviously, not all formulations of indirect realism are consistent with the empirical sciences. Older versions tend to work on the assumption of substance dualism, fall into Ryle's regress, and involve Cartesian humonculi or Cartesian theaters. The formulations of indirect realism that are consistent with the sciences are just those that have been tweaked and edited until they conform to the empirical sciences, which is the same thing that can be said for direct realism and other theories.

Unfortunately, a great deal of the literature on the objects of perception spends its time attacking the strawman of "naive realism." Yet showing that this naive realism cannot be the case doesn't really show that one's favored theory is more plausible than any other contemporary competing theory. Plus, it's unclear if such "naive realism," was ever embraced. The pre-Socratics already have formulations akin to indirect realism, direct realism, and phenominalism in key respects, so the "naive" position seems to be more a phantasm than something that must be torn down.

It still seems to me that significant critiques can be leveled at indirect realism as well. There are the adverbial critiques. There are the accusations of falling into a form of (crypto)-substance dualism with "mental representations" acting as ontological entities and "agents," only being able to view mental representations.

Here are the big problems:

Concepts - The notion of a "concept" is notoriously muddy. It not obvious that my conceptual understanding of a concept like "Hegelian dialectical," or "Marxism," is the same sort of thing as the way in which my visual cortex organizes sensory input into the experience of "seeing a flower." The first exists (only?) in recursive self-awareness and can be articulated to other people via words. The second seems impossible to even get into recursive self-awareness, let alone communicate. Neuroscience cannot proceed by my describing how it is I use these unconscious processes to turn visual input into the image of a flower, nor can I communicate how I achieve it. I am unaware of these "concepts." Further, the second sort of concept seems "necessary," for the cognitive acts that give rise to the first. I cannot come up with an articulation of what flowers are if my sensory system cannot distinguish them. Lower animals certainly have the second type of concept, but it seems doubtful they have the first.

Indeed, I am only really aware that I am using the second type of concepts when I begin to suffer from agnosia or have a stroke, etc. And even then, the experiences that people who suffer from these ailments describe is one of absence, they are not able to diagnose themselves. Whereas if I forget what "Hegelian dialectical," is, I am aware of this inability to recall or the fuzzyness of the concept. Nor does it seem like I have a "concept" of every particular shade of green, yellow, and brown I see when I look at my lawn in the same way that I have a concept of "the United States." So, to the extent that some forms of indirect realism make their claims about anthropology and perception by conflating these two notions of the word "concept," they seem to be open to attack. And note that the brain areas that appear to be involved in both notions of the term "concept," appear to be quite different as well.

Phenomenological Inseparability - This leads into another problem, that of the defining feature of indirect realism, the claim that "we experience mental representations." The problem here is well summarized in the Routledge Contemporary Introduction to Phenomenology, which comes up with a comical list of excerpts of philosophers and scientists trying to describe phenomenal awareness without reference to the things being experienced. These invariably degenerate into just describing the things being experienced, "the taste of coffee," or "the red of a balloon floating in my room," or else become unintelligible nonsense like "I am perceiving hotly," and "I am smelling bitterly."

The point intentionalists (and some direct realists) make here is that there seems to be absolutely no daylight between the perception and the objects perceived. We seem perfectly able to communicate our experiences to one another in some ways, but it becomes impossible to do so if we focus on the perception side of "perceiving representations," by themselves. It leads to incoherence. And, so they argue, this shows that there is no distinct ontological entity that might be called a "mental representation," that is experienced by a "perceiver who perceives them." Nor is there really good empirical reasons to divorce the two. Where does neuroscience say representation occurs versus the perception of representation? It doesn't say anything about this. It has yet to articulate how this works, but tends to conclude there is no Cartesian theater and that perception and representation are at least not distinct at the level of neuroanatomy (fine grained analysis is indeterminate on this issue).

(This seems like a good argument in favor of intentionalists)

Superveniance Relations - Finally, we can consider direct realists' objection, which I think might be the best one. This relies on notions in superveniance. Superveniance cannot just be defined as "no difference in A (mental phenomena) without a difference in B (physical phenomena)." This turns out to be a wholly inadequate way to frame superveniance.

Such a definition allows, in global superveniance, that a world where Mars has one more molecule of dust can have completely different mental properties from the world without the extra molecule of dust. There is a physical difference between the worlds, so there can be as much mental difference as we like. The same is true for local superveniance. If Sally 2 has one more magnesium atom in her body than Sally 1, she can now have totally different mental properties (we can place the atom in the brain and the same problem remains)

People have tried to fix this with the idea of P-regions and B-minimal properties. P-regions are just those regions of space time that are absolutely essential to the mental phenomena being considered. B-minimal properties are just those physical properties needed to ensure the mental phenomena in question.

If might be thought that these concepts wouldn't cause problems for indirect realism. After all, for any freeze frame microsecond of perception, we can assume that the relevant P Region is entirely in the brain. Does this not support the assertion that perception must just be "of" things in the brain, representations?

The problem comes when you want to analyze any perception that actually takes a meaningful amount of time. All of the sudden, things outside the body become part of the P Region. If we would not have seen the apple but for the apple being on the table, then the apple, or at least part of it or something with similar B-minimal properties, is required to explain the mental state.

So now the direct realist (along with all the externalists) will say: "hey, the superveniance relationship for perception has to involve the object, it is a necessary physical constituent of perception." Which, while not proving their point, still seems to make it more plausible. If the B-minimal properties of the object perceived cannot be changed one iota without changing the mental experience, then it seems like there is a very "direct" connection between the object and the perception. There is, in this case, no change in the mental representation without a change in the B-minimal properties of the object, and it seems that the "directness" of this relationship is exactly the sort of thing the direct realist is talking about.

Recall, Aristotle (and Aquinas) don't have us perceiving the entire form of an object. Nor do they have us perceiving the form "as it is in itself." This would require our heads turning into apples or something when we see an apple. Rather, a part of the substantial form is directly communicated to sensation. And here, the B-minimal properties of the object that precisely specify the part of subjective experience corresponding to that object, seems like a very good candidate for the parts of the object's "form/intelligibility" that are directly communicated. This relation is direct in that there can be no change in A without a change in B, and because B is B-minimal, no change in B without a change in A. This is a one to one relationship between part of sensation and an external object — what Aristotle wants to communicate even though he is certainly no naive realist. A lot of Catholic philosophers work with this sort of realism, and have enhanced it with semiotic explanations but unfortunately they reside in a bit of a bubble.

(Note, I would think this was a KILLER argument for direct realism BUT for the fact that P Regions and B-minimal properties actually seem to destroy superveniance by making what is considered a relevant physical element dependant on the qualities of mental experience - but that's a whole different thread lol)

Of course, there are similar problems with the other theories. I just wanted to illustrate that theories all have significant problems AND can be made consistent enough with empirical evidence that none of particularly "confirmed" above others

There is a chasm between us and I don't know how to bridge it, but if I work out a way I'll get back to you.

If you look at the part of my post above under the heading "Supervenience Relations," perhaps that might be helpful in elucidating such a "bridge." It shows how a "direct relationship," i.e. one to one correspondence, might be said to exist between objects and elements of our perception of them.

Contemporary formulations of direct realism do not argue that we see things "as they are." Indeed, pace mentions of "naive realism," I would maintain that even neolithic farmers must have had some sort of understanding of how it is that they could look at something that seems solid, pick it up, and discover that it was hollow. No theory of perception would seem to entail that when we experience an object we experience all of its properties.

Nor does it seem like any theory actually posits that experiences of objects are equivalent with objects. What distinguishes the direct realist's claims is simply the claim that some elements of perception have a direct correspondence to the objects perceived such that variance in one cannot exist without variance in the other. This does not entail that we necessarily know which elements of perception correspond to which elements of the world. This is clearly something that must be discovered.

But the upshot of such a correspondence is that we do not need to rely solely on "divine reason," to have access to external objects, as their intelligibility directly corresponds to elements of experience. This is in part the difference between saying that "we experience ideas of objects," and that we "experience objects using ideas." It is saying that the sign in the semiotic object/sign/interpretant relation is a bridge between objects and interpretant, not a barrier, because there is something, namely the intelligibility/form corresponding to the Kim's B-minimal superveniance properties, that comes to be in/a part of the object, sign, and interpretant during the transmission process.

and do not necessarily provide consistent representations of the noumena, as in a bat might see things differently from us, but we clear up the evil genius' deceptions with the clarity of our reasoning, then we're neither deceived about reality nor are our subjective limitations ultimately limiting.

What constitutes a "consistent representation of the noumenal?" If it needs to be that all entities experience objects in the same way at all times, then yes, we seem to have a problem. If consistent "representation," (I would use the term "experience" here) merely requires that some elements of experience are consistently in a one to one correspondence relationship with the object being perceived, then I do not see a problem. That bats and humans might experience a rock differently does not entail that no part of their experience might be tied to the properties of the rock in a direct manner.

We might still have a problem if our ability to access these intelligibilities is extremely constrained or varies completely from individual to individual. For example, if the elements of experience produced in one person's looking at a rock that conform to properties of that rock are "entirely different," from that of another person who looks at the same rock from the same vantage. But I'd argue that we have no grounds for claiming this is the case, that each instance of human experience is completely sui generis in how it corresponds to objects either moment to moment or between different people.


Consistency does not require absolute consistency or one to one correspondence, it merely requires an intelligible pattern.


Edit: a way of summarizing this might be that we experience B-minimal properties located in external objects in a direct way, and that this represents the Thomistic intelligibility of the object. This does not entail that all experience of an object corresponds to B-minimal properties located in that object. The relevant B-minimal properties of the physical system resulting in an experience will reside in the brain as well. This, for any experience of an object, only elements of that experience will correspond to B-minimal properties located in the object itself.

Of course, you can keep everything in the brain, but only if you chop experience up into picosecond blocks. Any experience extending over seconds will start to require an accounting parts of the world outside the body. But of course, we experience "over time."

That bats and humans might experience a rock differently does not entail that no part of their experience might be tied to the properties of the rock in a direct manner. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Kant isn't a simple indirect realist where there's some supervenience relation between the noumenon and the phenomenon. What's revolutionary in his insights is that the whole spaciotemporal framework is a priori.

Right, but my point is that multiple entities experiences don't need to be identical or even particularly similar to share a direct relationship with the objects being perceived.

As to the second part, I think advances in developmental biology seriously call into question prior understandings of the nature of essences and "a priori," capabilities.

A human body thrown into a vacuum produces no consciousness. An embryo only develops into a human being under an extremely precise and shockingly rare range of environmental conditions. Tweak an animal embryo's gestational enviornment and the same genes will produce nothing but liver tissue, nothing but heart tissue, etc. This is where I think a process philosophy understanding is helpful. The notion of a priori capabilities seems wed to concepts of discrete "things" existing to possess such capabilities. But if we have strong evidence to suggest the world is the result of one universal process, then we have a reason to doubt these metaphysical assumptions.

A human being cut off from all sensory inputs doesn't develop a sense of space because they will be dead. What is physically required to stop an embryo from receiving any sensory input is also going to kill it, and even just drastically reducing sensory input (but by no means eliminating it) leads to death or severe mental retardation after birth. The divorcing of elements of the human person from their enviornment just seems wrong to me. We can speak of commonalities in cetaris parabus scenarios, for sure, and this might even give us a modified conception of "essence," but it won't lead to any thought that exists without reference to the environment.

So, Kant's analysis might very well be relevant to some "essential nature," of human experience, provided we narrowly defined what constitutes the actualization of such an essence. However, it can't be prior to sensory perception. If anything, developmental biology would suggest that such regularities only come to exist provided a narrow range of environmental inputs. Sensory system inputs play a crucial role in the developing body long before we would think a fetus might be concious. I'd imagine that blocking all inputs from these organs through some physical means would almost certainly kill the developing human.

Spaciotemporal properties are aspects of the phenomena for Kant, or aspects of what we intuit. — frank

This is very unclear to me.

What I expressed in relation to Kant's take on space and time is simply that neither space nor time are of themselves phenomena for Kant. They are instead for him "pure (rather than empirical) intuitions". Here's an excerpt from IEP:

The most basic type of representation of sensibility is what Kant calls an “intuition.” An intuition is a representation that refers directly to a singular individual object. There are two types of intuitions. Pure intuitions are a priori representations of space and time themselves (see 2d1 below). Empirical intuitions are a posteriori representations that refer to specific empirical objects in the world. In addition to possessing a spatiotemporal “form,” empirical intuitions also involve sensation, which Kant calls the “matter” of intuition (and of experience generally). (Without sensations, the mind could never have thoughts about real things, only possible ones.) We have empirical intuitions both of objects in the physical world (“outer intuitions”) and objects in our own minds (“inner intuitions”). — https://iep.utm.edu/kantview/#SH2c

Phenomena for Kant are appearances - which I so far take to always be in one way or another empirical. And, hence, I so far take it that for Kant space and time - both being a priori representations that are then in no way empirical - are not phenomenal in and of themselves.

Which is not to then say that either pure or empirical intuitions are not representations for Kant.

If you find this interpretation mistaken, can you please back up your disagreement with references.

I don't disagree with anything you wrote. However, contemporary versions of direct realism, intentionality theories, and phenomenological theories all explain the same phenomena. Each of these have their own problems, but it doesn't seem readily apparent that some have significantly worse problems than others. The result is that I would tend to say that "indirect realism can be made consistent with the empirical sciences," rather than "the empirical sciences confirm indirect realism," which would seem to imply that we can eliminate competing theories based on the empirical sciences. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This seems to me to hinge one what one means by "direct" and "indirect" realism, and I acknowledge that opinions can vary greatly. It's a bit lengthy, but here is an excerpt from SEP on the matter:

2.3.3 Direct Realism

Proponents of intentionalist and adverbialist theories have often thought of themselves as defending a kind of direct realism; Reid (1785), for example, clearly thinks his proto-adverbialist view is a direct realist view. And perceptual experience is surely less indirect on an intentionalist or adverbialist theory than on the typical sense-datum theory, at least in the sense of perceptual directness. Nevertheless, intentionalist and adverbialist theories render the perception of worldly objects indirect in at least two important ways: (a) it is mediated by an inner state, in the sense that one is in perceptual contact with an outer object of perception only (though not entirely) in virtue of being in that inner state; and (b) that inner state is one that we could be in even in cases of radical perceptual error (e.g., dreams, demonic deception, etc.). These theories might thus be viewed as only “quasi-direct” realist theories; experiences still screen off the external world in the sense that the experience might still be the same, whether the agent is in the good case or the bad case. Quasi-direct theories thus reject the Indirectness Principle only under some readings of “directness”. A fully direct realism would offer an unequivocal rejection of the Indirectness Principle by denying that we are in the same mental states in the good and the bad cases. In recent years, direct realists have wanted the perceptual relation to be entirely unmediated: we don’t achieve perceptual contact with objects in virtue of having perceptual experiences; the experience just is the perceptual contact with the object (Brewer 2011).This is the view that perceptual experience is constituted by the subject’s standing in certain relations to external objects, where this relation is not mediated by or analyzable in terms of further, inner states of the agent. Thus, the brain in the vat could not have the same experiences as a normal veridical perceiver, because experience is itself already world-involving. — https://plato.stanford.edu/Entries/perception-episprob/#DireReal

I then take the highlighted portion of this text to imply that the yellow flower's uniformity of hew as seen by humans is (for emphasis) the one true reality of the object - this such that a bee's experience of the flower as having a pattern of different hews is then incorrect / bad / illusory ... if not also somehow hallucinatory.

If what I experience is a direct access (one that is hence "not mediated by or analyzable in terms of further, inner states of the agent") to reality as it truly, objectively is, then the just mentioned conclusion so far seems to me entailed. If so, this then contradicts our scientific knowledge of reality/the world.

In which way would you find the just expressed to be inaccurate?

Lower animals certainly have the second type of concept, but it seems doubtful they have the first. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There's plenty of scientific evidence that some of them do. As one example I quickly found online:
Can Dogs Learn Concepts the Same Way We Do? Concept Formation in a German Shepherd

This not to even start discussing studies on the great apes.

I just wanted to illustrate that theories all have significant problems AND can be made consistent enough with empirical evidence that none of particularly "confirmed" above others — Count Timothy von Icarus

My use of the term "confirmed" was likely inappropriate. I meant in the sense of "strengthened" rather than of of "having an assured accuracy". That mentioned, contingent on the issue of what "direct realism" entails, as previously expressed, our scientific knowledge does contradict our human perceptions being the be-all and end-all to what the objective world consists of (edit: to be clear, this perceptually). In this sense, I then yet find our scientific knowledge to evidence, hence support, the view that direct realism as just described in this post is erroneous. Be it "quasi-" or otherwise, this then results in science supporting an indirect realism.

But maybe I've got my definitions wrong.

I then take the highlighted portion of this text to imply that the yellow flower's uniformity of hew as seen by humans is (for emphasis) the one true reality of the object - this such that a bee's experience of the flower as having a pattern of different hews is then incorrect / bad / illusory ... if not also somehow hallucinatory.

I would agree that this would be a very difficult problem if this is what is being implied in the bolded text, but I don't see how that is the case. It would be bizarre for a professional philosopher to advance such a claim, given how much of our daily experience and work in the empirical sciences would appear to falsify it.

The point the text mentions seems to be that perceptions are not decomposable. They exist as relations between the perceiver and perceived. They cannot be further decomposed without losing something. This does not entail that we cannot refer to the eye or visual cortex in giving an account of vision, it just means that we cannot build up an accurate account of perception with just a combination of these parts. In this way, it might be appropriate to think of experiences as "strongly emergent," although that term has difficulties as well, and it doesn't totally fit here because what is being said does not preclude a reductionist account of perception, but rather a reductionist account of perception that excludes the objects being perceived.

The part above about how adverbial and intentional theories are actually just indirect realism seems to simply read these theories through and indirect realist lens and in so doing beg the question.

This seems to fall into the trap of thinking "direct realism," = "naive realism."

There's plenty of scientific evidence that some of them do.

Perhaps I should have been more precise. It seems unlikely that all animals that experience sense perception would have concepts of the first sort. The one can exist without the other. Flies perceive, but I don't think they have "concepts" in the way we have a concept of "communism," etc. But if the two notions of the term can exist separately from one another, differ dramatically in traits and how they are experienced, and seem to require quite different neurological explanations, then I still think there is a risk when conflating them. This of course, only effects some theories, and some of their claims at any rate.

My use of the term "confirmed" was likely inappropriate. I meant in the sense of "strengthened" rather than of of "having an assured accuracy". That mentioned, contingent on the issue of what "direct realism" entails, as previously expressed, our scientific knowledge does contradict our human perceptions being the be-all and end-all to what the objective world consists of. In this sense, I then yet find our scientific knowledge to evidence, hence support, the view that direct realism as just described in this post is erroneous. Be it "quasi-" or otherwise, this then results in science supporting an indirect realism.

That makes sense. But like I said, the literature on this topic tends to make a bad habit of taking evidence that "naive realism is wrong," as providing strong support for "my particular theory is right." This is done by direct realists too. "Look, naive realism is nonsense, so my account is preferable." IMO, the comparison case for all these theories should be the best/most popular theories in other camps, not naive realism, which is more a strawman than a real position.

IMO, the comparison case for all these theories should be the best/most popular theories in other camps, not naive realism, which is more a strawman than a real position. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I can get that, but then can you clarify what you make out of this statement - or else whether you find it erroneous - with emphasis on the highlighted portion:

In recent years, direct realists have wanted the perceptual relation to be entirely unmediated: we don’t achieve perceptual contact with objects in virtue of having perceptual experiences; the experience just is the perceptual contact with the object (Brewer 2011).This is the view that perceptual experience is constituted by the subject’s standing in certain relations to external objects, where this relation is not mediated by or analyzable in terms of further, inner states of the agent. — https://plato.stanford.edu/Entries/perception-episprob/#DireReal

I so far interpret it as expressing that our perceptions are in no way mediated by or else analyzable in terms of the agent's specific (even if this is only a perfect representation of the its species-specific) relations of "physiological senses - CNS capacities - resulting states of awareness" - these relations of themselves constituting the "inner states of the agent". I'll try to decompress this if needed, but I'm currently hoping it will make general sense to you as is. At any rate, how do you interpret the quoted statement?

Thanks for that - really interesting delve into pheromonal theory there. All new for me to chew on, and as you note, relates pretty squarely with my proposed hypothesis.

Glad to hear. :up:

I haven't read Brewer's paper so I cannot speak to it. If that's how the phrase is intended, then it seems like a silly position to advance, and I would not agree with a sentence that seems to claim that this position is held by "direct realists," generally.

However, I would take "unmediated" to refer to only "the relation that exists between perception and perceived object," not between say light waves and neurons firing in the optical nerve. That is, the relationship is not decomposable, it is a property of the whole that cannot be built up from the parts.